Bildner v. Illusorio

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 223358. September 14, 2021.]

MA. ERLINDA ILUSORIO BILDNER, MAXIMO K. ILUSORIO, AND SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs.RAMON K. ILUSORIO, MULTINATIONAL INVESTMENT BANCORPORATION (MIB), MANUEL C. BAHENA, JR. AND P.I. REALTY ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 14, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 223358 (Ma. Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner, Maximo K. Ilusorio, and Sylvia K. Ilusorio v. Ramon K. Ilusorio, Multinational Investment Bancorporation (MIB), Manuel C. Bahena, Jr. and P.I. Realty Enterprises, Inc.)

The Case

This appeal assails the following dispositions of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. CV-98192 entitled Ma. Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner, Maximo K. Ilusorio, and Sylvia K. Ilusorio v. Ramon K. Ilusorio, Multinational Investment Bancorporation (MIB), Manuel C. Bahena, Jr. and P.I. Realty Enterprises, Inc.: HTcADC

1) Decision1 dated June 9, 2015 affirming the trial court's dismissal of Civil Case No. 00-97287 on ground of res judicata; and

2) Resolution2 dated February 11, 2016 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Antecedents

Civil Case No. 00-97287:

In Civil Case No. 00-97287, 3 filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Branch 19, Manila on May 5, 2000, the late Potenciano T. Ilusorio, together with petitioners Ma. Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner, Maximo K. Ilusorio, and Sylvia K. Ilusorio sued Erlinda K. Ilusorio, along with respondents Ramon K. Ilusorio, Multinational Investment Bancorporation (MIB), Manuel C. Bahena, Jr. and P.I. Realty Enterprises, Inc. (PIREI) for specific performance and damages. They essentially alleged:

Potenciano and Erlinda were husband and wife. 4 On May 5, 1969, Erlinda put up PIREI 5 to engage in a real estate management business. PIREI had an authorized capital stock of 100,000 shares at one peso (P1.00) par value, of which 20,000 shares had been subscribed. In his desire to help his wife Erlinda, Potenciano provided P5,000.00 for PIREI's paid up capital. 6

Prior thereto, Potenciano secured loans of P1,500,000.00 an P1,200,000.00 to purchase a 4,500-square meter property in Pasong Tamo, Makati City and construct an office building and warehouse thereon. Though he paid for the purchase of the land and constructions, he registered the property under Erlinda K. Ilusorio married to Potenciano T. Ilusorio via Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-54037. 7

With Potenciano's consent, Erlinda executed a Deed of Assignment dated June 15, 1977 conveying the Pasong Tamo property to PIREI in consideration of PIREI's assumption of Potenciano's loan with the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA). Yet it was still Potenciano who paid for the loan. Meanwhile, on July 9, 1981, PIREI registered the property in its name under TCT No. 132678. 8

Subsequently, Potenciano executed a Sworn Declaration dated December 1, 1986, thus:

SWORN DECLARATION

1. That, I am the absolute owner of the Pasong Tamo property with land area of 4,500 sq. meters which I purchased in the 1960's although the same was registered and titled under "Erlinda K. Ilusorio married to Potenciano Ilusorio" and covered by TCT No. S-54037 issued by the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal;

2. That, the office building and warehouse constructed on said property in the late 1960's was likewise paid for and financed by me;

3. That, by virtue of a Deed of Assignment signed by Erlinda K. Ilusorio and executed with my marital consent on June 15, 1977, said Pasong Tamo property was transferred in the name of P.I. (Potenciano Ilusorio) Real Estate Management Corporation in consideration of the assumption of mortgage in favor of IBAA. However, no actual payment was made by the Assignee Corporation, [PIREI], in favor of IBAA, as it was still myself who actually paid said loan mortgage with IBAA. On July 9, 1984, TCT No. 132678 was nevertheless issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati in the name of the Assignee Corporation;

4. That, by virtue of another Deed of Conveyance signed by Erlinda K. Ilusorio with my marital consent on February 18, 1985, the building and warehouse improvements existing in TCT No. 132678 was also transferred in the name of [PIREI], for a consideration of P3,000,000.00 in exchange for the share subscriptions in the increase of the authorized capital stock of [PIREI];

5. That, the above conveyances were made in favor of [PIREI] only for the purpose of [PIREI] merely holding the title and ownership of the said property in Trust for me and my family, pursuant to my desire to plan for my estate. In view of the foregoing, I hereby agree that 50% of the shareholdings of [PIREI] shall remain in the name of Erlina K. Ilusorio,while the other 50% thereof shall be equally divided in favor of Ma. Erlinda K. Ilusorio, Maximo K. Ilusorio, Sylvia K. Ilusorio [herein petitioners], Marietta K. Ilusorio and Shereen K. Ilusorio;

6. That, any change or deviation from the above stated proportion in the ownership of corporation stockholdings of [PIREI] shall require my express written consent and signature in approval, particularly if the same shall result in Erlinda L. Ilusorio'sshareholding's diminution and/or enlargement.

In witness hereof, I have set my hand this 1st day of December 1986, at Manila. 9 [words in brackets and emphases added]

(sgd.)POTENCIANO ILUSORIO

The Sworn Declaration contained Erlinda's conformity, albeit the document was not notarized.

Verily, PIREI was only holding the Pasong Tamo property in trust for the Ilusorio family. More, Erlinda owned 50% of PIREI while the remaining 50% was owned in equal shares by Potenciano and Erlinda's five (5) children: petitioners Ma. Erlinda, Maximo and Sylvia together with their sisters Marietta and Shereen; the eldest son, respondent Ramon, was not included in the allotment of shares. Any act which would change this ratio would require Potenciano's prior written consent. 10

But in September 1996, Erlinda and defendant MIB, through insidious machinations and force, caused the five (5) Ilusorio children to endorse their respective shares in blank without receiving any form of compensation. 11 Specifically, Erlinda threatened to disown and disinherit them and to never see and talk to them ever again should they refuse to do so. They only acceded to Erlinda's request out of fear. Thereafter, Erlinda mortgaged the Pasong Tamo property, together with its improvements to MIB whose officers and members incidentally interlock with PIREI's. 12

Subsequently, on March 28, 1998, PIREI, through its Corporate Secretary Manuel C. Bahena, Jr. filed a General Information Sheet (GIS) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) indicating therein that Erlinda's shareholdings had increased to 99.9%. In other words, the shares in favor of Potenciano's children were transferred to her, in clear contravention of the 50-50 sharing scheme stipulated in the Sworn Declaration. The transfer, too, did not bear Potenciano's written consent. 13

In view of the foregoing breaches, Potenciano and petitioners sued Erlinda and respondents for specific performance and prayed that the trial court direct them to restore the 50% share of the Ilusorio children in PIREI worth P3,000,000.00. Alternatively, should reversion be no longer possible, respondents ought to execute the necessary documents conveying the Pasong Tamo property to Potenciano, free of all liens and encumbrances. Finally, they sought moral damages of P500,000.00, exemplary damages of P500,000.00, attorney's fees of P100,000.00, and litigation expenses of P50,000.00. 14 aScITE

For their part, Erlinda and respondents raised, inter alia, that Erlinda's signature on the Sworn Declaration was forged. 15 At any rate, the document was unnotarized and could not therefore bind respondents who were not privies thereto. 16

Meantime, Potenciano Ilusorio died on June 28, 2001. 17

Civil Case No. 05-114129:

In 2005, during the pendency of Civil Case No. 00-97287, petitioner Ma. Erlinda filed another case against her mother Erlinda, MIB, and PIREI, among others, for annulment of share, subscription, and damages. It was docketed Civil Case No. 05-114129 and entitled Erlinda I. Bildner v. Multinational Investment Bancorporation, Orioxy Investment Corporation, P.I. Realty Enterprises, Inc., Ramon K. Ilusorio, Ma. Lourdes C. Cristobal, Violeta J. Josef, Romeo Rodriguez, Joselito Manahan, Daniel C. Subido, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, and Cecilia Bisuña. It was raffled to the RTC-Branch 21, Manila.

In that case, Ma. Erlinda protested Orioxy Investment Corporation's (Orioxy) subscription of PIREI's shares in the amount of P4,000,000.00, claiming it would dilute the shares she and her siblings were allegedly entitled to and violate the stipulations in Potenciano's Sworn Declaration dated December 1, 1986. 18

Under Decision 19 dated June 29, 2007, RTC-Branch 21 dismissed the complaint, thus:

The plaintiff asseverates that the sale of the shares of stock by P.I. Realty Enterprises, Incorporated should be declared null and void inasmuch as it is the [unreadable] of a violation of the Sworn Declaration executed by her father, the late Atty. Potenciano Ilusorio.

Defendant Erlinda K. Ilusorio declared that her signature appearing in the Sworn Declaration was falsified. Moreover, defendants impugn the Sworn Declaration for not being notarized.

It is indisputable that the Sworn Declaration, which serves as basis for plaintiff's claim, not having been notarized, is a private document, obligatory between the contracting parties yet unenforceable against third parties. Hence, the private declarations between the spouses Potenciano Ilusorio and Erlinda K. Ilusorio cannot compel observance form the parties involved in this case.

Moreover, "Under the rules on evidence, documents are either public or private. Private documents are those that do not fall under any of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Section 20 of the same law, in turn, provides that before any private document is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.["] (Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation, G.R. No. 138084, April 10, 2002). In the present case, even granting arguendo that the Sworn Declaration is binding among the parties, this Court cannot assign any weight to it as there is a need for proof of its due execution and authenticity, especially in this case where the defendant assails the genuineness of defendant, Erlinda K. Ilusorio's signature.

xxx xxx xxx

Given thus the evidence presented by the plaintiff, this Court cannot be [unreadable] as to the preponderance of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, Erlinda I. Ilusorio.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby orders the DISMISSAL [of] the complaint against all defendants. The counterclaims of defendants are likewise DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 20

Ma. Erlinda moved for reconsideration which got denied on October 22, 2007.

On appeal via CA-G.R. CV No. 91087, the Court of Appeals affirmed under Decision 21 dated October 28, 2009. It similarly held that Ma. Erlinda failed to establish the authenticity of her mother Erlinda's signature in the Sworn Declaration. Against her testimony, the testimonies of her mother Erlinda and brother Ramon deserved greater weight, viz.:

It is worth nothing that it was on the strength of Atty. Ilusorio's supposed declaration, supra, that appellant instituted the instant case before the court a quo.

xxx xxx xxx

Basic is the rule that the due execution of a document must be reasonably established.

As borne out by the records, the signature of one of the parties in the sworn declaration, supra, was disputed by the Appellees, contending that Appellee Erlinda K. Ilusorio's signature therein is falsified. Necessarily, the Appellant was under obligation to reasonably establish, pursuant to Section 20 that such document including the signatures therein, was genuine. Notably, however, Appellant's testimony that she recognized the signatures of her mother and father on the said sworn declaration cannot sufficiently establish her stance in view of the opposing contention of Appellee RAMON, her brother and appellee ERLINDA, her mother and one of the signatories in the said declaration, alleging that Appellee ERLINDA's signature therein is forged. Verily, Appellant's testimony is only as good as that of her brother, Appellee RAMON, and that of her mother, Appellee ERLINDA. Clearly, even by preponderance of evidence, Appellant's evidence on the matter does not prosper.

xxx xxx xxx

Besides, it must be noted that under the rules on evidence, the party that alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.

xxx xxx xxx

Sadly, appellant failed in this respect.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, instant appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated 29 June 2007 and the Order dated 22 October 2007 of the court a quo are AFFIRMED intoto.

SO ORDERED. 22

The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration per Resolution dated December 18, 2009.

In G.R. No. 190602, the Court further affirmed with finality through Resolution dated March 8, 2010. 23

Ruling of the Trial Court

In view of the foregoing developments in Civil Case No. 05-114129, CA-G.R. CV No. 91087 and G.R. No. 190602, RTC-Branch 19 dismissed Civil Case No. 00-97287 under Decision 24 dated October 28, 2010 on ground of res judicata. It found that both cases were hinged on the Sworn Declaration of Potenciano, and based thereon, similarly sought the reversion of the PIREI shares to Ma. Erlinda and her co-plaintiffs and co-petitioners. As it was, RTC Branch 21, the Court of Appeals, and even this Court had already passed upon the legal efficacy of the aforesaid Sworn Declaration. 25 HEITAD

The trial court denied reconsideration on February 24, 2011. 26

Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals

On appeal via CA-G.R. No. CV-98192, petitioners faulted the trial court, first, in applying the concept of res judicata despite lack of identity of parties, subject matters, and causes of action between Civil Case No. 05-114129 for annulment of share, subscription and damages, on the one hand, and Civil Case No. 00-97287 for specific performance and damages, on the other; and, second, in failing to rule that Potenciano's Sworn Declaration was authentic, valid, and binding upon the parties. 27

The Rulings of the Court of Appeals

Through its assailed Decision 28 dated June 9, 2015, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dispositions of RTC-Branch 19 pertaining to resjudicata.

It held that absolute identity of parties is not required for resjudicata to come into play; substantial identity of parties is sufficient. 29 Too, the varying actions in Civil Case No. 05-114129 and Civil Case No. 00-97287 did not foreclose the application of res judicata. For the facts essential to sustain the causes of action in both cases were the same — both relied on the validity of Potenciano's Sworn Declaration, the binding effect of its contents, and the authenticity of Erlinda's signature thereon. 30 As for the legal efficacy of Potenciano's Sworn Declaration, this had already been conclusively settled in G.R. No. 190602. 31

The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration on February 11, 2016. 32

About a week later, on February 17, 2016, Erlinda passed away in New York at ninety-six (96) years of age.

The Present Petition

Petitioners now seek affirmative relief from the Court and pray for the reversal of the rulings below. They argue:

First, res judicata is inapplicable here given the difference between Civil Case No. 05-114129 and Civil Case No. 00-97287 in terms of parties, subject matters, causes of action and relief sought. 33

Second, petitioners Ma. Erlinda and Sylvia duly authenticated the Sworn Declaration of their father Potenciano, as well as the signatures appearing thereon during the trial. 34

Third, respondents clearly breached the trust reposed on them when they violated the provisions of the Sworn Declaration. Thus, they should be ordered to reconvey the Pasong Tamo property to the heirs of Potenciano, free from all liens and encumbrances, or effect the 50-50 ownership scheme. Respondents should also be made solidarily liable for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses. 35

For their part, 36 respondents riposte that the courts below correctly applied the doctrine of res judicata here. MIB adds that it should not be caught in the notorious Ilusorio family feud. For although respondent Ramon was among its founders, it was a mere innocent by-stander in the controversy. 37

Petitioners reiterate the arguments raised in the petition in their Reply. 38

Our Ruling

The petition must fail.

Res judicata bars a party from litigating the same issue more than once. It refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits. 39 The rule is embodied in Rule 39, Section 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, viz.:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

The provision comprehends two (2) concepts of res judicata: bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment. 40Degayo v.Magbanua-Dinglasan41 differentiated these two (2) concepts, thus:

The first aspect is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. In traditional terminology, this aspect is known as merger or bar; in modern terminology, it is called claim preclusion.

The second aspect precludes the relitigation of a particular fact of issue in another action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. This is traditionally known as collateral estoppel; in modern terminology, it is called issue preclusion.

Res judicata as a bar by prior judgment requires: (1) the prior decision must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and over parties; (3) there must be identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the two cases; and (4) it must be a judgment or order on the merits. 42 Meanwhile, conclusiveness of judgment requires the same circumstances, except identity of causes of action. 43

We find that these requirements are all present here.

To be sure, petitioners do not question the finality of the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 190602. There, the Court affirmed the rulings in CA-G.R. CV No. 91087 and Civil Case No. 05-114129 which dismissed Ma. Erlinda's complaint for annulment of share, subscription, and damages. Petitioners do not question the jurisdiction of the courts which rendered these adverse rulings either. As well, petitioners do not deny that said decisions constituted judgments on the merits.

Yet, petitioners claim that res judicata is inapplicable here in the absence of the third requirement: identity of parties, subject matters, and causes of action.

We disagree.

First. It must be stressed that res judicata does not require absolute identity of parties; shared identity of interest is sufficient to invoke the coverage of this principle. Thus, it is enough that there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second case even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case. 44 Otherwise, litigants could easily avoid the application of res judicata by conveniently including and excluding additional parties in the later suit. 45

Here, a tabulation of the parties involved reveals that there is substantial identity of parties between Civil Case No. 05-114129 and Civil Case No. 00-97287, thus:

 

	Civil Case No. 05-114129 (Annulment)	Civil Case No. 00-97287 (Specific Performance)
Plaintiff/s	• Ma. Erlinda I. Bildner	• Potenciano T. Ilusorio • Ma. Erlinda I. Bildner • Maximo K. Ilusorio • Sylvia K. Ilusorio
Defendants	• MultinationalInvestment Bancorporation • Orioxy Investment Corporation • PIREI • Ramon K. Ilusorio • Ma. Lourdes C.Cristobal • Violeta J. Josef • Romeo Rodriguez • Joselito Manahan • Daniel Subido • Erlinda K. Ilusorio • Cecilia Bisuña	• Ramon K. Ilusorio • Multinational Investment Bancorporation • Manuel C. Bahenda, Jr. • Erlinda K. Ilusorio • PIREI

 

Too, plaintiffs/petitioners and defendants/respondents in both cases have community of interests. Surely, Ma. Erlinda was not the only one who stood to benefit in the annulment suit she filed in Civil Case No. 05-114129. For had the courts recognized therein Ma. Erlinda's supposed right to 10% of PIREI, then we would be bound to similarly recognize the same 10% shares of herein petitioners which originated from the same source — Potenciano's Sworn Declaration dated December 1, 1986. ATICcS

In the same vein, a favorable ruling for respondents herein would have legitimized Orioxy's subsequent subscription of PIREI's shares of stock in Civil Case No. 05-114129. For this would have meant that petitioners did not have a share in PIREI which needed protection. Clearly, the interests of defendants/respondents in both cases also closely intertwined.

Second. The subject of an action is defined as the matter or thing with respect to which the controversy has arisen, concerning which a wrong has been done. 46 Certainly, both Civil Case No. 05-114129 and Civil Case No. 00-97287 involve the same subjectmatter — the ownership of PIREI. Petitioners are splitting hairs when they attempt to draw a distinction between the original shares of stock of PIREI and the additional shares of stock sought to be acquired by Orioxy. 47

Finally. There was also identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 05-114129 and Civil Case No. 00-97287.

In determining whether the causes of action between the prior and latter cases are identical, the test is whether they rely on thesame facts and evidence. If the same facts or evidence can sustain either action, the causes of action are considered identical and the judgment in one is a bar to the other. 48

Here, both Civil Case No. 05-114129 and Civil Case No. 00-97287 were hinged on petitioners' purported entitlement to 10% of the shares of stock in PIREI each in accordance with Potenciano's Sworn Declaration dated December 1, 1986. To recall, in Civil Case No. 05-114129, Ma. Erlinda protested Orioxy's acquisition of shares in PIREI as it would dilute the 10% share she allegedly owned. Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 00-97287, petitioners demand that the 50-50 ownership scheme in PIREI, as embodied in the same Sworn Declaration, be respected.

Verily, the common question in both cases is whether petitioners are entitled to a 10% share in PIREI each pursuant to Potenciano's Sworn Declaration dated December 1, 1986. Thus, there is identity of causes of action, plain and simple. That the causes of action in both cases were labelled differently is of no moment. For as the Court of Appeals aptly held, petitioners cannot escape the operation of res judicata by adopting a different mode of presenting the same case. 49

Indeed, the issue of petitioners' supposed ownership of shares in PIREI had already been resolved with finality in Civil Case No. 05-114129, as affirmed in CA-G.R. CV No. 91087 and G.R. No. 190602. In these cases, the RTC-Branch 21, Court of Appeals and this Court unanimously held that Ma. Erlinda's purported 10% ownership of PIREI had no legal basis as she failed to prove the genuineness and due execution of Potenciano's Sworn Declaration. Consequently, the courts are precluded from ruling otherwise in the present case. To abide by our Resolution in G.R. No. 190602, we, too, must declare here that Potenciano's Sworn Declaration does not entitle each of herein petitioners to a 10% ownership in PIREI.

At any rate, even assuming that there was no identity of causes of action, res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgement would still apply. Degayo further elucidated:

Conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and persons in privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while the judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition; the conclusively settled fact or question furthermore cannot again be litigated in any future or other action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action. Thus, only the identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.

While conclusiveness of judgment does not have the same barring effect as that of a bar by former judgment that proscribes subsequent actions, the former nonetheless estops the parties from raising in a later case the issues or points that were raised and controverted, and were determinative of the ruling in the earlier case. In other words, the dictum laid down in the earlier final judgment or order becomes conclusive and continues to be binding between the same parties, their privies and successors-in-interest, as long as the facts on which that judgment was predicated continue to be the facts of the case or incident before the court in a later case; the binding effect and enforceability of that earlier dictum can no longer be re-litigated in a later case since the issue has already been resolved and finally laid to rest in the earlier case. 50 (emphases and underscoring added)

Here, the common issue on the validity and binding effect of Potenciano's Sworn Declaration dated December 1, 1986 had also been settled in Civil Case No. 05-114129, CA-G.R. CV No. 91087 and G.R. No. 190602. In these cases, the courts gave credence to Erlinda's claim that her supposed signature on the Sworn Declaration was forged. Applying res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgement, therefore, this factual issue may no longer be relitigated here.

All told, the courts below did not err in dismissing petitioners' complaint for specific performance on ground of res judicata. Indeed, considering the finality of the dispositions in Civil Case No. 05-114129, CA-G.R. CV No. 91087 and G.R. No. 190602, we may now write finis to this unfortunate chapter in the Ilusorio family feud which has festered for more than two (2) decades in the docket of the Judiciary.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 9, 2015 and Resolution dated February 11, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-98192 are AFFIRMED. TIADCc

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodil V. Zalameda (now of the Supreme Court) and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela; rollo (Vol. I), p. 61.

2.Id. at 78.

3.Id. at 212.

4.Id. at 15.

5. Formerly P.I. Real Estate Management Corporation.

6.Rollo, (Vol. I), p. 213.

7.Id. at 214.

8.Id.

9.Id. at 147.

10.Id. at 215.

11.Id. at 215-216.

12.Id. at 216.

13.Id. at 216-218.

14.Id. at 219.

15.Id. at 226.

16.Id. at 231-232.

17.Id. at 223.

18.Rollo (Vol. II), p. 693.

19. Penned by Judge Amor A. Reyes; id.

20.Id. at 696.

21. Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose Catral Mendoza (now a retired Justice of the Supreme Court) and Marlene Gonzales-Sison; id. at 697.

22.Id. at 705-709.

23.Id. at 710.

24. Penned by Presiding Judge Carmelita S. Manahan; rollo (Vol. I), p. 292.

25.Id. at 316.

26.Id. at 357.

27.Id. at 64-65.

28. Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodil V. Zalameda (now of the Supreme Court) and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela; id. at 61.

29.Id. at 69-70.

30.Id. at 72-73.

31.Id. at 75-76.

32.Id. at 78.

33.Id. at 28-36.

34.Id. at 39-43.

35.Id. at 46-47.

36.Rollo (Vol. II), p. 484.

37.Id. at 519.

38.Id. at 900.

39.Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, 757 Phil. 376, 382 (2015).

40.Id. at 384.

41.Id. at 384-385.

42.Jebsens Maritime, Inc. v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 244098, March 3, 2021.

43.Monterona v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, G.R. No. 209116, January 14, 2019.

44.Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, supra note 39.

45.Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking Corporation, 441 Phil. 551, 566 (2002).

46.Taganas v. Emuslan, 457 Phil. 305, 313 (2003).

47.Rollo (Vol. I), p. 32.

48.Heirs of Payawal v. Court of Appeals, 551 Phil. 665, 677 (2007).

49.Rollo (Vol. I), p. 71.

50.Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan, supra note 39.