Antonio v. Escalada-Clavel

FIRST DIVISION

[OCA I.P.I. No. 17-4757. February 19, 2020.]

ANTONIO C. ANTONIO, complainant, vs.ATTY. GAY T. ESCALADA-CLAVEL, CLERK OF COURT V, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-BRANCH 3, BALANGA CITY, BATAAN, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedFebruary 19, 2020which reads as follows:

"OCA I.P.I. No. 17-4757 — (Antonio C. Antonio v. Atty. Gay T. Escalada-Clavel, Clerk of Court V, Regional Trial Court-Branch 3, Balanga City, Bataan)

The Case

In his Verified Complaint 1 dated October 30, 2017 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Antonio C. Antonio charged respondent Atty. Gay T. Escalada-Clavel, Clerk of Court V, Regional Trial Court-Branch 3, Balanga City, Bataan with grave misconduct for alleged violations of:

1. Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (RA) 3019, 2 the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended;

2. Sections 4 (a), (b), (c) 3 and 7 (b) (2) 4 of RA 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers and Employees;

3. Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 5 and Canon 6, Rule 6.02 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR); and

4. Canons 15 and 32 of the Code of Professional Ethics (CPE). 7

Antecedents

Complainant's Version

Antonio C. Antonio alleged that he was first cousins with Teresita Santos Cueto and Erlinda Santos Magat while the late Rosario Antonio Balmaceda was their mutual aunt. Rosario died on October 23, 2001, leaving a last will and testament.

On April 30, 2002, Teresita and Erlinda filed a petition for the allowance of Rosario's will. Docketed as SP 7523, the petition was raffled to the Regional Trial Court-Branch 3, Balanga City, Bataan where respondent Atty. Gay T. Escalada-Clavel worked as Clerk of Court. He (Antonio), Teresita and Erlinda were also blood-relatives of Atty. Escalada-Clavel. 8

On March 10, 2008, his sister Catherine Antonio and mother Victoria Miranda (intervenors) filed a Petition-in-Intervention in SP 7523, alleging that Rosario's will improperly covered properties belonging to Dr. Francisco P. Antonio, his late father and Rosario's brother. 9 The trial court granted the Petition-in-Intervention on April 28, 2008. 10

Subsequently, intervenors filed a Motion for Inhibition and Re-raffle citing Atty. Escalada-Clavel's relation to Teresita and Erlinda and intervenors. On the other hand, Teresita and Erlinda moved to dismiss the Petition-in-Intervention due to intervenors' supposed lack of legal interest and non-payment of docket fees. Teresita and Erlinda's motion got denied on May 29, 2014, prompting them to ask for reconsideration. 11

Later in 2014, then presiding Judge Remigio M. Escalada, Jr. got transferred to the Regional Trial Court-Branch 123, Caloocan City and Judge Marion Jacqueline P. Poblete assumed his former post. 12

Through Order dated January 28, 2015, Judge Poblete, upon agreement of Teresita and Erlinda and intervenors, referred SP 7523 to court-annexed mediation. 13 But even prior thereto, the parties had already been discussing the possibility of reaching a settlement. But despite exchange of draft compromise agreements, their attempts at a settlement failed. 14

On February 10, 2015, while counsel for intervenors Atty. Gil Venerando R. Racho was at the Hall of Justice in Balanga City, Bataan to attend the scheduled mediation for SP 7523, Atty. Escalada-Clavel approached him. Atty. Marlito I. Villanueva joined in. He was counsel for Teresita and Erlinda. 15 Thereupon, Atty. Escalada-Clavel handed both counsels a draft compromise agreement. She threatened Atty. Racho that Judge Poblete would dismiss the Petition-in-Intervention should intervenors refuse to sign it. But when they reviewed Atty. Escalada-Clavel's draft, he (Antonio) and intervenors noted that the terms embodied therein were the same as those previously offered by Teresita and Erlinda. Thus, intervenors rejected Atty. Escalada-Clavel's draft compromise agreement. 16

On June 10, 2015, Judge Poblete denied intervenors' Motion for Inhibition and Re-raffle. 17 On June 15, 2016, she granted Teresita and Erlinda's Motion for Reconsideration of the May 29, 2014 Order and dismissed the Petition-in-Intervention. 18

Consequently, intervenors filed an Omnibus Motion for Inhibition and Reconsideration of the Order dated June 15, 2016, this time bringing to fore Atty. Escalada-Clavel's actions on February 10, 2015. They charged Atty. Escalada-Clavel with acting beyond the scope of her official functions as branch clerk of court and unlawfully granting advantage to Teresita and Erlinda in SP 7523 when she drafted a compromise agreement which favored them, her own blood-relatives, and thereafter, threatened intervenors into accepting its terms.

In compliance with the trial court's Order dated July 20, 2016, Atty. Escalada-Clavel filed her Comment on the Omnibus Motion. She admitted to giving petitioners and intervenors copies of a draft compromise agreement on February 10, 2015. She even admitted sending them copy of the same draft via e-mail at an earlier date. She claimed though she was merely aiding the parties prepare for mediation. Too, Judge Escalada, Jr. purposely sought her help to convince petitioner and intervenors reach a settlement after he found out her relation to them. 19

Because of the events of February 10, 2015, compounded with Atty. Escalada-Clavel's admissions in her Comment on the Omnibus Motion, Antonio filed the present complaint for grave misconduct against Atty. Escalada-Clavel.

Respondent's Version

In her Comment 20 dated January 19, 2018, Atty. Gay T. Escalada-Clavel countered, in the main:

By Order dated October 29, 2004 in SP 7523, Rosario's will was allowed probate. On March 13, 2008 or almost four (4) years later, Catherine and Victoria sought to intervene. They claimed to be the heirs of Dr. Francisco P. Antonio, Rosario's brother and co-owner to certain properties mentioned in the will. 21 Despite Teresita and Erlinda's opposition on ground of finality of judgment, Judge Escalada, Jr. allowed the intervention in his Order dated April 28, 2008. 22

The parties' dispute had dragged on for a decade and eventually, Judge Escalada, Jr. got transferred to the Regional Trial Court-Branch 123, Caloocan City. Prior to his transfer, however, Judge Escalada, Jr. called Teresita and Erlinda, intervenors, and all known surviving collateral relatives of Rosario to a conference for purposes of reaching a settlement. 23

Per instruction of Judge Escalada, Jr., she acted as secretary during the conference and drafted a compromise agreement based on what had been discussed. She also assisted in convincing the parties to settle amicably, with further instruction to e-mail the draft she prepared to petitioners and intervenors for their evaluation. She clarified, however, that she did not give any undue advantage to any party. On the contrary, she assisted in the efforts for both petitioners and intervenors to reach a win-win situation. 24

As for the events on February 10, 2015, she admitted to handing a draft compromise agreement to Antonio and intervenors on said date, but denied it was Teresita and Erlinda who prepared it. She simply reduced the results of the conference into writing. At any rate, she neither forced nor threatened Antonio and intervenors to agree to the terms embodied in the draft. 25

She was initially unaware of her blood-relation to petitioners and intervenors and only found out that they were related during her father's wake in 2012. It was, in fact, Antonio's mother Victoria who explained to her how she (Victoria) was related to her father. 26

Finally, Antonio had other legal remedies available to protect his interests in the properties which he claimed were erroneously included in Rosario's will. He was merely using this administrative case to discredit the probate court. 27

Judge Escalada, Jr. executed an affidavit 28 corroborating respondent's narration. He admitted to calling the parties to a conference in his chambers for a possible settlement; instructing Atty. Escalada-Clavel to act as secretary therein; asking her to draft the compromise agreement based on what was discussed; and directing her to e-mail said draft to the parties to be evaluated by their respective counsels. He scheduled another conference, hoping that the parties would reach an agreement to write finis to the case. As it was though, before a further conference could take place, Judge Poblete already got appointed to his former post.

Complainant's Reply

In his Reply 29 dated January 29, 2018, Antonio asserted that respondent's Comment was not verified and, as such, produced no legal effect. Consequently, the Verified Complaint and the allegations therein were purportedly undisputed.

OCA Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation dated March 28, 2019, 30 the OCA recommended that the Verified Complaint be dismissed for lack of substantial evidence to support the charge of grave misconduct. On the other hand, Atty. Escalada-Clavel satisfactorily refuted the allegations against her. In the absence of fraud, bad faith, or malice on her part, bare allegations of misconduct could not prevail over the presumption of regularity in the performance of her official functions. 31

Ruling

We adopt the findings of the OCA.

At the outset, Atty. Escalada-Clavel's failure to verify her Comment is not fatal to her case. For one, technical rules are not binding in administrative proceedings. 32 For another, the Court has consistently held that the underlying principle in the administration of justice and the application of the rules is justice and fair play. What guides judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his or her complaint or defense. 33

Here, Antonio alleged that Atty. Escalada-Clavel violated Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Sections 4 (a), (b), (c) and 7 (b) (2) of RA 6713, Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02, and Canon 6, Rule 6.02 of the CPR, and Canons 15 and 32 of the CPE. As the OCA correctly found in its evaluation, Antonio essentially charged Atty. Escalada-Clavel with grave misconduct based on two (2) grounds: 34

First, Atty. Escalada-Clavel purportedly acted beyond the scope of her official functions as branch clerk of court when she drafted a compromise agreement for SP 7523 which she handed to intervenors and their counsel on February 10, 2015; and

Second, Atty. Escalada Clavel unlawfully granted advantage to Teresita and Erlinda when she threatened Antonio and intervenors with the dismissal of their Petition-in-Intervention should they refuse to sign the compromise agreement which she drafted.

"Misconduct" is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To constitute an administrative offense, the misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. Misconduct is considered grave when either corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule is manifest. 35

In administrative cases, complainants bear the onus of proving their allegations by substantial evidence or such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 36 If they fail to satisfactorily show the facts upon which their claims are based, respondents are not obliged to prove their exception or defense. 37

Here, Antonio offered nothing but bare allegations that Atty. Escalada-Clavel acted beyond the scope of her functions as clerk of court when she drafted a compromise agreement for the parties in SP 7523. While Atty. Escalada-Clavel indeed admitted to preparing such draft, it was upon instruction of then Presiding Judge Escalada, Jr. who, in fact, corroborated her story, viz.: 38

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5. When I was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, and while assigned as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Bataan, with the aim of helping the parties to end the decade-long litigation amicably, and for them and their blood relatives who may have existing rights over the subject properties to enjoy these properties while they still can, I called the parties, including all known surviving collateral relatives who were not impleaded as parties to the case, to a conference for a possible compromise;

6. Conferences ensued and present in the meetings were the siblings Teresita A. Santos-Cueto and Erlinda A. Santos-Magat, intervenors Catherine U. Antonio and Victoria U. Miranda, surviving heir Antonio Antonio and, at one point, even Editha Antonio, a cousin of the petitioners. I instructed my Branch Clerk of Court. Atty. Gay T. Escalada-Clavel, to ensure that all interested parties are present in the conferences, for otherwise, any agreement on the partition of properties will not be effective on those who will not participate. I likewise directed Atty. Escalada-Clavel to make a summary of the properties that will be subject of the partition. The parties were also required to bring available photos of the properties, as well as papers that will aid in forging a compromise agreement;

7. During these conferences, I made it clear to the parties and to those present that the efforts being exerted were intended not only to end the long-running controversy, but more importantly, to mend the strained relationship of the blood relatives brought about by the pending case. These relatives are first cousins after all. I came to know that my Branch Clerk is a blood relative of the parties, and I sincerely believed that she could help me convince the parties to amicably settle;

8. Atty. Escalada-Clavel was tasked to act as secretary during the conferences and she took notes while we combed through each and every property sought to be partitioned. I asked her, in one of these conferences, to make a draft of the compromise agreement based on what had been discussed, and as per request of the parties, the draft of the agreement shall be e-mailed to them for their evaluation, correction, and discussion with their respective counsels;

9. I recall having eventually set further conferences in the hope that in the end, all of the parties will agree to some kind of arrangement that will write finis to the case, but regrettably, before these other scheduled meetings could take place, a new Presiding Judge of the Court was appointed.

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Indeed, Judge Escalada, Jr. readily admitted to having called the parties to a conference in SP 7523. Antonio and intervenors never questioned this exercise; neither did they deny their participation therein. Antonio merely zeroed in on Atty. Escalada-Clavel's supposed authority to draft a compromise agreement on behalf of the parties. But weighed against Judge Escalada, Jr.'s admission that he instructed Atty. Escalada-Clavel to formalize the results of the conference, Antonio's bare allegations of grave misconduct against Atty. Escalada-Clavel fail. Atty. Escalada-Clavel herself was able to establish that she merely complied with Judge Escalada, Jr.'s directives when she drafted the compromise agreement and handed copies thereof to Teresita and Erlinda, intervenors, and their respective counsels.

In the same vein, there is no evidence on record that Atty. Escalada-Clavel threatened intervenors into signing the draft compromise agreement. Intervenors were free to refuse, as they did in fact refuse to sign Atty. Escalada-Clavel's draft.

The fact that Judge Poblete subsequently granted the Motion for Reconsideration of Teresita and Erlinda and dismissed the Petition-in-Intervention does not, by itself, establish that Atty. Escalada-Clavel, or the trial court for that matter, was biased in favor of petitioners.

If indeed Atty. Escalada-Clavel and Judges Escalada, Jr. and Poblete conspired to rule against intervenors, as Antonio alludes in his Verified Complaint, there would have been no point in prolonging the case for more than a decade. Contrary to Antonio's conspiracy theory, what appears on record is the trial court's tireless effort for the parties to forge a win-win situation.

Notably, Rosario's will was allowed probate as early as October 29, 2004 while Judge Poblete got appointed as presiding judge of Regional Trial Court-Branch 3, Balanga City, Bataan only in late 2014 or about a decade after. The Motion for Reconsideration of Teresita and Erlinda against Judge Escalada, Jr.'s May 29, 2014 Order was already pending when Judge Poblete assumed office. But since the parties agreed to refer SP 7523 to court-annexed mediation, the resolution of the motion got deferred. Eventually, the parties' attempts at settlement failed and the case got referred back to court. Only then did Judge Poblete issue her Order 39 dated June 15, 2016 granting petitioners' motion and dismissing the Petition-in-Intervention, thus: 40

To reiterate, the main case which is the probate of the will of Rosario Antonio Balmaceda has already been heard on the merits and resolved by the Court. In fact, it has attained finality. The admission by the Court of the Petition for Intervention should only cover properties passed upon by the will of Rosario Antonio Balmaceda. To be legally precise, the Court does not have any other pending matters to resolve on the merits but is merely bound to take action on residual processes for its liquidation, distribution and partition among the named heirs, devisees, and legatees, specifically herein petitioners, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court with the issuance of letters testamentary and complete settlement of the estate of the testator.

The Court, thru its previous Acting Presiding Judge, exerted extra efforts to completely amicably settle the estate involving the petitioners and intervenors, involving not only properties covered by the will of the testator but all other properties that may be included as part of an estate co-owned by blood-related predecessors-in-interest, but to no avail. The referral to mediation and for judicial dispute resolution by the undersigned Presiding Judge was done upon the request and agreement of the parties for the purpose of resolving among themselves the blanket settlement of estate of their respective predecessors-in-interests. This is the essence of the alternative dispute resolution process, giving the parties to the case the opportunity to reconcile and resolve, in its entirety, their differences before seeking the appropriate relief from and submitting the case for resolution to the Court, to ultimately end litigation. x x x

In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of question of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.

Undisputed is the fact that the testator is a widow and without a child. Therefore, she has no compulsory heirs. As such, she could bequeath to anybody any and all property owned by her. Intervenors were not designated as an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent Rosario Antonio Balmaceda. Claiming to be heirs of Dr. Francisco P. Antonio, a brother of Rosario Antonio Balmaceda, intervenors are not legally considered as compulsory heirs of decedent Rosario Antonio Balmaceda. Being a collateral relative of the afore-said decedent, intervenors can only inherit only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will which she has already been probated, intervenors do not have any direct or Immediate interest on the properties of the decedent Rosario Antonio Balmaceda covered by the will. Intervenors, claiming to be the sister-in-law and niece of the testator Rosario Antonio Balmaceda, are not compulsory heirs that may have been preterited by the subject will of the probate proceedings.

Moreover, as alleged in their Motion for Intervention, intervenors merely claimed that Dr. Antonio is also a co-owner of the properties listed in the Will and prayed for 'the collation of properties of the testator and settlement and distribution of the estate to all who, either by last will and testament, or by operation of law are entitled to share thereto, be done without any further delay.' Such stance on the part of the intervenors cannot be sustained. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate on such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.

It is important to emphasize that the Last Will and Testament of decedent Rosario Antonio Balmaceda merely bequeathed her shares over parcels of land owned in common by several named registered co-owners, which included Dr. Francisco P. Antonio, where intervenors derive their claim as lawful heirs. The pronouncement by the Court acting as a Probate Court did not diminish nor deprive the intervenors of whatever rights over properties that they claim to be rightfully theirs. The partition and division of the covered properties owned in common should be the subject of a separate action before a court of general jurisdiction impleading all parties having legal interests over the said properties. The same shall also apply to all other properties claimed by intervenors to be part of the estate of the decedent but were already transferred to another person. Jurisprudence teaches us that:

'[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.'

Accordingly, the dismissal was based on three (3) grounds: First, the Petition-in-Intervention was filed after the allowance of Rosario's will had already lapsed into finality, barring intervenors from raising any more question on its due execution; Second, intervenors were not Rosario's compulsory heirs and could not have therefore been preterited by their exclusion in Rosario's will; and Third, intervenors' claim that the will erroneously included properties belonging to Dr. Francisco Antonio is not a proper subject of a probate proceeding but should be threshed out in an original action for that purpose.

Whether the probate court erred in ruling so is not for this Court to decide here and now. The dismissal of the Petition-in-Intervention is subject to judicial remedies and review which should not be pre-empted in this administrative proceeding. At present, the Court may only rely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions 41 when the probate court rendered the Order dated June 15, 2016. In the absence of countervailing evidence to overturn this presumption, the Court cannot conclude that Atty. Escalada-Clavel made good her threat and somehow influenced Judge Poblete into dismissing the Petition-in-Intervention after intervenors refused to sign her draft compromise agreement.

All told, the Court finds no other conclusion than to dismiss Antonio's Verified Complaint. Be that as it may, Atty. Escalada-Clavel's act of providing the parties with a draft compromise agreement and conversing with their counsel in plain view of the public may nonetheless seem inappropriate from the perspective of those who are not privy to the conference talks in SP 7523. Indeed, it would have been more prudent for Judge Escalada, Jr. and, by extension, Atty. Escalada-Clavel to have conducted the conference through formal channels than through private proceedings. For this reason, the Court deems it proper to remind Atty. Escalada-Clavel to be more circumspect in performing her official functions, lest, she unwittingly diminish public confidence in the judiciary.

WHEREFORE, the Verified Complaint against Atty. Gay T. Escalada-Clavel, Clerk of Court V, Regional Trial Court-Branch 3, Balanga City, Bataan is DISMISSED. Atty. Escalada-Clavel is REMINDED to be more circumspect in performing her official functions.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, p. 2.

2.Section 3.Corrupt practices of public officers. — x x x

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(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

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3.Section 4.Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. — (A) Every public official and employee shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties:

(a) Commitment to public interest. — x x x

(b) Professionalism. — x x x

(c) Justness and sincerity. — x x x

4.Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — x x x

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(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. — Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

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(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or

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5. CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.

RULE 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

RULE 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

6. CANON 6 — These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.

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RULE 6.02. A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

7. 15. How far a lawyer may go in supporting a client's cause

Nothing operates more certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice against lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession of that full measure of public esteem and confidence which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than does the false claim, often set up by the unscrupulous for the defense of questionable transactions, that it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause.

It is improper for a lawyer to assert in argument his personal belief in his client's innocence or in the justice of his cause.

The lawyer owes "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability," to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or public popularity should restrain him from the full discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery, he must obey his own conscience and not that of his client.

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32. The lawyer's duty in its last analysis

No client corporate or individual, however, powerful nor any cause, civil or political, however important, is entitled to receive nor should any lawyer render any service or advice involving disloyalty to the laws whose ministers we are, or disrespect of the judicial office, which we are bound to uphold, or corruption of any person or persons exercising a public office or private trust, or deception or betrayal of the public. When rendering any such improper service or advice, the lawyer invites and merits stern and just condemnation. Correspondingly, he advances the honor of his profession and the best interests of his client when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral law. He must also observe and advice his client to observe the statute law, though until a statute shall have been construed and interpreted by competent adjudication he is free and is entitled to advise as to its validity and as to what he conscientiously believes to be its just meaning and extent. But above all a lawyer will find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen.

8.Rollo, p. 6.

9.Id.

10.Id. at 19.

11.Id. at 41; see also rollo, p. 85.

12.Id. at 120.

13.Id. at 21.

14.Id. at 7.

15.Id.

16.Id. at 7-8.

17.Id. at 22.

18.Id. at 41.

19.Id. at 121.

20.Id. at 58.

21.Id. at 121.

22.Id. at 121-122.

23.Id. at 122.

24.Id.

25.Id.

26.Id. at 122-123.

27.Id. at 123.

28.Id. at 74.

29.Id. at 102.

30.Id. at 119.

31.Id. at 123.

32.Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office v. Paumig, A.M. No. P-18-3882, December 04, 2018.

33.Malixi v. Baltazar, G.R. No. 208224, November 22, 2017.

34.Rollo, p. 124; see also rollo, pp. 5-6.

35.Judge Tolentino-Genilo v. Pineda, 819 Phil. 588, 594 (2017).

36.Sarmiento v. Leonardo, 529 Phil. 136, 141 (2006).

37.Re: Letter of Lucena Ofendoreyes Alleging Illicit Activities of a Certain Atty. Cajayon Involving Cases in the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City, 810 Phil. 369, 374 (2017).

38.Rollo, pp. 74-75.

39.Id. at 41.

40.Id. at 42-44.

41.RULES OF COURT, Section 3 (m), Rule 131.