THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 228202. July 7, 2021.]
MINA Y. BARITUA, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated July 7, 2021, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 228202 (Mina Y. Baritua v. People of the Philippines). — Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals' (CA) Decision 1 dated October 22, 2015 and its Resolutions dated March 18, 2016, 2 September 6, 2016, 3 and November 8, 2016 4 in CA-G.R. CR No. 34604. The CA Decision affirmed the Decision 5 dated August 14, 2009 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275 of Las Piñas City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 07-0745, which found Mina Baritua together with Rex Babaran guilty of the crime of carnapping, and sentencing each of them to suffer imprisonment for a period of fourteen years and eight months to seventeen years and four months, and to pay jointly and severally to Federico Z. Pahilum the value of the Revo in the amount of P350,000.00 and to pay the cost. They CA Resolutions denied petitioner's plea for new trial for failure to comply with the requirements of introducing newly discovered evidence.
Facts and Antecedent Proceedings
The instant case stemmed from an Information charging petitioner Mina Baritua (petitioner), together with Rex Babaran (Babaran), Orlando Colisao (Colisao), and Orlando Bruan (Bruan) for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of December 2006 or prior thereto, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain and without the consent and knowledge of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and drive away one Toyota Revo with Plate Number XCY-154 worth P350,000.00, belonging to Federico Z. Pahilum, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner thereof in the aforementioned amount of P350,000.00. 6
Petitioner and Babaran were arrested and later arraigned, while Colisao and Bruan remained at-large. On their arraignment, petitioner and Babaran pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 7
As appreciated by the RTC, the evidence presented before it showed that Jose Toyco owns a rent-a-car business under the name of Toyco Transport Service (TOYCO), which also caters to persons who want to lease their vehicles to others. Under a Participating Partnership Agreement, Federico Z. Pahilum placed his vehicle, which is a Toyota Revo with plate number XCY-154 (subject vehicle), for lease in said company. 8
On August 23, 2006, Babaran and Colisao went to TOYCO to rent a car for their alleged employer, Maria Baylon (Baylon). TOYCO informed them of its rules and regulations while Babaran and Colisao gave their respective identification cards. 9 The vehicle that they first rented was a Mitsubishi Adventure, which was delivered to them. After one week, Bruan and Babaran asked to change the aforesaid unit. In turn, TOYCO delivered to them a Toyota Hi-ace, which was received by Babaran. 10
Thereafter, they asked for another replacement. This time, a Toyota Revo with Plate No. XCY 154 was given to them. A series of lease contracts for the Revo was executed from September 11, 2006 to November 6, 2006 as they extended the rental thereof and the contract was renewed many times. The use of the Revo was paid in part by Bruan, while some were paid by Babaran. 11
In a document dated November 26, 2006 for the lease of the same Revo, the name of petitioner appeared as a signatory thereto. An employee of TOYCO named Marivic Barcelona (Barcelona) likewise testified that petitioner tendered the payment for the lease of the Revo at Greenwich Harrison Plaza. Petitioner allegedly paid in two checks, but one of the checks bounced. Petitioner promised to change the bounced check into cash but failed to do so. Every time the contract was renewed, Barcelona would ask the whereabouts of the vehicle, and she would receive a response that said vehicle was with Ms. Baylon who had a meeting at Tarlac and at different places. 12 Up to the present, Barcelona does not know the whereabouts of the Revo vehicle. Despite repeated demands, petitioner, Babaran, and Colisiao failed to return the Toyota Revo. 13
According to petitioner, prior to the execution of the November 6, 2006 contract, Baylon and Adolfo Aguirre (Aguirre), who are the employers of Babaran, Bruan and Colisao, could not return the Toyota Revo and/or pay the rental for the use thereof. Thus, Barcelona, as representative of TOYCO, had to file a blotter complaint before the Barangay Office against the representatives of Baylon and Aguirre. 14
In view of such failure to pay the lessor, Baylon asked help from petitioner, who did not hesitate to help the former by asking her sister to issue two post-dated checks in the total amount of P62,000.00. This accommodation was made possible by the promise of Baylon to fund the checks. 15 However, upon the failure of Baylon to fund the second check, the same was dishonored upon presentment, which caused the filing of the charge for carnapping. 16
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner, together with Babaran, guilty as charged. The RTC ratiocinated that when they failed to return the Revo to TOYCO after the stated period in the November 6, 2007 lease, they committed the crime of theft, qualified by the fact that what was taken is a motor vehicle, since their custody of the subject Revo was only precarious. They had no independent right or title to retain or possess the same after the expiration of the lease period. 17
On appeal, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC, finding the liability of petitioner as follows:
A perusal of the Rental Agreement dated November 6, 2006 and the direct testimony of Marivic Barcelona would show that Mina Baritua knew that the subject vehicle was being leased out by Toyco to her co-accused Rex Babaran, Orlando Bruan and Orlando Colisao. If indeed she did not know the whereabouts of the subject vehicle, she would not have signed the extension or renewal of the rental agreements and thereafter offered to pay for the lease thereof by giving two checks to Marivic Barcelona with the amount of Php31,000.00 each. We apply the presumption that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. It is presumed that Mina Baritua did not sign the Rental Agreement dated November 6, 2006 without informing herself of its contents.
xxx xxx xxx
While it can be argued that accused-appellant Mina Baritua was not part of the first five rental agreements of the subject vehicle, still, the fact remains that she subsequently signed the last Rental Agreement dated November 6, 2006 to extend the lease of the subject vehicle even without seeing her (sic) the subject vehicle being returned by accused Rex Babaran, Orlando Bruan and Orlando Colisao to Toyco. If, as she claims, she was merely asked by Baylon to lend checks for Toyco's obligation, it seems implausible that she was the one that directly transacted with Barcelona at Harrison Plaza. If it was true that it was Baylon who made the request, then logically, it would be Baylon who would deal with Toyco's representative. And yet, Baritua went out of her way to transact with Barcelona all by herself. Thus, even without proof of a prior agreement with Rex Babaran, Orlando Bruan and Orlando Colisao to carnap the subject vehicle, Mina Baritua's acts show that she acted in conspiracy with the other accused to commit the crime of carnapping. 18
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Submit Motion for New Trial 19 dated November 24, 2015 on the ground of newly-discovered evidence. This was denied in a Resolution 20 dated March 18, 2016 as petitioner failed to state the newly-discovered evidence which her defense is based, and to submit affidavits of witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given or by duly authenticated copies of documents which are proposed to be introduced in evidence. 21 Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Amended Motion for New Trial, 22 which was denied in a Resolution 23 dated September 6, 2016. This was followed by a second Motion for Reconsideration (with leave of court), which was denied in a Resolution 24 dated November 8, 2016.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition.
Issues
I.
Whether the CA gravely erred in ruling that petitioner's act of signing the 06 November 2006 lease contract is sufficient to prove that she has unlawfully taken, or participated in unlawful taking, of the subject vehicle;
II.
Whether the CA gravely erred in ruling that petitioner's accommodation for Baylon's failure to settle her unpaid rental is sufficient proof of the existence of conspiracy to commit carnapping; and
III.
Whether the CA gravely erred in ruling that there is no basis for granting the motion for new trial considering that all the requisites for such motion were complied with.
Before this Court, petitioner avers that while she had the obligation to return the vehicle, being a party to the Rental Agreement, such fact alone cannot be used to convict her of carnapping, considering that she has no possession of the subject vehicle upon the signing of the contract and even after its expiry. Without the fact of possession, the claim of carnapping must fail because of the lack of the element of taking with intent to gain. 25
In support of her prayer for new trial, petitioner argued that she would introduce in evidence the Barangay Blotter filed by TOYCO, through Barcelona, where it appeared that the latter filed a complaint against Baylon, Bruan, Babaran, Alado Cosio, and Cris Canoay, due to the failure of Baylon to pay the rentals for the use of the subject vehicle. The blotter is dated November 6, 2006 and dovetails with the claim of petitioner that she was merely accommodating the obligation of Baylon towards TOYCO when she executed the November 6, 2006 Rental Agreement. Had this piece of evidence been presented during trial, it would have proven that petitioner had no intent to gain for herself the subject vehicle and, therefore, had no mens rea to commit the crime of carnapping. This piece of document was in the possession of the prosecution during trial as the same was executed by prosecution witness Barcelona herself. Hence, it could not have been presented during trial proper, which is the reason why it was discovered fairly recently. 26
In a Manifestation (in lieu of Comment) 27 dated July 11, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General interposed no objection to petitioner's prayer for new trial, reiterating its position that petitioner should be given a second opportunity to present evidence through a new trial to prevent failure of justice considering that the case involves her personal liberty.
Ruling
Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the remedy of a new trial and outlines the requisites for availment of this remedy in accordance with the following provisions:
Section 1. New trial or reconsideration. — At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration. (1a)
Section 2. Grounds for a new trial. — The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
(a) The errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been committed during the trial;
(b) The new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment. (2a)
When the ground invoked by an accused in seeking for a new trial is newly discovered evidence, jurisprudence has laid down the following standards, also known as the Berry rule, before the same may be granted, thus:
(1) the evidence was discovered after trial;
(2) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(3) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and
(4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly discovered evidence could have been very well presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the same cannot be considered newly discovered. 28
The case of Custodio v. Sandiganbayan29 further explained when an evidence could be considered as newly discovered, thus:
The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence is whether the proffered evidence is, in fact, a "newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence." The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence has relevance. The Court has held that "in order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it; what is essential is that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it." 30
In the instant case, petitioner alleged that the Barangay Blotter dated November 6, 2006 is a newly-discovered evidence because it remained in the hands of a representative of TOYCO and there was no possibility that she could have acquired the same during the trial of her case. The Barangay Blotter alluded to by petitioner reads as follows:
Ako po ay si Marivic Barcelona ng Toyco Transport Service Rent-a-Car ay tumungo sa opisinang ito ng Barangay para magpablotter hinggil sa hindi pagbabayad ng renta ng Revo-Sport runner-color light blue-plate no. XCY-154 nina Maria Baylon nakatira sa 237 Menlo St. Pasay City at mga kasama ni Maria Baylon na sina Bruan Orlando, Babaran Rex, Cosio Alado at Cris Canaoay. 31
A plain reading of the aforecited barangay blotter would show that the name of petitioner was not among those included in the complaint for non-payment of the rent of the subject vehicle, as of its date of reporting. Consequently, there was no way by which petitioner would be informed of the existence of the barangay blotter, which she later discovered after a decision has been rendered by the trial court. Indeed, proceedings conducted before the barangay that was brought about by the said blotter were unknown to petitioner, which could have corroborated the defenses she raised during the trial of the carnapping case filed against her. It would be unfair for petitioner to be denied the opportunity to defend herself if a piece of evidence that was unknown to her, and which could have possibly buttressed her defense would not be allowed to be presented as her evidence.
As petitioner was not included among those reported in the blotter for non-payment of the rent of the subject vehicle, her involvement in the commission of the crime, which include the same individuals mentioned in the barangay blotter, would need a re-evaluation. It would also support her claim that on November 6, 2006, she signed the renewal of the car rental as an accommodation to Baylon. If this were true, the renewal of the car rental agreement by petitioner could not have involved her in a crime that has already been committed when the subject vehicle was not returned to TOYCO. If it were proven that petitioner had merely accommodated the request of Baylon, and did not have any knowledge of where the vehicle was at the time, her liability for committing the crime of carnapping will raise dubitable questions.
As an institution tasked with rendering justice, courts must pronounce judgments based on the acts proven to have been committed by the person hailed to court. An evaluation of the acts committed and the consequences brought about by the said acts, especially if the same warrants the imposition of a penalty, requires that the evidence presented point out the wrongdoer who should bear the punishment. This is part of the utilitarian theory espoused in the case of Magno v. Court of Appeals, 32 as follows:
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of society against actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not be falling prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)
Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that "criminal law is founded upon that moral disapprobation . . . of actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society. This disappropriation is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and built upon a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . . That which we call punishment is only an external means of emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is in reality the amount of punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice Pablo's view in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31).
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the "actual and potential wrongdoers."
With an issue raised on the participation of petitioner in the crime alleged to have been committed brought about by the documentary evidence she recently discovered, the determination of who the actual wrongdoer is, necessitates the conduct of a new trial. Even the Office of Solicitor General interposed no objection to the prayer of petitioner for a new trial. As petitioner seeks to introduce a piece of evidence that could possibly warrant the reversal of judgment involving her liberty, it would be prudent to grant her the full opportunity to defend herself and set aside technicalities. As held in Cuenca v. Court of Appeals: 33
Although in "Goduco v. CA" x x x decided some twenty (20) years ago, this Court ruled that it is not authorized to entertain a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial predicated on allegedly newly discovered evidence the rationale of which being:
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts, and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, in an appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, the latter has no jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, for only questions of fact are involved therein.
the rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent cases like "Helmuth, Jr. v. People" and "People v. Amparado."
In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities and despite the opposition of the Solicitor General, granted new trial to the convicted accused concerned on the basis of proposed testimonies or affidavits of persons which the Court considered as newly discovered and probably sufficient evidence to reverse the judgment of conviction. Being similarly circumstanced, there is no nagging reason why herein petitioner should be denied the same benefit. It becomes all the more plausible under the circumstances considering that the "People" does not raise any objection to a new trial, for which reason the Solicitor General ought to be specially commended for displaying once again such statesmanlike gesture of impartiality. The Solicitor General's finest hour, indeed.
The remedy of new trial has been described as "a new invention to temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice." 34 Thus, to ensure that justice is properly served, this Court finds the necessity to remand the case to the court of origin for the conduct of a new trial to introduce the evidence newly discovered by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 22, 2015 and the Resolutions dated March 18, 2016, September 6, 2016, and November 8, 2016 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34604 are SET ASIDE. Let the case be RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the court of origin for reception of petitioner's evidence.
SO ORDERED." (Hernando, J., no part; Caguioa, J., designated additional member per Raffle dated September 23, 2019; Rosario, J., designated Fifth Member per Special Order No. 2833 dated June 29, 2021).
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul Hernando (now a member of this Court), with Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (retired member of the Court) and Stephen C. Cruz concurring; rollo, pp. 36-50.
2.Rollo, pp. 155-157.
3.Id. at 51-53.
4.Id. at 54.
5. Penned by Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda; id. at 89-91.
6. See Brief for Appellant, id. at 70.
7. See rollo, p. 89.
8.Id.
9.Id.
10.Id. at 90.
11.Id.
12.Id.
13.Id. at 89-91.
14.Id. at 22.
15.Id.
16.Id.
17.Id. at 91.
18.Id. at 46; 49.
19.Id. at 98-101.
20.Supra note 2.
21.Id. at 156.
22.Id. at 102-122.
23.Supra note 4.
24.Supra note 5.
25.Rollo, pp. 26-27.
26.Id. at 30.
27.Id. at 195-200.
28.Custodio v. Sandiganbayan, 493 Phil. 194, 205 (2005), citing People v. Li Ka Kim, G.R. No. 148586, May 25, 2004; People v. Datu, 397 SCRA 695 (2003); People v. Remudo, 364 SCRA 61 (2001); People v. Ebias, 342 SCRA 675 (2000); Amper v. Sandiganbayan, 279 SCRA 434 (1997); Tumang v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 328 (1989); Jose v. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 257 (1976); People v. Mangulabnan, et at., 99 Phil. 992 (1956); Reyes v. People, 71 Phil. 598 (1941); People v. Luzon, 4 Phil. 343 (1905); Berry v. State of Georgia, 10 Ga 511 (1851).
29.Supra.
30.Id. at 206, citing Argyrou v. State, 349 Md 587, 709 A. 2d 1194 (1998) and Tumang v. CA, 172 SCRA 328 (1989).
31.Rollo, p. 93.
32. 285 Phil. 983, 989-990 (1992).
33. 321 Phil. 64, 69-70 (1995), (Citations omitted).
34.Custodio v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 28, at 203, citing Jose v. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 257 (1976).