FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 229617. * July 14, 2021.]
AL L. ARBISON, petitioner, vs.HON. RASAD S. LAGUINDAB, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, JOLO, SULU AND TIM U. ARBISON, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 14, 2021which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 229617(Al L. Arbison v. Hon. Rasad S. Laguindab, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari'a District Court, Jolo, Sulu and Tim U. Arbison).
The instant petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the November 26, 2016 Order 1 issued by the Shari'a District Court, First Shari'a Judicial District, Jolo, Sulu (SDC). In the said Order, the SDC dismissed petitioner's appeal on the grounds that it did not raise any substantial issues and the appealed Decision rendered by the First Shari'a Circuit Court, First Shari'a Judicial District, Jolo, Sulu (SCC), had already attained finality.
Antecedents
Petitioner Al L. Arbison (petitioner) married private respondent Tim U. Arbison (Tim) in accordance with Muslim rites on July 26, 1986 2 in Luuk, Sulu. They were blessed with four children. 3
On April 16, 2014, Tim filed a petition for Divorce by Faskh, custody of children, and partition of property 4 based on Articles 52 and 53 of Presidential Decree No. 1083 (Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines), which provide:
Article 52. Divorce by faskh. — The court may, upon petition of the wife, decree a divorce by faskh on any of the following grounds:
(a) Neglect or failure of the husband to provide support for the family for at least six consecutive months;
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Unusual cruelty of the husband as defined under the next succeeding article[.]
Article 53. Faskh on the ground of unusual cruelty. — A decree of faskh on the ground of unusual cruelty may be granted by the court upon petition of the wife if the husband:
(a) Habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable by cruel conduct even if this does not result in physical injury[.]
The SCC promulgated a Decision 5 on January 29, 2015, granting the petition and disposed in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby issues an order:
1. Dissolving the marriage bond between TIM UNDAIN-ARBISON and AL L. ARBISON.
2. Awarding the following properties to Tim Undain-Arbison:
a. Block 37, Lot 24, Street-5, Kasalamatan Village, Jolo, Sulu;
b. Block 4, Lot 21, Sto. Village, Putik, Zamboanga City; [and]
c. Block 4, Lot 13, HB Homes, Tumaga, Zamboanga City.
3. Jewelries to the petitioner, being a separate property of the wife.
4. All other properties shall be awarded to the respondent Al Arbison.
5. Petitioner Tim Undain-Arbison is no longer required to [observe] the prescribed idda the same has already been elapsed.
SO ORDERED. 6
On petitioner's appeal, however, the SDC set aside the decision and remanded the case to the SCC for further proceedings. 7
In compliance with the SDC decision, the SCC served notice to the parties and scheduled the pre-trial on July 28, 2015. 8 On motion filed by herein petitioner, the pre-trial was rescheduled on August 10, 2015. On the said date, however, he submitted a very urgent motion to reset the hearing. Tim opposed the motion for violating the 3-day notice rule, among others. The SCC then proceeded to receive the evidence and marking of documents and thereafter issued a pre-trial order scheduling the trial on September 8 and 9, 2015. The order was received by petitioner's counsel on September 3 and 4, 2015, respectively. 9
On September 8, 2015, at around 8:20 a.m., herein petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings, with motion to amend pre-trial order. 10
SCC Ruling
On November 18, 2015, the SCC rendered a Decision 11 in Tim's favor. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby issues an order:
1. Dissolving the marriage bond between TIM UNDAIN-ARBISON and AL L. ARBISON.
2. Awarding the following properties to Tim Undain-Arbison:
a. Block 37, Lot 24, Street-5, Kasalamatan Village, Jolo, Sulu;
b. Block 4, Lot 21, Sto. Village, Putik, Zamboanga City; [and]
c. Block 4, Lot 13, HB Homes, Tumaga, Zamboanga City.
3. Jewelries to the petitioner, being a separate property of the wife.
4. Awarding to the respondent Al Arbison the following properties:
a. Parcel of land (Lot 16, Block-26) with improvement situated in Kasalamatan Village, Asturias, Jolo, Sulu;
b. Parcel of land (Lot 11, Block 4) with improvements situated in Tumaga, Zamboanga City;
c. Motor vehicle (Montero Sport); and
d. Three (3) carry-carry vans.
5. Petitioner Tim Undain-Arbison is no longer required to [observe] the prescribed idda the same has already been elapsed.
SO ORDERED.12
The SCC noted the testimonies of the parties' children, especially that of Engineer Mizba U. Arbison, who testified that she was retracting the judicial affidavit she had previously executed in favor of her father (herein petitioner); and that she was only compelled to execute the same to please her father and to secure his wali for her proposed marriage to her husband. She also confirmed the allegations that petitioner would get angry when someone would talk to her mother (Tim); and that the latter supported her and her siblings by personally handing them or sending them money when her father is away. 13
As regards the motion to suspend proceedings with motion to amend pre-trial order, the SCC declared the same as a dilatory tactic being employed by herein petitioner. The court explained:
As admitted by the respondent, the purpose of Pre-Trial is to arrive at a certain agreement between the litigants or at least to come up with a win-win solution to the issues presented. However, it is the respondent that continuously avoided the holding of the same.
It is observed that respondent, in filing and submitting his motion for resetting is a clear act of delaying tactic to the [prejudice] of the petitioner's right. Being the appellant (in the SDC), he should have [been aware of] or prioritize the proceedings of the instant case or at best informed the court at the proper time as to his availability. Clearly, it was the petitioner who has been present at all times of the proceedings. It would give injustice to her if the motion of the respondent will always be granted. Hence, taking into consideration the feelings of the petitioner, we proceeded to hear her allegations. For to delay the proceedings will cause her more stress. While it is true that under the rules that respondent should be heard before rendering judgment against him/her to afford due process, this court cannot tolerate the acts in delaying the proceedings. In fact, the submission of the motion dated September 8, 2015 is very late. The motion to reset in the last minute of the scheduled hearing date is unacceptable. The information as to [whereabouts] of the other partner was only made known to this court for the first time. Such information should be made ahead so as not to mislead this court. It is an act of disrespect to the court. Hence, the court proceeded as scheduled. 14
Aggrieved by the ruling, herein petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. 15
SDC Proceedings
On January 28, 2016, the SDC issued a Notice of Appealed Case, 16 and required petitioner to file a memorandum pursuant to Section 7, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. In compliance, he filed a Memorandum 17 attributing procedural and substantive errors on the part of the SCC. He maintained that the SCC rendered the appealed decision during the conduct and before the termination of the pre-trial. He posited that since pre-trial is mandatory, the court should not have terminated the same without his participation. As regards the substantive aspects of the decision, he maintained that no object or testimonial evidence was submitted to prove Tim's claim of psychological and verbal abuse. He also noted that the SCC had no basis in the partition of the property, and that the decision was incomplete because it failed to settle the claim for custody of children.
On the other hand, Tim submitted a Manifestation, 18 stating that the November 18, 2015 Decision of the SCC had become final and executory based on a certificate of finality issued by the clerk of court of the SCC on December 22, 2015. 19 Petitioner subsequently filed a counter-manifestation, insisting that he filed the appeal within the 15-day reglementary period from receiving a copy of the decision. 20
The SDC issued an Order 21 on August 31, 2016, submitting the case for decision. On November 26, 2016, the SDC rendered the assailed Order which reads in full:
After going over the records of the case, the court finds no substantial issues raised by the Respondent-Appellant that merits consideration. More importantly, with the Certificate of Finality dated December 22, 2015 considered, the court has no other choice except to have this case dismissed. The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that when a case has attained finality, the winning party must be given the fruits of his labor and expenses in the prosecution of his case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.22
Hence, this petition.
Issues
Petitioner argues that the SDC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing his appeal based on the following grounds:
A
THE SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT OF SULU GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEALED CASE NO. 01-2016 FOR REASON THAT SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURT OF JOLO CASE NO. H-JOLO-14-016-CV HAS ATTAINED ITS FINALITY;
B
THE SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT OF SULU GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CONDUCT OF THE SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURT OF JOLO OF AN [EX PARTE] PRE-TRIAL A SUBSTANTIAL ISSUE IN THE APPEALED CASE NO. 01-2016;
C
THE SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT OF SULU GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT THE GRANT [OF] THE PETITION FOR DIVORCE BY [FASKH] JOLO CASE NO. H-JOLO-14-016-CV, BY THE SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURT OF JOLO WITHOUT EVIDENCE IS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL ISSUE; AND
D
THE SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT OF SULU GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT THE PARTITION AND GRANT [OF] PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT WITHOUT PROOF OF ACQUISITION AND CONTRARY EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP AS REFLECTED IN THE TITLES AS NOT SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES[.] 23
Petitioner maintains that he timely filed his appeal within the 15-day reglementary period under Sec. 9 of the Special Rules of Procedure in the Shari'a Courts or Ijra-at Al Mahakim Al Shari'a (Shari'a Rules); that the certificate of finality issued by the clerk of court of the SCC was questionable, especially since petitioner had not yet received a copy of the same; that if the appealed decision had become final, the clerk of court should have refused the filing of the Notice of Appeal on December 28, 2015; that a pre-trial is mandatory and his failure to appear on the scheduled pre-trial was justified; that the decision was not based on evidence because private respondent did not present either object or testimonial evidence; and that the award and partition of property in favor of private respondent was not supported by proof of acquisition.
In her comment, Tim tersely argues that under Sec. 8 (2) of the Shari'a Rules, the decision had already become final and executory. As such, there is nothing more to appeal. 24
We now resolve whether the SDC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the November 26, 2016 Order dismissing petitioner's appeal for not raising substantial issues, and because the November 18, 2015 Decision of the SCC had already attained finality. aScITE
The Court's Ruling
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Court may only entertain a
At the outset, the prevailing procedure for appeals or petitions involving final orders or decisions of the SDC, is to file the same with the Court of Appeals (CA). The Court laid down this procedure in Tomawis v. Balindong25(Tomawis), viz.:
Prefatorily, the Court acknowledges the fact that decades after the enactment in 1989 of the law creating the Shari'a appellate court and after the Court, per Resolution of June 8, 1999, authorized its creation, the Shari'a Appellate Court has yet to be organized with the appointment of a Presiding Justice and two Associate Justices. Until such time that the Shari'a Appellate Court shall have been organized, however, appeals or petitions from final orders or decisions of the SDC filed with the CA shall be referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of the CA stations preferably composed of Muslim CA Justices.
For cases where only errors or questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to this Court by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pursuant to Art. VIII, Sec. 5 of the Constitution and Sec. 2 of Rule 41 of the Rules. (emphasis and citations omitted)
Likewise, it is pertinent to stress that with the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 11054 or the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao on July 26, 2018, a Shari'a High Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, among others, subject to appeal to the CA and to this Court. Sec. 7, Art. X of R.A. No. 11054 provides:
Section 7. Shari'ah High Court. — There is hereby created within the Bangsamoro territorial jurisdiction as part of the Philippine judicial system, a Shari'ah High Court. It shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over the following cases where either or both parties are Muslims: Provided, That the non-Muslim party voluntarily submits to its jurisdiction:
(a) All petitions formandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all other auxiliary writs and processes, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; and
(b) All actions for annulment of [judgments] of Shari'ah District Courts within or outside the Bangsamoro autonomous Region.
The decisions of the Shari'ah High Court shall be final and executory except on questions of law which may be raised before the Supreme Court following the procedure for appeals from the Court of Appeals and to the Supreme Court.
Nothing contained herein shall affect the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution.
Pending the complete organization of the Shari'ah High Court, the decisions of the Shari'ah District Courts shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals.
Since the instant petition was filed in February 2017, or before the enactment of R.A. No. 11054, the procedure laid down in Tomawis shall apply.
Notable, however, in Tomawis and the succeeding case of Lomondot v. Balindong, 26 We still proceeded to resolve the petitions for certiorari because similar petitions in the past were decided by the Court without referring the same to the CA. Moreover, in the 2017 case of The Municipality of Tangkal, Province of Lanao del Norte v. Judge Balindong, 27 a petition for certiorari which mainly challenged the jurisdiction of the SDC, the Court resolved the petition, there being no question that such matter is within Our jurisdiction.
In view of these antecedents, and the circumstances attendant to this case, the Court shall proceed to resolve the petition.
There is grave abuse of
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Rasad S. Laguindab (public respondent), for instantly dismissing his appeal based on a short explanation that his appeal did not raise substantial issues and that the decision of the SCC had already attained finality. For private respondent Tim, the dismissal of the appeal due to the finality of the November 18, 2015 Decision of the SCC was proper under Sec. 8 (2) of the Shari'a Rules.
We have reviewed the records and find public respondent to have indeed, gravely abused his discretion in issuing the November 26, 2016 Order.
Grave abuse of discretion is committed when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or (2) executed "whimsically or arbitrarily" in a manner "so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined." 28 Manifest disregard of the basic rules and procedures constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. 29
It is a basic rule that all decisions or final orders of the courts should clearly state the facts and the law on which they were based. This is the clear mandate of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
This constitutional directive is also reflected in Sec. 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Section 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. — a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court.
To impress upon the judges, the importance of this constitutional mandate, the Court even went a step further by issuing Administrative Circular No. 1 on January 28, 1988, reminding them to avoid making generalizations and forming conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced. The Court expounded on the rationale behind this mandate in Francisco v. Permskul, 30 in the following manner:
Except for the second paragraph, which was introduced only in the present charter, Section 14 has been in force since the Constitution of 1935. The provision was recast in affirmative terms in the 1973 Constitution but has been virtually restored to its original form in the Constitution of 1987, to apply to all courts, including the municipal courts. The purpose has always been the same, viz., to inform the person reading the decision, and especially the parties, of how it was reached by the court after consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of the applicable laws.
The parties are entitled to no less than this explanation if only to assure them that the court rendering the decision actually studied the case before pronouncing its judgment. But there are more substantial reasons. For one thing, the losing party must be given an opportunity to analyze the decision so that, if permitted, he may elevate what he may consider its errors for review by a higher tribunal. For another, the decision, if well-presented and reasoned, may convince the losing party of its merits and persuade it to accept the verdict in good grace instead of prolonging the litigation with a useless appeal. A third reason is that decisions with a full exposition of the facts and the law on which they are based, especially those coming from the Supreme Court, will constitute a valuable body of case law that can serve as useful references and even as precedents in the resolution of future controversies. As the Court said in Rosales v. Court of First Instance: DETACa
Precedents are helpful in deciding cases when they are on all fours or at least substantially identical with previous litigations. Argumentumasimili valet in lege. Earlier decisions are guideposts that can lead us in the right direction as we tread the highways and byways of the law in the search for truth and justice. These pronouncements represent the wisdom of the past. They are the voice of vanished judges talking to the future. Except where there is a need to reverse them because of an emergent viewpoint or an altered situation, they urge us strongly that, indeed, the trodden path is best. (citation omitted, emphasis supplied)
Indeed, due process demands that the parties to a litigation be informed on how it was decided with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. 31 A decision or order wanting in facts and law for which it was based, is prejudicial to the losing party who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors that may have been committed by the court for review of a higher tribunal. 32
In Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 33 this Court declared that since an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits, it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law on which it is based. Similarly in the instant case, the November 26, 2016 Order of the SDC finding "no substantial issues raised by the Respondent-Appellant that merits consideration," is a decision on the merits of the appeal. As such, the facts and the law which led the SDC to conclude that the subject appeal did not raise substantial issues, should have been clearly stated in the order. By merely stating in the assailed order that the appeal did not raise substantial issues, public respondent had effectively deprived petitioner of due process for he was not sufficiently apprised of the supposed errors in his appeal, as well as the factual and legal basis considered by the SDC in arriving at its conclusion.
Another peculiar circumstance in the instant case that should have also prompted the SDC to fully explain its dismissal of the appeal, was its reliance on the Certificate of Finality issued by Clerk of Court II Abdelbashit T. Jikiri (Jikiri) of the SCC on December 22, 2015. The said certificate reads:
CERTIFICATE OF FINALITY
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the decision of this Court dated November 18, 2015 in the above-entitled case has become final and executory.
Issued at the Shari'a Circuit Court of Jolo, Sulu this 22nd day of December 2015.
(sgd.)ABDELBASHIT T. JIKIRIClerk of Court II 34
Here, petitioner claimed to have received a copy of the November 18, 2015 Decision of the SCC on December 14, 2015, and that he filed a Notice of Appeal and paid the requisite docket fee on December 28, 2015. The said payment appeared to have been received by Jikiri. 35 Based on this timeline, petitioner appeared to have timely filed his appeal under Sec. 9 of the Shari'a Rules which reads:
Section 9. Appeal. — An appeal shall be made by filing a notice of appeal addressed to the court and by paying the docket fee within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the judgment.
Furthermore, in the Notice of Appealed Case dated January 28, 2016, SDC Clerk of Court VI Pakhruddin M. Astih stated that the SDC received the original records of the case on even date. The receipt of the records by the SDC was pursuant to Sec. 10 36 of the Shari'a Rules which provides that the clerk of court shall transmit the original record to the appellate court within five days from the perfection of the appeal.
Thus, it is quite unclear how the original records of the case was transmitted to the SDC when, based on the Certificate of Finality issued by Jikiri on December 22, 2015, the appealed November 18, 2015 Decision of the SCC had already attained finality. To recall, petitioner appealed the case and paid the docket fees on December 28, 2015. The said payment was received by Jikiri, the same court officer who purportedly issued the December 22, 2015 Certificate of Finality.
The above chronology of events should have alerted public respondent to inquire into the veracity of petitioner's claims, most especially the circumstances behind the issuance of the certificate of finality. Public respondent should have treated the said certificate with skepticism as it did not indicate when the November 18, 2015 Decision of the SCC had become final and executory pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court. 37 If only public respondent had been faithful in complying with Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution, this matter should have already been clarified in the assailed order.
This Court has emphasized that to warrant a writ of certiorari, there must be a showing that the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." The use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." 38
The patent disregard by public respondent of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which had been echoed in Sec. 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court and Supreme Court Circular No. 1-88, is a sheer display of grave abuse of discretion. It amounted to a clear evasion of a positive duty enjoined by the Constitution and existing laws. Accordingly, the November 26, 2016 Order which did not clearly state the facts and the law from which it is based, is null and void and of no effect. Thus, the instant case should be remanded to the SDC for the conduct of the appropriate proceedings to determine the merits of petitioner's appeal.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari; DECLARES as NULL and VOID the November 26, 2016 Order of the Shari'a District Court, First Shari'a Judicial District, Jolo, Sulu, in SDC Appealed Case No. 01-2016; and REMANDS the case to the Shari'a District Court, First Shari'a Judicial District, Jolo, Sulu, for the conduct of the appropriate proceedings.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator to conduct an administrative investigation behind the filing of the Notice of Appeal and the issuance of the Certificate of Finality dated December 22, 2015, by Clerk of Court II Abdelbashit T. Jikiri; and to submit a report to this Court within thirty (30) days from the completion of the said investigation.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
by:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
* Part of the Supreme Court Decongestion Program.
1.Rollo, p. 21.
2. Referred as July 22, 1986 in some other parts of the records.
3.Rollo, p. 24.
4. Docketed as SCC Case No. H-JOLO-14-016-CV.
5.Rollo, pp. 24-28; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Remee-Raida S. Tanjili.
6.Id. at 28.
7.Id. at 30-44; Decision dated May 29, 2015, penned by Acting Presiding Judge Macaundas M. Hadjirasul.
8.Id. at 47.
9.Id. at 56-57.
10.Id. at 57.
11.Id. at 47-64.
12.Id. at 63-64.
13.Id. at 61.
14.Id. at 60-61.
15.Id. at 67.
16.Id. at 70.
17.Id. at 72-79.
18.Id. at 87-88.
19.Id. at 90. (Also stated as December 22, 2016 in private respondent's Manifestation.)
20.Id. at 91-92.
21.Id. at 106.
22.Id. at 21.
23.Id. at 8-13.
24.Id. at 120.
25. 628 Phil. 252, 258-259 (2010).
26. 763 Phil. 617 (2015). In this case, the Court furnished the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals a copy of the decision for whatever action he may undertake in light of Tomawis v. Balindong on the creation of a Special Division to handle appeals or petitions from trial orders or decisions of the Shari'a District Court.
27. 803 Phil. 207 (2017).
28.St. Mary of the Woods School, Inc. v. Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, 596 Phil. 778, 795, (2009); Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto V, 500 Phil. 226, 242 (2005).
29.Sayre v. Xenos, G.R. Nos. 244413 & 244415-16, February 18, 2020; Spouses Crisologo v. JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation, 728 Phil. 315, 328 (2014).
30. 255 Phil. 311, 316-317 (1989).
31.Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Young, 424 Phil. 675, 696 (2002).
32.Go v. East Oceanic Leasing and Finance Corporation, 824 Phil. 1, 7 (2018), citing Yao v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 86, 105, 106 (2000).
33. 283 Phil. 12 (1992).
34.Rollo, p. 90.
35.Id. at 68-69.
36. Section 10. Appeal to the Shari'a District Court. — Within five (5) days from the perfection of the appeal, the clerk of court shall transmit the original record to the appropriate appellate court.
37. Section 2. Entry of judgments and final orders. — If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final order shall forthwith be entered by the clerk on the book of entries of judgements. The date of finality of the judgment or final order shall be deemed to be the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final order and shall be signed by the clerk, [with] a certificate that such judgment or final order has become final and executory.
38.Yu v. Judge Reyes-Carpio, 667 Phil. 474, 482 (2011).