Articulo v. Cagayan State University

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 253213. December 2, 2020.]

ARCHIMEDES C. ARTICULO, ANICETO E. UDANGA, JR., ROY L. MORGADO, AND ELMA V. GISMUNDO, petitioners, vs.THE CAGAYAN STATE UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY DR. URDUJAH A. TEJADA AS UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT AND THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE CAGAYAN STATE UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED BY LILIAN A. DE LAS LLAGAS AS CHAIRPERSON OF THE CSU BOARD OF REGENTS, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated December 2, 2020which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 253213 — ARCHIMEDES C. ARTICULO, ANICETO E. UDANGA, JR., ROY L. MORGADO, and ELMA V. GISMUNDO, petitioners, versus THE CAGAYAN STATE UNIVERSITY represented by DR. URDUJAH A. TEJADA as University President and THE BOARD OF REGENTS of the Cagayan State University represented by LILIAN A. DE LAS LLAGAS as Chairperson of the CSU Board of Regents, respondents. — The petitioners' motion for an extension of thirty (30) days within which to file a petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED, counted from the expiration of the reglementary period.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (Petition) of the Decision 2 dated November 28, 2019 and Resolution 3 dated July 16, 2020 of the Court of Appeals, Special Tenth Division (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 159238, which affirmed the Decision dated August 15, 2018 (CSC Decision) and Resolution dated November 26, 2018 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). 4 The CSC Decision, in turn, affirmed respondent Cagayan State University Board of Regents' (CSUBOR) Decision dated June 22, 2017 (CSUBOR Decision) which ordered petitioners' dismissal from service 5 on the ground of grave misconduct, serious dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and receiving for personal use of a fee, gift or other valuable thing in the course of official duties.

Petitioners again seek the nullification of the CSUBOR Decision due to violations of their right to due process. According to petitioners, their right to due process was violated when: (i) CSUBOR failed or refused to furnish them copies of the documents they requested; 6 (ii) persons other than the CSU President placed them on preventive suspension for a total of 107 days; 7 (iii) they were deprived the right to meaningfully participate in the proceedings of a fair and impartial Committee; 8 and (iv) they were prosecuted on the basis of an invalid Formal Charge. 9 Petitioners also add that CSUBOR's refusal or failure to give them copies of the documents amounts to violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Acts, 10 the Anti-Red Tape Law, 11 and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. 12 Notably, petitioners no longer interpose any argument with respect to the merits of the case.

The Court finds no merit in the Petition.

The two fundamental requirements of due process in administrative cases are: (1) that a person must be duly informed of the charges against him and (2) that he cannot be convicted of an offense or crime with which he was not charged. 13

Relevantly, Section 20, Rule 5 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) requires the disciplinary authority to furnish the employee concerned with a Formal Charge, viz.:

Section 20. Issuance of Formal Charge; Contents. — After a finding of a [prima facie] case, the disciplining authority shall formally charge the person complained of, who shall now be called as respondent. The formal charge shall contain a specification of charge/s, a brief statement of material or relevant facts, accompanied by certified true copies of the documentary evidence, if any, sworn statements covering the testimony of witnesses, a directive to answer the charge/s in writing, under oath in not less than seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof, an advice for the respondent to indicate in his/her answer whether or not he/she elects a formal investigation of the charge/s, and a notice that he/she may opt to be assisted by a counsel of his/her choice.

Here, it is undisputed that petitioners were each served a copy of the Formal Charge as well as the affidavits of the complaining witness. 14

Petitioners' argument that the determination of prima facie case should have been done by a majority of the CSUBOR and not just by the Preliminary Investigation Committee is not supported by the provisions under Rule 4 of the RRACCS on Preliminary Investigation which does not require that the determination of prima facie case be done personally by the disciplining authority.

Section 15. Preliminary Investigation; Definition. — A Preliminary Investigation is a proceeding undertaken to determine whether a [prima facie] case exists to warrant the issuance of a formal charge. It involves a fact-finding investigation or an [ex-parte] examination of records and documents submitted by the complainant and the person/s complained of, as well as documents readily available from other government offices.

Section 16. How Conducted. — Within five (5) days from receipt of the complaint sufficient in form and substance, the person/s complained of shall be required to submit his/her/their counter-affidavit/comment. Where the complaint is initiated by the disciplining authority, the disciplining authority or his authorized representative shall issue a show-cause memorandum directing the person/s complained of to explain why no administrative case should be filed against him/her/them. The latter's failure to submit the comment/counter-affidavit/explanation shall be considered a waiver thereof and the preliminary investigation may be completed even without his/her[/their] counter-affidavit/comment.

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Section 18. Investigation Report. — Within five (5) days from the termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating officer shall submit the Investigation Report with recommendation and the complete records of the case to the disciplining authority.

Section 19. Decision or Resolution After Preliminary Investigation. — If a prima facie case is established during the investigation, the disciplining authority may issue either a formal charge or a notice of charge/s pursuant to Rule 5 of this Rules.

In the absence of a prime facie case, the complaint shall be dismissed.

It is also undisputed that petitioners filed their respective counter-affidavits and/or answers in response to the Show Cause Order and Formal Charge. 15 They also attended the hearings before the Committee and were even assisted by counsel. 16 Apart from these, they were able to appeal the CSUBOR Decision before the CSC and seek reconsideration of the CSC Decision. These circumstances attest to the fact that petitioners were afforded ample opportunity to be heard.

It bears emphasis that administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. In administrative proceedings, a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary and technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. 17 In fact, the right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of administrative due process. 18 After all, due process in administrative cases, in essence, is simply an opportunity to explain one's side or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling. 19 Thus, there is no basis to nullify the CSUBOR Decision for lack of due process.

Likewise, petitioners' preventive suspension will not nullify the proceedings before the CSUBOR. Petitioners failed to show that the CSU President's authority to preventively suspend them is exclusive. On the other hand, Section 26, 20 Rule 7 of RRACCS authorizes the disciplining authority, in this case the CSUBOR, to place on preventive suspension subordinate employees/officer under investigation. Moreover, even if petitioners' preventive suspension exceeded the maximum period provided under Section 27, 21 Rule 7 of RRACCS, this will not nullify the proceedings taken against them. The invalidity of a preventive suspension for being in excess of the maximum period shall only entitle the public officer/employee to back salaries provided that such officer/employee is fully exonerated of the charges. 22

Finally, petitioners' allegation that CSUBOR's refusal or failure to furnish them copies of certain documents violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Anti-Red Tape Law, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, deserves scant consideration. Petitioners failed to demonstrate, more so prove, how CSUBOR could have violated these laws, and how these alleged violations also amount to a violation of their right to due process.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated October 16, 2020 is hereby DENIED, and the Decision dated November 28, 2019 and Resolution dated July 16, 2020 of the Court of Appeals, Special Tenth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 159238, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 7-39.

2.Id. at 47-59. Penned by Associate Justice Marlene B. Gonzales-Sison and concurred in by Associate Justices Pedro B. Corales and Ronaldo Roberto B. Martin.

3.Id. at 61-63.

4.Id. at 47-48.

5.Id. at 50.

6.Id. at 26-27.

7.Id. at 27-29.

8.Id. at 27-31.

9.Id. at 25.

10. Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, approved on August 17, 1960.

11. R.A. 9485, "AN ACT TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY IN THE DELIVERY OF GOVERNMENT SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC BY REDUCING BUREAUCRATIC RED TAPE, PREVENTING GRAFT AND CORRUPTION, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFOR," approved on June 2, 2007.

12. R.A. 6713, "AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, TO UPHOLD THE TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC OFFICE BEING A PUBLIC TRUST, GRANTING INCENTIVES AND REWARDS FOR EXEMPLARY SERVICE, ENUMERATING PROHIBITED ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on February 20, 1989. Rollo, p. 22.

13.Geronga v. Varela, G.R. No. 160846, February 22, 2008, 546 SCRA 429, 446.

14.Rollo, p. 12.

15.Id. at 12.

16.Id. at 13.

17.Pat-og, Sr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 198755, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 567, 584.

18.Id. at 584.

19.Magcamit v. Internal Affairs Service-Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, G.R. No. 198140, January 25, 2016, 781 SCRA 573, 582.

20. Sec. 26, Rule 7 of the RRACCS provides:

Section 26. When Issued; Grounds. — Upon petition of the complainant or motu proprio, the proper disciplining authority may issue an order of preventive suspension upon service of the formal charge or notice of charge/s, or immediately thereafter to any subordinate officer or employee under his/her authority pending an investigation, if:

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21. Sec. 27, Rule 7 of the RRACCS states:

Section 27. Duration of Preventive Suspension. — Unless otherwise provided for by law, the disciplining authority may place the respondent under preventive suspension for a maximum period of ninety (90) days in the case of national agencies or sixty (60) days in the case of local government units x x x.

22. Sec. 29, Rule 7 of the RRACCS provides:

Section 29. Payment of Back Salaries during Preventive Suspension. — The payment of back salaries during the period of suspension shall be governed by the following:

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b. A declaration of invalidity of a preventive suspension order not based on any of the reasons enumerated in Section 29 (a), shall result in the reinstatement of the official or employee concerned. The payment of back salaries shall, however, await the final outcome of the principal case. If the official or employee is fully exonerated of the charge/s or when the penalty imposed in the principal case is reprimand, he or she shall be paid such back salaries. Otherwise, no back salaries shall be awarded.

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