THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 222620. August 19, 2019.]
GLORIA AZARCON, petitioner, vs.FLORENCIA PENDON NAVARRO, BY HERSELF AND REPRESENTING HER SIBLINGS, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated August 19, 2019, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 222620 (Gloria Azarcon v. Florencia Pendon Navarro, by herself and representing her siblings, and the Department of Justice, represented by Secretary Leila de Lima). — This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated March 16, 2016, of petitioner Gloria Azarcon (Azarcon) that seeks to set aside and annul the Decision 2 dated April 15, 2015 and Resolution 3 dated January 19, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 134796, which affirmed in toto the Resolutions dated August 3, 2011 4 and January 21, 2014 5 of public respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) finding probable cause to indict the petitioner for Estafa through Falsification of Public Document by a private individual under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The facts follow.
On September 13, 2004, private respondent Florencia Pendon Navarro (Navarro), for herself and in behalf of the other heirs of her parents, Spouses Estanislao Pendon and Priscilla Francisco (Spouses Pendon), filed a Complaint-Affidavit 6 charging petitioner Azarcon, Maura Cabinbin (Cabinbin), Benjamin Rosario (Benjamin), and those provisionally named as John Does with the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public/Private Documents. It was alleged that in 1982, Navarro was authorized 7 to mortgage their family home located at No. 1956 Almeda Street, Tondo, Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 113061 8 due to the mounting hospital bills and other medical expenses of one of their siblings, Nenita Pendon, who later died; that the lot was mortgaged to Azarcon in the amount of P30,000.00, 9 but the loan had reached a total of P180,000.00; that Azarcon eventually possessed the front portion of the subject lot and built a small dress shop as further payment for the interest on the loan; that in 1998, Navarro and her co-heirs heard rumors that their property was being sold, but Azarcon denied it; that it was only recently that Navarro and her co-heirs found out that the mortgaged property was bought by Cabinbin, who later sold the same to Segundina Rosario (Segundina), the mother of Benjamin; that upon checking with the Register of Deeds of Manila, there was no document conveying the property from Azarcon to Cabinbin, but only from the latter to Segundina; that with the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Questioned Documents Division, 10 it was found that the signatures of the complainants appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 24, 1997, 11 the Confirmation of Heirship and Sale dated March 12, 1998, and the Capital Gains Tax Return/Application for Certificate Authorizing Registration 12 were all forged; and that Azarcon, Cabinbin, and Benjamin conspired and falsified the aforesaid documents to illegally transfer the subject property from the heirs of the Spouses Pendon under TCT No. 113061 to Segundina, who is now deceased, under TCT No. 238265, 13 to the detriment, prejudice and damage of the Pendon family. CAIHTE
Only Azarcon and Benjamin, who is also her brother-in-law, 14 filed a Counter-Affidavit. 15 They jointly contend that the heirs of the Spouses Pendon, with Navarro acting as the attorney-in-fact, already sold to Azarcon the mortgaged property as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 11, 1986; 16 that Azarcon requested Cabinbin to have TCT No. 113061 cancelled and a new one issued; that without the knowledge and participation of Azarcon, Cabinbin maliciously had the new TCT No. 236787 17 issued in her name after forging the signature of Navarro in a Deed of Sale 18 executed between them on November 14, 1997; that Azarcon subsequently sold the subject property to Segundina by virtue of a Deed of Conditional Sale dated March 20, 1998; 19 that upon discovery of the treacherous act, Azarcon confronted Cabinbin, who admitted that she had the new TCT issued in her name after cancelling the old one; that Azarcon then brought Cabinbin to Segundina's house where she again confessed her misdeed; that to correct her betrayal, Cabinbin executed a Deed of Absolute Sale on April 11, 1998 20 in favor of Segundina; and that as a consequence, TCT No. 238265 21 was issued in the name of Segundina.
Navarro asserted in her Reply 22 that they did not intend to sell the mortgaged property, but Azarcon was very insistent that they could not make a loan if a blank deed of sale and a special power of attorney would not be signed; that the alleged treachery of Cabinbin is a farce to cover up the falsification charge against them; and that it is apparent that Benjamin and Azarcon are using the theory in land registration that a void title can be ratified and/or validated after it has undergone three transfers.
Finally, in their Rejoinder, 23 Rosario and Azarcon argued that Navarro did not categorically deny her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 11, 1986; the dates of the execution of the deed of mortgage and the deed of sale are far apart; that the treachery of Cabinbin is not a moro-moro as proven by an Acknowledgment Receipt 24 showing that Azarcon gave her the amount of P30,000.00 "bilang kabayaran sa anumang gastusin sa pag-salin ng titulo sa kanyang pangalan mula kay Florencia Pendon sa pamamagitan ng Deed of Sale sa maayos na paraan"; that the best evidence of sale of the subject property is a letter 25 by Navarro to Azarcon whereby the former was asking for mercy from the latter not to throw them out yet from the subject property for they had no place to transfer; and that the criminal action should be suspended as there exists a prejudicial question (on whether TCT No. 238265 issued in the name of Segundina is a valid and existing title and whether there was falsification committed) with the filing of a petition for annulment of title 26 by Navarro and her family with regard to TCT Nos. 113061, 236787 and 238265, which is pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 14.
On June 20, 2005, Assistant City Prosecutor Romeo S. Poso resolved to recommend the filing of the case against Cabinbin for Estafa through Falsification of Public Document and the dismissal of the case against Azarcon and Benjamin for insufficiency of evidence. 27 The motion for reconsideration of Navarro was denied for lack of merit. 28
Upon petition for review before the DOJ, Undersecretary Francisco F. Baraan III found probable cause against Azarcon, being in conspiracy with Cabinbin, for Estafa through Falsification of Public Document by a private individual under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, of the RPC. 29 The City Prosecutor of Manila was directed to amend the Information earlier filed against Cabinbin by including Azarcon therein. Azarcon filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied with finality. 30
As aforesaid, the CA denied the petition for certiorari filed by Azarcon and affirmed in toto the assailed resolutions of the DOJ. Likewise, it denied her motion for reconsideration; hence, the present petition.
Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors:
a. The Court of Appeals Committed Serious Errors of Law When It Issued the Questioned Decision Dated April 15, 2016 and the Resolution Dated January 19, 2016.
b. No Falsification of Public Document Could Have Taken Place with Respect to the Petitioner as the Subject Property Had Already Been Sold to Her Way Before the Alleged Falsification Took Place. 31
Petitioner insists in her petition that she had every right to instruct Cabinbin to have the title of the respondents transferred to her name and that she did not have to resort to falsification as she was already the rightful owner of the subject property. She also argues that Navarro can no longer go against an innocent buyer of the property because Navarro and her siblings are no longer the owners of the same property. Hence, according to petitioner, there is no probable cause to charge her with the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Document. DETACa
The petition lacks merit.
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be, of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction. 32 This is consistent with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. 33 There are, however, exceptions to this rule. Among the exceptions are enumerated in Brocka v. Ponce Enrile. 34
A close examination of the arguments presented in this case, however, shows that the present case does not fall under any of the exceptions.
To hold petitioner liable for the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Document, the prosecution must show that she committed Estafa through any of the modes of committing Falsification. Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, Falsification is committed under any of the following modes:
(1) Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
(2) Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
(3) Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
(4) Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(5) Altering true dates;
(6) Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
(7) Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
(8) Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book.
On the other hand, Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit; and (b) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. 35
The DOJ, in finding probable cause to indict petitioner with the above crime, ruled as such:
After re-examining the evidence and attending circumstances, we find the petition to be meritorious as against respondent Azarcon. Evidence tends to show that without her indispensable cooperation, if not instigation, the falsification would not have been committed. She gave to Cabinbin the owner's copy of the land title in the name of complainants. Although she denied any part in the falsification in the questioned deed of sale, the glaring fact is that she signed as witness in the deed of sale in favor of respondent Segundina Rosario. This is a prima facie evidence that respondents Azarcon and Cabinbin conspired with each other to facilitate the ultimate sale of the property. There is merit in complainant's contention that falsification was resorted to, with intent to bar them from running after the property as against an innocent buyer, and to avoid the tedious and lengthy proceedings of foreclosure of the mortgage.
Complainants are likewise right in assailing the erroneous finding of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila that it was only respondent Cabinbin who benefited from the transfer of the land title to her name. Actually, she did not gain anything from said conveyance. It is not she, but respondent Azarcon, who received the price of the property, which she (Azarcon) admitted having sold to Segundina Rosario by ordering Cabinbin to execute a deed of sale in Rosario's favor. Obviously, Azarcon merely made Cabinbin as her dummy. Moreover, Segundina Rosario was at fault for participating in a patently anomalous transaction. It should be noted that Azarcon, claiming to be the owner, offered to sell a land not registered in her name. Notwithstanding this highly suspicious circumstance, Segundina Rosario proceeded to buy the property, satisfied with a deed of sale executed by respondent Cabinbin. 36 aDSIHc
The CA found the above ruling of the DOJ to be devoid of any grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against petitioner, thus:
In the case at bench, We find that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of DOJ in finding probable cause against petitioner Azarcon as the attending circumstances and the evidence gathered would establish that falsification would not be committed without her indispensable cooperation. As found out by the DOJ, petitioner Azarcon was the one who gave to Maura the owner's copy of the land title in the name of private respondents and although the former was denying any participation in the falsification in the questioned deed of sale, it was established that she signed as a witness in the said deed of sale in favor of Segundina. With all these considered, a prima facie case was established against petitioner Azarcon and Maura for having conspired with each other to facilitate the ultimate sale of the subject property.
We, therefore, affirm the DOJ's finding that there is merit in private respondents' contention that falsification was resorted to with intent to bar them from running after the property as against an innocent buyer and also to avoid the tedious and lengthy proceedings of foreclosure of the mortgage. The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the DOJ are amply supported by substantial evidence. 37
The findings of the DOJ, as affirmed by the CA, clearly show that the elements of the crime are present in this case. It must be remembered that owing to the nature of a preliminary investigation and its purpose, all of the foregoing elements need not be definitively established for it is enough that their presence becomes reasonably apparent. 38 This is because probable cause, the determinative matter in a preliminary investigation, implies mere probability of guilt; thus, a finding based on more than bare suspicion, but less than evidence that would justify a conviction, would suffice. 39
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. 40 Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and, definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. 41 A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. 42 It is not a pronouncement of guilt. 43 Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. 44 It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. 45
Thus, in this case, the ends of justice will be better served through the conduct of a full-blown trial considering that there is no evidence that the DOJ acted in a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in its finding of probable cause. It must be noted that the DOJ's finding of probable cause to indict petitioner prevails over her bare allegation of grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated March 16, 2016, of petitioner Gloria Azarcon is DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated April 15, 2015 and the Resolution dated January 19, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 134796 are AFFIRMED. ETHIDa
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 10-23.
2.Id. at 374-380. Penned by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Edwin D. Sorongon.
3.Id. at 400-401.
4.Id. at 89-93.
5.Id. at 164-167.
6.Id. at 40-41.
7.Id. at 327-329.
8.Id. at 80-81.
9.Id. at 74-76.
10.Id. at 83-85.
11.Id. at 86-87.
12.Id. at 88.
13.Id. at 371-372.
14.Id. at 43.
15.Id. at 43-46.
16.Id. at 101-102.
17.Id. at 475-477.
18.Id. at 86.
19.Id. at 332-333.
20.Id. at 334.
21.Id. at 371-372.
22.Id. at 47-48.
23.Id. at 49-53.
24.Id. at 54.
25.Id. at 55-57.
26.Id. at 58-63.
27.Id. at 64-67.
28.Id. at 77-79.
29.Id. at 89-93.
30.Id. at 164-167.
31.Id. at 17.
32.Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil. 568, 615 (1996).
33.Id.
34. 270 Phil. 271, 276-277 (1990).
"a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
"b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
"c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice;
"d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
"e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
"f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
"g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
"h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
"i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied." (Citations omitted.)
35.Eugenio v. People, 573 Phil. 22, 35 (2008), citing People v. Caures, 346 Phil. 786, 804 (1997).
36.Rollo, p. 91.
37.Id. at 379.
38.Reyes v. The Office of the Ombudsman, et al., 810 Phil. 106, 114 (2017).
39.Id.
40.Senator Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., 751 Phil. 821, 868 (2015).
41.Id.
42.Id.
43.Id.
44.Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice, 512 Phil. 145, 159 (2005).
45.Id.