FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 198836. June 16, 2021.]
BENGSON COMMERCIAL BUILDING, INC., petitioner, vs.GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondent.
[G.R. No. 198945. June 16, 2021.]
MARIANO A. NOCOM, petitioner, vs.GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 16, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 198836 (Bengson Commercial Building, Inc., Petitioner, v. Government Service Insurance System, Respondent) and G.R. No. 198945 (Mariano A. Nocom, Petitioner, v. Government Service Insurance System, Respondent.) — These are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari1 seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 2 dated 26 November 2010 and Amended Decision 3 dated 06 October 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84625. The assailed Decisions reversed and set aside the Partial Decision 4 dated 27 October 2004 of Branch 66, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in Civil Case No. 2794 which, among others, reinstated the Order dated 06 April 1995 awarding the amount of Thirty One Million Pesos (Php31,000,000.00) as costs of suit to petitioner Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (Bengson).
Antecedents
These cases are offshoots of our ruling in Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) v. Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc. (G.R. Nos. 137448 and 141454) 5 and GSIS v. Mariano A. Nocom (G.R. No. 175989). 6 For consistency, the Court adopts and reiterates the factual antecedents in the said cases, to wit:
[BENGSON] obtained loans from the [GSIS], herein petitioner, on August 20, 1965 and November 23, 1971 in the amounts of [Php1,025,000.00] and [Php3,000,000.00], respectively, or in the aggregate sum of P4.025 million. As security for the payment of these loans, BENGSON executed real estate and chattel mortgages in favor of the GSIS. For BENGSON's failure to settle its arrearages despite due notices, the mortgages were extrajudicially foreclosed. Its properties then were sold at public auction to the highest bidder, the GSIS itself. A certificate of sale and new certificates of title were thereafter issued in its name.
On June 23, 1977, BENGSON filed with the then Court of First of Instance of San Fernando, La Union an action for annulment of the auction sale, docketed as Civil Case No. 2794. Later on, the case was transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, also in San Fernando, La Union. After hearing, it rendered a Decision (1) nullifying the auction sale of BENGSON's mortgaged properties; (2) ordering the cancellation of the titles issued to the GSIS and the issuance of new ones in the name of BENGSON; (3) ordering BENGSON to pay the GSIS [Php900,000.00] for the debenture bonds; and (4) ordering GSIS to (a) restore to BENGSON full possession of the foreclosed properties; (b) restructure the [Php4,025,000.00] loans with legal rate of interest from the finality of the judgment; (c) pay BENGSON [Php1,009,000.00] representing accrued monthly rentals and P20,000 monthly rental until the properties are restored to BENGSON's possession, and (d) pay the costs of the suit.
On appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 09361, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming the RTC judgment with modification. The appellate court ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for reception of evidence to determine the costs of suit. On February 10, 1988, the Decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory.
On April 6, 1995, the trial court issued an Order awarding BENGSON [Php31,000,000.00] as costs of suit. While Atty. Rogelio Terrado, counsel for GSIS, received a copy of the Order on the same date, however, he did not file a motion for reconsideration. It turned out that he was absent without official leave since April 6, 1995. Hence, the Order became final and executory. Eventually, BENGSON's ex parte motion for the issuance of a writ of execution was granted by the trial court.
On May 4, 1995, the GSIS received a copy of the Order of execution. Hence, on May 15, 1995, the GSIS, through its corporate counsel, Atty. Oscar Garcia, filed with the trial court an urgent omnibus motion. Attached thereto was an affidavit of merit executed by Margarito C. Recto, manager of the GSIS Legal Services Group, praying that the motion should be considered as a petition for relief from the April 6, 1995 Order and that Atty. Terrado's gross negligence should not bind the GSIS, for to do so would result in the deprivation of its properties without due process.
On January 16, 1997, the trial court issued an Order denying the GSIS's urgent omnibus motion on the ground, among others, that the questioned Order of April 6, 1995 has attained finality. The GSIS received a copy of the Order on February 4, 1997.
On February 16, 1997, the GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration but the trial court denied the same, prompting the GSIS to file, on June 11, 1998, a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47669.
However, on November 24, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for the following reasons: (1) the petition was filed out of time; (2) the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping were not signed by an authorized officer of the GSIS; (3) no copy of the questioned writ of execution dated April 24, 1995 was attached to the petition; (4) the copy of the Order dated January 16, 1997 is not a certified true copy; (5) petitioner did not rebut BENGSON's evidence; and (6) the assailed Order of April 6, 1995 has become final and executory.
The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated January 29, 1999. The GSIS then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 137448.
Meanwhile, on December 16, 1998, the trial court issued an Order directing the issuance of an alias writ of execution for the satisfaction of the award of P31 million representing the costs of suit awarded to BENGSON in its Order of April 6, 1995. The sheriff then garnished the 6.2 million Class "A" shares of stock of San Miguel Corporation owned by the GSIS. They were sold at public auction, with BENGSON as the sole bidder.
The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration with motion to quash the alias writ of execution, but this was denied by the trial court on January 8, 1999. Hence, the GSIS filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 136874, seeking to annul both the December 16, 1998 and January 8, 1999 Orders of the trial court directing the execution of its April 6, 1995 Order and the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution.
On January 21, 1999, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the implementation of the April 6, 1995 Order (directing the transfer, registration, or issuance of new certificates of stock in the name of BENGSON). Thereafter, this Court referred the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 136874 to the Court of Appeals for adjudication. It was then re-docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51131.
In its Decision on January 14, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition of the GSIS in CA-G.R. SP No. 51131. Consequently, the GSIS filed with this Court a petition for certiorari with very urgent motion for the issuance of preliminary injunction and/or TRO, docketed as G.R. No. 141454. Forthwith, this case was consolidated with G.R. No. 137448.
On January 31, 2002, the Supreme Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 137448 and 141454, granting the petitions. This Court held:
Similarly, in the higher interest of justice and equity, and the ground for relief from the 6 April 1995 Order of the trial court being evident, we shall reverse and set aside the 24 November 1998 and 8 January 1999 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, as well as the 16 January 1997 Decision and 23 April 1998 Order of the trial court. We shall then remand the case to the trial court, and pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure the case shall stand as if the 6 April 1995 Order has never been issued. Thereafter, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for a new trial or reconsideration has been granted by it.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petitions at bar are GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 24 November 1998, 8 January 1999, and 14 January 2000, as well as the 16 January 1997 and 23 April 1998 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The cases are hereby ordered remanded to the trial court, which shall then proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for a new trial or reconsideration has been granted by it. Since the issues raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 51131 are irretrievably linked with, or are but a consequence of the 6 April 1995 Order of the trial court, the said case shall be suspended or held in abeyance until after the aforementioned proceedings in the trial court shall have been finally resolved. The Temporary Restraining Order we issued on 7 February 2000 shall remain in effect until further orders from this court.
SO ORDERED.
The records were eventually remanded to the trial court for hearing to determine the merits of the case. 7
At this juncture, the Court adopts the CA's summary of the subsequent proceedings: ASTcaE
Consequently, the entire records of the case was remanded to the RTC and the then Presiding Judge of Branch 26 of the RTC scheduled the new trial on 26 May 2003, where BENGSON manifested that it was adopting its previously recorded evidence. The Judge of the said court allowed the adoption of such evidence but subject to the right of GSIS to cross-examine BENGSON's lone witness, Mrs. Bengson.
However, on 28 June 2003, before the scheduled cross-examination of BENGSON's witness, GSIS filed a Motion to Strike on the ground that BENGSON's recorded evidence are not material and competent to prove the costs of suit for being violative of Section 8, Rule 142 of the Rules of Court on the manner on how it should be taxed and that the Schedule of Costs of Suit presented by BENGSON does not fall within the purview of Section 10, Rule 142 of the same rules.
Meanwhile, SMC and Mr. Enrique Ll. Yusingco filed a Manifestation and Motion dated 2 July 2003 praying for the liting n of the annotation of the sale of the P6.2 Million Class "A" shares of stock of SMC and to dispense with their participation in the ongoing proceedings. According to SMC and Mr. Yusingco, the Supreme Court's directive in its 31 January 2002 en banc Decision for the trial court to hear and determine the case "as if the 6 April 1995 order had never been issued" voided all proceedings that took place after the issuance of the said order, including the issuance of the Alias Writ of Execution, Notice of Levy/Garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the court.
On 16 September 2003, GSIS filed a Manifestation and Motion, alleging that it is joining the manifestation of SMC and Mr. Yusingco dated 2 July 2003 and further argued that under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291, otherwise known as the GSIS Act of 1997, the GSIS funds and/or properties are exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes issued by the court.
After the parties submitted their respective opposition, reply, rejoinder and sur-rejoinder, the Judge of the RTC handling the case voluntarily inhibited himself in an order dated 19 November 2003, without resolving the above-stated issues or motions. Consequently, the case was re-raffled and assigned to Branch 66 of the trial court. The case was then called for hearing on 24 March 2004 in the morning where the parties amplified their arguments on the pending incidents.
Thereafter, on 20 May 2004, Branch 66 of the RTC issued an order denying the Motion to Strike and allowing the recorded evidence on the costs of suit to remain without retaking the same, but subject to the right of GSIS to cross-examine BENGSON's witness. Said hearing was set on 7 June 2004.
On the date of the hearing, GSIS manifested that it finds no necessity for such cross-examination and considering that BENGSON's testimony is immaterial and incompetent to prove the costs of suit. GSIS further manifested that it is waiving its rights to adduce contradictory evidence. Hence, there being no objection on the part of BENGSON, the RTC allowed the waiver and admitted BENGSON's evidence on the costs of suit consisting of Exhibits "A" to "BBBBB," and directed the case submitted for decision after the parties have submitted their respective memoranda.
Thus, on 27 October 2004, Branch 66 of the RTC of San Fernando, La Union rendered its assailed Partial Decision decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, the Order of this Court dated April 06, 1995 awarding the amount of THIRTY-ONE MILLION PESOS ([Php]31,000,000.00) as costs of suit is hereby reinstated. Considering, however, that the garnished 6.2 Million Class "A" SMC shares of defendant GSIS has already been sold to [BENGSON] at public auction for the satisfaction of the Alias Writ of Execution by virtue of the above-mentioned Order, the awarded costs of suit is hereby declared paid and satisfied.
SO ORDERED.
The said Partial Decision was thereafter modified in an Order dated 10 December 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing, the Order of this Court dated April 06, 1995 awarding the amount of THIRTY-ONE MILLION PESOS ([Php]31,000,000.00) as cost of suit to [BENGSON] is hereby reinstated. Considering, however, that the garnished 6.2 Million Class "A" SMC shares of defendant GSIS has already been sold to [BENGSON] at public auction for the satisfaction of the Alias Writ of Execution by virtue of the above-mentioned Order, the awarded costs of suit is hereby declared paid and satisfied.
In view thereof, let an Entry of Satisfaction of Judgment under Section 44 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court be entered in the record of the case.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved with the foregoing ruling, GSIS filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Partial Decision which was subsequently denied by the trial court in its Order dated 11 March 2005, the decretal portion of which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, [GSIS'] Motion for Reconsideration dated November 26, 2004 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Similarly, since the ground averred in the Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam Motion for Partial Reconsideration of SMC and Yusingco are substantially the same as those raised in [GSIS'] motion, the same is likewise DENIED.
However, considering that [GSIS'] Notice of Appeal Ad Cautelam was filed within the reglementary period, the same is hereby granted.
Let the records of this case, therefore, be transmitted to the Court of Appeals on appeal.
SO ORDERED. 8
Ruling of the CA
On 26 November 2010, the CA promulgated its Decision granting GSIS' appeal, viz.:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED, and the appealed Partial Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.9
The CA found that the RTC committed a reversible error in reinstating the Order dated 06 April 1995 of the trial court awarding Bengson Php31,000,000.00 as costs of suit, as the same is without legal and factual basis. It held that the items to be taxed as costs of suit are limited only to those enumerated under Rule 142 of the Rules of Court (Rules); only costs which may be recovered are those which are allowed by statute. The Schedule of Costs submitted by Bengson and used by the RTC as basis for the award consists of names of persons from whom money was obtained and utilized, including the value of mortgaged jewelry, stock certificates, foreclosed appliances and others. None of these fall within any of the items enumerated under Section 10 of Rule 142 which are taxable as costs. 10
The CA also noted that the proper procedure for taxation of costs was not followed when the trial court (1) conducted a hearing to receive evidence supporting Bengson's claim of costs of suit and (2) rendered a separate judgment for costs. 11
Finally, the CA disagreed with the RTC in finding that the Supreme Court, in its Decision in G.R. Nos. 137448 and 141454, found the award of costs proper and in order. According to the CA, there was nothing in said Decision which touched on the propriety of the award of Php31,000,000.00 as costs of suit; the focus of the Court's discussion was on the matter of negligence of the former GSIS counsel. It was therefore an error for the RTC to apply the doctrine of the law of the case to support its ruling. 12
Petitioners filed their respective motions for reconsideration. On 06 October 2011, the CA issued an Amended Decision. 13 It acknowledged that Bengson, as the prevailing party in Civil Case No. 2794, was entitled to an award of costs of suit as a matter of course. It nevertheless maintained that Bengson can recover as costs only those allowed by the Rules, and nothing more. 14 The dispositive portion of the CA's Amended Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of this Court promulgated on 26 November 2010 is hereby MODIFIED. The instant case is REMANDED to the trial court for proper determination of the actual costs of suit, excluding the P31 Million amount of indebtedness of BENGSON to several parties and including only the expenses incurred for those items exclusively enumerated under Section 10 of Rule 142 of the Revised Rules of Court, and in accordance with the proper procedure of taxing of costs under Section 8 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED.15
Hence, these Petitions.
On 14 December 2011, the Court resolved to deny the petition in G.R. No. 198836 for failure to show any reversible error on the part of the CA. 16 Upon motion, 17 however, the Court reconsidered and ordered its consolidation with G.R. No. 198945. 18
Issue
The Court resolves the issue of whether the CA erred in reversing and setting aside the Partial Decision of the RTC which reinstated the 06 April 1995 Order and awarded Php31,000,000.00 as costs of suit to Bengson. cDSAEI
Ruling of the Court
The consolidated Petitions are without merit.
Costs are the statutory allowances to a party to an action for his expenses incurred in the action, and having reference only to the parties and to the amounts paid by them. 19 These are prescribed by law; in the absence of a statute permitting the taxation of costs, they cannot be allowed. 20 Section 10, Rule 142 of the Rules regulates the costs which may be recovered by a prevailing party in the RTC. This Section reads:
Sec. 10. Costs in Courts of First Instance. — In an action or proceeding pending in a Court of First Instance, the prevailing party may recover the following costs, and no other:
(a) For the complaint or answer, fifteen pesos;
(b) For his own attendance, and that of his attorney, down to and including final judgment, twenty pesos;
(c) For each witness necessarily produced by him, for each day's necessary attendance of such witness at the trial, two pesos, and his lawful traveling fees;
(d) For each deposition lawfully taken by him, and produced in evidence, five pesos;
(e) For original documents, deeds, or papers of any kind produced by him, nothing;
(f) For official copies of such documents, deeds, or papers, the lawful fees necessarily paid for obtaining such copies;
(g) The lawful fees paid by him in entering and docketing the action or recording the proceedings, for the service of any process in action, and all lawful clerk's fees paid by him. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The terms of the rule are clear, only the enumerated items can be recovered as costs "and no other." Thus, it has been declared that the court has no authority or right to tax costs against either party litigant not allowed by statute. If it does so, it violates the law. 21 Accordingly, the Court has disallowed attempts to charge premium paid on an attachment bond, 22 attorney's fees, 23 and monetary sums awarded in a judgment, as costs. 24
Here, it is undisputed that the amount of Php31,000,000.00 sought to be recovered as costs pertain to expenses which do not fall within any of the items enumerated under Section 10, Rule 142 of the Rules. Bengson and Mariano A. Nocom, however, insist that these costs should be allowed against GSIS regardless, as a consequence of not only of the latter's failure to conduct cross-examination of the witness but also of its waiver to present contradictory evidence. 25 They further maintain that the Court, in G.R. Nos. 137448 and 141454, 26 had already passed upon the propriety of the procedure adopted by the trial court to tax the cost of suit. According to petitioners, the Supreme Court "found nothing improper in the award of the costs of suit except for the fact that the same was granted and arrived at without any participation from GSIS due to the negligence of the latter's counsel." 27 They thus maintain that this finding constituted the law of the case which the CA had no choice but to apply. 28
The Court disagrees.
The doctrine of the law of the case is not applicable in this case. This doctrine states that whatever has once been irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. 29
As correctly noted by the CA, the Decision in G.R. Nos. 137448 and 141454 was silent on the propriety of the award of Php31,000,000.00 as costs of suit. The Court there resolved the issues of: (1) whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion to dismissing both CA-G.R. SP Nos. 51131 and 47669 on the ground of forum shopping; 30 and (2) whether the CA committed reversible error when it dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 47669 for non-compliance with technical requirements. 31 CA-G.R. SP No. 51131 was about the propriety of issuance of the Alias Writ of Execution while CA-G.R. SP No. 47669 dealt with the denial by the trial court of GSIS' Omnibus Motion/Petition for Relief from the 06 April 1995 Order.
Based on examination, and contrary to petitioners' claim, the Court's discussion in G.R. Nos. 137448 and 141454 did not address the merits of the 06 April 1995 Order; rather, its finding was limited to the fact that the acts of GSIS' former counsel "constituted gross negligence, if not fraud, and resulted in the deprivation of GSIS of an opportunity to move to reconsider or appeal the adverse order." 32 Since then, and far from "squander[ing] its golden opportunity," 33 we find that GSIS had been consistent in asserting that the award of P31 Million as costs of suit is not authorized by the Rules of Court. Records show that GSIS filed a Motion to Strike 34 before the trial court, praying that the adopted recorded evidence (particularly the Schedule of Costs of suit submitted by Bengson) be stricken off the record for being immaterial and incompetent. In this regard, it is not hard to see why GSIS refused to cross-examine petitioners' witness or present contradictory evidence, as it could be construed as some sort of waiver of its standing objections. 35
In any case, the doctrine of the law of the case is also described as a discretionary doctrine. It merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided. Prior decisions should, however, still be followed unless: (1) the decision is clearly erroneous and its enforcement would work a manifest injustice; (2) intervening controlling authority makes reconsideration appropriate; or (3) substantially different evidence was adduced at a subsequent trial. 36 As earlier discussed, this case clearly falls within the first exception. EDCcaS
All told, the Court simply cannot subscribe to the contention that the trial court can disregard the provisions of Rule 142 of the Rules, GSIS' failure to cross-examine petitioners' witness and present contradictory evidence notwithstanding. It bears repeating that the court has no authority to tax costs against either party litigant not allowed by statute. The RTC thus violated the law when it reinstated the Order dated 06 April 1995 allowing costs of suit on the basis of items outside those enumerated by the law. 37
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions are hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the Amended Decision dated 06 October 2011 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84625 is AFFIRMED.
The supplement to the reply of petitioner in G.R. No. 198945 to comment on the petition for review on certiorari, praying that reliefs he prayed for in his petition be granted, is NOTED; and the petitioner in G.R. No. 198945 is hereby directed to SUBMIT, within five (5) days from notice hereof, a verified declaration of the supplement to the reply to comment pursuant to A.M. Nos. 10-3-7-SC and 11-9-4-SC.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 9-36, G.R. No. 198836; Id. at 15-53, G.R. No. 198945.
2.Id. at 41-65, G.R. No. 198836; Id. at 59-83, G.R. No. 198945; penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez and concurred in by Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes and Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla of the Court of Appeals-Special Third (3rd) Division, Manila.
3.Id. at 66-76, G.R. No. 198836; Id. at 85-95, G.R. No. 198945; penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez and concurred in by Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla of the Court of Appeals-Former Special Third (3rd) Division, Manila.
4.Id. at 185-190, G.R. No. 198836; Id. at 171-177, G.R. No. 198945.
5. 426 Phil. 111 (2002), G.R. Nos. 137448 & 141454, 31 January 2002 [Per J. Davide].
6. 567 Phil. 641 (2008), G.R. No. 175989 [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez].
7.Id. at 642-646.
8.Rollo, pp. 50-54, G.R. No. 198836; Id. at 68-72, G.R. No. 198945.
9.Id. at 64, G.R. No. 198836; Id. at 82, G.R. No. 198945.
10.Id. at 56-62, G.R. No. 198836; Id. at 74-80, G.R. No. 198945.
11.Id. at 61-62, G.R. No. 198836; Id. at 79-80, G.R. No. 198945.
12.Id. at 62-64, G.R. No. 198836; Id. at 80-82, G.R. No. 198945.
13.Id. at 66-77, G.R. No. 198836; Id. at 85-96, G.R. No. 198945.
14.Id. at 68-69, G.R. No. 198836; Id. at 87-88, G.R. No. 198945.
15.Id. at 75-76, G.R. No. 198836; Id. at 94-95, G.R. No. 198945.
16.Id. at 204, G.R. No. 198836.
17.Id. at 9-13, G.R. No. 198945.
18.Id. at 217-218, G.R. No. 198836.
19.Damasen v. Hernando, 191 Phil. 453-460 (1981), G.R. No. L-49995, 08 April 1981 [Per J. Melencio-Herrera], citing Ballentine Law Dictionary, 1948 ed.
20.See Hontiveros v. Altavas, 39 Phil. 226-229 (1918), G.R. No. 11769, 05 December 1918 [Per J. Johnson].
21.Id.
22.Huang v. Associated Realty Development, Co. Ltd., 124 Phil. 1219-1225 (1966), G.R. No. L-26421, 29 October 1966 [Per J. Castro].
23.Damasen v. Hernando, supra at note 19.
24.Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Genovea, 201 Phil. 862-873 (1982), G.R. No. L-60687, 31 August 1982 [Per J. Melencio-Herrera].
25.Rollo, pp. 22, 29-33, G.R. No. 198836; Id. at 41-45, G.R. No. 198945.
26.Supra at note 5.
27.Rollo, p. 51, G.R. No. 198945.
28.Id. at 25-29, G.R. No. 198836; Id. at 52, G.R. No. 198945.
29.See Spouses Garcia v. Santos, G.R. No. 228334, 17 June 2019 [Per J. Caguioa].
30.Supra at note 5.
31.Id.
32.Id.
33.Rollo, p. 189, G.R. No. 198836; Id. at 175, G.R. No. 198945.
34.Id. at 128-135, G.R. 198945.
35.See Intestate Estate of Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil. 698-703 (1927), G.R. No. 27498, 20 September 1927 [Per J. Malcolm]; see also Macfarlane v. Green, 54 Phil. 551-557 (1930), G.R. No. 31141, 11 March 1930 [Per J. Villareal].
36.Philippine National Bank v. Urieta (Notice), G.R. No. 180264, 25 September 2019.
37.Supra at note 20.
n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official document.