Berano, Jr. v. Yialos Manning Services, Inc.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 221127. June 14, 2021.]

TEOFILO U. BERANO, JR., petitioner, vs. YIALOS MANNING SERVICES, INC., OVERSEAS SHIP MANAGEMENT SA, and/or DINO ALBERTO V. ALFONSO, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated June 14, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 221127 (TEOFILO U. BERANO, JR., petitioner, v. YIALOS MANNING SERVICES, INC., OVERSEAS SHIP MANAGEMENT SA, and/or DINO ALBERTO V. ALFONSO, respondents). — For this Court's resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by Teofilo U. Berano, Jr. (Berano), assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision 2 and Resolution 3 which reversed the labor tribunals' 4 award of total and permanent disability benefits in his favor.

Overseas Ship Management SA (Overseas) hired Berano through Yialos Manning Services, Incorporated (Yialos) as a Fitter on board M/V Thetis for a period of nine months. 5 Overseas tasked Berano to ensure the seaworthiness of the vessel, which required him to work for eight to 16 hours each day. 6

On October 12, 2012, Berano boarded M/V Thetis and left the Philippines. 7

On November 6, 2012, per the Chief Engineer's instruction, Berano was repairing the hydraulic hose in storage number six, when he suddenly lost consciousness and collapsed on the floor. 8 The ship captain immediately reported to the company doctor based in Singapore. The company doctor then advised Berano to drink plenty of water and take "Buscopan" and "Norfloxazine." 9 Coordinating with the company doctor, the ship captain monitored his condition on November 7, 2012 and the following day. 10

On November 9, 2012, the company referred Berano to a doctor in a medical facility in Indonesia. The doctor diagnosed Berano with "OBS Febrrs + Kolik Renal[,]" and declared him unfit to work. 11 Three days later, on November 12, 2012, he was repatriated to Manila. 12

Upon arrival, Yialos referred him to a doctor from Metropolitan Medical Center, who diagnosed him with "Bilateral L5 Radiculopathy" and advised him to undergo rehabilitation and medication. 13

Berano underwent therapy and medication for three months. However, he claimed that he did not fully recover. On the other hand, the company-designated physician issued a certification that declared Berano fit to resume his work as of February 18, 2013. 14

Believing that he was still unfit to work, Berano sought the medical opinion of another doctor, Dr. Misael Jonathan Ticman (Dr. Ticman), who required him to undergo a Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Lumbar Spine. The examination revealed that Berano had "Degenerative Disc Disease, L5-S1 with Disc [Protrusion], Annul Tear and bilateral Facet Arthrosis causing Neuroforaminal Stenosis, Disc Bulge with Left Facet Arthrosis causing Neuroforaminal Stenosis L4L5." 15 Dr. Ticman then declared Berano unfit to work as a seafarer. 16

Thereafter, Berano sought disability benefits from Yialos, but this was unheeded. Thus, he filed a Complaint for disability benefits and damages against Yialos, Overseas, and Dino Alberto V. Alfonso (collectively, Yialos, et al.). 17

Labor Arbiter Veneranda C. Guerrero (Labor Arbiter Guerrero) then rendered her August 30, 2013 Decision, 18 ruling in favor of Berano. She directed Yialos, et al., to pay Berano his total and permanent disability benefits for US$62,792.00. 19 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: HSCATc

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents Yialos Manning Services, Inc., and/or foreign principal Overseas Shipmanagement SA to pay, jointly and severally, complainant Teofilo U. Berano, Jr., the amount of US DOLLARS SIXTY TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY TWO (US$62,792.00) or its Philippine peso equivalent at the time of actual payment, representing total permanent disability benefits and sickness wages, plus ten percent (10%) thereof, as and for attorney's fees.

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 20

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission rendered its November 29, 2013 Decision 21 affirming Labor Arbiter Guerrero's ruling.

The National Labor Relations Commission upheld the findings of Berano's physician that he was permanently unfit for sea duty. It affirmed the directive for Yialos, et al., to pay Berano total and permanent disability benefits. The dispositive portion of its Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents' Appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter Veneranda C. Guerrero dated August 30, 2013 stands AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 22 (Emphasis in the original)

On January 24, 2014, the National Labor Relations Commission issued a Resolution 23 denying Yialos, et al.'s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

Undeterred, Yialos, et al., then filed their Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, arguing that the National Labor Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in awarding total and permanent disability benefits and attorney's fees to Berano. 24

The Court of Appeals granted the Petition in its March 6, 2015 Decision. 25 It found that Berano failed to comply with the conflict resolution procedure in his employment contract, as governed by the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA Standard Employment Contract). 26 It further held that it was Berano's burden to initiate the referral to a third doctor, since only he knew of the contradicting findings between the company-prescribed physician and his doctor of choice. 27

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 29 November 2013 and Resolution dated 24 January 2014 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. (OFW-M) 10-000948-13, NLRC NCR Case No. (M) 03-04172-12 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 28 (Emphasis in the original)

Berano then filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion in its October 15, 2015 Resolution. 29

Thereafter, Berano filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition, which this Court granted in its November 23, 2015 Resolution. 30 He later filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari. 31

Respondents moved to dismiss the case, 32 asserting that petitioner filed his Petition out of time. In its April 18, 2016 Resolution, 33 this Court required respondents to comment on the Petition within 10 days from receipt of the notice.

Respondents then filed their Comment, 34 which this Court noted in its July 25, 2016 Resolution. 35

In its July 24, 2017 Resolution, 36 this Court required petitioner to reply to the Comment within 10 days from receipt of the notice. Petitioner then filed his Reply, 37 which this Court noted in its December 11, 2017 Resolution. 38

Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that he had the burden to secure a third doctor, considering that under the POEA Standard Employment Contract, referral to a third doctor is merely discretionary. 39

Petitioner claims that while the company-designated urologist, gastroenterologist, and neurologist had declared his fitness to work, the orthopedist had yet to clear him of his "Bilateral L5 Radiculopathy" injury. This was also the company-designated physician's diagnosis. 40

Insisting that he is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits and sick wage benefits, 41 petitioner points out that respondents did not dispute that his diagnosed illness is compensable and work-related. 42 He contends that having undergone examination by the company-designated physician constituted substantial compliance with the requirements of their contract. 43

Even if he signed the quitclaim, petitioner asserts that his signature did not render his claim for benefits void. He avers that it is common practice that "employers of overseas contract workers . . . [require] applicants to execute and sign documents being figuratively exacted through the barrel of a gun by employers[.]" 44

Finally, petitioner argues that respondents' failure to perform their duties and responsibilities clearly showed bad faith, entitling him to damages. 45 He adds that he is entitled to attorney's fees, since the Complaint involves recovery of wages and an action for indemnity. 46

To counter, respondents reiterate that petitioner filed his Petition out of time, as he erroneously sent the copy of his motion for extension of time to another law office. 47 Respondents also argue that the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the decisions of Labor Arbiter Guerrero and the National Labor Relations Commission. Petitioner was certified fit to work after a series of check-ups and therapy sessions, which he admitted to in a quitclaim he signed. 48 Respondents maintain that petitioner should have referred the matter to a third doctor if he disagreed with the findings of their physicians. 49

For this Court's resolution is the lone issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the labor tribunals' award of total and permanent disability benefits in favor of petitioner. Subsumed in this is the issue of whether or not a seafarer's non-referral to a third doctor is fatal to their claims. DaIAcC

The Petition is denied.

This Court is not a trier of facts. Generally, petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must only raise questions of law, thus, without the need to re-assess evidence. 50 Weighing the opposing medical opinions on petitioner's fitness to work is a question of fact which is beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Contradictory findings of the lower tribunals only present a prima facie basis for this Court's review. 51

In labor cases, the inquiry in a Rule 45 petition is whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the National Labor Relations Commission's alleged grave abuse of discretion. 52 This means determining whether it "capriciously acts or whimsically exercises judgment to be 'equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.' Furthermore, the abuse of discretion must be so flagrant to amount to a refusal to perform a duty or to act as provided by law." 53

This Court has scrutinized the records and found no error in the Court of Appeals' judgment. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the National Labor Relations Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded settled rules.

The law, employment contract, and medical findings collectively govern the compensation for a seafarer's disability. 54 Deemed integrated into petitioner's employment contract with respondents, 55 the POEA Standard Employment Contract outlines the procedure in claims of disability benefits.

The grant of disability benefits for a seafarer requires the concurrence of the following elements:

(1) [he or she] suffered an illness; (2) [he or she] suffered this illness during the term of [his or her's] employment contract; (3) [he or she] complied with the procedures prescribed under Section 20-B; (4) [his or her] illness is one of the enumerated occupational disease[s] or that [his or her] illness or injury is otherwise work-related; and (5) [he or she] complied with the four conditions enumerated under Section 32-A for an occupational disease or a disputably-presumed work-related disease to be compensable. 56

Here, it was established that petitioner lost consciousness, as he was performing his duties on board respondents' vessel. A foreign doctor initially diagnosed him with "OBS Febrrs + Kolik Renal," and recommended his medical repatriation. 57

Upon his arrival in Manila, petitioner submitted himself for a post-employment medical examination, where the company-designated physician diagnosed him with "Bilateral L5 Radiculopathy." 58 He then underwent therapy and medication for three months, until the company-designated physician declared him fit to resume his work. Disagreeing, he sought the opinion of another doctor who declared him unfit to work. 59

What is assailed here is whether petitioner should have prompted respondent of his intent to dispute their physicians' findings, and refer his condition to a third doctor.

On this, Section 20 (A) (3) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract states that:

SECTION 20. Compensation and Benefits. —

A. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness. The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

3. . . . For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. In the course of the treatment, the seafarer shall also report regularly to the company-designated physician specifically on the dates as prescribed by the company-designated physician and agreed to by the seafarer. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties. (Emphasis supplied)

When there is divergence in the findings of the company-designated physician and a seafarer's chosen doctor, the POEA Standard Employment Contract requires a referral to a third physician agreed upon by the parties. TAacHE

Contrary to petitioner's argument that this is merely discretionary, it is settled that referral to a third doctor is a mandatory procedure "as a consequence of the provision that it is the company-designated doctor whose assessment should prevail." 60Nonay v. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc. 61 surveyed instructive cases:

In Transocean Ship Management (Phils.), Inc., et al. v. Vedad, the reason for the third-doctor referral provision in the POEA Standard Employment Contract is that:

In determining whether or not a given illness is work-related, it is understandable that a company-designated physician would be more positive and in favor of the company than, say, the physician of the seafarer's choice. It is on this account that a seafarer is given the option by the POEA-SEC to seek a second opinion from his preferred physician. And the law has anticipated the possibility of divergence in the medical findings and assessments by incorporating a mechanism for its resolution wherein a third doctor selected by both parties decides the dispute with finality, as provided by Sec. 20 (B) (3) of the POEA-SEC quoted above.

In Montierro v. Rickmers Marine Agency Phils., Inc., one of the issues that was resolved was "whether it is the opinion of the company doctor or of the personal doctor of the seafarer that should prevail.["]

This court held that non-observance of the procedure under Section 20 (B) (3) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract would mean that the assessment of the company-designated physician prevails. This rule was reiterated in Veritas Maritime Corporation, et al. v. Gepanaga, Jr.:

Gepanaga failed to observe the prescribed procedure of having the conflicting assessments on his disability referred to a third doctor for a binding opinion. Consequently, the Court applies the following pronouncements laid down in Vergara:

The POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA clearly provide that when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel, his fitness or unfitness for work shall be determined by the company-designated physician. If the physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the company-designated physician's assessment, the opinion of a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and the seafarer to be the decision final and binding on them.

Thus, while petitioner had the right to seek a second and even a third opinion, the final determination of whose decision must prevail must be done in accordance with an agreed procedure. Unfortunately, the petitioner did not avail of this procedure; hence, we have no option but to declare that the company-designated doctor's certification is the final determination that must prevail. . . .

Indeed, for failure of Gepanaga to observe the procedures laid down in the POEA-SEC and the CBA, the Court is left without a choice but to uphold the certification issued by the company-designated physician that the respondent was "fit to go back to work."

In the earlier landmark case of Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag, to disregard the third-doctor referral provision in the POEA Standard Employment Contract without any explanation is grave abuse of discretion because it is tantamount to failure to uphold the law between the parties. 62 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Following settled jurisprudence, petitioner's non-referral of his condition to a third doctor constituted a breach of his contractual obligations that proved fatal to his claim. The company-designated physician's assessment that he is fit to work prevails in the absence of a third doctor's medical opinion.

Contrary to petitioner's claims, it is only upon notification of his disagreement with the company physician's assessment that the burden shifts to respondents in initiating the referral. The Court of Appeals correctly found that petitioner should have informed the respondents, since only he knew of the contradicting findings of the doctors. 63

When the company does not cooperate with the seafarer in seeking a third doctor upon notification of the disagreement on medical findings, courts can then consider the assessment of the seafarer's physician. 64 Further:

. . . if the findings of the company-designated physician are clearly biased in favor of the employer, then courts may give greater weight to the findings of the seafarer's personal physician. Clear bias on the part of the company-designated physician may be shown if there is no scientific relation between the diagnosis and the symptoms felt by the seafarer, or if the final assessment of the company-designated physician is not supported by the medical records of the seafarer. 65

Here, we do not see any clear bias on the company physician's assessment. The doctors had similar diagnoses, and differed only as to petitioner's fitness to work. HDICSa

In Monana v. MEC Global Shipmanagement, 66 this Court gave greater weight to the company-designated physician's assessment, considering the duration of treatment that the seafarer underwent in contrast to his personal doctor's scarce examination. It concluded that "as between the company-designated doctor who has all the medical records of petitioner for the duration of his treatment[,] and as against the latter's private doctor who merely examined him for a day as an outpatient, the former's finding must prevail." 67

Here, petitioner underwent three months of rehabilitation therapy and medication under the company physician's close supervision. 68 On the other hand, petitioner's doctor of choice examined him once and certified his unfitness to work. We also note that respondents remained stalwart in their duties as employers. When petitioner collapsed while on board the vessel, the ship captain monitored his condition and later brought him to a facility in Indonesia for medical examination. Further, respondents supervised petitioner's three-month therapy upon his repatriation. 69

Thus, since petitioner did not comply with the mandatory third doctor referral without any justification, this Court is constrained to deny his claim for disability benefits.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit, and the Court of Appeals' March 6, 2015 Decision and October 15, 2015 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 134617 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED." (Hernando, J., on official leave)

By authority of the Court:

MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

By:

(SGD.) RUMAR D. PASIONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 9-30.

2.Id. at 33-41. The March 6, 2015 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 134617 was penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, and concurred in by Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela of the Eighth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

3.Id. at 42-43. The October 15, 2015 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 134617 was penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, and concurred in by Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela of the Former Eighth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

4. The decisions and resolutions of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission do not appear in the rollo.

5.Rollo, p. 34.

6.Id.

7.Id.

8.Id.

9.Id.

10.Id.

11.Id. at 34-35.

12.Id.

13.Id.

14.Id.

15.Id.

16.Id.

17.Id.

18. The Labor Arbiter's Decision was not attached to any of the pleadings. It does not appear in the rollo.

19.Rollo, pp. 35-36.

20.Id. at 35-36.

21. The National Labor Relations Commission's Decision was not attached to any of the pleadings. It does not appear in the rollo.

22.Rollo, p. 34.

23.Id. at 33. The Resolution was not attached in any of the pleadings.

24.Id. at 36.

25.Id. at 33-41.

26.Id. at 36-38.

27.Id. at 38-40.

28.Id. at 40-41.

29.Id. at 42-43.

30.Id. at 7.

31.Id. at 9-30.

32.Id. at 64-69.

33.Id. at 85-86. In the same Resolution, petitioner was required to submit a verified statement of the material date of filing of the motion for reconsideration, to comment on the Motion to Dismiss, and for his counsel, Atty. Justiniano Panambo, Jr., to show cause as to why he attached a completely unrelated decision to the petition.

34.Id. at 89-111.

35.Id. at 130-131.

36.Id. at 154.

37.Id. at 161-175.

38.Id. at 178.

39.Id. at 22-23.

40.Id. at 26.

41.Id. at 27-28.

42.Id. at 165.

43.Id. at 169.

44.Id. at 172.

45.Id. at 173.

46.Id. at 174.

47.Id. at 95-103.

48.Id. at 104.

49.Id. at 107.

50.See RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Sec. 1. See also Goduco v. Court of Appeals, 119 Phil. 531 (1964) [Per J. Paredes, En Banc].

51.See Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 188-189 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division] citing Fernan v. Court of Appeals, 260 Phil. 594, 598-599 (1990) [Per J. Narvasa, First Division].

52.See Nonay v. Bahia Shipping Services, 781 Phil. 197, 213 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]; Dayo v. Status Maritime Corporation, 751 Phil. 778, 785 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]; Monana v. MEC Global Shipmanagement, 746 Phil. 736, 751 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

53.Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc., 809 Phil. 106, 120 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

54.Cutanda v. Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc., 817 Phil. 1106 (2017) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].

55.Jebsen Maritime, Inc. v. Ravena, 743 Phil. 371, 385 (2014) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

56.Id. at 388-389.

57.Rollo, p. 35.

58.Id.

59.Id.

60.Manansala v. Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc., 817 Phil. 84, 114 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division] citing INC Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Rosales, 744 Phil. 774 (2014) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

61. 781 Phil. 197 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

62.Id. at 226-227.

63.Rollo, pp. 38-40.

64.Ebuenga v. Southfield Agencies, Inc., 828 Phil. 122 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

65.Nonay v. Bahia Shipping Services, Incorporated, 781 Phil. 197, 228 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

66.Monana v. MEC Global Shipmanagement, 746 Phil. 736 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

67.Id. at 751.

68.Rollo, p. 35.

69.Id. at 34-35.