Arrieta v. Miranda

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 250620. September 15, 2021.]

FLORDELIZA M. ARRIETA AND LEOPOLDO M. MANAHAN, petitioners,vs.CRESENCIA A. MIRANDA, EDUARDO JOVEN, AND THOSE ACTING FOR AND ON THEIR BEHALF, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated15 September 2021 which reads as follows: HTcADC

"G.R. No. 250620 (Flordeliza M. Arrieta and Leopoldo M. Manahan v. Cresencia A. Miranda, Eduardo Joven, and those acting for and on their behalf). — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision 2 dated July 5, 2019 and the Resolution 3 dated November 28, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 150296. In the assailed issuances, the CA affirmed the Decision 4 dated June 30, 2015 of Branch 220, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Quezon City in Civil Case No. R-QZN-14-09421-CV, where the RTC affirmed the Decision 5 dated July 15, 2014 of Branch 37, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City in Civil Case No. 37-41517 dismissing the Complaint 6 for Forcible Entry and Damages.

The Antecedents

As summarized by the CA, Flordeliza M. Arrieta and Leopoldo M. Manahan (collectively, petitioners) filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry and Damages (Complaint) against Cresencia A. Miranda (Cresencia), Eduardo Joven, one Lino Joven, and those acting for and on their behalf (collectively, respondents). 7

Petitioners alleged that they, together with Renato Manahan, are the co-owners of a house and lot situated at Block 66, Lot 4, La Naval Street, Greater Lagro, Quezon City and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 004-2012001460 8 in their names (subject property). They acquired the subject property through a deed of donation executed in their favor by spouses Rogelio D. Miranda (Rogelio) and Cresencia dated August 1, 2011. 9

Rogelio was the uncle of herein petitioners. His only son predeceased him. 10

Petitioners filed the forcible entry case against respondents when the latter, after the death of Rogelio, took possession of the subject property through stealth, force, and/or violence by destroying the padlocks and occupying the house therein to the exclusion and prejudice of petitioners. The incident was reported to the police and referred to the barangay upon failure of respondents to vacate the subject property despite repeated demands to do so. 11

In the Complaint, petitioners averred that they commenced taking possession of the subject property when they became owners thereof. 12

In response, respondents questioned the MeTC's jurisdiction over the subject matter on account of the lack of allegation in the Complaint that the petitioners had been in prior physical possession of the subject property. Aside from this defect, respondents disputed the validity of the donation and imputed the employment of fraud and machinations by petitioners to secure the thumb mark and signature of Rogelio and Cresencia. Respondents further countered that there was no force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth in their access to the subject property. They averred that it was petitioners who padlocked the house when Cresencia went abroad. This constrained them to remove the padlock to enter the then unoccupied house which still had all of Cresencia and her deceased husband's personal belongings. 13

Ruling of the MeTC

On July 15, 2014, the MeTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground that petitioners are not the real parties in interest as they failed to present a TCT issued in their names. 14

Ruling of the RTC

On June 30, 2015, the RTC affirmed the dismissal of the Complaint, but for a different ground. 15 For the RTC, petitioners failed to prove the jurisdictional requirement of prior physical possession essential in an action for forcible entry. It distinctly remarked:

Clearly, in a forcible entry case, the law requires that the party deprived of possession must be able to establish his prior physical possession of the property, that is, his legal right to possess the same, before he was actually illegally dispossessed of the property.

The claim of defendants-appellees that all their personal belongings are inside the subject property were not refuted while plaintiffs-appellants have failed to show, apart from mere allegations, that they had prior physical possession of the subject property. Plaintiffs-appellants' allegation that they stay in the subject property as they were the ones taking care of the late Rogelio D. Miranda, is not the possession contemplated by law, to be subject of a case for unlawful detainer. In a forcible entry case, actual possession and use of the property, emanating from a valid right to possess and use the same, must be shown. 16

The RTC further observed that petitioners' claim of possession that is anchored on a claim of ownership is not clearly within the ambit of an accion interdictal proceeding, but an accion reivindicatoria. 17

Ruling of the CA

In the assailed Decision, 18 the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC that prior physical possession was not established by petitioners. 19 The CA ruled that petitioners, who have the burden of proof in establishing prior physical possession, merely alleged that they took possession and occupied the subject property, and that such allegation without evidence is not equivalent to proof. 20 The CA further ruled that contrary to petitioners' contention, their Complaint, blotter, demand letter, and judicial affidavits did not contain sufficient details as to prove prior physical possession. The CA declared that petitioners failed to establish that they brought personal belongings to the subject property and refute respondents' assertion that their personal belongings were still inside the subject property. 21

The CA explained that petitioners had access and later padlocked the subject property because they were the ones who took care of Rogelio, but such fact does not necessarily prove that their physical possession precedes respondents' possession of the subject property. 22 The CA further explained that Cresencia's admission in her affidavit of adverse claim that petitioners prevented her from entering the subject property is not proof that the latter had prior possession. 23 Lastly, the CA noted that respondents have in their favor prior possession in time, they have the security that entitles them to remain on the subject property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects them. 24

Issue

Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of the Complaint for failure to prove prior physical possession.

Petition for Review on Certiorari

Petitioners reiterate that the CA erred in ruling that their prior physical possession of the subject property was not substantiated. They maintain that respondents' admission that the petitioners padlocked the subject property negates their assertion of physical possession. 25 For petitioners, their act of padlocking the house constitutes assertion and protection of their right over the subject property. Petitioners argue that "[w]e need not go to the forests to see the trees"26 and raise the question why the respondents needed to destroy the padlock and barge inside the subject property if they indeed were in physical possession. 27

As to the element of force, petitioners repeat that the destruction of the padlocks to gain access to the subject property and the installation of a new one to prevent petitioners from entering the premises constituted the "force" contemplated by law and jurisprudence in forcible entry cases. They view that the lack of occupants at the time of the employment of force to gain entry is immaterial. 28

Comment on the Petition

In their Comment-Opposition, 29 respondents opposed the petition and viewed it as without merit for being a mere rehash of petitioners' previous arguments. 30 They echo the CA findings that petitioners merely alleged prior physical possession but did not establish the same; and that petitioners failed to show that they exercised a single act of possession, use, or enjoyment of the subject property; neither did they stay therein even for one day. 31

Reply of Petitioners

Petitioners insist on their prior physical possession of the subject property because the donation was only logical, coupled with respondents' admission of petitioners' prior possession thereof through the latter's act of padlocking the subject property. They highlight the fact that respondents employed "force" to gain access to the subject property through the destruction of the padlock and installation of a new one to prevent petitioners from entering the premises. Finally, they reiterate that any evidence as to ownership is expressly banned by Section 4, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. 32

Our Ruling

The petition is denied.

The Court finds no reversible error in the findings of the CA. As a general rule, the Court's jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review of pure questions of law since the Court is not a trier of facts. 33 Factual findings of the lower court when supported by substantial evidence on the record is not usually reviewed by the Court, especially when it is affirmed by the CA. 34 In this case, no cogent evidence appears from the records of the case for the Court to apply the above doctrine differently. To serve as the basis for review of factual issues, conflicting findings must be arrived at by each of the courts below in consideration of the same issues raised in a case, which is wanting herein. The issue of petitioners' failure to substantiate the allegation of prior physical possession has already been resolved by both the RTC and the CA. Further, it involves the review of the factual matters which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court.

Even after a judicious consideration of the merits of the case, the Court sees no reason to overturn the ruling of the CA as to warrant the Court's exercise of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction. As aptly explained by both the RTC and the CA, prior physical possession, a jurisdictional element in a forcible entry case was not duly proven by petitioners. While the Court agrees that ownership carries the right of possession, the possession contemplated by the concept of ownership is not exactly the same as the possession in issue in a forcible entry case. 35

Petitioners' allegation of prior physical possession remained uncorroborated. Instead of squarely addressing the issue of prior physical possession and presenting evidence to show that they had prior possession of the subject property, they merely narrated how they acquired ownership of the subject property and justified their access thereto by asserting that they took care of its previous owner, their uncle, Rogelio, prior to the donation. However, their access to the subject property is not the prior possession contemplated by law in forcible entry cases. It should be stressed that their possession thereof, in the nature of access to the subject property, was simultaneous with that of its previous registered owner, who continued to occupy the premises despite the donation.

Indeed, the Court is not convinced that petitioners' act of putting a padlock on the subject property was an exercise of possession. Petitioners' insidious and surreptitious conduct of putting a padlock on the subject property at a time when its current occupants are away just to exact and impose recognition of their rights thereof as its new owners, should not be tolerated. It should be emphasized that Cresencia is after all the previous owner of the subject property who remained in possession thereof. As established in the proceedings below, her personal belongings, together with that of her deceased husband, remained in the subject property despite the transfer of ownership. Petitioners did not even present any controverting evidence. Apparently, Cresencia, as the prior owner is questioning the donation made in favor of petitioners.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases underscoring the remedies available to an owner to recover possession of the property from its occupant. A forcible entry action is not the proper remedy to obtain possession of a property from its previous owner, especially from one who retained possession thereof despite a change in ownership status. As correctly observed by the RTC and the CA, petitioners should avail themselves of an accion reinvidicatoria or an accion publiciana to recover and obtain possession over the subject property as its new registered owners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 5, 2019 and the Resolution dated November 28, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 150296 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED." (CAGUIOA, J., designated as Additional Member vice GAERLAN, J., per Raffle dated August 2, 2021. ROSARIO, J., designated as Additional Member per Special Order No. 2835 dated July 15, 2021).

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 12-33.

2.Id. at 39-56; penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a member of the Court) with Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Pablito A. Perez, concurring.

3.Id. at 57-58.

4.Id. at 251-259; penned by Judge Jose G. Paneda.

5.Id. at 215-217; penned by Judge Augustus C. Diaz.

6.Id. at 70-74.

7.Id. at 40.

8.Id. at 77-79.

9.Id. at 40.

10.Id.

11.Id.

12.Id.

13.Id. at 41-42.

14.Id. at 216.

15. See Decision of the RTC, id. at 259.

16.Id. at 258.

17.Id. at 257-259.

18.Id. at 39-56.

19.Id. at 55-56.

20.Id. at 52-53.

21.Id. at 53.

22.Id.

23.Id.

24.Id. at 55-56.

25.Id. at 20-21.

26.Id. at 23.

27.Id.

28.Id. at 23-24.

29.Id. at 383-388.

30.Id. at 384.

31.Id. at 384-385.

32. See Reply dated December 11, 2020, id. at 400-409.

33.General Mariano Alvarez Services Cooperative, Inc. v. National Housing Authority, 753 Phil. 353, 359 (2015).

34.Catapusan v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 586, 592 (1996), citing Meneses v. CA, 316 Phil. 210 (1995) and Salvador v. CA, 313 Phil. 36 (1995).

35. See Nenita Quality Foods Corp. v. Galabo, 702 Phil. 506, 516 (2013).