SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 10231. October 11, 2017.]
OSCAR M. BAYSAC, petitioner,vs. ATTY. ELOISA M. ACERON-PAPA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated October 11, 2017, which reads as follows:
"A.C. No. 10231 (Oscar M. Baysac v. Atty. Eloisa M. Aceron-Papa). — For consideration and resolution is the motion for reconsideration 1 filed on November 7, 2016 by respondent Atty. Eloisa M. Aceron-Papa seeking to reverse our Decision 2 dated August 10, 2016, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds Atty. Eloisa M. Aceron-Papa GUILTY of violating the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, this Court REVOKES her incumbent commission, if any; PROHIBITS her from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years; and SUSPENDS her from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective immediately. She is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the respondent's personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED. 3 (Emphasis in the original.)
In her motion, respondent alleges that the proceedings against her were void as she was denied her right to procedural due process. She asserts that she did not receive any pleading, notice or order relative to this case as the address which complainant identified in his complaint as her address was erroneous and fictitious. She maintains that the first time she discovered that a case was filed against her was when a prospective client informed her that based on the former's research, respondent cannot represent the client as respondent is suspended from the practice of law. She avers that the first time she saw the records of the case and our Decision dated August 10, 2016 was on October 18, 2016 when she went to the Supreme Court to verify the information she earlier received regarding her status as a lawyer. 4
Because of these irregularities, respondent prays that the proceedings against her, from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to the Supreme Court, be declared void and that our Decision dated August 10, 2016 be reversed and set aside.
On April 5, 2017, we issued a Resolution 5 requiring complainant Oscar M. Baysac to comment on the motion for reconsideration. Copies of the Resolution were sent to complainant and his counsel of record; however, they were returned unserved with the notation "RTS-Moved Out." 6
In a Resolution 7 dated August 30, 2017, we resolved that the April 5, 2017 Resolution is deemed served on complainant and the filing of comment on respondent's motion for reconsideration is dispensed with.
We deny the motion for reconsideration and affirm our Decision dated August 10, 2016.
Respondent cannot claim violation of her due process rights in order to nullify the proceedings against her.
Rule 139-B, Section 11 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 11. Defects. — No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigator's Report shall be considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon considering the whole record, finds that such defect has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which event the Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances may warrant, including invalidation of the entire proceedings.
In this case, the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation 8 dated November 25, 2009 was approved by the IBP on February 13, 2013 through its Resolution No. XX-2013-136. 9 With its approval, it is clear that the IBP Board of Governors found no defect or miscarriage of justice warranting remedial action or the invalidation of the proceedings.
We emphasize that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. 10 In Shu v. Dee, 11 we held:
What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be heard. Sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process exists when a party is given a chance to be heard through his motion for reconsideration. 12 (Citation omitted.)
In Ylaya v. Gacott, 13 we further explained:
[A]ny seeming defect in the observance of due process is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. [A] [d]enial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. x x x 14 (Emphasis in the original; citation omitted.)
Thus, the instant motion for reconsideration cured whatever due process defect which may have existed.
At any rate, we have earlier held that when all means were exhausted to give a respondent an avenue to oppose the charges filed against him/her, his/her failure and/or refusal to file a comment will not be a hindrance to the Court to mete out an appropriate sanction. 15
The records show that the Court has given numerous attempts to respondent in order to afford her an opportunity to be apprised of the proceedings and defend herself. Whether she knew of the proceedings against her and purposely did not participate, only respondent would know. As far as the Court is concerned, all means were exhausted to give respondent an opportunity to be heard.
On the merits, respondent did not proffer any argument in support of her innocence. We sustain our ruling that respondent violated the Notarial Law when she notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale without the personal appearance of one of the parties to the document. SDHTEC
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 83-119.
2.Id. at 66-74.
3.Id. at 73.
4.Id. at 83, 87.
5.Id. at 180-181.
6.Id. at 182.
7.Id. at 192.
8.Id. at 36-40.
9.Id. at 35.
10.Roces v. Aportadera, A.C. No. 2936, March 31, 1995, 243 SCRA 108, 114.
11. G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014, 723 SCRA 512.
12.Id. at 521.
13. A.C. No. 6475, January 30, 2013, 689 SCRA 452.
14.Id. at 465.
15. See Dizon v. De Taza, A.C. No. 7676, June 10, 2014, 726 SCRA 70, 77-78.