FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 235350. April 16, 2018.]
RINA G. ANGTUD, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedApril 16, 2018which reads as follows: AaCTcI
"G.R. No. 235350 — Rina G. Angtud v. People of the Philippines
Petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time of Thirty (30) days from the expiration of the reglementary period within which to file her Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED.
After a thorough review of the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the Petition for Review on Certiorari, the Court further resolves to DENY the same for failure to show that the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 02158 committed any reversible error in affirming with modification the August 15, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, Branch 28 in Criminal Case Nos. DU-14993-A to DU-14938-A, which in turn affirmed the Decision dated October 30, 2006 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six (6) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
In support of her present petition, petitioner avers that the prosecution failed to prove that she knew of the insufficiency of her funds with the drawee bank when the subject checks were presented for payment which is an essential element for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP Blg. 22).
The issue raised by petitioner entails a re-examination of the evidence presented. She would have us delve into the veracity and truthfulness of the testimonial and documentary evidence presented, the determination of which generally involves a question of fact. It must be stressed that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, it is not the function of this Court to assess and evaluate the facts and the evidence again, the jurisdiction of this Court being generally limited to reviewing errors of law. 1 While the Court recognizes several exceptions, the Court nevertheless sees no compelling reason to deviate from the rule.
In her bid to exonerate herself from liability under BP Blg. 22, petitioner further faults the CA in not holding that the Petition for Voluntary Insolvency constituted a prejudicial question that must first be resolved before proceeding with the criminal actions.
The elements of a prejudicial question are provided under Section 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, as follows: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 2
Like the CA, we also find no prejudicial question involved as to justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case. As succinctly ruled by the CA, "even if the trial court in the civil case declares petitioner insolvent, which it did on October 28, 2004, this would not affect the prosecution of petitioner in the criminal cases. It has been established that she issued checks which were subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds and thus the subject of prosecution under BP 22." It must be stressed that "the gravamen of the offense punished by BP Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order. 3 The mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an offense. In the present case, since the resolution of the issue in the insolvency case will not determine the criminal responsibility of the petitioner in the criminal action, the insolvency case did not involve a prejudicial question. Thus, the CA did not err in holding that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question was absent in the instant case. EcTCAD
This notwithstanding, a modification as to rate of interest imposed by the CA is warranted in view of the Court's ruling in Nacar vs. Gallery Frames4 in that in the absence of an express stipulation as to the rate of interest that would govern the parties, the rate of legal interest for loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments shall be 12% per annum until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum until full payment. Thus, the amount of damages corresponding to the total value of the checks should earn interest of 12% per annum from the filing of the Informations on September 10, 2004 until June 30, 2013 and thereafter interest of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed July 16, 2013 Decision and September 22, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CEB-CR No. 02158 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that petitioner RINA G. ANGTUD is ordered to pay the private complainant interest on the value of the checks at the rate of 12% per annum from the filing of the Informations on September 10, 2004 until June 30, 2013 and interest of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment.
SO ORDERED." (Sereno, C.J., on leave; De Castro, J., designated as Acting Chairperson of the First Division per Special Order No. 2540 dated February 28, 2018; Jardeleza, J., no part; Reyes, Jr., J., designated additional member per Raffle dated March 12, 2018.)
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Sps. Orencia vs. Vda. De Ranin, 792 Phil. 697, 703 (2016).
2.Landbank of the Philippines vs. Jacinto, 640 Phil. 358, 366 (2010).
3.Ambito vs. People, 598 Phil. 546, 568 (2009).
4. 716 Phil. 267, 281 (2013).