THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 201437. January 20, 2014.]
BEVERLY HILLS MEDICAL GROUP, INC., petitioner, vs. BEVERLY HILLS COSMETIC SURGERY & SKIN INSTITUTE, INC., respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated January 20, 2014, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 201437 (Beverly Hills Medical Group, Inc. v. Beverly Hills Cosmetic Surgery & Skin Institute, Inc.). — This treats of the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated October 11, 2011 and April 10, 2012, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 111412.
Subject of the instant petition is a dispute between herein petitioner and respondent over the use of the words "Beverly Hills" as part of their corporate name.
Herein respondent Beverly Hills Cosmetic Surgery & Skin Institute, Inc. (BHCSI) is a domestic corporation which was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on November 17, 2005. Sometime in September 2006, respondent discovered that petitioner Beverly Hills Medical Group (BHMG) was able to register with the SEC on September 7, 2006. On September 21, 2006, BHCSI filed a Petition for Cancellation of Corporate Name Registration 3 with the SEC, praying that petitioner's company name be cancelled. ADCETI
In her Order 4 dated March 4, 2009, the General Counsel of the SEC granted respondent's Petition, directing petitioner to "[change or modify] its corporate name within thirty (30) days from receipt" of a copy of the said Order. The Order held that, in accordance with the "first in time, first in right doctrine," respondent acquired a prior right over the use of the contested corporate name; that since petitioner and respondent are engaged in the same business of cosmetic surgery and skin care, the similarity in their corporate names will likely mislead a person using ordinary care and discretion.
On appeal, the SEC en banc affirmed the questioned Order of the SEC General Counsel via its Decision 5 dated October 15, 2009.
Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the CA. On October 11, 2011, the CA rendered its assailed judgment denying the petition and affirming the Decision of the SEC en banc. 6
In the instant petition, petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling that the corporate name of BHMG is identical or confusingly similar to that of respondent corporation and that the CA also erred in concluding that respondent has proprietary right over the words "Beverly Hills."
The petition lacks merit.
The arguments raised by petitioner had already been threshed out by the assailed Order of the SEC General Counsel as well as the questioned Decisions of the SEC en banc and the CA.
Anent petitioner's first contention, it has been established that petitioner and respondent are engaged in the same line of business and, thus, cater to the same clientele. To reiterate, the General Counsel of the SEC, the SEC en banc and the CA, unanimously observed that both petitioner and respondent have identical purpose clauses as shown in their Articles of Incorporation, thus:
To establish, operate, manage, own and maintain a cosmetic surgery and skin clinic and such other enterprises which may have similar or analogous undertakings related to or in connection therewith, and to provide, supply, prescribe, purchase and sell related drugs and medicines, whether prescription or over-the-counter, as long as they are approved by the appropriate government agency regulating drugs and medicines. 7
In this respect, the Court quotes with approval the pronouncement of the SEC en banc, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
It is well settled in our jurisdiction that the use of identical or closely similar marks or trade names on non-competing goods may likely cause confusion as to their source or origin where the non-competing goods or services are so related with each other that it might reasonably be assumed that they originate from one and the same manufacturer or service provider. Proceeding with this line, the law protects prior registered corporations, which have identical or similar names with subsequent registrants offering related, although non-competing goods and services. In the case at bar, it must be emphasized that both BHCSI and BHMG are engaged in "competing goods," and not merely related goods. The more reason, therefore, that the mantle of protection be given in favor of [herein respondent] BHCSI. AIaDcH
xxx xxx xxx
As culled from the facts of the case, BHMG deliberately used the words "Medical Group" to make it appear that it is engaged in the practice of general medicine. BHMG is trying to convince the Commission that it offers "a whole gamut of medical services," when in reality, it does not. Again, it is noteworthy to stress that both corporations have identically the same primary purpose, as indicated in their respective Articles of Incorporation. BHMG cannot claim that [it is] engaged in medical services in general, when it is clear from its incorporation that it will offer only a specialized field of medicine, particularly cosmetic surgery and skin care. The fact that there are certain services offered by BHMG, which are not offered by BHCSI is not sufficient to dispel the possibility of confusion because of the obvious similarity not only with respect to the services they provide, but also with respect to their target clientele. Hence, contrary to BHMG's assertion, the use of the terms "Medical Group" is inadequate to support the conclusion that persons exercising ordinary care will unlikely be misled that there is a connection between the two corporations. AHacIS
Moreover, it is worth stressing that [herein petitioner] BHMG rather contradicted itself when it stated that "the consumers/clients will exercise a relatively higher degree of care when availing of the services and purchasing the products of the parties herein, due to the relative expense of the goods and services in question. These, clients shall certainly be unlikely to be confused as to the source of those services and products.
The foregoing claim of BHMG lacks basis and, therefore, cannot hold water. For one, it is not for BHMG to declare that customers will exercise a higher degree of care than that required by law when availing of such services just because they entail a relatively enormous expense, and consequently, there is a low possibility of confusion. Such contention, at the most, is deemed only as an assumption, lacking in foundation as to its veracity. Again, the test in determining the existence of confusing similarity in corporate names is whether the similarity is such as to mislead a person using ordinary care and discrimination. A party trying to prove the improbability of confusion cannot deviate from such parameters by assuming that a person will exercise a higher degree of care under certain circumstances, such as in this case, for instance. 8
As to petitioner's second contention, this Court likewise finds no cogent reason to depart from the CA ruling that respondent has acquired an exclusive right to the use of its corporate name which should be protected against infringement, insofar as the cosmetics business is concerned. The right to the exclusive use of a corporate name with freedom from infringement by similarity is determined by priority of adoption. 9 While the gap between the registration of the corporate names of petitioner and respondent is just eight months, the fact remains that respondent's registration of its corporate name was made prior to that of petitioner's.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 11, 2011, and its Resolution of April 10, 2012, both in CA-G.R. SP No. 111412, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED." CaDATc
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANODivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor, with Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Ramon A. Cruz, concurring; rollo, pp. 33-45.
2. Id. at 47-48.
3. Annex "E" to petition, id. at 54-68.
4. Annex "G" to petition, id. at 89-93.
5. Annex "J" to petition, id. at 130-138.
6. Annex "A" to petition, id. at 32-45.
7. Rollo, p. 298.
8. Id. at 134-135. (Underscoring in the original; citations omitted)
9. Industrial Refractories Corporation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 439 Phil. 36, 47 (2002), citing Philips Export B. V. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96161, February 21, 1992, 206 SCRA 457, 463.