BDO Unibank, Inc. v. Spouses Chang

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 250769. May 3, 2021.]

BDO UNIBANK, INC.,petitioner, vs. SPOUSES HENRY CHANG AND TE LEE CHANG, TIFFANY HAZEL LEE CHANG, HAROLD TIMOTHY LEE CHANG, AND HOWARD TERRENCE LEE CHANG, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedMay 3, 2021which reads as follows: HTcADC

"G.R. No. 250769 — BDO UNIBANK, INC., petitioner, versusSPOUSES HENRY CHANG AND TE LEE CHANG, TIFFANY HAZEL LEE CHANG, HAROLD TIMOTHY LEE CHANG, AND HOWARD TERRENCE LEE CHANG, respondents.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision 2 dated August 5, 2019 and the Resolution 3 dated December 9, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 145014.

The Facts

Petitioner BDO Unibank, Inc. (BDO) filed a Complaint 4 for collection of sum of money with application for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against Chemvision, Inc. (Chemvision) and the following individuals: Te Lee Chang (Te), Chemvision's President; Henry Chang (Henry), spouse of Te; Tiffany Hazel Lee Chang (Hazel), Chemvision's former corporate treasurer; Harold Timothy Lee Chang (Harold), Chemvision's corporate treasurer; and Howard Terrence Lee Chang (Howard), Chemvision's corporate secretary (collectively, Respondents).

The Complaint was raffled to Branch 139, Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC) and docketed as Civil Case No. 14-328. In the Complaint, BDO alleged that it extended various credit accommodations to Chemvision which the latter failed to pay despite repeated demands. BDO further alleged that Respondents refused to comply with various surety agreements they executed in favor of BDO.

On March 28, 2014, the RTC issued an Order 5 granting BDO's application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. Sheriffs Joseph Edwin Carreon (Sheriff Carreon), Camilo Tabaco, Jr. (Sheriff Tabaco), and Alberto H. Buenaventura (Sheriff Buenaventura) were appointed to implement the writ of attachment and to serve summons upon Chemvision and Respondents.

In the Sheriff's Partial Report 6 dated April 21, 2014, the sheriffs narrated the attempts made at personal service of summons together with the Complaint and its annexes, Writ of Preliminary Attachment, orders of the RTC, and preliminary attachment bond:

1. The undersigned Sheriffs attempted to personally served (sic) copies of the Summons together with Complaint and all its complete annexes attached thereon, Writ of Preliminary Attachment, Order and Bond to defendant Chemvision, Inc., on the following dates and addresses to wit:

a. On March 31 and April 1, 2014, at its given address located at [San Francisco Del Monte Address], but the same was ineffectual and unavailing as said defendant's Officer who are (sic) authorized to received (sic) said Court Processes are not around (sic) the said address.

i. Acting upon information that Chemvision's President, defendant [Te, Tiffany, Harold, and Howard] were probably attending a wake at the Columbary located at Araneta Ave., Quezon City [(Columbary)], [Sheriff Buenaventura], together with [BDO]'s counsel, Atty. Joel S. Romero, and account officer Dory C. Apacible, went to said place on 31 March 2014 at around 4:00 P.M. However, upon arrival thereat, the said defendant[s] reportedly had just left the building.

ii. Acting upon information that defendants [Te, Harold, Howard, and Tiffany] [would] possibly attend the cremation on 1 April 2014 at 9:00 A.M., [Sheriff Buenaventura], together with Atty. Romero, went back to the Columbary on the said date and time. Despite waiting until around 11:30 A.M., the said defendants could not be found at the said place.

iii. Also on 31 March 2014 at around 2:00 P.M. at Chemvision's [San Francisco Del Monte Address], Security Guard Jennifer Delfin told [Sheriff Buenaventura] that [Te, Harold, Howard, and Tiffany] were allegedly not at the premises. When [Sheriff Buenaventura] returned on 1 April 2014 at around 8:00 A.M., the same security guard informed [Sheriff Buenaventura] that Chemvision was purportedly no longer operating. When [Sheriff Buenaventura] pointed out to Security Guard Delfin that there [were] trucks inside the premises with the name "Chemvision" printed on their doors, Security Guard Delfin insisted that Chemvision [was] no longer operating.

b. On March 31, 2014, at its possible address located at [Noble Street, Batangas Address], but the same was ineffectual and unavailing as said defendant Corporation is unknown to them per information given by its present occupant, Ms. Luceria Gozum.

c. On the same day (March 31, 2014) at its another (sic) possible address located at [Noble Street Batangas Address], but the same was ineffectual and unavailing as said defendant Corporation is unknown to them per information given by its present occupant Mr. Michael Angelo Bunyo King.

2. That after several attempts and diligent efforts to personally serve copy of the Summons together with the Complaint and its complete annexes, Writ of Preliminary Attachment, Order and Bond, in the above-captioned case upon the following defendants to wit:

a. To defendant/s Spouses [Henry and Te], on their address located at [Lexus New Manila Address] [in] Quezon City and at their office/place of business located at c/o Chemvision, Inc. [San Francisco Del Monte Address].

b. To defendant/s [Tiffany, Harold, Timothy, and Howard] on their address located at [7th St. New Manila Address], and [on] their office/place of business located at c/o Chemvision [San Francisco Del Monte Address].

 On the following dates, to wit:

1) March 31, 2014 at around 8:00 A.M. and 2:00 P.M.

2) April 1, 2014 at around 8:00 A.M. and 1:00 P.M.

The same proved futile as they were always out of the said addresses, according to the security officer, namely, Mr. Domingo Zamudio and Mr. Aproniano Catlang, Jr., [Sheriff Buenaventura] insisted for several times that the summons and the complaint be served on any other member of the households of the said defendants, but the said security officer replied that none was inside. CAIHTE

As aforestated [Sheriff Buenaventura] likewise attempted personal service to [Te, Harold, Timothy, Howard, and Tiffany] at [the Columbary] on 31 March 2014 at around 4:00 P.M. and 1 April 2014 from 9:00 A.M. to 11:30 A.M., but the same likewise failed at (sic) the said defendants were not at the said address. 7

Because of the failure to effect personal service, the sheriffs resorted to substituted service of summons. As stated in the Sheriff's Partial Report, substituted service proceeded as follows:

Thus, on April 1, 2014, at around 3:00 P.M. when said defendants were still not around at their given addresses, and because of impossibility of personally serving said court processes to the defendant/s, the undersigned sheriffs were constrained to personally hand-in upon (sic) the following persons to wit:

A. To Mr. Domingo Zamudio, who introduce (sic) himself as the Security Officer of the defendants Spouses [Henry and Te] x x x

B. To Mr. Aproniano Catiang, Jr., who introduce (sic) himself as the Security Officer of [Tiffany, Harold, and Howard] x x x

C. To Mr. (sic) Jennifer Delfin, who introduce (sic) himself (sic) as the Security Officer of [Chemvision, Henry, Te, Tiffany, Harold, and Howard] x x x

Substituted service of summons and other court processes upon defendant/s [Henry, Te, Tiffany, Harold, and Howard] were made in accordance with the provisions of Rule 14, Section 7(a) and (b) of the New Rules of Court, by leaving copies of the Summons together with a copy of the Complaint and its complete annexes, Writ of Preliminary Attachment, Order and Bond:

A. Thru Mr. Domingo Zamudio, who introduce (sic) himself as the Security Officer of [Henry and Te] who refuse (sic) to affix his signature on the receiving copies of the same, on their address at [Lexus New Manila Address].

B. Thru Mr. Aproniano Catiang[,] Jr., who introduce (sic) himself as the Security Officer of [Tiffany, Harold, and Howard] who refuse (sic) to affix his signature on the receiving copies of the same, on their [7th St. New Manila Address].

C. Thru Mr. (sic) Jennifer Deflin, who introduce (sic) himself (sic) as the Security Officer of [Henry, Te, Tiffany, Hazel, Harold, Howard] who refuse (sic) to affix his signature on the receiving copies of the same, on their [San Francisco Del Monte Address]. 8

Subsequently, Te filed a Special Entry of Appearance with Motion to Dismiss 9 dated April 28, 2014 claiming lack of jurisdiction over her person. In her motion, Te averred that she came to know of BDO's Complaint and the Writ of Preliminary attachment after verifying cases filed against her with the Office of the Clerk of Court. 10 Claiming that she has yet to receive a copy of the summons, Complaint, and the Writ of Preliminary Attachment, she prayed for the dismissal of the case. 11

In the Sheriff's Report 12 dated May 13, 2014, Sheriff Buenaventura informed the RTC that on May 9, 2014 he effected personal service upon Chemvision through Te, Chemvision's President, who received the same but refused to sign the original copy of the court processes.

Having received no responsive pleading, BDO filed a motion to declare Chemvision and Respondents in default. 13

During the August 15, 2014 hearing on BDO's motion, Atty. Roderick Rabino (Atty. Rabino) entered his special appearance and manifested before the court that he was in the process of being engaged by Respondents. Atty. Rabino asked for a period of 15 days within which to respond to BDO's motion. 14 The RTC, in its Order dated August 15, 2014, granted Atty. Rabino's request for time with a caveat that the court would not recognize any pleading filed without proof of his engagement as counsel by Respondents.

Thereafter, Tiffany, Harold, and Howard, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss 15 dated August 28, 2014 claiming that the RTC had no personal jurisdiction over them as the substituted service of summons was invalid. They argued that since impossibility of prompt personal service was never established, then the resort to substituted service was improper. 16 They maintained that security officers Delfin and Catiang were unknown to them. To this, they presented a certification from the security agency engaged to provide security services for the residential compound located at the 7th Street New Manila Address that there was no security guard or employee with the name Aproniano Catiang, Jr. 17

The Ruling of the RTC

Acting on BDO's motion to declare in default and Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, the RTC issued its Order 18 dated March 5, 2015. The RTC ruled that there was an invalid service of summons upon Respondents. Instead of dismissing the case, the RTC ordered the issuance of alias summons. Finding the service of summons on Chemvision effective, the RTC declared Chemvision in default. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court RULES as follows:

(1) The Special Entry of Appearance with Motion to Dismiss filed by [Te] is hereby NOTED and DENIED, respectively. There being an invalid substituted service of summons to her, let an Alias Summons be issued and served to the said defendant;

(2) The Motion to Declare in Default [Chemvision, Henry, Tiffany, Harold, and Howard], is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED insofar as [Chemvision] is concerned. The said defendant is hereby DECLARED IN DEFAULT;

(3) The Motion to Dismiss filed by [Tiffany, Harold, and Howard] is hereby DENIED. There being an invalid substituted service of summons to them, let an Alias Summons be issued and served to the said defendants.

Furnish copies of this Order to the parties and their respective counsels.

SO ORDERED. 19

According to the RTC, it was not shown that the security officers who received the summons on behalf of Respondents were "authorized and possessed relations of confidence" and, hence, service on these security officers could not be considered as valid substituted service of summons. 20 BDO's argument that Respondents voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction due to the appearance of Atty. Rabino during the August 2014 motion hearing was rejected. 21

BDO and Respondents sought the partial reconsideration of the foregoing Order. In its Order 22 dated January 11, 2016, the RTC denied all motions for reconsideration. aScITE

Both parties filed Rule 65 petitions for certiorari before the CA, assailing the RTC Orders dated March 5, 2015 and January 11, 2016. BDO's petition was docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 145014 while Respondents' petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 144744.

The Ruling of the CA

In its Decision 23 dated August 5, 2019, the CA dismissed BDO's petition and affirmed the RTC's Orders.

The CA sustained the RTC's finding that there was an invalid substituted service of summons. It was not shown that the security officers who received the summons were authorized and possessed relations of confidence with Respondents. Records showed that the security officers did not reside in any of the addresses of Respondents. The CA also agreed with the RTC that the special appearance of Atty. Rabino during the August 2014 hearing cannot be considered as voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction.

BDO's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution 24 dated December 9, 2019. Hence, this Petition.

It should be noted that the CA also dismissed Respondents' petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 144744 in a Decision 25 dated April 8, 2016 and Resolution 26 dated July 28, 2016. There, the CA found that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Respondents' motions to dismiss and in issuing alias summons. Respondents appealed the CA Decision before this Court, with their petition for review docketed as G.R. No. 226093. In a Resolution dated June 20, 2018, the Court denied their petition which attained finality on September 18, 2018.

BDO now comes before the Court posing the sole issue of whether the RTC acquired personal jurisdiction over Respondents either by a valid substituted service of summons or their voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is not meritorious.

Preliminarily, the Court notes that the issues raised by BDO are factual in nature as they pertain to the perceived defects of the factual bases for the substituted service of summons. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are deemed conclusive and binding upon the Court. 27 While this rule is subject to certain exceptions, none of those is present in this case.

In any case, after a careful review of the merits of BDO's claim, the Court finds that the CA did not commit any reversible error in affirming the Orders of the RTC.

BDO instituted a Complaint for collection of sum of money. Being an action in personam, the court must acquire jurisdiction over the persons of Respondents. 28 Personal jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either through a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. 29

The Court has extensively discussed the contours of personal and substituted service of summons in Manotoc v. Court of Appeals (Manotoc). 30 As a rule, summons must be served personally. 31 Resort to substituted service may only be made upon the concurrence of two requisites: 32 (1) the impossibility of personal service of summons within a reasonable time after diligent efforts at locating the defendants; and (2) service upon any of the persons identified in Rule 14, Section 7 of the Rules of Court.

Otherwise stated, when confronted with a challenge on the validity of a substituted service of summons, the Court must examine two aspects: first, the impossibility of personal service and, second, the manner by which substituted service was made.

Since substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service, parties do not have unbridled right to resort to the same. 33 The requirements for substituted service of summons must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully. 34 As such, the pertinent facts proving these circumstances must be stated in the proof of service or in the officer's return. 35 Naturally, the Court's analysis must begin with the sheriff's report.

A perusal of the Sheriff's Partial Report would show that several attempts to effect personal service were made on at least two different dates. 36 The attempts were spread out from March 31 to April 1, 2014, at varying times of the day. 37 Efforts to locate Respondents were clearly stated in the Sheriff's Partial Report which led the sheriffs to visit six different addresses. 38 The impossibility of personal service within a reasonable time despite diligent efforts in locating Respondents was sufficiently proven. 39 In fact, BDO does not raise any issue on this front.

The bone of contention lies in the manner by which substituted service was effected. Was the service of summons to the security officers proper in this case?

When efforts to personally serve summons on a defendant within a reasonable time is impossible, substituted service may be done by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or residence or at the defendant's office or regular place of business. 40

If substituted service is made at the defendant's house or residence, the sheriff must leave a copy of the summons with a person of "suitable age and discretion residing therein." 41 This refers to a person who has reached the age of legal capacity and has sufficient discernment to comprehend the importance of a summons as well as the duty to deliver it immediately to the defendant. 42 The Court, in Manotoc, clarified this requirement in no uncertain terms:

x x x A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed." Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the "relation of confidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons. 43

If substituted service is made at the defendant's office or regular place of business, the sheriff must leave a copy of the summons with a "competent person in charge thereof." 44 This refers to any person managing the office or the business of the defendant, such as the president or a manager. 45 For this mode of substituted service, the Court, in Manotoc, explained: DETACa

x x x Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the Return. 46

In either case, the proof of return or the sheriffs' report must disclose specific details regarding the inquiries made and the competencies of the person upon whom copies of the summons and court processes were given.

Weighed against the foregoing jurisprudential standards, the sheriffs' report in this case is wanting. Service was made to the security guards allegedly stationed at the residences and place of business of Respondents. However, it does not appear from their report that the sheriffs made any inquiry as to the age, relationship with Respondents, and duties of these security guards. Neither does it appear from their report that the sheriffs explained to the security guards the importance of the latter's duty of immediately delivering the summons to Respondents or, at the very least, of notifying Respondents.

In Orion Security Corporation v. Kalfan Enterprises, Inc.47(Orion) and in Chu v. Mach Asia Trading Corporation, 48 the Court rejected the contention that service on the security guard constituted compliance with the stringent rules of substituted service since it was not shown that the security guards therein who received the summons shared such relation of confidence with the defendants that the latter would surely receive the summons.

Similar omissions in the sheriff's return have resulted in the invalidation of substituted service of summons. In B.D. Long Span Builders, Inc. v. R.S. Ampeloquio Realty Development, Inc., 49 citing the ruling in Orion, the Court found it fatal that there was nothing in the sheriff's return or on record indicating that the person who received the summons shared such relation of confidence as required by Manotoc. 50

In finding that there was an ineffective substituted service, the Court, in Spouses Galura v. Math-Agro Corporation51 and in Land Bank of the Philippines v. La Loma Columbary, Inc., 52 pointed to the absence in the return of service of any showing that the person who received the summons was of suitable age, discretion, and residing in the residence of the defendants.

In Go Ramos-Yeo v. Spouses Chua, 53 the sheriff's return failed to indicate that the person receiving the summons was of suitable age with full legal capacity and with enough discernment to comprehend the import of the summons and his duty of delivering it to the defendant at the earliest possible time. 54

That being said, it must nevertheless be emphasized that the absence in the sheriff's return of statements showing compliance with the statutory and jurisprudential requirements of substituted service of summons does not conclusively prove that the service is invalid. While the sheriff's return carries with it the presumption, albeit disputable, of regularity in the sense that the entries therein are deemed correct, it does not necessarily follow that an act done in relation to the official duty for which the return is made was not done simply because it was not disclosed therein. Besides, the sheriff's neglect in making such a disclosure should not unduly prejudice the plaintiff if what was undisclosed was in fact done. 55

Hence, when defects are apparent on the face of the sheriff's report, as in this case, evidence that would prove proper compliance with the rules on substituted service may be presented. 56

Extrinsic evidence was received by the trial court in the cases of Sagana v. Francisco, 57 and Robinson v. Miralles, 58 thereby supplementing the defective sheriff's return which aided the courts in finding that there was valid substituted service. In Boticano v. Chu, 59 the Court appreciated evidence showing that the defendant actually received a copy of the summons which cured the defects in the substituted service of summons.

Corollarily, extrinsic evidence may also be offered to prove non-compliance with the rules. In the cases of Mapa v. Court of Appeals, 60Sy y Ang v. Navarro, 61Ang v. Chinatrust (Philippines) Commercial Bank Corp., 62 and Filmerco Commercial Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 63 evidence was presented which controverted the statements made in the sheriff's return showing irregularities in the actual service of summons. In these cases, the Court considered the totality of evidence and arrived at the conclusion that there was an invalid substituted service of summons despite the statements made in the sheriff's return.

In the case at bar, when confronted with allegations from Respondents that there was improper service of summons, the RTC proceeded to hear the motions filed together with BDO's oppositions thereto. Respondents averred that the security guards who were allegedly stationed at the residential compounds were unknown to them. They presented a certification from the security agency showing that the security guard upon whom service was made was not its employee. BDO failed to present countervailing evidence to meet these assertions. Moreover, the claim by Respondents that they have not received a copy of the summons, together with the Complaint and other court processes, was never challenged by BDO.

The Court further notes that the sheriffs were accompanied by representatives of BDO. Thus, it would have been easy for BDO to have presented testimonial evidence that would show compliance with the legal requirements in substituted service of summons. Instead of doing so, BDO merely relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of the sheriffs' official duty. 64

All told, the RTC cannot be faulted for issuing its Orders when the preponderance of evidence tipped in favor of Respondents.

Finally, BDO's contention that, nevertheless, Respondents have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC, is bereft of any factual and legal basis. While it is true that one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, 65 this is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority. 66

The Court is convinced that Respondents never acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the RTC. The appearance of the counsel for the Respondents was precisely to challenge the court's jurisdiction. Their initial prayer for time to respond to BDO's motion to declare them in default cannot be considered voluntary submission. 67

Neither can the Court ascribe grave abuse of discretion to the RTC for ordering the issuance of alias summons. This is a logical directive proceeding from the failure of substituted service of summons. A case need not be dismissed simply because an original summons was wrongfully served. 68 An alias summons can be served on said defendant, as provided for under Section 5 of Rule 14, 69 and such order is well within the trial court's discretion to do so. 70

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The challenged Decision dated August 5, 2019 and the Resolution dated December 9, 2019 of the Court of Appeals, Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 145014 are hereby AFFIRMED.

The petitioner's submission and manifestation, in compliance with the Resolution dated October 7, 2020, is NOTED. aDSIHc

SO ORDERED."GaerIan, J., no part; Lopez, J., J., Additional Member per Raffle dated April 21, 2021.

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 9-30.

2.Id. at 36-45a. Penned by Associate Justice Germano Francisco D. Legaspi, with Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a Member of the Court), concurring.

3.Id. at 50-51.

4.Id. at 58-71.

5.Id. at 75-81. Penned by Presiding Judge Benjamin T. Pozon.

6.Id. at 82-87.

7.Id. at 82-84.

8.Id. at 84-85.

9.Id. at 89-90.

10.Id.

11.Id.

12.Id. at 88.

13.Id. at 91-92.

14.Seeid. at 94.

15.Id. at 98-103.

16.Id. at 100.

17.Id. at 101.

18.Id. at 107-110.

19.Id. at 110.

20.Id. at 109.

21.Id.

22.Id. at 111-112.

23.Supra note 2.

24.Supra note 3.

25.Rollo, pp. 122-123. Penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba, with Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia and Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez (now a Member of the Court), concurring.

26.Id. at 125-126.

27. See Carbonell v. Carbonell-Mendes, 762 Phil. 529, 537 (2015).

28.Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., G.R. No. 140244, August 29, 2000, 339 SCRA 243, 247, citing Venturanza v. Court of Appeals, 240 Phil. 306 (1987).

29.Elice Agro-Industrial Corp. v. Young, 669 Phil. 48, 58 (2012); Casimina v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 147530, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 171, 177.

30. G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006, 499 SCRA 21.

31. RULES OF COURT, Rule 14, Sec. 6.

32. See Pioneer International, Ltd. v. Guadiz, Jr., G.R. No. 156848, October 11, 2007, 535 SCRA 584, 600; see also Prudential Bank v. Magdamit, Jr., 746 Phil. 649 (2014).

33. See Carson Realty & Management Corp. v. Red Robin Security Agency, 805 Phil. 562, 571 (2017).

34.Pioneer International, Ltd. v. Guadiz, Jr., supra note 32, at 601.

35.Spouses Jose v. Spouses Boyon, G.R. No. 147369, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA 216, 222.

36. See Heirs of Abella v. Fernandez-Espenilla, G.R. No. 228804, October 4, 2017 (Unsigned Resolution).

37. On March 31, 2014, attempts were made at 8:00 a.m., 2:00 p.m., and 4:00 p.m. On April 1, 2014, attempts were made at 8:00 a.m., 9:00 a.m., and 1:00 p.m.

38. These were: (1) San Francisco Del Monte Address, (2) Columbary, (3) and (4) Noble Street, Batangas Addresses, (5) Lexus New Manila Address, and (6) 7th Street New Manila Address.

39. See B.D. Long Span Builders, Inc. v. R.S. Ampeloquio Realty Development, Inc., G.R. No. 169919, September 11, 2009, 599 SCRA 468, 474, citing Ang Ping v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 607, 614 (1999).

40. RULES OF COURT, Rule 14, Sec. 7; see Spouses Jose v. Spouses Boyon, supra note 35; see also Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA 98, 103.

41. RULES OF COURT, Rule 14, Sec. 7.

42.Ang v. Chinatrust (Philippines) Commercial Bank Corp., 784 Phil. 791, 800 (2016), citing Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, supra note 30, at 36.

43.Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, supra note 30, at 36. Citations omitted.

44. RULES OF COURT, Rule 14, Sec. 7.

45.Ang v. Chinatrust (Philippines) Commercial Bank Corp., supra note 42, citing Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, supra note 30, at 37.

46.Supra note 30, at 37.

47. G.R. No. 163287, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 617, 623.

48. 707 Phil. 284, 290-292 (2013).

49.Supra note 39.

50.Id. at 476.

51. G.R. No. 167230, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 205, 217. According to the Court: "there was no showing in the return of service (1) of the impossibility of personal service within a reasonable time; (2) that Lapuz, the person on whom summons was served, was of suitable age and discretion; and (3) that Lapuz resided in the residence of the Spouses Galura.

52. G.R. No. 230015, October 7, 2019, accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65840>. Similarly, the Court pronounced: "the return did not indicate whether the household help was a person of suitable age and discretion. For failure to observe the requirements for substituted service of summons as expounded in Manotoc, there was improper service of summons." Nonetheless, there was voluntary appearance in this case.

53. G.R. Nos. 236075 & 236076, November 5, 2018, 884 SCRA 245.

54.Id. at 266.

55.Mapa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 79374, 82968, October 2, 1992, 214 SCRA 417, 428-429; see also Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Evangelista, G.R. No. 146553, November 27, 2002, 393 SCRA 187, 199-200.

56.Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Evangelista, id. at 200, citing Toyota Cubao, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 181 (1997).

57. 617 Phil. 387 (2009).

58. 540 Phil. 1 (2006).

59. 232 Phil. 503 (1987).

60. 289 Phil. 20 (1992).

61. 171 Phil. 404 (1978).

62.Supra note 42.

63. 233 Phil. 197 (1987).

64.Rollo, pp. 24-25.

65.Galicia, et al. v. Manliquez, 549 Phil. 595, 606 (2007).

66.Casimina v. Legaspi, supra note 29.

67. See La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103200, August 31, 1994, 236 SCRA 78; Interlink Movie Houses, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 823 Phil. 1032, 1041-1042 (2018), citing Orion Security Corporation v. Kalfan Enterprises, Inc., supra note 47, at 717-718.

68.Linger & Fisher GMBH v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 210 Phil. 438 (1983); Far Corp. v. Francisco, G.R. No. L-57218, December 12, 1986, 146 SCRA 197, 204.

69. Section 5. Issuance of alias summons. — If a summons is returned without being served on any or all of the defendants, the server shall also serve a copy of the return on the plaintiff's counsel, stating the reasons for the failure of service, within five (5) days therefrom. In such a case, or if the summons has been lost, the clerk, on demand of the plaintiff, may issue an alias summons. See Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 469 Phil. 38 (2004).

70.Spouses Anunciacion v. Bocanegra, G.R. No. 152496, July 30, 2009, 594 SCRA 318, 331.