Bayani-Magay v. Magay

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 227279. September 22, 2020.]

MA. TERESA BAYANI-MAGAY, petitioner, vs. ALEXANDER E. MAGAY AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 22, 2020 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 227279 — MA. TERESA BAYANI-MAGAY vs. ALEXANDER E. MAGAY AND REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

The Case

This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 seeks to reverse and set aside the following dispositions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100887:

(1) Decision 2 dated August 14, 2014 which reversed the grant of the petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner Ma. Teresa Bayani-Magay and respondent Alexander E. Magay; and

(2) Resolution 3 dated August 17, 2016 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The Antecedents

On January 27, 2010, petitioner Ma. Teresa Bayani-Magay filed the petition 4 below for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. B-7974 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Branch 25, Biñan, Laguna. 5

Teresa essentially averred:

She was previously married to one Dr. Cesar M. Sandoval III. They were married on April 14, 1991. They begot two (2) children, Cesar Rusty Bayani Sandoval IV and Darren Robee Bayani Sandoval, born on September 4, 1991 and October 1, 1993, respectively. 6 In 2000, during her marriage with Dr. Salvador, she admittedly had an illicit relationship with Alexander. The latter was her crew in a Jollibee outlet where she worked as Manager. This clandestine relationship resulted in her unexpected pregnancy. Thus, on September 2, 2001, she gave birth to her third child and named him Darium Gabriel B. Magay. 7

Consequently, Dr. Sandoval filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against her before the RTC of Quezon City. On July 29, 2002, the RTC-Quezon City declared their marriage void ab initio. 8 It found her to be psychologically incapacitated to perform essential marital obligations. The psychiatrist in the case diagnosed her with Anti-Social Personality Disorder, a severe disturbance in personality of long-standing duration which affected several areas of functioning i.e., work and social behavior. 9 Too, she had already abandoned Dr. Salvador and their two (2) children. She lived with her parents together with Alexander's child. She also continued her relationship with Alexander. 10

Despite the nullity of her first marriage, she did not live with Alexander under the same roof. Since the start of their relationship in 2000, she and her son with Alexander lived in Biñan, Laguna while Alexander stayed with his parents in Makati City. Alexander only came to visit once in a while. 11

In 2006, she was offered a job in the United States. She and Alexander planned to migrate there with their son for good. Thus, before leaving, or on February 5, 2007, they got married in civil rites before then Judge Perpetua Atal-Paño of the RTC of Makati City. 12

Unfortunately, her plan to work and for them to migrate to the United States fizzled out. The sudden turn-around of events placed her and Alexander's marriage in the rocks. Eventually, in August 2007 or just six (6) months after their marriage, they broke up. Alexander never showed up since then. No communication. No explanation. No closure. Just Alexander's deafening silence. Too, Alexander never shared in the upkeep and support of their child. She had been solely supporting their child since the latter was born. 13

She was, therefore, constrained to seek a declaration of nullity of their marriage.

Despite having been served with summons and furnished copy of the petition, Alexander did not file his answer. 14

On September 2, 2010, the case was called for pre-trial conference. Teresa and her counsel were present. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on the other hand, appeared as oppositor. 15

During the trial, Teresa and Clinical Psychologist Dr. Mariano B. Gagui, testified. 16

Teresa merely reiterated the contents of her petition. Dr. Gagui, on the other hand, narrated his findings based on the examination of Teresa alone. He found that both Teresa and Alexander were psychologically incapacitated. 17 Teresa was diagnosed with "Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified" while Alexander was afflicted with "Avoidant Personality Disorder." Dr. Gagui's Medical Court Report 18 states, thus:

REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

In view of the following interviews, series of mental status examinations, physical and neurological examinations, collateral [information], submitted documents and psychological tests, Teresa, the petitioner was found to have an average level of current intellectual capacity. She is an individual who is assertive, with strong aggressive[,] striving for achievement and competitive tendencies. She has normal empathy and has fair interpersonal relations. She tended to be practical. Furthermore[,] she is found to be hardworking, patient and industrious, loving and caring. Tess is noted also to have had difficulties in handling situations in the past.

On the other hand, with the strong clinical evidence of having a pervasive pattern of timidity, withdrawal from others and strong feelings of inferiority complex, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the respondent Alex, is found to be suffering from a personality disorder classified as AVOIDANT PERSONALITY DISORDER. A person suffering from an avoidant personality disorder usually presents with a repeated and continuous pattern of social inhibition, feelings of inadequacy and hypersensitivity to negative evaluation beginning by early adulthood. They avoid activities where they will be criticized. They restrain themselves from intimate relationships because of the fear of being ridiculed. Since all types of personality disorder develop during the early stages of a person, it tends to be chronic and hard to treat or manage.

Nevertheless, we can not discount that Teresa is also suffering from a personality disorder classified as PERSONALITY DISORDER NOT OTHERWISE SPECIFIED, meaning that she has a mixture or has other features of other personality disorders hence her unstable relationships.

Therefore[,] after much consideration and analysis of the above case, ALEX and TERESA are both found to be psychologically incapacitated, may I then suggest, with all due respect that the petitioner, TERESA BAYANI, be granted annulment. 19

On August 1, 2011, after admitting Teresa's documentary evidence, the case was submitted for decision. 20

The Trial Court's Ruling

By Decision 21 dated December 16, 2011, the trial court granted the petition and declared as void ab initio the marriage between Teresa and Alexander, viz.:

x x x After a careful evaluation of the evidence on record, the Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by the petitioner, particularly the psychological findings of Clinical Psychologist, Dr. Mariano B. Gagui as embodied in his Medical Court Report (Exhibit G) shows that the parties' psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence[,] and incurability.

xxx xxx xxx

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe[,] and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they contracted on February 5, 2007, is thus declared null and void. x x x

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage contracted by the petitioner Ma. Teresa Bayani-Magay with respondent Alexander E. Magay solemnized on February 05, 2007 as NULL and VOID, under Article 36 of Family Code, as amended. 22

The OSG filed its motion for reconsideration on the alleged ground that the psychological incapacity of Alexander was not sufficiently established. 23

Teresa opposed. She maintained that Alexander's psychological incapacity need not be proven since her own psychological incapacity anyway was undisputed. This fact alone was purportedly sufficient basis to nullify their marriage. 24

Under Order 25 dated March 30, 2012, the trial court denied the OSG's motion for reconsideration.

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the OSG faulted the trial court when it granted the petition for nullity of the marriage. It argued in the main that the totality of evidence failed to establish sufficient basis for declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. The requisites of juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability had not been sufficiently met. 26

The Court of Appeals' Ruling

In its Decision 27 dated August 14, 2014, the Court of Appeals reversed. The totality of evidence presented failed to establish the psychological incapacity of either Teresa or Alexander. The requisites of juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability were not met.

The Court of Appeals found that Teresa had no complaints against Alexander's behavior prior to and at the time of their marriage. They had been a couple without any issues against each other from 2000 to 2007. In fact, after seven (7) years, they decided to get married but admittedly only for convenience so they could easily bring their common child to the United States. Notably, their relationship turned sour only in 2007, when Teresa's plan to work and migrate to the United States did not push through. As such, the requisite juridical antecedence was patently missing. 28

Further, Dr. Gagui's report was vague as to the gravity and incurability of Teresa's supposed psychological incapacity. He did not identify the various acts or omissions of Teresa's "Not Otherwise Specified" personality disorder. Lastly, Alexander did not participate in the case, let alone, examined by Dr. Gagui. His assessment of Alexander's purported psychological incapacity was based only on Teresa's narration. It was, therefore, self-serving. As it was, Dr. Gagui's report failed to discuss an in-depth analysis of Alexander's grave·and incurable psychological incapacity. 29

Since neither Teresa nor Alexander was proven to be psychologically incapacitated, the trial court erred when it declared as void ab initio their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 30

Teresa's motion for reconsideration was denied under Resolution 31 dated August 17, 2016.

The Present Petition

Teresa now seeks affirmative relief from the Court and prays that the assailed dispositions of the Court of Appeals be reversed and her marriage with Alexander be declared void ab initio. She faults the Court of Appeals for disregarding the expert findings of Dr. Gagui. She argues that the lack of personal examination and interview of Alexander did not per se invalidate the findings of Dr. Gagui. 32

Too, the requisites of juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability here were sufficiently proven. The Court of Appeals failed to consider that Teresa was previously declared psychologically incapacitated to perform essential marital obligations in her first marriage with Dr. Sandoval. Such finding should similarly be considered to support a declaration of nullity of her second marriage with Alexander. 33

In its Resolution 34 dated January 11, 2017, the Court required Alexander and the OSG to file their comments on the petition within ten (10) days from notice. The resolution was served on Alexander's address in Makati City. 35 The OSG filed a manifestation 36 adopting its Appellant's Brief dated October 17, 2013 before the Court of Appeals as its comment.

By Resolution 37 dated December 14, 2017, the Court required Alexander to show cause why he should not be fined for failure to submit his comment. This was reiterated in the subsequent Resolutions dated October 8, 2018 38 and July 29, 2019, 39 respectively. Still, Alexander failed to file his comment to date. Accordingly, Alexander is deemed to have waived his right to respond to the petition.

Issue

Did the Court of Appeals commit reversible error when it reversed the trial court's decision granting the petition for declaration of nullity of Teresa's marriage with Alexander?

Ruling

We deny the petition.

The validity of marriage and unity of family are enshrined in our Constitution and statutory laws; hence any doubts attending the same are to be resolved in favor of the continuance and validity of marriage and the burden of proving the nullity of the same rests at all times upon the petitioner. No less than Section 2, Article XV, of the 1987 Constitution imposes upon the State the duty to protect the sanctity of marriage as a social institution and as foundation of the family. The Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable, and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. 40

Given this constitutional inviolability of the institution of marriage, psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify the same under Article 36 41 of the Family Code should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 42

In Santos v. CA, et al., 43 the Court decreed that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 44

Too, in Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 45 the Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the disposition of psychological incapacity cases, including "(t)he root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision." 46

Santos and Molina have remained the precedential guidelines in deciding annulment of marriage cases grounded on psychological incapacity of either or both spouses. The Court has also been consistent that the existence or absence of psychological incapacity should be strictly based on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections, or generalizations. 47 Indeed, to entitle petitioner to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove that either or both of the spouses' psychological incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing prior to the time of the marriage. 48

Here, as the Court of Appeals aptly found, the totality of evidence presented in the proceedings below failed to establish the so-called psychological incapacity of either Teresa or Alexander. The requisites of juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability have not been sufficiently met.

First. Expert witness Dr. Mariano Gagui diagnosed Teresa with "Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified" while Alexander purportedly suffers from "Avoidant Personality Disorder." Dr. Gagui, however, failed to state if these personality disorders were already existing before and at the time of their marriage.

Further, one of the grounds for nullification of Teresa's first marriage to Dr. Salvador was her illicit relationship with Alexander. Teresa even admitted leaving the conjugal dwelling because she wants to continue her relationship with her then paramour. Teresa was likely so head over heels in love with Alexander before and at time of their marriage that abandoning her former husband and her two (2) children at that time did not matter to her at all. She would do everything to be with Alexander even though it meant sacrificing her once harmonious marriage with her first husband.

Teresa and Alexander even decided to get married after seven (7) years of being together as a couple. Nothing on record shows that Teresa ever had a discordant relationship with Alexander. What was clearly established though was that their relationship turned soured only when their plan to migrate to the United States fizzled out.

In Republic v. Tecag, 49 the Court dismissed Tecag's petition for declaration of nullity of marriage for failure of the psychologist to give a discernible explanation on the juridical antecedence of both Tecag and her spouse's psychological incapacity. There, it was also not discussed in the psychologist's report if the parties' supposed conditions were already present before and at time of their marriage.

Too, there is no merit to Teresa's argument that the previous judicial declaration of her psychological incapacity in her first case ought to be applied as well to her present case.

Records show that Teresa's first marriage with Dr. Sandoval was declared void ab initio based on a psychiatric evaluation which she did not even participate in. Only her former husband Dr. Sandoval was examined during the proceedings before the trial court. 50 Thus, it was possible that the psychiatric assessment in the first nullity case could have been entirely different from the assessment of the psychiatrist in this case which Teresa herself initiated. Notably, Dr. Comandao's evaluation in the first case diagnosed Teresa with "Anti-Social Personality Disorder" 51 while here, Dr. Gagui identified Teresa's psychological affliction as "Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified."

Verily, considering that there was no sufficient credible evidence here to prove that the spouses' alleged psychological condition were already present prior to or at the inception of their marriage, the requisite juridical antecedence is patently missing.

Second. Dr. Gagui's psychological report was ostensibly vague on the root cause, gravity, and incurability of Teresa's supposed psychological incapacity. As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, there was no mention about Teresa's various acts or omissions explaining her "Not Otherwise Specified" disorder; and how it affects her inability to perform essential martial obligations, viz.:

"Low score is seen only in the factor of Emotional Stability. Client seems to have an external locus control, reacting to events in an emotionally lamile manner and feeling unable to cope when things go wrong. She can worry a great deal, be anxious, excitable, easily perturbed, evasive of responsibilities, and can give up easily. Her attitude and interests may change often and quickly in response to external events. She does not seem to have a strong sense of self.

High scores are seen in Dominance, Privateness, Anxiety, and Independence. Client has tendency to try to control others and subjugate their wishes to her own. She can command to a leadership position without alienating others. x x x Client is independent and persuasive, yet can have greater tendencies for anxiety and worry. 52

Dr. Gagui's report simply states that Teresa is anxious, excitable, and evasive of responsibilities. Nothing more.

Also, Alexander did not participate at any stage of the proceedings in this case. Yet, Dr. Gagui was able to assess his purported "Avoidant Personality Disorder" based on the examination of Teresa alone.

In Eliscupidez v. Eliscupidez, 53 the Court decreed that the psychological assessment of one (1) spouse alone without examining the other spouse is self-serving, in the absence of other independent and competent evidence.

Surely, the Court has consistently recognized that law and jurisprudence do not require the allegedly incapacitated spouse to be personally examined by a physician or a psychologist as condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. This recognition, however, does not signify that the evidence should be any less than the "totality of evidence" that an Article 36 case by its nature requires. 54

Lastly, Teresa admitted she only married Alexander forconvenience; specifically, to legitimize their child and for the three (3) of them to easily migrate in the United States, thus:

QUESTION 15: But what made you decide to marry in February 2007?

ANSWER 15: At that time, a prospective employer in the USA expressed interest in petitioning me. I thought it was an opportunity for me, my child, and Alex to build a life in the USA. So(,) I prevailed on him that we get married so that all of us could migrate in the USA.

QUESTION 16: What happened to this plan?

ANSWER 16: The employment prospect or petition for me by the prospective employer fizzled out. Together with it, our relationship or whatever interest remained in the two of us to try to make it as a family was totally lost. 55 (emphases supplied)

In Republic v. Albios, 56 the Court introduced the concept of "marriage fraud in immigration" otherwise known as "limited purpose marriage" in the Philippine setting citing the seminal U.S. cases of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 57United States v. Rubenstein, 58Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines59 and Matter of McKee. 60 There, the Court ruled that a dishonest marriagei.e., for purposes of migration and legitimization of a child remains valid and subsisting. It should not be nullified or declared void ab initio since it creates mockery on the sacred institution of marriage which the Constitution 61 through the State is mandated to protect, viz.:

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondent's attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, (it) cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondent's marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting. (emphases supplied)

Indeed, allowing Teresa's marriage with Alexander to be declared void ab initio would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court could not declare such a marriage void even if the parties fail to migrate or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. 62 Teresa already misused the RTC of Makati City to enter into a marriage for convenience. She should not be allowed to again abuse this Court to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed. 63

So must it be.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 14, 2014 and Resolution dated August 17, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100887 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

by:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 8-22.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion and concurred in by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso and Associate Justice Pedro B. Corales, all members of the Special Tenth Division, id. at 23-33.

3.Id. at 34-35.

4.Id. at 42-45.

5.Id. at 46.

6.Id. at 36-37.

7.Id. at 11.

8. See RTC of Quezon City Decision dated July 29, 2002 in Civil Case No. Q-01-45236; id. at 36-41.

9.Id. at 38.

10.Id. at 37.

11.Id. at 43.

12.Id. at 44.

13.Id. at 11.

14.Id. at 25.

15.Id. at 26.

16.Id.

17.Id. at 48.

18.Id. at 48-49.

19.Id.

20.Id. at 27.

21. Penned by Judge Teodorio N. Solis, id. at 46-53.

22.Id. at 53.

23.Id. at 54.

24.Id.

25.Id. at 54-55.

26.Id. at 27.

27.Id. at 23-33.

28.Id. at 30.

29.Id. at 31.

30.Id. at 32.

31.Id. at 34-35.

32.Petition (for Review on Certiorari) dated September 29, 2016.

33.Id.

34.Rollo, pp. 63-64.

35.Id. at 92.

36.Id. at 65-69.

37.Id. at 92.

38.Id. at 104.

39.Id. at 108.

40.Eliscupidez v. Eliscupidez, G.R. No. 226907, July 22, 2019. (Citations omitted)

41. ARTICLE 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (Family Code of the Philippines, Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987).

42.Supra note 40.

43. 310 Phil. 21, 39 (1995).

44.Supra note 40.

45. 335 Phil. 664, 677 (1997).

46.Supra note 40.

47.Republic v. Court of Appeals, 698 Phil. 257, 267 (2012).

48.Mendoza v. Republic of the Phils., et al., 698 Phil. 241, 243 (2012).

49. G.R. No. 229272, November 19, 2018.

50.Rollo, pp. 38-39.

51.Id. at 38.

52.Id. at 30-31.

53.Supra note 40.

54.Toring v. Toring, 640 Phil. 434 (2010).

55.Rollo, p. 30.

56. 719 Phil. 622 (2013).

57. 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).

58. 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).

59. 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971).

60. 17 I. & N. Dec. 332, 333 (B.I.A. 1980).

61. Constitution (1987), Article XV, Section 2.

62.Supra note 56.

63.Id.