SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 207426. September 25, 2013.]
GIL BILAZON AND NESTOR BELEN, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 25 September 2013 which reads as follows:
G.R. No. 207426 — Gil Bilazon and Nestor Belen v. People of the Philippines
On January 2, 1995, petitioners Gil Bilazon (Gil) and Nestor Belen (Nestor), together with David Garais (David) and Romeo Gaton (Romeo), were charged with Frustrated Homicide in an Information that reads as follows:
That on or about the 14th day of August, 1994, at Barangay Sulangan, municipality of Matnog, province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, armed with pieces of [wood], did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault, strike, beat and [maul] one Domingo Givera, thereby inflicting upon him injuries, to wit:
- Patellar Fracture, close, left. CSIDEc
- Open Supracondylar fracture, type III-B left humerus.
- Fracture, open type III-B Alecranon left.
- Fracture, open type III-B radial head, left.
which injuries could have caused the [death] of said Domingo Givera, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Homicide as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, because of the timely and able medical assistance given to said Domingo Givera which prevented his death, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
Domingo Givera (Domingo) testified that on August 14, 1994 at around 11 o'clock in the evening, he was on his way home from a drinking session. He stopped beside the fence of the barangay hall to urinate. While relieving himself, petitioner Gil punched him on his left arm. He started to run but petitioner Nestor struck him on his left knee causing him to fall down. Thereafter, he was hit on his forehead causing him to lose consciousness. Domingo, however, failed to identify the person who hit him on his head.
Sixto Givera (Sixto) testified that at around 11 o'clock in the evening of August 14, 1994, he was outside his house when he saw his brother, Domingo, being assaulted by the petitioners and their co-accused. He waited until the four assailants left before summoning the help of the barangay captain. aScITE
Domingo was thereafter brought to the hospital for treatment. He underwent three operations on his knee, left elbow and left eye and incurred expenses amounting to P70,000.00. However, no receipt was presented.
Petitioner Gil denied any participation in the mauling of Domingo. He claimed that he was asleep inside his house at the time of the incident. Petitioner Nestor, as well as the two other accused, David and Romeo, likewise interposed the defense of denial.
In its Decision dated April 16, 2009, the Regional Trial Court of Irosin, Sorsogon Branch 55, found petitioners Gil and Nestor guilty of Frustrated Homicide. The other accused, David and Romeo, were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found petitioners guilty of Serious Physical Injuries only and not of Frustrated Homicide. The dispositive portion of the appellate court's September 20, 2012 Decision 2 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 55, Irosin, Sorsogon in Criminal Case No. 1089 is hereby MODIFIED by finding Gil Bilazon and Nestor Belen GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of serious physical injuries, defined and penalized under Article 263 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing them to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months as minimum to two (2) years and ten (10) months as maximum. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED. 3
Hence, this Petition. aIDHET
For one to be held liable for Frustrated Homicide, the following elements must be satisfactorily established:
(1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault;
(2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and
(3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is present. 4
As correctly noted by the appellate court, the prosecution failed to introduce any evidence to establish the first two elements, to wit: intent to kill and the mortal nature of the wounds inflicted. According to the Court of Appeals, the intent to kill "cannot be inferred from the blow that [petitioner] Gil inflicted on Domingo's left arm or the blow that was dealt by Nestor on Domingo's knee." 5 As to whether the wounds inflicted on Domingo were mortal or fatal as to result to the death of the victim if not for the timely medical intervention, the appellate court ruled that: cIaHDA
While Domingo's medical certificate shows evidence of injuries he sustained and the surgical procedure he underwent, such findings are insufficient to prove that the nature of his wounds or injuries are fatal or mortal. The records are bereft of any testimony from the attending physician who signed the medical certificate, or any physician for that matter, alluding to such fact. Although the defense admitted the existence of the medical certificate and the findings stated therein, there was no evidence offered to prove that without medical intervention, Domingo would have succumbed to the injuries. 6
There being no intent to kill and considering that the wounds suffered by Domingo were not fatal or mortal, the appellate court correctly found petitioners guilty of Serious Physical Injuries only. The imposable penalty for Serious Physical Injuries where the victim was incapacitated to perform work in which he was habitually engaged in for more than 90 days, as in this case, 7 is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. 8 There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present, the maximum imposable penalty shall be taken from the medium period, which is 1 year, 8 months and 21 days to 2 years, 11 months and 10 days. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty shall be arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, the range of which is 2 months and 1 day to 6 months. Thus, the Court of Appeals properly sentenced petitioners to an indeterminate penalty of 6 months of arresto mayor maximum, as minimum, to 2 years and 10 months of prision correccional medium, as maximum. DcSEHT
We note, however, that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to award actual damages. In this case, the prosecution tried to establish that the amount of P70,000.00 was incurred in connection with Domingo's hospitalization. However, no receipt was presented to substantiate the same. Thus, we award temperate damages in the amount of P4,000.00 9 in lieu of actual damages. Article 2219 of the Civil Code also provides that moral damages may be recovered in a criminal offense resulting to physical injuries. Thus, to conform to prevailing jurisprudence, we find that an award of moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 10 is in order. Finally, all the damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DENIED. The September 20, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals and its May 31, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 34283 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that petitioners Gil Bilazon and Nestor Belen are ordered to pay Domingo Givera temperate damages in the amount of P4,000.00 in lieu of actual damages and moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00, both with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. cEITCA
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.CA Decision, p. 2; rollo, p. 65.
2.Rollo, pp. 64-80; penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon and concurred in by Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez.
3.Id. at 79.
4.Josue v. People, G.R. No. 199579, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA 675, 682.
5.Rollo, p. 76.
6.Id. at 76-77.
7.The Medical Certificate, which the defense admitted, stated that Domingo required medical attendance for six to eight months.
8.See REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 263 (3).
Prision correccional in its minimum and medium period ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
Minimum: 6 months and 1 day to 1 year, 8 months and 20 days
Medium: 1 year, 8 months and 21 days to 2 years, 11 months and 10 days
Maximum: 2 years, 11 months and 11 days to 4 years and 2 months.
9.Mupas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 172834, February 6, 2008, 544 SCRA 85, 99.
10.Id.