Bautista v. Agchem Construction and Development Corp.

SECOND DIVISION

[UDK No. 16547. December 4, 2019.]

PERCIVAL T. BAUTISTA, JOMARIE PALAD, ANGELITO VITAN, DHENOEL CASTRO, JHON CARLO P. MONTANTE, JONNEL S. AMARO, MICHAEL MACAPINLAC, AND PASCUAL DAÑO, JR., petitioners,vs. AGCHEM CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., AND/OR EDGARD E. IGLESIA, DANILO TEODOSIO, AND ROGELIO ROQUERO, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated04 December 2019which reads as follows:

"UDK No. 16547 (Percival T. Bautista, Jomarie Palad, Angelito Vitan, Dhenoel Castro, Jhon Carlo P. Montante, Jonnel S. Amaro, Michael Macapinlac, and Pascual Daño, Jr. vs. Agchem Construction and Development Corp., and/or Edgard E. Iglesia, Danilo Teodosio, and Rogelio Roquero). — This is a Petition for Review 1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the December 12, 2018 Minute Resolution 2 and October 2, 2019 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 158440-UDK. The CA denied petitioners' motion for extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and considered the case closed and terminated.

The Facts

The Percival T. Bautista, Jomarie Palad, Angelito Vitan, Dhenoel Castro, Jhon Carlo P. Montante, Jonnel S. Amaro, Michael Macapinlac, and Pascual Daño, Jr. (petitioners) filed complaints 4 for actual illegal dismissal; underpayment of salary/wages; non-payment of holiday pay, holiday premium, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages; and attorney's fees and others against the Agchem Construction and Development Corp., and/or Edgard E. Iglesia, Danilo Teodosio, and Rogelio Roquero (respondents) construction company which were later consolidated and docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 01-00010-18.

Petitioners claimed that they are regular employees considering their length of service, their jobs, and skills are necessary and desirable to the main business of the respondents. Most of the petitioners were construction helpers with the exception of Percival Bautista who was a Thread Machine Operator and Michael Macapinlac who was a Pipe Fitter. 5

For their part, respondents countered that petitioners were project employees whose employment were terminated upon the completion of their respective functions for the project. Petitioners were sufficiently apprised that their employment would only last as long as the specific project or phase thereof to which they were assigned was subsisting. Respondents submitted Project Employment Contracts 6 establishing the projects to which they were assigned as well as the duration and scope of said project. Establishment Employment Reports 7 were also submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) every time the projects ended.

As to the monetary claims, respondents averred that petitioners failed to prove entitlement thereto. They added that all their monetary obligations to petitioners were duly paid. 8

The LA Ruling

On March 8, 2018, the Labor Arbiter (LA) 9 dismissed the case for lack of merit. 10 The LA ruled that the petitioners were project employees whose terminations of employment were predetermined at the time of their engagement. 11 The LA also considered the quitclaims denominated as "Pagpapaubaya ng Lahat ng Karapatan" 12 which were executed by the petitioners to constitute a voluntary settlement of their monetary claims and ultimately of the entire case. 13

Unsatisfied, petitioners elevated the case to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). 14

The NLRC Ruling

On June 29, 2018, the NRLC affirmed the findings of the LA and denied the appeal for lack of merit. 15

A Motion for Reconsideration 16 was subsequently filed assailing the NLRC's June 29, 2018 Decision, but was denied in a Resolution 17 dated August 24, 2018.

The August 24, 2018 Resolution was judicially admitted to have received by petitioners' representative on September 6, 2018. 18 A Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari19 dated November 5, 2018 was filed praying for an additional period of fifteen (15) days or until November 20, 2018 within which to file a petition for certiorari.

On November 21, 2018, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor tribunals for not declaring petitioners as regular employees of the respondent construction company. 20

The CA Ruling

In a Minute Resolution 21 dated December 12, 2018, the CA resolved to:

DENY the petitioners' motion for extension of fifteen (15) days from November 5, 2018 or until November 20, 2018, within which to file the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, in the absence of special or compelling reason that could be substantiated by affidavit of merit. x x x

NOTE without action the petition for certiorari subsequently filed on November 21, 2018.

Accordingly, CONSIDER the case CLOSED and TERMINATED. 22

Unperturbed, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the Minute Resolution substantially claiming that their lack of luxury of time to process the requirements to be allowed to litigate as indigents is a compelling reason which warrants the extension of time to file a petition for certiorari. 23

In denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the CA ruled that the motion for extension of time was filed on November 6, 2018 which is after the expiration of the period sought to be extended. Necessarily, the assailed judgment became final and executory. 24

On October 2, 2019, an Entry of Judgment 25 was issued by the CA stating that the case has already become final and executory.

Hence, the instant recourse.

The Ruling of the Court

Petitioners averred that the CA committed an error when it denied the motion for extension to file petition for certiorari stating that it was filed on November 6, 2018 instead of November 5, 2018 as clearly shown by the registry receipt attached in the pleading. 26 They also claimed that the extension prayed for was necessary for them to complete the documentary requirements to be allowed to litigate as indigents. 27 Petitioners added that they were able to establish compelling reason as the motion for extension was not due to flimsy and unreasonable basis, hence social justice warrants that the law should protect and preserve their rights as workers. 28

We deny the instant petition, albeit on a different ground.

A perusal of the rollo of the case shows that the Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari was indeed filed on November 5, 2018 or within the sixty (60)-day period for filing a petition for certiorari given that they received a copy of the assailed Resolution on September 6, 2018. Petitioners submitted before this Court the original registry receipt 29 supported by a PhilPost Certification 30 dated October 25, 2019 which proves that registered mail matter RD 958 479 165 ZZ containing the motion for extension was mailed on November 5, 2018 contrary to the ruling of the CA that it was filed on November 6, 2018. However, despite the fact that the motion for extension was filed with the reglementary period, the Court finds no compelling reason to grant the same.

A motion for extension is a prohibited pleading in filing petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. This is because the 60-day period is considered reasonable and sufficient time for a party to decide and prepare a petition on the ground of grave abuse of discretion by a lower court. "The period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of the parties to a speedy disposition of their case." 31 But in exceptional or meritorious cases, an extension may be granted by the court provided it is anchored on special or compelling reasons clearly presented by the movant. 32

In this case, petitioners failed to present a compelling reason that warrants the extension prayed for. As stated, petitioners admitted that they received a copy of the challenged NLRC Resolution 33 on September 6, 2018 hence, had until November 5, 2018 to file a petition for certiorari. On November 5, 2018, petitioners prayed for a fifteen (15)-day extension under the pretext that the needed additional time to secure documentary evidence that supports their claim of indigency. However, a perusal of the rollo of the case shows that the supporting documents submitted before the CA which they alleged to be the compelling reason for the prayed extension were already issued way before November 5, 2018 or the date of the expiration of the period to filed a petition for certiorari.

 

	Date of Issue of Certificate of Indigency	Date of Issue of Certificate of No Real Property
Percival Bautista	October 23, 2018 34	October 24, 2018 35
Angelito Vitan	October 25, 2018 36	October 26, 2018 37
Dhenoel Castro	October 23, 2018 38	October 24, 2018 39
Jonnel Amaro	October 22, 2018 40	October 25, 2018 41
John Carlo Montante	October 26, 2018 42	October 29, 2018 43
Michael Macapinlac		October 29, 2018 44

 

Clearly, petitioners failed to present and duly establish a compelling reason for the prayed extension and resorted to Galileo argument. As there is no sufficient justification to allow an extension of the 60-day period, the petition for certiorari that was subsequently filed was time-barred. In view of petitioners' failure to file an appeal by certiorari within the reglementary period, the assailed Resolutions of the CA became final and executory by operation of law. Resultantly, the appellate court was divested of jurisdiction over the appeal.

This Court is not persuaded by petitioners' invocation of liberality. Time and again, it stressed that procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of the litigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order to, and enhance the efficiency of, the judicial system. 45

In Brgy. Dasmariñas v. Creative Play Corner School, et al., the Court ruled: 46

It is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the rules of procedure should not be strictly followed in the interest of substantial justice. However, it does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will. It bears emphasizing that procedural rules should not be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantial rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons. (Emphasis Supplied).

Indeed, as the Court pronounced in Nueva Ecija II Electric Cooperative, Inc., et al. v. Mapagu: 47

While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It raises a jurisdictional problem, as it deprives the appellate court of its jurisdiction over the appeal. After a decision is declared final and executory, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision on the case. 48 (Emphasis Supplied)

In any event, even if we tackle the other issues raised by the petitioners, the instant case is still bound to fail because the proffered arguments are patently without merit.

It is well-settled that in labor cases, the factual findings of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions are accorded respect and even finality by the Court when they are supported by substantial evidence. 49 Consequently, it is no longer necessary to delve into the accuracy of their factual findings, in the absence of a clear showing that the same were arbitrary and bereft of any rational basis. 50

A judicious reading of the case reveals the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission. Documentary evidence 51 appended in the instant petition substantially proves that herein petitioners were engaged on a project basis. Their eventual severance from project employment was properly reported to the DOLE. 52 Moreover, petitioners already executed quitclaims denominated as "Pagpapaubaya ng Lahat ng Karapatan" 53 which substantially provides that the consideration they received from respondents constitutes full settlement for all claims that they may have against the company. These quitclaims appear to be valid. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. 54

Evidently, there was no grave abuse on the part of the labor tribunals when they dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal with monetary claims. Grave abuse of discretion in the context of labor cases is discussed in UST v. Samahang Manggagawa ng UST, et al.55viz.:

In labor cases, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, which refers to that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. Thus, if the NLRC's ruling has basis in the evidence and the applicable law and jurisprudence, then no grave abuse of discretion exists and the CA should so declare and, accordingly, dismiss the petition. 56 (Citation omitted)

When a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion, the burden to establish that the findings and conclusions of the respondent court or tribunal were not supported by substantial evidence is on the petitioner. 57 The petitioners failed to discharge this burden.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED." (BERNABE,J., on official business; ZALAMEDA, J., on official leave.)

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-37.

2.Id. at 67. Issued by the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals.

3. Penned by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Manuel M. Barrios, concurring; rollo, pp. 47-51.

4.Id. at 382-391a.

5.Id. at 384-384 dorsal portion.

6.Id. at 262-298.

7.Id. at 299-337.

8.Id. at 152-159.

9. Labor Arbiter Joel A. Allones.

10.Rollo, pp. 142-150.

11.Id. at 148.

12.Id. at 319-337.

13.Id. at 149.

14.Id. at 106.

15. Penned by Presiding Commissioner Alex A. Lopez with Commissioners Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. and Cecilio Alejandro C. Villanueva concurring; id. at 106-117.

16.Rollo, pp. 94-104.

17.Id. at 92-93.

18.Id. at 423.

19.Id. at 423-425.

20.Id. at 68-86.

21.Id. at 67.

22.Id.

23.Id. at 57-59.

24.Id. at 48-49.

25.Id. at 52.

26.Id. at 16.

27.Id. at 12.

28.Id.

29.Id. at 423.

30.Id. at 427-428.

31.Adtel, Inc. and/or Reynaldo T. Casas v. Marijoy A. Valdez, G.R. No. 189942, August 9, 2017.

32.Supra.

33.Rollo, pp. 92-93.

34.Id. at 39.

35.Id. at 43.

36.Id. at 38.

37.Id. at 42.

38.Id. at 40.

39.Id. at 44.

40.Id. at 41.

41.Id. at 45.

42.Id. at 396.

43.Id. at 402.

44.Id. at 406.

45.Malixi v. Baltazar, G.R. No. 208224, November 22, 2017, 846 SCRA 244, 257, citing Le Soleil Int'l. Logistics Co., Inc., et al. v. Sanchez, et al., 769 Phil. 466-473 (2015).

46. 655 Phil. 285, 296 (2011).

47. 805 Phil. 823, 836 (2017), citing Gonzales, et al. v. Pe, 670 Phil. 597, 614 (2011).

48.Id. at 836.

49.Grande v. Philippine Nautical Training College, 806 Phil. 823, 836 (2017).

50.Zambrano, et al. v. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corp., 811 Phil. 569, 580 (2017), 811 Phil. 569.

51.Rollo, pp. 262-298.

52.Id. at 299-318.

53.Id. at 319-337.

54.Arlo Aluminum, Inc. v. Piñon, 813 Phil. 188, 199 (2017).

55. 809 Phil. 212 (2017).

56.Id. at 220.

57.Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, et al., 716 Phil. 500, 510 (2017).