Atacador v. People

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 240182. September 30, 2020.]

MARIO G. ATACADOR, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOHN MARTIN TABANIAG, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated September 30, 2020, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 240182 (MARIO G. ATACADOR, petitioner v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOHN MARTIN TABANIAG, respondents). — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 questioning the February 19, 2018 Decision 2 and the June 8, 2018 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 150095. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Mario G. Atacador (Atacador) for two (2) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. 4

In 2015, two (2) separate Informations were filed against accused-appellant Atacador charging him with violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The Informations stated:

Criminal Case No. 15-1400 (2016-1404)

"That on or about the 15th day of October 2014, or prior thereto, in Parañaque City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to JOHN MARTIN A. TABANIAG, to apply on account or for value the check described below:

Check No.: 0249507

said accused well knowing at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the bank for payment in full of the amount of such check upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason 'ACCOUNT CLOSED' and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof, within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.

Contrary to law." 5

The Information for Criminal Case 151401 (2016-1405), on the other hand, contained these details:

Check No.: 02495086

During arraignment, Atacador pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. 7

A Compromise Agreement was then reached during the mediation conference where Atacador agreed to pay P1,000,000.00 to private respondent John Martin Tabaniag (Tabaniag), with the amount representing the compensation for the civil aspect of the case. However, due to his failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement, the Metropolitan Trial Court issued a Writ of Execution against Atacador. 8

According to the prosecution, Atacador was the registered owner of a house and lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 324310, which he offered to sell to Tabaniag in March 2014 for P2,700,000.00. On April 8, 2014, Tabaniag accepted the offer. On June 26, 2014, he paid P700,000.00 as downpayment for the price of the house and lot. 9

Thereafter in October 2014, Atacador informed Tabaniag that he was no longer interested in selling the house and lot to the latter because he sold it to another buyer. Atacador told Tabaniag, however, that he would be returning the downpayment paid by the latter. Tabaniag acceded, but told Atacador to reimburse him for the renovation expenses spent on the house. 10

Subsequently on October 13, 2014, Atacador issued and signed three (3) Allied Bank checks amounting to P350,000.00 each, with the first two (2) (Check Nos. 0249507 and 0249508) representing the down payment, and the last check standing for the renovation expenses spent by Tabaniag. 11

However, when Tabaniag deposited the first two (2) checks in his Banco De Oro account, they were dishonored by the drawee bank because Atacador's account was already closed. 12

Thereafter, Tabaniag sent a demand letter to Atacador, which the latter personally received. But despite Tabaniag's requests and demands to Atacador, the latter failed to make good the dishonored checks. 13

Atacador admitted that the checks were dishonored, and imputed his failure to pay to Tabaniag's refusal to vacate the subject house and lot. He argued that Tabaniag's failure to leave the house and lot also accounts for his refusal to comply with the Compromise Agreement. 14

On June 17, 2016, the Metropolitan Trial Court found Atacador guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. It ruled that "the prosecution sufficiently proves that the accused had knowledge of insufficient funds at the time of the issuance of the check[.]" 15

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of two counts of BP 22 and is ordered to pay a fine of Php200,000.00 for each count. Considering that the parties already entered into a compromise agreement, the terms thereof shall govern the civil aspect of this case.

SO ORDERED. 16

The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City then affirmed the ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court. 17 It likewise found that the accused had knowledge that he did not have sufficient funds in the bank to fund the check "since he admitted that the reason why he did not make good his two (2) checks is because of the refusal of the private complainant to vacate the subject premises." 18 The Regional Trial Court, in a Resolution, likewise denied his Motion for Reconsideration. 19

Atacador elevated the case before the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Review under Rule 42. 20 He argued that he can only be held civilly, but not criminally liable for the dishonored checks. 21

Further, Atacador claimed that "[t]he private respondent refused to vacate the house and lot sold by the petitioner to him even after they agreed to the cancellation of the contract to sell." 22 According to him, this prompted his refusal to comply with the Compromise Agreement. 23

However, in its February 19, 2018 Decision, 24 the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's Decision. It ruled that for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, intent is immaterial; it declared that "[t]he mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum." 25 Thus, regardless of the reasons purported by Atacador for the issuance of the dishonored checks and for his noncompliance with the Compromise Agreement, his conviction for violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 stands. 26

Lastly in its June 8, 2018 Resolution, 27 the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atacador.

Petitioner now files this Petition for Review on Certiorari28 under Rule 45 before this Court. He prays for this Court's exercise of its equity jurisdiction, arguing that he be adjudged as only civilly, and not criminally liable for the dishonored checks. 29

Further, petitioner claimed that his failure to comply with the Compromise Agreement was due to the failure and refusal of respondent Tabaniag to vacate the house and lot despite their agreement. 30 Thus, petitioner's liability is "only civil in nature in view of the cancellation of the contract to sell involving a house and lot owned by [petitioner] and his sister." 31

On December 12, 2018, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment. 32 The OSG argues that the petition should be denied because petitioner raises questions of fact, which is not allowed under Rule 45. 33

In addition, violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is malum prohibitum. Hence, petitioner's reasons for not paying the value of the checks would not exculpate him from liability. 34 It was sufficiently proven that petitioner knew that the checks had bounced because he received the Notices of Dishonor; on top of that, private respondent even sent a demand letter. 35

The OSG further argues that petitioner's invocation of this Court's equity jurisdiction has no basis because the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are clear. Equity "is applied only in the absence of, and never against statutory law." 36

Petitioner then filed a Reply, 37 arguing that the circumstances of the case justify the application of equity. He argues that there "is unjust enrichment on the part of [respondent Tabaniag] as he refused to vacate the house and lot owned by the petitioner." 38 While the Compromise Agreement stated that petitioner only had to pay P1,000,000.00, he also had to pay a fine of P200,000.00 for each check that bounced. 39

Further, respondent Tabaniag filed an estafa case against petitioner after the sale transaction was cancelled. 40 Petitioner prays that the payment of the penalty amounting to a total of P400,000.00 be dispensed with. 41

The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court that petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

We deny the petition.

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner imputes his failure to comply with the Compromise Agreement to the refusal of respondent Tabaniag to vacate the subject house and lot. 42

Petitioner prays for this Court's exercise of its equity jurisdiction as he claims that he is only civilly, and not criminally, liable for his failure to make good the dishonored checks. 43 He prays that this Court absolve him from the payment of the P200,000.00 fine imposed for each of the dishonored checks. Finally, he prays that he be allowed to pay P1,000,000.00 as per the Compromise Agreement. 44

However, as pointed out by the Court of Appeals, this does not justify his refusal to make good the dishonored checks in time, and certainly, does not acquit him from violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. 45

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, penalizes the following acts as regards issuance of checks:

SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. — Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

SECTION 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

San Mateo v. People of the Philippines46 summarizes the requirements for conviction under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 as follows:

To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 47 (Citation omitted)

Here, petitioner does not deny that he issued two (2) checks which were subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for being unfunded. 48 The two (2) Allied Bank checks (Check Nos. 0249507 and 0249508) dated October 15, 2014 and October 17, 2014, 49 respectively, were issued and signed by petitioner to represent the amount of the downpayment to be reimbursed to respondent Tabaniag. 50

However, when respondent Tabaniag tried to deposit these checks with Banco De Oro, the drawee bank dishonored them and stamped them with the words "Account Closed." 51 Hence, the first and the third elements were sufficiently established by the prosecution.

As regards the second element, Chua v. People52 explains the evidence necessary to prove the issuer's knowledge of insufficiency of funds to honor the check:

Section 2 of BP 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which, however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment. 53 (Citation omitted)

Thus, the law prescribes that the issuer must be sufficiently informed in writing of the dishonor of the checks. Proof of the receipt by the issuer of such notice must also be established in order to trigger the presumption under Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

In this case, petitioner does not deny that respondent Tabaniag sent him a demand letter on October 23, 2014 to inform him about the dishonor of the checks and to request the payment of the amount of the said checks. Further, petitioner does not deny that he received such demand letter personally from respondent Tabaniag. 54

However, despite such personal receipt along with repeated requests from respondent Tabaniag, petitioner plainly refused to heed the demand to pay the value of the dishonored checks to respondent Tabaniag. The presumption, therefore, that petitioner proceeded on issuing the checks despite knowledge that it may be dishonored due to the insufficiency of funds in his account, arises. Hence, the second element for conviction under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was duly established by the prosecution.

Despite admission of the issuance and the subsequent dishonor of the checks, petitioner prays for this Court's exercise of equity jurisdiction, claiming that he may only be cited for civil, and not for criminal liabilities. 55 Petitioner repeatedly cites respondent Tabaniag's failure to vacate the house and lot as a reason sufficient to justify his refusal to make good the dishonored checks. 56

However this Court, in a number of cases, has ruled that violations under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is malum prohibitum. Nissan Gallery-Ortigas v. Felipe57 expounded on the reason behind the malum prohibitum nature of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 violations:

[i]n cases like violation of BP 22, a special law, the intent in issuing a check is immaterial. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bad check malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by the legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Considering the rule in mala prohibita cases, the only inquiry is whether the law has been breached. 58

Resterio v. People59 explained the policy behind the strict guidelines and proscriptions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with regard to the issuance of worthless checks:

The law was designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient or no credit or funds therefor. Such practice is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.

xxx xxx xxx

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. 60

Hence, regardless of the intent of the issuer, the law looks only on the mere issuance of the dishonored check and penalizes the issuer for such misconduct. The law protects against the far-reaching consequences of the distribution of worthless commercial papers among the public and preserves the economy in the process.

Petitioner must face the consequences of his issuing of worthless checks. Despite repeated demands on the part of respondent Tabaniag and despite being personally informed of the dishonor of the checks, petitioner consistently failed and refused to pay the value of the checks and the amount due to respondent Tabaniag.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition is DENIED. The February 19, 2018 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 150095 and June 8, 2018 Resolution are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-11.

2.Id. at 13-24. The February 19, 2018 Decision docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 150095 was penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles of the Second Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

3.Id. at 26-27. The June 8, 2018 Resolution docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 150095 was penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles of the Second Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

4.Id. at 23.

5.Id. at 14.

6.Id.

7.Id. at 15.

8.Id.

9.Id.

10.Id.

11.Id. at 15-16.

12.Id. at 16.

13.Id.

14.Id.

15.Id. at 17.

16.Id. at 16.

17.Id. at 17.

18.Id.

19.Id. at 18.

20.Id. at 13.

21.Id. at 18.

22.Id. at 37.

23.Id.

24.Id. at 13-24.

25.Id. at 22.

26.Id. at 22-23.

27.Id. at 26-27.

28.Id. at 3-11.

29.Id. at 6.

30.Id.

31.Id.

32.Id. at 52-63.

33.Id. at 55.

34.Id. at 58.

35.Id.

36.Id. at 59.

37.Id. at 67-69.

38.Id. at 67.

39.Id.

40.Id.

41.Id. at 69.

42.Id.

43.Id.

44.Id.

45.Id. at 22.

46. 705 Phil. 630 (2013) [Per J. Abad, Third Division].

47.Id. at 636-637.

48.Rollo, pp. 6-7.

49.Id. at 15-16.

50.Id. at 16.

51.Id.

52. 763 Phil. 644 (2015) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].

53.Chua v. People of the Philippines, 763 Phil. 644, 660 (2015) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division], citing Nissan Gallery-Ortigas v. Felipe, 720 Phil. 828 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].

54.Rollo, p. 16.

55.Id. at 7.

56.Id. at 6.

57. 720 Phil. 828 (2013) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].

58.Id. at 840.

59. 695 Phil. 693 (2012) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

60.Id. at 702-703.