FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 250723. June 23, 2020.]
BERLINDO BELLEZA @ Bansot, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 23, 2020which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 250723 — Berlindo Belleza @ Bansot v. People of the Philippines — The petitioner's motion for an extension of thirty (30) days within which to file a petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED, counted from the expiration of the reglementary period.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 2 dated July 26, 2019 and the Resolution 3 dated November 28, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 41157, which affirmed with modifications the Decision 4 dated November 30, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 67, Binangonan, Rizal, which found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of child abuse under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
In an Information dated June 26, 2015, petitioner Berlindo Belleza was charged with Lascivious Conduct in violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, to wit:
That on or about the 22nd day of June 2014, in the Municipality of Cardona, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, taking advantage of the victim's minority and while the latter is sleeping and therefore unconscious, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit lascivious conduct upon [JJJ] a fifteen (15)-year old minor, by holding her vagina, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
So, we find accused Berlindo Belleza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of child abuse under §5(b), R.A. 7610 sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 10 years, 2 months and 21 days of Prision Mayor to Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal in its medium period to Reclusion Perpetua as maximum. Further, we ORDER him to pay JJJ P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages plus costs.
SO ORDERED. 6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modifications. The dispositive portion of the said CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 30 November 2017 by RTC, Branch 67, Binangonan, Rizal, in Criminal Case No. 15-356 is AFFIRMED subject to MODIFICATIONS in that appellant shall suffer imprisonment of 10 years, 2 months and 21 days of prision mayor, as minimum and 17 years, 4 months and one 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Furthermore, appellant is ordered to pay JJJ the amounts of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral damages, P15,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P15,000.00 as fine, pursuant to Section 31 (f), Article XII of R.A. No. 7610. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 7
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in its Resolution dated November 28, 2019. 8
In the present Petition, petitioner raises the following issues: (1) The CA erred in affirming the petitioner's conviction despite JJJ's incredible testimony; (2) The CA erred in disregarding petitioner's plausible defense; (3) The CA erred in convicting the petitioner despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
We sustain the ruling of the CA insofar as it affirmed the decision of the RTC, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
Petitioner questions the credibility of JJJ due to the inconsistencies in her testimony. Petitioner points out that JJJ initially stated in her Sinumpaang Salaysay that she told her aunt about the incident. However, in her testimony in open court, JJJ claimed to have told her mother about the encounter with petitioner first and the latter called JJJ's aunt. Further, petitioner questions the fact that JJJ did not offer any resistance when petitioner was allegedly touching her. Petitioner also claims that it is highly improbable that JJJ did not shout for help or awaken her brother, CCC, who was only in the adjacent room.
We find petitioner's arguments untenable.
The Court has time and again held that inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. 9
Moreover, courts expect minor inconsistencies when a child-victim narrates the details of a harrowing experience, especially when the details are too painful to recall. Such inconsistencies only prove that the child-victim was unrehearsed, especially when the discrepancies are minor details irrelevant to the elements of the crime, and thus, cannot be considered as grounds for acquittal. 10
In the instant case, the alleged inconsistency in JJJ's testimony pertains to whom she first reported the incident. We find this to be immaterial to the determination of petitioner's guilt.
Further, the settled rule is that when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled that when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court. Without any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should not be disturbed. 11
Regarding petitioner's claim that JJJ's testimony is incredible because she did not give any resistance and that she did not awaken her brother who was only in the other room, we also find the same to be untenable.
Time and again, the Court has recognized that different people react differently to a given situation involving a startling occurrence. The workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and people react differently — some may shout, others may faint, and still others may be shocked into insensibility even if there may be a few who may openly welcome the intrusion. 12 There is no standard behavior for a victim of a crime against chastity. Behavioral psychology teaches that people react to similar situations dissimilarly. 13
Petitioner proceeds to claim that his plausible defense of denial should have been given weight and credence.
Again, the Court disagrees. As noted by the CA, it is not impossible for petitioner to surreptitiously enter the store and commit the crime charged.
Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witness, on one hand, and the bare denial of the petitioner, on the other, the former must perforce prevail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They are considered with suspicion and always received with caution, not only because they are inherently weak and unreliable but also because they are easily fabricated and concocted. Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner. 14
When the victim's testimony is straightforward, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility, and the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof. 15
Petitioner further argues that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610. Petitioner submits that the second element of the said offense was not properly alleged and proven by the prosecution. That the second element is clearly wanting as the Information did not contain any allegation to the effect that JJJ was a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
For a person to be convicted of violating Section 5 (b), R.A. No. 7610, the following essential elements need to be proved: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse"; and (3) the child whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 16
Contrary to petitioner's assertions, the second element of the offense was indeed sufficiently alleged and proven.
The Court ruled in Dimakuta v. People: 17
As correctly found by the trial court, all the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 are present in the case at bar.
First, petitioner's lewd advances of touching the breasts and vagina of his hapless victim constitute lascivious conduct as defined in Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 7610:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
Second, petitioner clearly has moral ascendancy over the minor victim not just because of his relative seniority but more importantly due to the presumed presence of mutual trust and confidence between them by virtue of an existing employment relationship, AAA being a domestic helper in petitioner's household. Notably, a child is considered as sexually abused under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 when he or she is subjected to lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. Intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. The law does not require physical violence on the person of the victim; moral coercion or ascendancy is sufficient. On this point, Caballo v. People explicated:
As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides that when a child indulges in sexual intercourse or any lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of any adult, the child is deemed to be a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." In this manner, the law is able to act as an effective deterrent to quell all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination against children, prejudicial as they are to their development.
In this relation, case law further clarifies that sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will. Corollary thereto, Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of influence which manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as:
The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another's objective." Meanwhile, "coercion" is the "improper use of . . . power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it." (Emphasis supplied)
It is also not necessary that the description of the crime, as worded in the penal provision allegedly violated, be reproduced verbatim in the accusatory portion of the Information before the accused can be convicted thereunder, as held in Quimvel v. People: 18
The Court has held in a catena of cases that the rule is satisfied when the crime "is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged." Furthermore, "[t]he use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is sufficient." Hence, the exact phrase "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other abuse" need not be mentioned in the Information. Even the words "coercion or influence" need not specifically appear.
xxx xxx xxx
The absence of the phrase "exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse" or even the specific mention of "coercion" or "influence" was never a bar for the Court to uphold the finding of guilt against an accused for violation of RA 7610.
All told, we agree with the CA in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. However, we find it necessary to modify the award of damages on account of recent jurisprudence on the matter. In cases involving Sexual Abuse or Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 [Victim is a child 12 years old and below 18, or above 18 under special circumstances], the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages when the penalty imposed is within the range of reclusion temporal medium is P50,000.00 each. 19 Petitioner is also liable to pay a fine in the amount of P15,000.00, pursuant to Section 31 (f), Article XII of R.A. No. 7610. Legal interest of 6% per annum is imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 26, 2019 and the Resolution dated November 28, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 41157, which affirmed with modifications the Decision dated November 30, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court Branch 67, Binangonan, Rizal, are hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Petitioner Berlindo Belleza is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years, two (2) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as minimum and seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to PAY a fine of P15,000.00. He is further ORDERED to PAY the victim JJJ civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages, each in the amount of P50,000.00. The civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages so imposed are subject to interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
by:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 11-27.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas, with Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi, concurring; id. at 29-40.
3.Id. at 43-44.
4. Penned by Judge Dennis Patrick Z. Perez, id. at 58-60.
5.Id. at 29-30.
6.Id. at 60.
7.Id. at 40.
8.Supra note 3.
9.People v. Esquila, 324 Phil. 366-374 (1996).
10.Fernandez y Medina v. People, G.R. No. 217542, November 21, 2018.
11.People v. Apole, 697 Phil. 194-202 (2012).
12.People v. Amar y Montano, 813 Phil. 370-378 (2017).
13.Awas v. People, 811 Phil. 702-707 (2017).
14.People v. Bringcula y Fernandez, G.R. No. 226400, January 24, 2018.
15.People v. Wile, 784 Phil. 418, 443 (2016).
16.People v. Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019.
17. G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015.
18. 808 Phil. 891, 920-921 (2017).
19.People v. Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, [March 12, 2019].