Beler y Sualivido v. People

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 244191. June 3, 2019.]

MARLON BELER y SUALIVIDO @ ALO A.K.A. MARLON BELER y SUALIVIO, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated June 3, 2019, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 244191 (Marlon Beler y Sualivido @ Alo a.k.a. Marlon Beler y Sualivio vs. People of the Philippines). — This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by herein petitioner Marlon Beler y Sualivido @ Alo a.k.a. Marlon Beler y Sualivio (Marlon), seeking the reversal of the Decision 2 dated August 24, 2018 and Resolution 3 dated January 18, 2019, rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 40425, convicting him of the crimes of Frustrated Murder and Frustrated Homicide.

The Antecedents

Petitioner Marlon was charged with two (2) counts of Frustrated Murder committed against the brothers Rizalino Villacarlos (Rizalino) and Raul Villacarlos (Raul), in two separate Informations, committed as follows:

Criminal Case No. 2011-13625-MK

That on or about the 23rd day of July 2011 in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a long and sharp object with (sic) 10 inches long including the handle, and by means of treachery he surprised the complainant from behind, with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab (sic) complainant Rizalino Villacarlos Y Santiago hitting him on side, abdomen and chest, which would ordinarily cause his death, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence thereof, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause, independent of his will, that is due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to him that prevented his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 2011-13626-MK

That on or about the x x x 23rd day of July 2011 in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with a long and sharp object with (sic) 10 inches long including the handle, and by means of treachery he surprised the complainant from behind, with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab [sic] complainant Raul Villacarlos Y Santiago eight times hitting him one on the back, one on the tight (sic), two on the side and four on the abdomen, which would ordinarily cause his death, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence thereof, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause, independent of his will, that is due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to him that prevented his death. CAIHTE

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4 (Emphases in the original)

Marlon pleaded not guilty to the charges. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. 5

The antecedent facts reveal that at around 11:30 p.m. of July 23, 2011, brothers Raul and Rizalino were walking towards their home. They noticed several men talking along Gen. Malvar Street in Marikina City. 6

Rizalino walked ahead of Raul. Upon reaching the corner of Gen. Malvar and Molave streets, someone suddenly stabbed Raul from behind. Raul turned to face his attacker, who stabbed him several times further in his stomach and chest. 7

Rizalino, upon seeing his brother being attacked, intervened and pushed the attacker away from Raul. The attacker stabbed Rizalino twice. 8

Fearing that the assailant would kill them, Rizalino grabbed the hand of Raul, and they ran away. While they were running, the attacker pursued them and stabbed Raul at the back. 9

Upon reaching the intersection, a barangay patrol car passed by and brought Raul and Rizalino to the Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center, where they were treated. 10

While the brothers were confined, the police came and investigated the crime. The police showed the brothers photos of several men from a rogue gallery. The brothers identified their assailant, who happened to be petitioner Marlon. 11

Marlon vehemently denied the charges leveled against him. He claimed that on July 23, 2011, he slept at around 10:00 p.m. at his home in Gregorio del Pilar Street, Marikina City. He stated that he did not know the brothers personally, and that he never had any altercations with them. 12

Ruling of the RTC

On July 31, 2017, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a Joint Decision 13 convicting Marlon of two counts of frustrated murder. The dispositive portion of the RTC ruling reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused [MARLON] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 2011-13625-MK, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

The Court likewise finds accused [MARLON] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 2011-13626-MK, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

His period of detention shall be fully credited to his [sentence].

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED. 14

Aggrieved, Marlon filed an appeal with the CA. In his appeal, he questioned the reliability of the out-of-court identification made by Raul and Rizalino. He, likewise, argued that the trial court erred in appreciating treachery in the commission of the offense. 15

Ruling of the CA

On August 24, 2018, the CA rendered the assailed Decision 16 partially granting Marlon's appeal. DETACa

First, the CA found that the out-of-court identification made by the brothers Raul and Rizalino was valid. Neither was there any doubt regarding their ability to identify Marlon as their assailant, considering that the place where the crime transpired was well-lit.

Second, the CA affirmed Marlon's conviction for frustrated murder under Criminal Case No. 2011-13626-MK. The CA noted that the attack against Raul was so sudden and unexpected, that the latter had no chance to mount a defense.

However, the CA downgraded the offense in Criminal Case No. 2011-13625-MK to frustrated homicide. The CA found that treachery was wanting considering that the attack against Rizalino was not sudden and unexpected. Rizalino intervened to save his brother Raul, thereby negating the presence of treachery.

Accordingly, the CA modified the penalty and damages imposed by the RTC, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.

The Decision in Criminal Case No. 2011-13626-MK is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, in that [Marlon,] who is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is hereby ordered to pay [Raul] the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

The Decision in Criminal Case No. 2011-13625-MK is SET ASIDE. [Marlon] is found GUILTY only of frustrated homicide. He is sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two months of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. [Marlon] is ordered to pay [Rizalino] civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 and moral damages also in the amount of P30,000.00.

All monetary awards shall earn yearly interest of 6% from the finality of this Decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED. 17 (Citation omitted)

Dissatisfied with the ruling, Marlon filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its Resolution 18 dated January 18, 2019.

Undeterred, Marlon filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Issue

The main issue raised for the Court's resolution rests on whether or not the CA erred in convicting Marlon for the crimes of frustrated murder and frustrated homicide.

In his Petition, Marlon seeks exoneration from the charges, raising the same arguments he earlier raised in his appeal before the CA. He claims that the RTC and the CA erred in giving credence to the out-of-court identification made by the brothers, 19 and in appreciating the presence of treachery in the attack committed against Raul. 20 Marlon avers that Raul's claim that he was suddenly stabbed at the back does not inspire belief, as Raul admitted that Marlon and his group were exchanging pleasantries when Raul first saw them. Thus, there seems to be a void on Raul's version as to how Marlon suddenly ended up stabbing him all of a sudden. This holds even more truth considering that they did not have any grudge against each other. 21 Neither was it proved that the alleged treacherous manner of attack was deliberately or consciously adopted. 22

Ruling of the Court

The instant petition is bereft of merit.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines the crime of murder as follows:

ARTICLE 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: aDSIHc

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. (Emphasis Ours)

Essentially, the elements of murder are: (i) that a person was killed; (ii) that the accused killed him or her; (iii) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (iv) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide. 23

Notably, there is treachery or alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In order for the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated, the following requisites must be shown: (i) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution which would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate, and (ii) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. 24

Guided by the foregoing, the Court finds that the CA properly appreciated treachery in Criminal Case No. 2011-13626-MK, which refers to the attack against Raul, and correctly negated treachery in Criminal Case No. 2011-13625-MK, committed against Rizalino.

In Criminal Case No. 2011-13626-MK, Marlon attacked Raul in a sudden, unexpected and rapid motion. Raul, who was walking quietly on his way home, had no inkling that an attack was forthcoming. He was completely unaware of the imminent peril to his life. In a rapid motion, Marlon chanced upon Raul, and stabbed him in the back. The attack was so sudden and unexpected that Raul, who was unarmed, had no chance to mount a defense. The deliberate swiftness of the attack significantly diminished the risk to Marlon that may be caused by Raul's retaliation. Thus, there can be no denying that Marlon's attack against Raul reeks of treachery. 25

The same, however, does not hold true in Criminal Case No. 2011-13625-MK — the attack against Rizalino. ATICcS

The facts show that at the time Marlon suddenly attacked Raul, Rizalino was a few steps ahead of Raul. Rizalino heard Raul whimpering, which caused the former to turn his back. Upon seeing Raul being stabbed by Marlon, Rizalino immediately rushed to the aid of Raul and pushed Marlon in an attempt to pacify him. The following exchange reveals how Rizalino was attacked:

Q: And what did you do upon seeing your brother Raul being stabbed by Marlon?

A: I went near him and I pushed him in order to pacify them, sir.

Q: And what happened next?

A: He moved back a bit but upon seeing me, I was the one he stabbed next, sir.

Q: And on what particular part of your body were you stabbed?

A: On my side, sir (witness pointing to his left side of [his] body). 26

It is evident from the foregoing testimony that the attack against Rizalino was not sudden and unexpected. In fact, Rizalino had the opportunity to flee and defend himself. In choosing to swoop in, and defend his brother, he was aware of the impending peril that would befall him.

It cannot be gainsaid that in order for an attack to be regarded as treacherous, it must have come without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape the sudden blow. 27 The victim's awareness of the peril to his life negates treachery. 28

In fact, in People v. Casas, 29 a case which bears a striking similarity to the instant case, the Court held that there could be no treachery if the victim knew of the impending peril to his life, and was fully aware of the danger he may be faced with. In Casas, a fistfight ensued between a certain Eligio and therein accused-appellant Casas. Joel, the victim, saw Casas stab Eligio. Wanting to help Eligio, Joel grabbed a bamboo pole. Unfortunately, however, Joel slipped and fell. Then, Casas fatally stabbed Joel while the latter lay prostrate on the floor. The Court declared that treachery could not be appreciated in the attack against Joel, explaining that: ETHIDa

Under these circumstances, it is the Court's observation that Joel was fully aware of the danger posed in assisting Eligio. He knew that Casas was armed with a knife and had just used the same on Eligio. Joel elected to intervene, and even armed himself with a bamboo pole. Accordingly, it is rather obvious that Joel was aware of the danger to his life. Further, acting in the heat of the moment, and there being no showing that no appreciable interval of time had elapsed from Joel's mishap to his stabbing so as to allow for the assailant's careful reflection, it does not equally appear that Casas deliberately adopted means in order to ensure that Joel had no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. Palpably, Casas just happened to stab Joel as the latter had just slipped on the floor when the former caught up with him (Joel). Evidently, this lack of deliberation on the part of Casas, as well as Joel's obvious awareness of the danger to his life, prompts this Court to discount treachery as a qualifying circumstance.

Thus, insofar as the incidents in Crim. Case No. 136842 go, the Court downgrades the conviction to the crime of Homicide. 30 (Emphasis Ours)

Similarly, in People v. Se, 31 the Court stressed that the essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the victim, without the slightest provocation on the latter's part. The victim must not have known the peril he was exposed to at the moment of the attack. Should it appear, however, that the victim was forewarned of the danger he was in and, instead of fleeing from it, he met it and was killed as a result, then the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated. 32 As eloquently stated by the Court in People v. Mantes, 33 "there is no treachery where the victim was aware of the danger to his life; when he chose to be courageous instead of cautious." 34

Equally important, in assessing whether treachery attended the commission of the offense, the Court, in People v. Escarlos, 35 warned that any doubt as to the existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of the accused. 36

Based on the foregoing, it becomes all too apparent that the attack against Rizalino was in no way treacherous, inasmuch as the obvious danger he faced was in no way sudden, unexpected, or unforeseen.

The Crimes Were Properly Regarded

The RTC and the CA correctly ruled that the crimes were committed in the frustrated stage.

In Serrano v. People, 37 the Court characterized a frustrated felony as one wherein the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence, and the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator. 38 "The crucial point to consider is the nature of the wound inflicted which must be supported by independent proof showing that the wound inflicted was sufficient to cause the victim's death without timely medical intervention." 39

The prosecution sufficiently established that the victims survived because of timely medical intervention. Notably, the records show that Raul and Rizalino were treated for "acute abdomen secondary to multiple stab wounds." 40 In medical terms, this meant that the patients must be immediately operated on. In fact, Dr. Farrah Mae Salvani, the physician who operated on Raul and Rizalino, testified that the numerous wounds sustained by the brothers would have been fatal, if they were not immediately operated on. She stressed that the brothers would have died without proper and immediate medical intervention. 41

The Out-of-Court Identification

Remarkably, in assessing the admissibility and credibility of the out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test, where they consider the following factors, viz.:

(1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. 42 cSEDTC

More specifically, for out-of-court identifications made through photographs, the Court, in People of the Philippines v. Antonio Llamera y Atienza, 43 laid down the guidelines for ensuring the reliability of the victim's identification: first, a series of photographs must be shown and not merely that of the suspect; second, the arrangement and display of the photographs should in no way suggest which one of the pictures pertains to the suspect; and third, the photographic identification should be free from any impermissible suggestions that would single out a person to the attention of the witness making the identification. 44

In the case at bar, the procedure employed by the police was in accordance with the above-mentioned guidelines. Raul and Rizalino were shown a set of photos, from which to identify their attacker. The police investigator simply asked them if they could identify their assailant from the gallery. The investigator watched passively, while Raul and Rizalino scoured through the photos. Likewise, the identification was done on separate occasions since Raul and Rizalino were separated by a curtain during their confinement in the hospital. 45

Suffice to say, there can be no doubt as to Raul's and Rizalino's ability to remember the face of their attacker, who they clearly saw from the illumination provided by the Meralco lamppost. 46 This allowed them to, likewise, accurately describe how Marlon looked and what he was wearing. Moreover, the trial court regarded the brothers' testimonies as credible and trustworthy. There was no reason for them to falsely impute a crime against Marlon. In fact, Marlon never ascribed any ill-motive against them.

It is well-settled that when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect; more so, when such findings are affirmed by the appellate court. Absent any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, this rule on the assessment of a witness' credibility should not be disturbed. 47

Based on all the foregoing, Marlon's weak and self-serving defenses of denial and alibi certainly falter against the positive identification made by Raul and Rizalino. It must be remembered that for an alibi to prosper, it must be shown that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime. This was not established in the case at bar.

The Proper Penalty and Pecuniary

Significantly, Article 50 of the RPC states that "[t]he penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony."

In line with this, Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 48 provides that the penalty for murder shall be reclusion perpetua. Thus, the imposable penalty for frustrated murder shall be reclusion temporal.

Furthermore, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence shall be imposed, consisting of a maximum term, which is the penalty under the RPC properly imposed after considering any attending circumstance; while the minimum term is within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the RPC for the offense committed. 49 Accordingly, the CA correctly imposed the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for frustrated murder.

Similarly, the CA correctly ordered the payment of the following amounts of damages — P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as exemplary damages. SDAaTC

However, the Court finds that the CA erred in ordering the payment of temperate damages for the medical expenses incurred by Raul. In the landmark case of People v. Jugueta, 50 the Court stated that temperate damages may be awarded only "when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in court, the amount of P50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded." 51

The Proper Penalty and Pecuniary

Article 249 of the RPC provides that the imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. However, considering that the crime committed is merely frustrated homicide, then, the imposable penalty shall be the penalty next lower in degree than reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances present in this case, the minimum penalty to be meted on Marlon should be anywhere within the range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to anywhere between the medium period of prision mayor ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Thus, the imposition by the CA of an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum, was correct.

Likewise, the amount of damages awarded by the CA, which consist of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral damages, is in accordance with the case of Jugueta. As ruled, there shall be no award of exemplary damages unless an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, which is not applicable in the case at bar. 52

Finally, all amounts due to the victims shall earn a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until full satisfaction. 53

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 24, 2018 and Resolution dated January 18, 2019, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 40425 are AFFIRMED with modification by DELETING the award of temperate damages granted by the Court of Appeals in Criminal Case No. 2011-13626-MK for Frustrated Murder.

All other awards are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 10-29.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla, with Associate Justices Victoria Isabela A. Paredes and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi, concurring; id. at 33-47.

3.Id. at 49-50.

4.Id. at 33-34.

5.Id. at 34.

6.Id. at 35.

7.Id.

8.Id.

9.Id.

10.Id.

11.Id.

12.Id. at 35-36.

13. Rendered by Judge Acerey C. Pacheco; id. at 67-75.

14.Id. at 74-75.

15.Id. at 36-37.

16.Id. at 33-47.

17.Id. at 46-47.

18.Id. at 49-50.

19.Id. at 20.

20.Id. at 23.

21.Id. at 24.

22.Id.

23.People v. Gaborne, 791 Phil. 581, 592 (2016).

24.People v. Bugarin, 807 Phil. 588, 600-601 (2017).

25.People v. Las Piñas, et al., 739 Phil. 502, 525 (2014).

26.Rollo, p. 86.

27.People v. Bugarin, supra note 24.

28.People v. Cariño, 416 Phil. 276, 285 (2001), citing People v. Escarlos, 457 Phil. 580, 599 (2003).

29. 755 Phil. 210 (2015).

30.Id. at 222.

31. 469 Phil. 763 (2004).

32.Id. at 771.

33. 420 Phil. 751 (2001).

34.Id. at 760.

35. 457 Phil. 580 (2003).

36.Id. at 599, citing People v. Doctolero Sr., 415 Phil. 632, 642 (2001).

37. 637 Phil. 319 (2010).

38.Id. at 335, citing Palaganas v. People, 533 Phil. 169, 192 (2006).

39.Serrano v. People, id. at 328.

40.Rollo, p. 69.

41.Id.

42.People v. Lugnasin, et al., 781 Phil. 701, 713 (2016).

43. G.R. No. 218703, April 23, 2018.

44.Id., citing People v. Rodrigo, 586 Phil. 515, 531 (2008).

45.Rollo, p. 90.

46.Id.

47.People v. Lugnasin, et al., supra note 42, at 711.

48. AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Approved on December 13, 1993.

49. Act No. 4103, Section 1.

50. 783 Phil. 806 (2016).

51. Id. at 853-854.

52. Id.

53. Id.