THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 232265. September 13, 2017.]
RAMON BARNACHEA, MARIA MERCOLITA, FELIX A. MONTEMAYOR, AND MELITA MONTEMAYOR-BELECINA, petitioners, vs.RAUL Q. MONTEMAYOR, ANGELES TAN-CARDOSO AND MARIANO S. MONTEMAYOR, JR., respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated September 13, 2017, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 232265 (Ramon Barnachea, Maria Mercolita, Felix A. Montemayor, and Melita Montemayor-Belecina vs. Raul Q. Montemayor, Angeles Tan-Cardoso and Mariano S. Montemayor, Jr.). — This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision dated February 24, 2017 1 and Resolution dated May 31, 2017 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 105353. There, the CA affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision 3 annulling the June 30, 2011 Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate executed by and among petitioners Ramon Barnachea, Maria Mercolita, Felix Montemayor and Melita Montemayor-Belecina.
At the center of the dispute is the ownership of a 778,112 square-meter parcel of land (subject property) designated as Lot No. 9234, situated in Barangay Luna, Mabini, Pangasinan. Such property is now being claimed by two (2) different families whose predecessors bore similar first and last names — Juan Montemayor.
Respondents Raul Montemayor, Angeles Tan-Cardoso and Mariano Montemayor, Jr. allege that they are the grandchildren of Juan Montemayor y De Castro (De Castro), married to Maria Rangel. Upon De Castro and Maria's respective deaths, they were succeeded by six (6) children, all of whom already passed away. As a consequence, the subject property has now passed to respondents. They have been in continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of such for more than seventy (70) years now, through their tenants, caretakers and predecessors-in-interest.
On June 30, 2011, it has come to their knowledge that petitioners executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and tried to gain possession of the subject property. However, they did not succeed because its tenants refused to acknowledge them as the lawful owners. Despite repeated demands, petitioners refused to give up their claim on the property. Respondents thus filed a Petition for the Annulment of Documents and Damages before the RTC, seeking to annul the deed that petitioners executed. Some of the witnesses they presented are the land's caretakers and tenants who were born in that place and whose parents and grandfathers were also caretakers and tenants during De Castro's lifetime. Respondents also presented tax declarations, an agricultural leasehold contract and a deed of extrajudicial settlement to prove their ownership. 4 De Castro's last will and testament, which mentions the subject property being bequeathed to his six (6) children, was also offered as evidence.
For their part, petitioners claim that the actual owner of the subject property is Juan Montemayor y Quimson (Quimson), and not Juan Montemayor y De Castro. Being the grandchildren of Quimson, they executed the questioned Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition over the subject property on the ground of hereditary succession. To prove Quimson's ownership, petitioners presented, among others, a tax clearance certificate issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue indicating the taxpayer as "MONTEMAYOR, ESTATE OF JUAN Q."
In ruling for the respondents, the RTC said that all the evidence presented shows that De Castro is the primitive owner of the property, and not Quimson. The inclusion of the property in de Castro's last will and testament, according to the court, is the most vital piece of evidence of ownership as he exercised acts of dominion thereon. The tenants of the land corroborated respondents' claim that De Castro was the original owner and that they never met petitioners prior to the dispute. The RTC also considered respondents' proof of periodic payments of real estate taxes on the property to be a more decisive proof of ownership, as against petitioners' sole payment, which was made right before laying their claim on the property. The fallo of said decision reads: ETHIDa
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the [respondents] and against the [petitioners] as follows:
1. Annulling the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition of Estate dated June 30, 2011, executed by and among Ramon Barnachea, Maria Mercolita, Felix A. Montemayor and Melita Montemayor-Belecina, the same having no legal force and effect;
2. Ordering the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 3917 in the name of the [petitioners]; and
3. Ordering [petitioners] to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED. 5
The Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC and ruled that petitioners' unsubstantiated claim over the property cannot prevail over respondents' indubitable right to it, borne by both credible testimonial and documentary evidence. The presumption of regularity of petitioners' deed of extrajudicial partition had been effectively overthrown by respondents' adverse possession of the land in the concept of owner for many years and their invariable exercise of acts of ownership thereon. Petitioners also failed to dispute De Castro's last will and testament where he bequeathed the land to his heirs. The credence given by the RTC to this document was upheld by the CA, thus:
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED, and the Decision dated February 28, 2015, AFFIRMED. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED. 6
A motion for reconsideration was filed but the same was denied in a Resolution dated May 31, 2017.
The Issues
Petitioners filed the present petition, 7 bringing forth the following issues for the Court's consideration:
I. Whether the [CA] gravely erred in affirming the trial court's decision nullifying the deed of extrajudicial partition executed by the petitioners and ordering the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 3917 despite the petitioners' status as the legal heirs of the rightful owner of the subject property.
II. Whether the [CA] gravely erred in affirming the trial court's decision despite the fact that the testimonies of the witnesses of the respondents [are] hearsay.
III. Whether the [CA] gravely erred in affirming the trial court's decision ordering the petitioners to pay the costs of the suit. 8
The Ruling of the Court
The Court resolves to deny the petition.
A tax declaration, per se, is not
In Republic v. Alba, 9 the Court has settled that tax declarations alone do not suffice as basis of one's claim of ownership. Only when a tax declaration is coupled with proof of actual possession of the property can it become the basis of a claim of ownership. Indeed, it is not a conclusive proof of possession or ownership, and its submission will not lend support in proving the nature of the possession required by the law.
Here, aside from the deed of extrajudicial partition that petitioners themselves prepared and old tax declarations bearing the name "Juan Montemayor," the only evidence presented that may suggest Quimson as the owner is a tax clearance certificate. Since petitioners have never been in possession of the subject property, such tax declaration alone is short of proving possession, much less ownership of the property. Another, the tax clearance certificate presented by the plaintiffs bore the name "MONTEMAYOR, ESTATE OF JUAN Q." as the taxpayer. The "Q," as petitioners insist, stands for Quimson, thus proving that their predecessor Juan Montemayor y Quimson is the true owner of the property. This argument, however, does not persuade the Court. There is no showing that the letter "Q" indeed stood for "Quimson" to unequivocally establish ownership of the land by the petitioners' predecessor. The letter "Q" could stand for some other name, or perhaps, could even be a typographical error. Hence, petitioners' claim of ownership based on the tax clearance certificate alone utterly lacks merit.
Respondents established their
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that in civil cases, the quantum of evidence required is preponderance of evidence. In a catena of cases, preponderance of evidence is defined as the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. 10
Here, respondents' evidence clearly preponderate over the evidence submitted by the petitioners. They amply proved by testimonial and documentary evidence, that: (1.) Juan Montemayor y De Castro left a Last Will and Testament and bequeathed the land to his children, respondents' parents; (2.) tenants who have been lawfully occupying the land since 1985 know and recognize them to be the owners of the land, having inherited the same from De Castro; and (3.) they have been paying the real estate taxes on the property since 1974.
Petitioners' evidence, on the other hand, consist of: (1.) a tax clearance certificate indicating "Montemayor, Estate of Juan Q." as the taxpayer; (2.) deed of extrajudicial partition which they themselves executed; and (3.) old tax declarations bearing the name "Juan Montemayor," attached to the new tax declaration already bearing their names as owners of the property.
The respondents, who have been in possession of the property since time immemorial, have been recognized by the tenants as owners thereof, and have been paying realty taxes thereon for many years, should definitely be favored over those who have only recently surfaced, who have never been in possession of the property, who have not exercised acts of ownership and dominion over it, and who had paid realty taxes on the property only once. Evidently, respondents' evidence carries more weight than what the petitioners proffered.
A question on the lower court's
The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45. The scope of this Court's judicial review under the rule does not extend to questions of fact. A question of fact requires the Court to review the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations of the parties. It includes the examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants, such as the lower court's appreciation of witnesses presented by the parties. 11 Save for a few exceptional instances that the party seeking review should demonstrate, 12 the Court's function is not to analyze or weigh all over again the lower court's factual findings.
Here, petitioners failed to establish that exceptional circumstances apply for the Court to reconsider the facts and the evidence already presented. Thus, their argument that the tenants' testimonies are hearsay should be rejected. A lower court's appreciation of testimonies should be accorded the highest degree of respect because it is in a better position to examine the real evidence, and observe the demeanor of the witnesses, and can therefore discern if they are telling the truth, based on their personal knowledge. 13
Petitioners' claim is already
Assuming arguendo that the evidence presented failed to preponderate in favor of the respondents, the latter is still to be considered the owner of the property as petitioners' claim is already barred by prescription and laches, owing to their long inaction in recovering it.
In Calicdan v. Cendaña, 14 the Court discussed prescription as another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable property. It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. It was further elucidated that acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten years. Extraordinary prescription, on the other hand, entails an uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years without need of title or of good faith. The present possessor may complete the said period necessary for prescription by tacking his possession to that of his predecessor-in-interest. 15
Likewise, an action is barred by laches when a party entitled to assert a right fails to do so for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that such party has either abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society. 16
Here, it was established that respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property for more than 70 years, which is more than the required number of years for extraordinary acquisitive prescription to apply. Further, there are several instances proving respondents' public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the property in the concept of an owner: the presence of tenants who recognize De Castro, and later on his heirs as the owner of the property; the testimonies of the land's caretakers and tenants who were born in that place and whose parents and grandfathers were also caretakers and tenants during De Castro's lifetime saying that they never met any of the petitioners prior to the dispute; the rentals being remitted by the lands' administrator to the respondents. Indeed, the conditions laid down by law and the period necessary for the application of acquisitive prescription were sufficiently met. cSEDTC
In much the same way, petitioners asserted their right on the property too late in the day, thus laches has already set in. Respondents' continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of such for more than 70 years should have prompted petitioners, or their predecessors-in-interest, to assert their right on the property if they were indeed its owner. Instead, they waited for years to aver their right, the same being tantamount to abandonment of claim over the property.
Finally, the Court sustains the order of payment of costs of suit as respondents were forced to litigate to protect their interest on the property.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed February 24, 2017 Decision and May 31, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 105353, the Court resolves to DENY the petition and, thus, AFFIRM said Decision and Resolution.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 35-48. Penned by Associate Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla and concurred in by Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Samuel H. Gaerlan.
2.Id. at 51.
3.Id. at 69-85.
4.Id. at 78.
5.Id. at 85.
6.Id. at 48.
7.Id. at 10-29.
8.Id. at 19.
9. G.R. No. 169710, August 19, 2015, 765 SCRA 385, 397.
10.Vitarich Corporation v. Losin, G.R. No. 181560, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 671. See also BP Oil and Chemicals International Philippines, Inc. v. Total Distribution & Logistic Systems, Inc., G.R. No. 214406, February 6, 2017.
11.Id.
12.Angeles v. Pascual, G.R. No. 157150, September 21, 2011, 658 SCRA 23.
13.Castillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106472, August 7, 1996, 260 SCRA 374.
14. G.R. No. 155080, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA 272.
15.South City Homes v. Republic, G.R. No. 76564, May 25, 1990, 185 SCRA 693.
16.Aguirre v. Heirs of Lucas Villanueva, G.R. No. 169898, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 855, 863.