Bello y Danao v. People

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 249425. August 31, 2022.]

MODESTO BELLO y DANAO alias "BUDING" and JANET MANCENIDO y SAYNO, petitioners, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court's First Division, issued a Resolution datedAugust 31, 2022which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 249425 (Modesto Bello y Danao alias "Buding" and Janet Mancenido y Sayno, petitioners vs. People of the Philippines, respondent). — This is an Appeal by Certiorari1 from the April 11, 2019 Decision 2 and September 13, 2019 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 41566, which upheld the January 16, 2018 Consolidated Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 82 (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. GL-Q-12-177707 and GL-Q-12-177708. The RTC found Modesto Bello y Danao alias "Buding" (Modesto) and Janet Mancenido y Sayno (Janet; collectively, petitioners) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, 5 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Antecedents

Modesto was charged with illegal possession of 0.03 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, in an Information 6 dated July 26, 2012, which reads:

That on or about the 24th day of July, 2012, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and control dangerous drugs, to wit: One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing zero point zero three (0.03) gram of white crystalline substance containing, METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, a dangerous drug. CAIHTE

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Janet, on the other hand, was likewise charged with illegal possession of 0.05 gram of shabu in a separate Information, 7 which reads:

That on or about the 24th day of July, 2012, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not authorized by law to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and control dangerous drugs, to wit: 2 strips of aluminum foil with zero point zero two (0.02) gram and zero point zero three (0.03) gram with a total weight of zero point zero five (0.05) gram of white crystalline substance containing METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

During arraignment on September 5, 2012, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 8 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

On July 20, 2012, Police Senior Inspector Emil Raymond Celis (PSI Celis), Chief of Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Task Group (SAID-SOTG), received a report from a confidential informant (CI) that Janet was engaged in illegal drug activities at Gana Compound, Barangay Unang Sigaw, Balintawak, Quezon City. Thus, on July 24, 2012, PSI Celis dispatched Police Officer II Wilfredo Flores (PO2 Flores) and Police Officer III Eugene Martinez (PO3 Martinez) to the area to validate the information. 9

Upon arrival at the area, they roamed around and passed by a shanty with its door left ajar. Through the opening, the police officers saw Janet holding a lighter and strips of aluminum foil while Modesto was holding a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. The police officers then entered the shanty and apprehended petitioners. PO3 Martinez seized from Janet two strips of aluminum foil, which he marked as "JM 24-07-12" and "JM-2 24-07-12," respectively, and a lighter; while PO2 Flores seized from Modesto the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, which he marked as "MB 24-07-12." They next went to the police station and turned over the seized items to Police Officer III Wilfredo Corona (PO3 Corona), who conducted the inventory in the presence of a barangay official and prepared the request for laboratory examination. 10

PO3 Corona, PO2 Flores, and PO3 Martinez then brought the seized items to the Crime Laboratory Station 10 of the Quezon City Police District for examination. Police Chief Inspector Maridel Rodis-Martinez (PCI Rodis-Martinez), a forensic chemist, examined the seized items and reported that they were positive for shabu. PCI Rodis-Martinez turned over the items to the evidence custodian for safekeeping. 11

The prosecution and the defense stipulated on the testimonies of PO3 Corona and PCI Rodis-Martinez, as follows:

With respect to PO3 Corona's testimony:

1. PO3 Corona was the Police Investigator assigned to investigate these cases; DETACa

2. That in connection with the investigation he conducted, he took the Affidavit of PO2 Wilfredo Flores and PO3 Eugene Martinez marked as Exhibit "D";

3. That the evidence in these cases previously marked as Exhibits "B", "B-1" to "B-3" were turned over to him by the Arresting officers;

4. That in connection therewith, he prepared a Request for Laboratory Examination marked as Exhibit "A" and relative thereto, he received a copy of Chemistry Report marked as Exhibit "C";

5. That he likewise prepared an Inventory of Seized Item marked as Exhibit "E";

6. That he prepared the Chain and Custody Form marked as Exhibit "F";

7. That he took the photographs of the accused and the dangerous drug subject hereof marked as Exhibits "G" and "H";

8. That he prepared the Arrest and Booking Sheet marked as Exhibit "I"; and

9. That he likewise prepared a letter referral to the office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City marked as Exhibit "J." 12

With respect to PCI Rodis-Martinez's testimony:

1. That PCI Rodis-Martinez is a Forensic Chemist of the Philippine National Police; HEITAD

2. That her office received a Request for Laboratory Examination marked as Exhibit "A";

3. That together with the same request was a paper wrapper marked as Exhibit "B" which contained a plastic sachet marked Exhibit "B-1" with two (2) aluminum foils marked as Exhibits "B-2" and "B-3";

4. That she, thereafter, conducted the requested laboratory examination and, in connection therewith, she submitted a Chemistry Report marked as Exhibit "C";

5. That the findings thereon showing the specimen positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride was marked as Exhibit "C-1";

6. That her signature was marked as Exhibit "C-2" and the Jurat was marked as Exhibit "C-3"; and

7. That she, thereafter, turned over the evidence to the evidence custodian and retrieved the same and brought it to court. 13

Version of the Defense

Petitioners denied the accusations against them. Janet testified that on July 20, 2012, 14 she was washing clothes in front of her house when a man arrived and asked her if she saw someone running away. She answered in the negative but the man brought her to the police station where she was asked for money in exchange for her freedom. 15 On the other hand, Modesto testified that on July 20, 2012, he was walking on his way home when he saw two men running towards him while being chased by policemen. When the police officers failed to catch said men, they arrested Modesto in their stead. He claimed that he only met Janet at the police station. 16

The RTC Ruling

In its January 16, 2018 Consolidated Decision, the RTC found petitioners guilty of the charges against them. It held that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Sec. 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 and that there was an unbroken chain of custody of the same illegal substances. It ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal substances were never compromised. The dispositive portion of the consolidated decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. GL-Q-12-177707, the Court finds the accused Modesto Bello y Danao alias "Buding"GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165.

Accordingly, this Court sentences accused Modesto Bello y Danao alias "Buding" to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day as minimum to Fourteen (14) Years as maximum and to pay a Fine in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos ([P]300,000.00).

2. In Criminal Case No. GL-Q-12-177708, the Court finds the accused Janet Mancenido y Sayno GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165.

Accordingly, this Court sentences accused Janet Mancenido y Sayno to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day as minimum to Fourteen (14) Years as maximum and to pay a Fine in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos ([P]300,000.00).

The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to transmit to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) the dangerous drug subject of these cases for proper disposition and final disposal. ATICcS

SO ORDERED. 17

The CA Ruling

In its April 11, 2019 Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling and findings of the RTC. Moreover, the CA rejected petitioners' contention that the items seized as a result of the illegal search must be excluded from evidence because they never questioned the admissibility of the said evidence during trial. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Consolidated Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 82, Quezon City, dated January 16, 2018, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 18

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its September 13, 2019 Resolution. 19 Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

Petitioners raise the following errors:

I.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONERS' CONVICTION FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS DESPITE THE ILLEGALITY OF THE PETITIONERS' ARREST, RENDERING THE ITEMS SUBSEQUENTLY SEIZED INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM.

II.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONERS' CONVICTION FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE ALLEGED SEIZED ITEMS[.]

III.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE PETITIONERS' CONVICTION FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS DESPITE THE POLICE OFFICERS' FAILURE TO JUSTIFY THEIR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 21 OF R.A. NO. 9165. 20

Petitioners claim that the items allegedly seized from them are inadmissible in evidence because they were illegally arrested by the police officers who peeped inside their shanty without probable cause. They likewise claim that the police officers failed to comply with the provisions of Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 and failed to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the marked seized items. 21

In its Comment, 22 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that petitioners pray for a review of the facts and evidence, which is beyond the ambit of a petition for review on certiorari. The OSG also urges this Court to affirm the challenged decision of the CA because the prosecution duly proved all the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. 23 The OSG insists that petitioners were caught in flagrante delicto, thus, the warrantless arrest was valid. 24 Moreover, petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties of the police officers. 25 The OSG alleges that the chain of custody rule was complied with and that the police officers were able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. It argues that the prosecution had proven the whereabouts and safekeeping of the shabu from the time of seizure by the apprehending officers and brought to the police station for investigation until they were delivered to the crime laboratory for examination and their subsequent presentation in court. 26 TIADCc

In their Reply, 27 petitioners argue that while their petition raises factual questions, it falls under the exceptions under the Rules of Court. They claim that the decision of the CA was based on a misapprehension of facts. Thus, the remedy of petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is proper.

The Court's Ruling

The petition has merit.

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must, as a general rule, only raise questions of law. Parties may only raise issues that can be determined without having to review or reevaluate the evidence on record. This Court generally gives weight to the factual findings of the lower courts "because of the opportunity enjoyed by the [lower courts] to observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand and assess their testimony." 28

As an exception to the rule, questions of fact may be raised in a Rule 45 petition if any of the following is present: (1) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded on speculations; (3) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual findings are conflicting; (6) when the CA went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7) when the CA overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) when the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. 29

In this case, one of the above exceptions exists — that the CA rendered judgment based on a misappreciation of facts and overlooked undisputed facts, which must be properly considered to arrive at a just conclusion. Accordingly, the Court may entertain the questions of fact in the present petition.

Evidence obtained from petitioners

A citizen's right to be secure against any unreasonable searches and seizures is sacrosanct. 30 The Constitution guarantees that the State cannot intrude into the citizen's person, house, papers, and effects without a warrant issued by a judge finding probable cause:

Article III

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SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. AIDSTE

The Constitution guarantees against "unreasonable" warrantless searches and seizures. This presupposes that the State may do so as long as they are reasonable. 31 In People v. Aruta, 32 this Court outlined the situations where a warrantless search and seizure may be declared valid, to wit:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent[;] and

(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances. 33 (italics omitted)

Here, PO3 Martinez testified that on the day of the incident, he and PO2 Flores were instructed by PSI Celis to validate the information given by a CI regarding the illegal activities of Janet at Gana Compound, Barangay Unang Sigaw, Balintawak, Quezon City. He stated that they peeped through an open door of the shanty and saw Janet holding a lighter and strips of aluminum foil while Modesto was holding a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Petitioners were then arrested and the lighter, two strips of aluminum foil, and plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance were seized from them. Consequently, petitioners were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs. 34

Petitioners argue that their warrantless arrest was illegal since the police officers had to peep through the open door to ascertain that there was indeed illegal activity in the shanty. They claim that their case is similar to People v. Bolasa, 35 where the police officers were tipped-off by an informant that people were packing drugs in a certain house. When the police officers reached the house, they peeked through a window and saw a man and a woman repacking marijuana. The police officers entered the house, introduced their authority, and arrested the pair. In that case, the Court held that the arrests and the subsequent searches and seizures were invalid as the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that the people in the house were committing a crime. 36

On the other hand, the CA denied petitioners' assertion that the seized items must be excluded from evidence considering that petitioners never questioned the admissibility of said evidence during trial and that they had already waived the right to question the legality of their warrantless arrest for failure to raise the issue before arraignment. 37

This Court disagrees with the CA.

In Lapi v. People, 38 the Court held that the right to question the validity of a warrantless arrest can be waived. This waiver, however, does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of the evidence seized during the illegal arrest. Thus, in the instant case, petitioners were not considered to have waived their right to question the inadmissibility of the evidence seized during the illegal arrest. 39

The seizure of the purported items from petitioners is not one of the abovementioned situations where a warrantless search and seizure may be considered valid. Notably, the prosecution cannot invoke the plain view doctrine as ground for the warrantless search. Under the plain view doctrine, the law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. 40

In this case, the essential requisite of the plain view doctrine is absent because the items purportedly seized were not inadvertently discovered by the police officers. As established by the evidence, the police officers intentionally peeped through the open door of petitioners' house before they confirmed petitioners' activities inside the shanty. Evidently, this act of the police officers does not show that they merely inadvertently or unintentionally stumbled upon the items being handled by petitioners inside their home. Instead, the police officers were purposely searching and investigating the alleged illegal activity being committed by petitioners in their house. EcTCAD

In like manner, the search cannot be considered as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing. 41 Accordingly, there was no basis for the police officers to conduct a warrantless search of petitioners' shanty and, consequently, the seizure of the purported items therein was illegal.

Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved.

The apprehending team's blatant

The alleged crime was committed on July 24, 2012. 42 Thus, R.A. No. 9165 shall apply. 43 Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 requires the presence of three witnesses during the inventory and photograph taking, namely: (1) media representative; (2) representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ); and (3) any elected public official. Sec. 21 thereof, pertinently states:

Section 21.  Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.] (emphasis supplied)

The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) further elaborate on the proper procedure to be followed in Sec. 21 (a), Art. II of R.A. No. 9165. It provides:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] HSAcaE

In the instant case, the police officers committed several patent procedural lapses in the conduct of the seizure and handling of the seized items thus, creating reasonable doubt as to the identity and integrity of the drugs, and, consequently, reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. 44

First, the venue for the inventory was not properly complied with. Sec. 21 (a) of the IRR requires that the inventory and photographing, pursuant to a warrantless search, be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation. Thus, it must be done at the place of arrest, or at the nearest police station or nearest office of the apprehending officers, whichever is practicable. 45

In the recent ruling of People v. Taglucop, 46 the Court settled the proper place for the conduct of the inventory and taking of photographs under R.A. No. 9165. It was therein stated that, in case of warrantless seizures, the inventory and taking of photographs must generally be immediately conducted at the place of seizure. 47 The exception to this rule, wherein the inventory and taking of photographs are allowed at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officers, is when the police officers provide justification that:

1. It is not practicable to conduct the same at the place of seizure; or

2. The items seized are threatened by immediate or extreme danger at the place of seizure. 48

In People. v. Dumanjug, 49 the Court rejected the buy-bust team's argument that it failed to conduct the marking, inventory, photography of the seized drug immediately at the place of arrest because a crowd of 200 people had gathered creating a dangerous environment. Clearly, bare invocation of inconvenience does not translate to compliance with the chain of custody rule. 50

In People v. Salenga, 51 the police officers simply gave the flimsy excuse that the crowd was getting bigger at the place of seizure to justify the transfer of venue to the nearest police station. However, the Court explained that such general excuse was an invalid reason to conduct the inventory at the nearest police station because it was not proven that it was actually not practicable to conduct the inventory at the place of seizure.

In this case, PO3 Martinez testified that immediately after petitioners' arrest, they proceeded to the police station for the conduct of inventory. He explained that a crowd had already gathered at the place of arrest so they decided to go to the police station. Accordingly, the inventory and taking of photographs were not conducted at the place of seizure. However, as stated in the abovecited cases, the mere fact that there was a crowd gathering at the place of arrest is insufficient to establish that it was not practicable to immediately conduct the inventory and taking of photographs thereat.

Second, it is also clear from the testimony of PO3 Martinez that only the barangay kagawad was present at the time of the physical inventory of the evidence seized from petitioners. He also confirmed the absence of the DOJ and media representatives.

CROSS EXAMINATION

Atty. Magallanes:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Who were present during the inventory?

A: The one we invited the Kagawad.

Q: Why did you invite him?

A: To witness the Inventory. AcICHD

Q: Do you have picture showing this Kagawad signing the Inventory?

A: None, sir.

Q: There was no representative from the media and DOJ?

A: None, sir. 52

In People v. Caray, 53 this Court held:

It is a matter of record that only appellant and media representative Maeng Santos were present to witness the inventory of the seized items. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals even noted the absence of any elected official and representative from the DOJ during inventory. No explanation was offered for this omission.

In People v. Abelarde, the accused was acquitted of violation of Section 5, RA 9165 because there was no evidence that the inventory of the seized dangerous drugs was done in the presence of an elected official, a media representative and a representative from the DOJ.

Similarly, in People v. Macud, the buy-bust team similarly failed to secure the presence of the required witnesses to the conduct of inventory of the seized drug items. For this, the Court, too, rendered a verdict of acquittal.

Indeed, the presence of the insulating witnesses during inventory is vital. In the absence of these persons, the possibility of switching, planting, or contamination of the evidence negates the credibility of the seized drug and other confiscated items. Noncompliance with the requirement is, therefore, fatal to the prosecution's case. (citations and emphases omitted)

Clearly, compliance with Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 is mandatory. Absent faithful compliance with the said provision which is primarily intended to, first, preserve the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items in drugs cases, and second, to safeguard accused persons from unfounded and unjust convictions, an acquittal becomes the proper recourse. 54

Saving clause is not applicable

Nevertheless, the absence of the required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such absence or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses must be adduced. 55 In the absence of the witnesses required by law during the physical inventory and photography of the seized items, the Court emphasized in People v. Lim56 that:

It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses (now two witnesses under RA 10640) to the physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:

(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised penal Code proved futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape. 57 (emphasis omitted) ICHDca

As a rule, strict compliance with the foregoing requirements is mandatory. However, following the IRR of R.A. No. 9165, the courts may allow a deviation from these requirements if the following requisites under the "saving clause" are availing: (1) the existence of "justifiable grounds" allowing departure from the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. If these two elements concur, the seizure and custody over the confiscated items shall not be rendered void and invalid; ergo, the integrity of the corpus delicti remains untarnished. 58

Under the saving clause, "[i]t bears stressing that the prosecution has the burden of proving compliance with the requirements of Sec. 21. In case of deviation from or noncompliance with the said requirements, the prosecution must provide a sufficient explanation why Sec. 21 was not complied with." 59 The prosecution must also prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved notwithstanding the foregoing lapses in complying with Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165.

In People v. Hementiza, 60 the Court enumerated the following links that the prosecution must establish in the chain of custody of a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.

This Court finds that the prosecution cannot invoke the saving clause.

Under the first requirement, the prosecution offered no sufficient justification as to the absence of the DOJ and media representatives. The prosecution did not even recognize their procedural lapses or give any plausible explanation on why the apprehending team did not conduct the marking, inventory, and taking of photographs of the seized evidence in the presence of all the insulating witnesses. Neither did the prosecution prove that the arresting officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of the required witnesses.

The second requisite of the saving clause was also not complied with. In this case, aside from noncompliance with the mandatory rules in the inventory and photography of the seized items, this Court finds that the first, third and fourth links in the chain of custody were not clearly established by the prosecution.

First link

Marking is the first and most crucial step in the chain of custody rule as it initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence. 61 Further, marking should be done in the presence of the apprehended violator and the required insulating witnesses i.e., a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official immediately upon confiscation to truly ensure that they are the same items which enter the chain of custody. 62

In this case, the marking of the seized items was conducted only by the police officers amongst themselves without the presence of the required insulating witnesses. As stated earlier, at the police station, the representative from the media and the DOJ were not present to observe the marked items. Worse, the prosecution did not give an explanation as to why the marking was not observed by any of the needed witnesses. cTDaEH

Third link

The third link is the delivery by the investigating officer of the illegal drugs to the forensic chemist. Here, the testimony of PO3 Martinez and the stipulated testimony of PO3 Corona are bereft of any information as to who received the seized items from them. There was likewise an absence of description as to the condition of the seized items when they were delivered to the crime laboratory.

In People v. Beran, 63 the police officer, who both served as apprehending and investigating officer, claimed that he personally took the drug to the laboratory for testing, but there was no showing of who received the drug from him. The records therein also showed that he submitted the sachet to the laboratory for testing only the next day, without explaining how he preserved his exclusive custody thereof overnight. All these facts cast serious doubt that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item were not fatally compromised. Hence, the accused was acquitted.

Also, in People v. Carlit, 64 this Court acquitted the accused when the investigating officer, who was in custody of the dangerous drug before the same was sent to the crime laboratory for examination, failed to testify on how he handled the drug while in his custody until its turnover to the forensic chemist. It was emphasized that "for during the interim time — from when the specimen was placed under his custody until the time it was brought to court — the threat of tampering, alteration, or substitution of the corpus delicti still existed."

Fourth link

The last link in the chain of custody involves the submission of the seized drugs by the forensic chemist to the court when presented as evidence in the criminal case. 65 Here, PCI Rodis-Martinez did not testify in court and the parties merely entered into general stipulations on her testimony, which are bereft of information regarding the condition of the seized items while in her custody and the precautions she took to preserve their integrity. It was stipulated that the specimens were turned over to the evidence custodian, but the latter did not testify as to how he preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. As such, the prosecution was not able to establish, with clarity and certainty, the proper handling and custody of the specimen by the custodian. Absent any testimony on the management, storage, and preservation of the illegal drugs allegedly seized after their qualitative examination, the fourth link in the chain of custody could not be reasonably established. 66 This casts serious doubt on the identity and the integrity of the corpus delicti and leaves several questions unanswered. In People v. Angeles, 67 the Court held:

Clearly, the third and fourth links in the chain of custody are sorely lacking. PO2 Saez's lone testimony leaves several questions unanswered. What happened to the drugs from the time Relos received it from PO2 Saez until it was eventually transmitted to the forensic chemist for examination? Were there other persons who came into contact with the drugs before the forensic chemist subjected it to examination? Who handed the drugs to the forensic chemist? How did Relos and the forensic chemist handle the drugs? Who ultimately transmitted the drugs seized from Angeles to the trial court to be used as evidence against him? The necessary details to prove the preservation of the integrity of the drugs recovered from Angeles remain a mystery. All these are left open to the realm of possibilities such that the evidentiary value of drugs presented in court was unduly prejudiced; considering that it cannot be said with certainty that the drugs were never compromised or tampered with. 68 (emphasis supplied) cSaATC

In view of the foregoing, it appears there were significant gaps in the chain of custody to establish the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. Given the procedural lapses, serious uncertainty hangs over the identification of the corpus delicti that the prosecution introduced into evidence. 69 Consequently, the prosecution's failure to justify such lapses, as well as the inadmissibility of the seized evidence, entitles petitioners to an acquittal based on reasonable doubt. 70

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The April 11, 2019 Decision and September 13, 2019 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 41566, which affirmed the January 16, 2018 Consolidated Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 82 in Criminal Case Nos. GL-Q-12-177707 and GL-Q-12-177708, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners Modesto Bello y Danao alias "Buding" and Janet Mancenido y Sayno are ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Director General of the New Bilibid Prison, Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City and the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City are ORDERED to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE petitioners from detention, unless they are being lawfully held in custody for any other reason, and to INFORM this Court of their action hereon within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution.

Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 11-39.

2. Id. at 43-64; penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, with Associate Justices Danton Q. Bueser and Rafael Antonio M. Santos, concurring.

3. Id. at 66-67.

4. Id. at 93-103; penned by Presiding Judge Lyn Ebora-Cacha.

5. Entitled "AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." Approved, June 7, 2002.

6. Records, p. 2.

7. Id. at 4.

8. Rollo, p. 44-a.

9. Id.

10. Id. at 44-45.

11. Id.

12. Id. at 45-46.

13. Id. at 46.

14. TSN, October 13, 2017, p. 3.

15. Id. at 3-4.

16. Rollo, p. 47.

17. Id. at 102-103.

18. Id. at 64.

19. Id. at 66-67.

20. Id. at 19.

21. Id. at 19-34.

22. Id. at 149-168.

23. Id. at 157-158.

24. Id. at 158-159.

25. Id. at 159-161.

26. Id. at 161-165.

27. Id. at 172-183.

28. Lapi v. People, G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019, 892 SCRA 680, 687-688.

29. Alburo v. People, 792 Phil. 876, 889 (2016).

30. See Lapi v. People, supra note 28 at 689.

31. Id. at 690.

32. 351 Phil. 868 (1998) as cited in Lapi v. People, supra note 28.

33. Id. at 879-880.

34. Id. at 44a-45.

35. 378 Phil. 1073 (1999).

36. Id., as cited in Lapi v. People, supra note 28 at 693.

37. Id. at 695.

38. Id.

39. Id.

40. People v. Acosta, G.R. No. 238865, January 28, 2019, 891 SCRA 397, 405.

41. See People v. Bolasa, supra note 35 at 1080.

42. See Information, records, p. 2.

43. The amendments of R.A. No. 10640 shall not apply as this law became effective on August 7, 2014.

44. See People v. Santos, G.R. No. 218579 (Notice), December 5, 2019.

45. People v. Andanar, G.R. No. 246284, June 16, 2021; citing People v. Dela Torre, G.R. No. 225789, July 29, 2019, 911 SCRA 128, 143.

46. G.R. No. 243577, March 15, 2022.

47. Id.

48. Id.

49. G.R. No. 235468, July 1, 2019, 907 SCRA 89, as cited in People v. Andanar, supra note 45.

50. See People v. Andanar, supra.

51. G.R. No. 239903, September 11, 2019, 919 SCRA 342, 358-359.

52. TSN, October 24, 2016, p. 7.

53. G.R. No. 245391, September 11, 2019, 919 SCRA 389, 398-399.

54. Tolentino v. People, G.R. No. 227217, February 12, 2020.

55. People v. Baptista, G.R. No. 225783, August 20, 2018, 878 SCRA 124, 138; citing People v. Umipang, 686 Phil. 1024, 1052 (2012).

56. G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018, 879 SCRA 31, 61-62.

57. Id.

58. People v. Luna, 828 Phil. 671, 686 (2018).

59. See People v. Arellaga, G.R. No. 231796, August 24, 2020.

60. 807 Phil. 1017, 1030 (2017) as cited in People v. Omamos, G.R. No. 223036, July 10, 2019, 908 SCRA 367, 378-379.

61. People v. Apelanio, G.R. No. 250645, January 18, 2021, citing People v. Martinez, 652 Phil. 347, 377 (2010).

62. Barayuga v. People, G.R. No. 248382, July 28, 2020.

63. 724 Phil. 788 (2014) as cited in People v. Bangcola, G.R. No. 237802, March 18, 2019, 897 SCRA 330, 354.

64. 816 Phil. 940 (2017) as cited in Largo v. People, G.R. No. 201293, June 19, 2019, 905 SCRA 1, 17-18.

65. People v. Dahil, 750 Phil. 212, 237 (2015).

66. People v. Ubungen, 836 Phil. 888, 902 (2018).

67. 833 Phil. 822 (2018) as cited in People v. Labadan, G.R. No. 237769, March 11, 2019, 895 SCRA 600, 622.

68. Id. at 836.

69. People v. Bangcola, supra note 63 at 356.

70. People v. Abdula, G.R. No. 212192, November 21, 2018, 886 SCRA 383, 413.