SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 240976. April 3, 2019.]
BASILAN COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, INC., * REPRESENTED BY MARIA SOCORRO E. PADILLA, petitioner, vs.PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 03 April 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 240976 — Basilan Community Hospital, Inc., represented by Maria Socorro E. Padilla versus Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
After reviewing the instant Petition and its annexes, inclusive of the Court of Appeals' (CA) Decision 1 dated August 25, 2017 and Resolution 2 dated July 23, 2018 in CA-G.R. SP No. 146603, the Court resolves to DENY the instant Petition for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the CA committed any reversible error that warrants the exercise of the Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
As regards petitioner Basilan Community Hospital, Inc.'s (petitioner BCHI) first argument, the Board of respondent Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (respondent PhilHealth) factually held that the appeal made by petitioner BCHI before it was filed out of time, with petitioner BCHI failing to file an appeal fee and appeal bond. Petitioner BCHI questions this factual finding by the CA. However, a catena of cases has consistently held that questions of fact cannot be raised in an appeal viacertiorari before the Court and are not proper for its consideration. 3 The Court does not find any cogent reason to depart from such elementary rule. Petitioner BCHI's assertion that it paid the required appeal fee is unsubstantiated. Aside from its mere say-so, petitioner BCHI did not provide even an iota of evidence that it indeed paid the appeal fee. More so, petitioner BCHI itself admitted in its Petition that it failed to file an appeal bond. As held time and time again, the right to appeal is not a natural right but merely a statutory privilege. A party appealing is, thus, expected to comply with the requirements of relevant rules otherwise he would lose the statutory right to appeal. 4
As to petitioner BCHI's second argument on the sufficiency of the evidence presented by respondent PhilHealth in substantiating its Complaint against petitioner BCHI, it must again be stressed that the Court is not a trier of facts. A question of facts exists when the query invites the calibration of evidence. 5 It is unmistakably evident that in the instant Petition, the Court is being asked by petitioner BCHI to re-weigh the evidentiary value of the documentary evidence on record. To reiterate once more, such issues cannot be raised in an appeal via certiorari before the Court and are not proper for its consideration. 6 Further, it must also be emphasized that the factual findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, such as respondent PhilHealth, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings were made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed. In the instant case, it was factually established by respondent PhilHealth, after a rigorous investigation process and after a meticulous assessment of the evidence on record, that petitioner BCHI made false benefit claims with respondent PhilHealth regarding the supposed emergency circumcision of four (4) patients.
In any case, petitioner BCHI's argument assailing the evidentiary value of the Domiciliary Visit Undertaking and Domiciliary Visit Report on the basis of the hearsay rule is erroneous. As correctly held by the CA, technical rules of evidence are not to be applied with rigidity in administrative proceedings, considering the nature of administrative bodies. 7 CAIHTE
Lastly, petitioner BCHI cannot escape liability and argue that it may not be held liable for the unlawful act of its physician. As emphasized by the Arbitration Department and Board of respondent PhilHealth, as well as the CA, under Item No. 4.4, Part II of the Warranties of Accreditation of petitioner BCHI, the latter "agreed to take full responsibility for any omission or commission in the preparation of claims and in the entry of clinical records." 8 In the instant Petition, such assumption of obligation was not genuinely contested nor refuted by petitioner BCHI.
SO ORDERED. (REYES, J., JR., J., on wellness leave)"
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MARIA LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of CourtBy:TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
* Also referred to as "Basilan Community Hospital" in some parts of the rollo.
1. Rollo, pp. 19-27. Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang (now a Member of this Court), with Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela concurring.
2. Id. at 38-39.
3. Bautista v. Puyat Vinyl Products, Inc., 416 Phil. 305, 309 (2001), citing Hi-Precision Steel Center, Inc. v. Lim Kim Steel Builders, Inc., 298-A Phil. 361, 372 (1993) and Navarro v. Commission on Elections, 298-A Phil. 588, 593 (1993).
4. Magsino v. De Ocampo, 741 Phil. 394, 401 (2014).
5. See Caiña v. People, 288 Phil. 177, 182-183 (1992).
6. Bautista v. Puyat Vinyl Products, Inc., supra note 3, at 309.
7. See Asprec v. Itchon, 123 Phil. 792, 798 (1966).
8. Rollo, p. 26.