Arciaga v. F&E De Castro Corp.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 239491. October 13, 2021.]

HELEN ARCIAGA and REYNALDO ARCIAGA, petitioners,vs. F&E DE CASTRO CORPORATION, HOUSEHOLD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and EMELITA ARCIAGA, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 13, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 239491 (Helen Arciaga and Reynaldo Arciaga v. F&E De Castro Corporation, Household Development Corporation and Emelita Arciaga). — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the June 8, 2016 Decision 2 and May 21, 2018 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 104228 which affirmed the August 19, 2014 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC dismissed the action for quieting of title filed by Helen Arciaga and Reynaldo Arciaga (petitioners) on the ground that they failed to prove alleged acts of forgery in the execution of a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and a Kasulatan sa Paghirang ng Kinatawan which they claimed deprived them of their rights over real properties left by their deceased parents. According to petitioners, these forged documents resulted in the sale of the properties to the Household Development Corporation (HDC) and the F&E De Castro Corporation (FEDC), both of which were issued certificates of title over the properties.

We resolve to deny the petition.

In Kumar v. People of the Philippines, 5 We reiterated the basic procedural standards which a petitioner must satisfy if a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is to be entertained:

(1) that the petition does not only exclusively raise questions of law, but also that it distinctly sets forth those legal issues;

(2) that it be filed within 15 days of notice of the adverse ruling that impels it;

(3) that docket and other lawful fees are paid;

(4) that proper service is made;

(5) that all matters that Section 4 [of Rule 45] specifies are indicated, stated, or otherwise contained in it;

(6) that it is manifestly meritorious;

(7) that it is not prosecuted manifestly for delay; and

(8) that that the questions raised in it are of such substance as to warrant consideration.

The first requirement — that the petition does not only exclusively raise questions of law, but also that it distinctly sets forth those legal issues — is based on the well-settled principle that this Court is not a trier of facts. Consistent with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, "[a]s a rule, only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45." 6 However, there are recognized exceptions to this general rule that binds this Court to the factual findings of lower courts, as follows:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, and conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and

(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 7

Considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced in this petition, this Court finds no cogent reason to apply any of these recognized exceptions to the general rule that binds this Court to the factual findings of lower courts.

The eighth requirement — that the questions raised in the petition are of such substance as to warrant consideration — means that the Court shall entertain the petition "only when there are special and important reasons." 8 We have expounded on this criterion in Kumar v. People of the Philippines, 9 thus:

The use of the conjunctive "and" vis-à-vis the adjectives "special" and "important" means that the reasons invoked for review must be of distinctly significant consequence and value. Rule 45, Section 6 (a) and (b) illustrate the gravity of reasons which would move this Court to act:

(a) When the court a quo has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; or

(b) When the court a quo has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision.

From these, this Court is better advised to stay its hand and not entertain the appeal when there is no novel legal question involved, or when a case presents no doctrinal or pedagogical value whereby it is opportune for this Court to review and expound on, rectify, modify and/or clarify existing legal policy, or lay out novel principles and delve into unexplored areas of law.

This Court may decline to review cases when all that are involved are settled rules for which nothing remains but their application. Also, when there is no manifest or demonstrable departure from legal provisions and/or jurisprudence. So too, when the court whose ruling is assailed has not been shown to have so wantonly deviated from settled procedural norms or otherwise enabled such deviation.

Litigants may very well aggrandize their petitions, but it is precisely this Court's task to pierce the veil of what they purport to be questions warranting this Court's sublime consideration. It remains in this Court's exclusive discretion to determine whether a Rule 45 Petition is attended by the requisite important and special reasons.

The central question raised in this petition — the fact of forgery of certain documents in the transfer of real property — is not a question of substance that warrants consideration under a Rule 45 petition.

The specific issue raised in the Petition is the alleged forgery of two documents: (1) the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, and (2) the Kasulatan sa Paghirang ng Kinatawan.

With respect to the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, the petitioners allege the forgery of the signatures of Agueda Arciaga, the mother-in-law of Helen Arciaga, and the grandmother of Reynaldo Arciaga, and Faustina Arciaga, the mother of Norma Ramos. 10 Petitioners claim that Agueda Arciaga and Faustina Arciaga had no knowledge of the execution of the said document. Moreover, Agueda Arciaga was already dead on the date of the execution of the deed on February 15, 1979. 11

With respect to the Kasulatan sa Paghirang ng Kinatawan, the petitioners allege the forgery of the signatures of: (1) Helen Carpio Arciaga; (2) Felicidad Arciaga, who allegedly died before the execution date of July 13, 1987; (3) Mario Aximina; 12 (4) Eugenia Baccay; (5) Leonila Umali; and, (6) Crispulo Ramos, who allegedly died on August 12, 1967, or before the execution date of July 13, 1987. 13 The petitioners also claimed that Leonila Hernandez and Mariano 14 Villanueva were already dead at the time of execution of the Kasulatan on July 13, 1987. 15 Unfortunately, petitioners only proved the death of Crispulo Ramos, Leonila Hernandez, and Mariano Villanueva. 16

In the event of a finding of forgery, petitioners allege that the transfer of rights and interest over the parcels of land subject of these two documents, particularly the sale of the lots to Household Development Corporation (HDC) and F&E De Castro Corporation (FEDC) by Orellana, is null and void.

Petitioners are mistaken.

Forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence. The burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. In civil actions, one who alleges forgery has the burden to establish his/her case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. 17

Generally, the fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized to have been forged. 18 The opinion of handwriting experts is not necessarily binding upon the court, the expert's function being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own opinion. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. 19

Hence, the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, similarities, or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm, pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may be found between the questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the former's authenticity. The result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be taken into consideration. The position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is written is placed, his/her state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used, play an important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case, absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial competent evidence on the character of a questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities, between that questioned handwriting and an authentic one. 20

In other words, the ruling in Gepulle-Garbo v. Spouses Garabato provides that circumstantial evidence can be used to prove forgery. "Circumstantial evidence" is that evidence which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. 21 The circumstantial evidence are "like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when interwoven." 22 Each strand cannot be plucked out and scrutinized individually because it only forms part of the entire picture. 23

Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are classifications of evidence with legal consequences. The difference between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence involves the relationship of the fact inferred to the facts that constitute the offense. Their difference does not relate to the probative value of the evidence. Direct evidence proves a challenged fact without drawing any inference. Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, "indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the factfinder must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence." 24

The probative value of direct evidence is generally neither greater than nor superior to circumstantial evidence. The Rules of Court do not distinguish between "direct evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred." The same quantum of evidence is still required. 25

A direct evidence of forgery may include the testimony of a witness who saw a person affix the signature in the name of a different person. Another direct evidence is the admission of the forger himself/herself.

Circumstantial evidence of forgery includes the comparison of specimens of genuine signature and the allegedly forged signature, the opinion of the handwriting expert, the testimony of an ordinary witness as to the surrounding incidents of the forgery, and a combination of the foregoing.

In this case, the petitioners claim that the death of certain party-signatories on the execution date of the subject documents prove the fact of forgery.

We hold that the fact of death of a signatory at the time of the execution of a document is a valid circumstantial evidence of forgery, for it is an incontrovertible fact of nature that a dead person can no longer rise to the grave and participate in the affairs of the living. It is also a legal truism that the dead cannot produce actions with legal effects, as the juridical capacity of a person is extinguished at the time of death.

The notarization of a document purportedly signed by a party who is dead at the time of execution gives rise to only one possible inference: the signatory did not physically appear before the notary, and the notary is therefore in violation of the notarial rules. While it is a hornbook doctrine that a notarized document carries with it the presumption of regularity, authenticity, and due execution, 26 that presumption can be rebutted by proving the fact of death of a party-signatory at the time of notarization.

The question now is: did the petitioners sufficiently prove the fact of death of the signatories at the time of execution? And if so, does this circumstantial evidence prove the fact of forgery?

To recall, the cause of action of the petitioners is based on their being successors-in-interest to the subject parcels of land. Specifically, the Sps. Arciaga had seven (7) children: Agapito, Severina, Juan, Manuel, Domingo, Victorio, and Celedonio. Agueda Arciaga is an offspring of Agapito, and Faustina Arciaga is an offspring of Manuel. Agueda Arciaga is the mother-in-law of Helen Arciaga and the grandmother of Reynaldo Arciaga. Meanwhile, Faustina Arciaga is the mother of Norma Ramos.

Helen Arciaga, Reynaldo Arciaga, and Norma Ramos are parties in interest and have a right of action to file for the nullification of the sale of the properties originally belonging to the Sps. Arciaga only to the extent that they derive their rights through specific lines of succession, particularly through Agueda Arciaga and Faustina Arciaga. The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Kasulatan sa Paghirang ng Kinatawan are signed by numerous party-signatories. However, since their rights of action are based on their lines of succession through Agueda Arciaga and Faustina Arciaga, the only relevant factual issues on forgery are the alleged forgery of the signatures of Agueda and Faustina. To prove the forgery of the signature of party-signatories other than Agueda Arciaga and Faustina Arciaga is irrelevant to the cause of action of Helen Arciaga, Reynaldo Arciaga, and Norma Ramos. It is not a sound logical proposition for the petitioners to claim that the signature of X was forged to prove that the signature of Y was also forged. While We have recognized that circumstantial evidence can prove forgery, the same must still be clear, positive, and convincing evidence.

The forgery of the signature of another party-signatory will not invalidate the legal effects of the signatures of Agueda Arciaga and Faustina Arciaga. If the signatures of Agueda Arciaga and Faustina Arciaga are specifically not proven to be forged, then the presumption is that they intended to be bound by the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Kasulatan sa Paghirang ng Kinatawan.

The evidentiary item presented by petitioners must still have probative value and meet the quantum of evidence required. This, they failed to do.

With respect to the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, petitioners claimed that Agueda Arciaga (who is a signatory) was already dead on the date of the execution of the deed on February 15, 1979. However, this was a mere allegation. Petitioners offered documentary evidence proving the death of Crispulo Ramos, Leonila Hernandez, and Mariano Villanueva, but not that of Agueda Arciaga. 27 Hence, for failure to meet the sufficient quantum of evidence required to prove the death of Agueda Arciaga prior to the execution date of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, We are constrained to rule that there is not enough circumstantial evidence to prove the forgery of the signature of Agueda Arciaga.

With respect to the Kasulatan sa Paghirang ng Kinatawan, petitioners raised the forgery issue only in respect of the signatures of Helen Carpio Arciaga, Felicidad Arciaga, Mario Aximina, 28 Eugenia Baccay, Leonila Umali, and Crispulo Ramos. 29 The petitioners also claimed that Leonila Hernandez and Mariano 30 Villanueva were already dead at the time of execution of the Kasulatan on July 13, 1987. 31 Again, these factual propositions are not relevant to establish the specific forgery of the signatures of Agueda Arciaga and Faustina Arciaga.

Finally, with respect to the testimonial evidence presented by the petitioners to the effect that both Agueda Arciaga and Faustina Arciaga were not aware of the execution of the subject documents, the same would constitute a mere denial of the execution of the said documents. Forgery must be proved by clear, positive, and convincing evidence, and mere denial of the execution of the document is not sufficient to meet the quantum of evidence required to prove forgery in a civil action.

Accordingly, We rule that petitioners failed to prove the fact of forgery sufficient to nullify the sale of the parcels of land to the respondents.

In any case, assuming without conceding that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and the Kasulatan sa Paghirang ng Kinatawan were partially forged, it is well-settled that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title. 32

In Sps. Peralta v. Heirs of Abalon, 33 this Court explained the purpose of the Torrens system and its legal implications to third persons dealing with registered land, as follows:

The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such further inquiry. Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property.

The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all. This would not only be unfair to him. What is worse is that if this were permitted, public confidence in the system would be eroded and land transactions would have to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence would be that land conflicts could be even more numerous and complex than they are now and possibly also more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government, recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.

The Torrens system was intended to guarantee the integrity and conclusiveness of the certificate of registration, but the system cannot be used for the perpetration of fraud against the real owner of the registered land. The system merely confirms ownership and does not create it. It cannot be used to divest lawful owners of their title for the purpose of transferring it to another one who has not acquired it by any of the modes allowed or recognized by law. Thus, the Torrens system cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner or to shield the commission of fraud or to enrich oneself at the expense of another.

A person who is dealing with a registered parcel of land need not go beyond the face of the title. A person is only charged with notice of the burdens and claims that are annotated on the title. This rule, however, admits of exceptions, which We explained in Clemente v. Razo:

xxx xxx xxx

The aforesaid principle admits of an unchallenged exception: that a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith; and hence does not merit the protection of the law.

Thus, the determination whether one is a buyer in good faith or can be considered an innocent purchaser for value becomes imperative. x x x

Jurisprudence has defined an innocent purchaser for value as one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest therein and who then pays a full and fair price for it at the time of the purchase or before receiving a notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. Buyers in good faith buy a property with the belief that the person from whom they receive the thing is the owner who can convey title to the property. Such buyers do not close their eyes to facts that should put a reasonable person on guard and still claim that they are acting in good faith. 34

In connection with the sale of a property through a forged document to an innocent purchaser for value, this Court has made an exception to the general rule that a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title. A fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title, as held in Fule v. Legare: 35

Although the deed of sale in favor of John W. Legare was fraudulent, the fact remains that he was able to secure a registered title to the house and lot. It was this title which he subsequently conveyed to the herein petitioners. We have indeed ruled that a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title (Director of Lands vs. Addison, 49 Phil., 19). However, we have also laid down the doctrine that there are instances when such a fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title. One such instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate (Inquimboy vs. Cruz, G.R. No. L-13953, July 28, 1960).

We have been constrained to adopt the conclusion here set forth because under the Torrens system, "registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land" (Secs. 50 and 51, Land Registration Act). Consequently, where there was nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would entirely be futile and nugatory. (Reynes vs. Barrera, 68 Phil., 656; De Lara and De Guzman vs. Ayroso, 50 O.G. No. 10, 4838). The public shall then be denied of its foremost motivation for respecting and observing the Land Registration Act In the end, the business community stands to be inconvenienced and prejudiced immeasurably. 36

Nothing in the facts show that HDC and FEDC had notice of any facts and circumstances that point to the alleged forgery. Accordingly, they are considered innocent purchasers for value. Thus, assuming that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and the Kasulatan sa Paghirang ng Kinatawan were partially forged (as petitioners claim), the forged documents could still become the root of a valid title in favor of innocent purchaser for value.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 8, 2016 and the Resolution dated May 21, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104228 are AFFIRMED. The Decision dated August 19, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City in Civil Case No. 99-256 dismissing the complaint for quieting of title is UPHELD.

SO ORDERED."Lopez, M., J., on official leave.

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

by:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 14-20.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob with Associate Justices Ricardo R. Rosario and Edwin D. Sorongon, concurring; id. at 23-33.

3.Id. at 35-37.

4.Id. at 48-60.

5. G.R. No. 247661, June 15, 2020.

6.Macayan v. People of the Philippines, 756 Phil. 202, 214 (2015), citing Heirs of Deauna v. Fil-Star Maritime Corporation, 688 Phil. 582 (2012) and People of the Philippines v. Esteban, 735 Phil. 663 (2014).

7.Macayan v. People of the Philippines, supra, at 215-216.

8. REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Sec. 6.

9.Supra note 5.

10.Rollo, pp. 153-154.

11.Id. at 174.

12. "Mario Aximina" in the Complaint, id. at 88, but referred to as "Amparo Oximina" in the signatory portion of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, id. at 99.

13.Id. at 174.

14. Referred to as "Mariano" in the Petition, id. at 17, but referred to as "Mardino" in the signatory portion of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition; id. at 99.

15.Id. at 176.

16.Id. at 40.

17.Gepulle-Garbo v. Spouses Garabato, 750 Phil. 846, 855 (2015).

18.Id. at 856.

19.Id. at 857.

20.Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission, 432 Phil. 895, 908-909.

21.Espineli v. People, 735 Phil. 530, 539 (2014).

22.Bacerra v. People, 812 Phil. 25, 38 (2017).

23.People v. Bacares, G.R. No. 243024, June 23, 2020.

24.Bacerra v. People, supra, at 35.

25.Id.

26.Heirs of Spouses Liwagon v. Heirs of Spouses Liwagon, G.R. No. 193117, November 26, 2014, 748 Phil. 675, 686 (2014).

27.Rollo, p. 40.

28. "Mario Aximina" in the Complaint, id. at 88, but referred to as "Amparo Oximina" in the signatory portion of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, id. at 99.

29.Id. at 174.

30. Referred to as "Mariano" in the Petition, id. at 17, but referred to as "Mardino" in the signatory portion of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, id. at 99.

31.Id. at 176.

32.Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation vs. Heirs of Vicente Coronado, 612 Phil. 573, 581 (2009).

33. 737 Phil. 310 (2014), citing Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, 300 Phil. 588 (1994).

34.Id. at 323-326 (2014).

35. 117 Phil. 367 (1963).

36.Id. at 376-377.