THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 196213. March 27, 2017.]
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS [FORMERLY FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY], petitioner,vs. VIOLETA PESONS, ET AL., respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedMarch 27, 2017, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 196213(Bank of the Philippine Islands [formerly Far East Bank and Trust Company] vs. Violeta Pesons, et al.). — This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 2 dated September 10, 2009 and Resolution 3 dated February 23, 2011 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82438. HTcADC
Benjamin Pesons (Benjamin), the husband of herein respondent Violeta Pesons (Violeta), was the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City, Cebu and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-747 (subject property). Benjamin obtained several loans from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), now petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), in the aggregate amount of P700,000.00. The loans were evidenced by three promissory notes (PN), which were signed by the Spouses Benjamin and Violeta Pesons (Spouses Pesons). On May 6, 1994, as security for the loans, a real estate mortgage (REM) was constituted over the subject property, including all improvements thereon, in favor of FEBTC. 4
When the Spouses Pesons failed to pay their loan, FEBTC instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings with the Office of the Sheriff of Mandaue City. During the auction sale, FEBTC emerged as the highest bidder and was consequently issued a certificate of sale dated March 3, 1995, which was annotated at the back of OCT No. O-747. 5
On December 12, 1996, with no redemption having been made within the one-year period following the issuance of the certificate of sale, FEBTC consolidated its title to the subject property; it was thereafter issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 39649. 6 Since the Spouses Pesons were still in possession of the subject property, FEBTC filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of the subject property with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, Cebu. The case was docketed as LRC Case No. 3 and was raffled to Branch 56. Violeta opposed the petition, but the RTC overruled her opposition and, consequently, directed the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of FEBTC on December 16, 1997. 7
On March 11, 1998, Violeta filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of REM, annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure, reconveyance of property, with prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction and damages with the RTC. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-3194 and was raffled to Branch 55. 8 Violeta claimed that subject property was their family home and the REM was executed without her consent. She claimed that she only came to know of the mortgage when she received an order from the RTC Branch 56, directing them to vacate the subject property since its title had already been transferred in FEBTC's name. 9 She insisted that she was not privy to the execution of the REM and that her signature appearing thereon was a forgery. She further averred that her children, who are beneficiaries of the subject property, are likewise not aware nor consented to the REM constituted thereon. 10 CAIHTE
In its answer, FEBTC maintained that Violeta knowingly and voluntarily participated in the execution of the REM over the subject property and that she personally signed the contract therefor. FEBTC claimed that the subject property is not a family home and, assuming that it is, it is not exempt from execution. 11
The RTC Branch 55, after due proceedings, issued a writ of preliminary injunction, which enjoined FEBTC, its employees, agents and all those acting in its behalf, from enforcing the writ of possession issued by Branch 56 and further directing the parties to maintain the status quo pending litigation. 12
During the trial, the testimonies of Violeta, her son Benjamin Pesons, Jr., and Romeo Varona (Varona), a handwriting expert, were presented. On the other hand, FEBTC presented the testimony of Maria Josefina Alovera (Alovera), its credit officer. 13
Violeta testified that she was the one supporting her four children (collectively, the respondents) with Benjamin since the latter had financial problems. She claimed that Benjamin was no longer staying in their house. That she neither saw nor signed any REM. She maintained that her signature appearing on the contract was forged and, to support her claim, she sought the help of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory to examine her signature as against the signature appearing on the mortgage document. When Varona testified, he presented a chart bearing the questioned and standard signatures of Violeta. He explained how he arrived at the conclusion that the questioned signature in REM was a forgery. 14
On the other hand, Alovera testified that the Spouses Pesons obtained a credit line from FEBTC in the amount of P700,000.00 secured by three PNs, a REM constituted over the subject property, and a loan agreement. She averred that she personally saw the Spouses Pesons sign the REM, as well as the three PNs evidencing their loan obligation to FEBTC and was in fact one of the witnesses to the REM. 15
On April 14, 2003, the RTC Branch 55, rendered a Decision in favor of the respondents. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Varona and, accordingly, declared the REM constituted on the subject property a nullity. Thus, the RTC directed the cancellation of TCT No. 39649 that was issued in the name of FEBTC and ordered the latter to reconvey the subject property to the respondents. 16
On appeal, the CA, in its Decision 17 dated September 10, 2009, affirmed in toto the RTC's Decision dated April 14, 2003. FEBTC sought a reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution 18 dated February 23, 2011.
Hence, the instant petition.
BPI, as the successor-in-interest of FEBTC, now claims that the CA erred in nullifying the REM constituted on the subject property. It claims that the CA should not have lent credence to the opinion of handwriting expert Varona and took it as conclusive proof of the alleged forgery. 19 It also avers that the CA erred in ruling that the subject property is a family home since the respondents failed to properly set up and prove such claim. 20
On the other hand, the respondents, in their Comment, 21 maintain that the REM is a nullity since Violeta's signature appearing thereon was a forgery. 22 Further, the respondents claim that they were able to sufficiently establish that the subject property is a family home and that the encumbrance of the same sans their written consent is proscribed under Article 158 of the Family Code. 23
Essentially, the issue set forth for the Court's resolution is whether the REM constituted on the subject property is null and void. aScITE
Ruling of the Court
The petition is denied.
BPI's claim that the CA erred in ruling that Violeta's signature appearing on the deed of REM is a forgery is plainly untenable. That Violeta's signature is a forgery is a finding of the RTC and the CA on a question of fact. Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Factual findings of the lower courts are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal, and in fact accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence on the record. 24 The lower courts' finding that Violeta's signature was forged is conclusive upon the Court, especially as it is based on the expert opinion of Varona, a handwriting expert from the PNP Crime Laboratory, which constitutes more than clear, positive and convincing evidence that Violeta did not sign the deed of REM.
Moreover, BPI's insinuation that the lower courts should have given more credence to the testimony of Alovera, its credit officer who testified that she saw Violeta sign the deed of REM, over the expert testimony of Varona likewise deserves scant consideration. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide; the assessment of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of abuse of discretion. 25
In this case, the RTC did not commit any abuse of discretion in giving more credence to the expert testimony of Varona, who has been working with the PNP Crime Laboratory as a handwriting expert since 1975, 26 as against that of Alovera. Alovera's testimony, by itself, carries little weight considering that Alovera is a biased witness being an employee of BPI. In the absence of any corroborative evidence, the RTC correctly overruled Alovera's testimony in favor of Varona's expert testimony. DETACa
Further, Alovera, prior to the signing of the deed of REM, does not personally know Violeta. Thus, at the time of the signing of the deed, she could not have been sure that the one signing the same is indeed Violeta. 27 Furthermore, Alovera stated that the Spouses Pesons maintained an account with FEBTC prior to their loan application and, thus, signed several bank forms therefor which is presumably in the possession of FEBTC. During the trial, the respondents, through counsel, asked Alovera to produce the documents pertinent to the joint deposit account so that Violeta's signature thereon could be compared to the signature appearing in the deed of REM. However, FEBTC opted not to present the said bank documents in court. 28 It is, thus, presumed that had said bank documents been produced, they would be adverse to the bank's theory. 29 On this point, the CA aptly ruled that:
Undoubtedly, [FEBTC's] presentation of its records of Violeta's signature could readily dispel the latter's claim of forgery and such simple act could have been the most convenient and effective refutation by [FEBTC]. However, not only did [FEBTC] fail to present such records even after being asked to by [the respondents], but it further neglected to offer any explanation for the failure. 30
BPI further asserts that the lower courts should have considered that the deed of REM is a public document and, hence, enjoys the presumption of regularity. Indeed, settled is the rule that generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. However, this presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 31 As already stated, Varona's expert testimony that Violeta's signature was forged constitutes clear and convincing evidence which effectively rebuts the presumption of regularity of the notarized deed of REM.
Spouses Pesons were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and their property relations, in the absence of a marriage settlement, is governed by the system of conjugal partnership of gains under the Civil Code. 32 Pursuant to the system of conjugal partnership of gains, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. 33 Further, any alienation or encumbrance of any real property belonging to the conjugal partnership by the husband without the wife's consent, express or implied, is voidable. 34 Thus, considering that Violeta did not give her consent to the encumbrance of the subject property, which presumably belongs to the conjugal partnership in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the lower courts correctly ordered the nullification of the REM.
The issue of whether the subject property is a family home and whether such fact was properly claimed and set up by the respondents is immaterial; the REM constituted thereon, in the first place, was void since Violeta did not give her consent thereto. Accordingly, the Court sees no reason to further discuss the parties' respective contentions on this issue. HEITAD
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated September 10, 2009 and Resolution dated February 23, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82438 are AFFIRMED. (Jardeleza, J., no part, as a family member is connected with a party; Martires, J., designated additional Member per Raffle dated March 27, 2017.)
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 13-45.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante, with Associate Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos and Samuel H. Gaerlan concurring; id. at 48-63.
3.Id. at 65.
4.Id. at 22-23.
5.Id. at 23.
6.Id.
7.Id. at 24.
8.Id.
9.Id. at 49.
10.Id. at 50.
11.Id. at 25.
12.Id. at 51.
13.Id.
14.Id. at 51-53.
15.Id. at 26.
16.Id. at 27.
17.Id. at 48-63.
18.Id. at 65.
19.Id. at 31.
20.Id. at 39.
21.Id. at 87-102.
22.Id. at 94.
23.Id. at 95.
24.Spouses Bernales v. Heirs of Julian Sambaan, 624 Phil. 88, 97 (2010).
25.See People v. Basite, 459 Phil. 197, 206-207 (2003), citing People v. Baid, 391 Phil. 552, 571-572 (2000).
26.Rollo, p. 96.
27.Id. at 56-57.
28.Id. at 57.
29. RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Section 3 (e).
30.Rollo, pp. 57-58.
31.See Lazaro, et al. v. Agustin, et al., 632 Phil. 310, 321 (2010).
32. CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 119.
33. CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 160.
34. CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Articles 166 and 173.