THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 12321. July 17, 2019.]
MINELLI A. BALANA, complainant, vs.ASSISTANT REGIONAL PROSECUTOR EVA AIREEN N. MONTEZA-CADAVEDO, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 17, 2019, which reads as follows:
"A.C. No. 12321 (Minelli A. Balana vs. Assistant Regional Prosecutor Eva Aireen N. Monteza-Cadavedo). — For the Court's resolution is the complaint 1 dated August 17, 2018 filed by Minelli A. Balana (complainant) against Assistant Regional Prosecutor Eva Aireen N. Monteza-Cadavedo (respondent).
Factual Antecedents
The present case stemmed from the complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property filed by Vic Valerie Jane E. Wiseman against the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Zamboanga City. The complaint was docketed as NPS Docket No. IX-06-INV-18B-00083. 2 HTcADC
After investigation, the respondent found probable cause to indict the complainant for the crime charged against the latter. Hence, in the Resolution 3 dated June 28, 2018, the respondent recommended the filing, in the proper court, of information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property against the complainant. The respondent further recommended the amount of P26,000.00 bail bond for the temporary liberty of the complainant. 4
Conformably with the resolution, the corresponding information was filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Zamboanga City, Branch 3. Thereafter, MTCC Presiding Judge Carlo Martin R. Alcala, in the Order 5 dated July 16, 2018, issued a warrant of arrest against the complainant and fixed the bail at P26,000.00.
On July 17, 2018, the complainant posted a bail bond in the amount specified in the Order dated July 16, 2018. On even date, the MTCC issued an Order 6 recalling the warrant of arrest it previously issued against the complainant. It likewise ordered the release of the bail in favor of the complainant.
Aggrieved by the foregoing incidents, the complainant instituted the instant disbarment complaint against the respondent, praying that the latter be suspended and/or disbarred from the practice of law. The complainant averred that the Resolution dated June 28, 2018 effectively prayed for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against her. This, according to the complainant, was in direct contravention of the pertinent laws and the Rules of Court. She added that the resolution violated Department Circular No. 013 7 of the Department of Justice. 8 Moreover, the unlawful acts of the respondent caused emotional and psychological stress on her part due to threat of arrest and to rigors of posting a bail bond. 9
Respondent, for her part, argued that her recommendation for the amount of bail should not be construed as a prayer for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. She asserted that she was not the one who issued the warrant of arrest as it is not within her power to issue the same. 10 She added that she did not act with malice or bad faith in issuing the resolution. 11 She further contended that there was a waiver on the part of the complainant on the issuance of the warrant of arrest by the MTCC after she posted bail. 12 Hence, she prayed that the instant case against her be dismissed for lack of merit. 13 CAIHTE
Ruling of the Court
After examining the present complaint, the Court resolves to dismiss it outright.
The Court notes that the assailed action of the respondent pertains to her quasi-judicial function. Ultimately, the complainant faulted the respondent for issuing the Resolution dated June 28, 2018. Based on the complainant's allegations, the acts complained of against the respondent pertain to the exercise of the latter's function as investigating prosecutor.
In several cases, the Court held that the alleged error committed by judges in the exercise of their adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should instead be assailed through judicial remedies. 14 In like manner, the acts of the prosecutors, who exercise adjudicative functions in the determination of the existence of probable cause to hold the accused for trial in court, are not subject to disciplinary action. 15
As a rule, an administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari. 16 In this case, the complainant had the remedies to contest the resolution issued by the respondent. She, however, failed to exercise the same.
The Court observes that the issuance of the warrant of arrest by the MTCC against the complainant primarily prompted the latter to institute this administrative complaint against the respondent. The Court, thus, rejects the complainant's assertion. While the Resolution dated June 28, 2018, finding probable cause to indict the complainant, contained a bail recommendation, the Court finds that this does not amount to a prayer for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against her. Besides, as correctly pointed out by the respondent, it is not within her power to determine whether a warrant of arrest should be issued or not.
The respondent, in issuing the resolution, merely determines the existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information in court. During a preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor evaluates if the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. 17
On the other hand, once the information has been filed in court, the judge makes a preliminary examination of the evidence submitted, and on the strength thereof, and independent from the findings of the public prosecutor, determines the necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. 18 The judge, thus, ascertains if a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. aScITE
In Young, et al. v. People, 19 the Court emphasized the stark distinctions between executive and judicial determination of probable cause, viz.:
Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of the Prosecutor. 20 (Citation omitted)
Accordingly, the subsequent issuance of the warrant of arrest against the complainant cannot be ascribed to the respondent. The Court, thus, sees no reason to subject the respondent to the sanction of disbarment or suspension. There being no other evidence whatsoever tending to prove unfitness of the respondent to continue in the practice of law and to remain as an officer of the court, and there being no showing of malice or bad faith on her part with regard to the issuance of the subject resolution, the charges against her must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant administrative complaint dated August 17, 2018 against respondent Assistant Regional Prosecutor Eva Aireen N. Monteza-Cadavedo is DISMISSED and this case is considered CLOSED and TERMINATED. DETACa
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 1-10.
2.Id. at 2.
3.Id. at 12-13.
4.Id. at 13.
5.Id. at 15.
6.Id. at 18.
7. Re: 2018 New Bail Bond Guide.
8.Rollo, p. 6.
9.Id. at 7.
10.Id. at 24-26.
11.Id. at 27-31.
12.Id. at 31-32.
13.Id. at 32.
14.Sps. Chua v. SACP Tan-Sollano, et al., 810 Phil. 365, 368 (2017), citing Maquiran v. Judge Grageda, 491 Phil. 205, 230 (2005).
15.Sps. Chua v. SACP Tan-Sollano, et al., id.
16.Id.
17.Young, et al. v. People, 780 Phil. 439, 448 (2016).
18.Id. at 448-449.
19. 780 Phil. 439 (2016).
20.Id. at 449.