Anglo-Eastern Crew Management Philippines, Inc. v. Manalansan

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 224492. September 2, 2020.]

ANGLO-EASTERN CREW MANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC., ANGLO-EASTERN CREW MANAGEMENT (ASIA) LIMITED, AND GREGORIO SIALSA, petitioners,vs. FLIXY N. MANALANSAN, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 2, 2020, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 224492 — (ANGLO-EASTERN CREW MANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, INC., ANGLO-EASTERN CREW MANAGEMENT (ASIA) LIMITED, AND GREGORIO SIALSA, petitioners, v. FLIXY N. MANALANSAN, respondent.) — A seafarer is presumed to be totally and permanently disabled if the company-designated physician fails to issue a final and definite disability assessment. The company cannot deny the seafarer's claim on the ground of concealment of a previous medical condition when it was the one who designated a physician to diagnose, repatriate, treat the seafarer, and subsequently declare him fit to work again after a pre-employment medical examination.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the Decision 2 and Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 134072, which affirmed the Resolutions 4 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR Case No. OFW-M-01-00296-12. The National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the Decision 5 of the Labor Arbiter granting disability compensation benefit and sickwage allowance to Flixy N. Manalansan (Manalansan).

In March 2012, Anglo-Eastern Crew Management Philippines, Inc. (Anglo-Eastern) hired Manalansan as a seafarer. However, Manalansan was repatriated on May 12, 2012 after being diagnosed with syncope, a condition where one usually faints due to insufficient blood flow to the brain. 6

After medication, Manalansan was declared fit to work by Anglo-Eastern's designated physician on July 12, 2012. 7

On November 5, 2012, Anglo-Eastern, on behalf of its foreign principal, Anglo-Eastern Crew Management (Asia) Ltd., hired Manalansan as a Messman for nine (9) months with a basic monthly salary of US$430.00. 8

Manalansan underwent the prescribed pre-employment medical examination and was declared fit to work. He was deployed on board M/V Karoline N on November 25, 2012. 9

On December 12, 2012, Manalansan experienced a dull ache with numbness in his neck and shoulders, total body weakness, difficulty breathing and elevated blood pressure. When their vessel reached Panama, Manalansan was brought to Clinica Einstein for medical treatment and was confined therein for four days. The attending physician, Dr. Gabriel Sucre (Dr. Sucre), diagnosed Manalansan with "cervical disc pathology, recurrent, [and] anxiety attack." 10 He was declared unfit for work and was recommended to be immediately repatriated for further evaluation by an Orthopedist Surgeon or Neurosurgeon. 11

On December 17, 2012, Manalansan arrived in the Philippines and reported to Anglo-Eastern but he was ignored and denied medical examination and treatment. Due to his condition, Manalansan consulted a neurosurgeon, Dr. Amado San Luis (Dr. San Luis). 12 After a series of examinations, Manalansan was diagnosed with "[d]isc herniation and disc dessication, C3-C4, discogenic radicular (root) pain on the left upper extremity and upper chest area." 13 Further, Dr. San Luis declared that the disability was work-related, permanent and total. 14

On January 8, 2013, Manalansan filed a complaint for "disability benefits, sickness allowance, reimbursement of medical and transportation expenses, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees" 15 before the Labor Arbiter. Manalansan claimed that he was denied medical treatment upon his repatriation and that his medical condition entitled him to total and permanent disability benefits. 16

In its defense, Anglo-Eastern claimed that it denied Manalansan's claim for post-employment medical examination and disability compensation pursuant to Section 20 (E) of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) because Manalansan allegedly concealed his previous medical condition during the pre-employment medical examination. 17

Since the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement during the preliminary conference, the Labor Arbiter directed the parties to file their respective position papers. On February 14, 2013, 18 Anglo-Eastern filed its Position Paper while Manalansan filed his on February 15, 2013. 19 Both parties subsequently filed their Replies 20 and Rejoinders reiterating their arguments.

On April 29, 2013, Labor Arbiter Veneranda C. Guerrero rendered a Decision in favor of Manalansan. The dispositive portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents jointly and severally liable to pay complainant FLIXY N. MANALANSAN the Philippine peso equivalent at the actual payment of Sixty One Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty U.S. Dollars (US$61,720.00) representing the disability compensation benefit and sickwage allowance plus ten (10%) percent thereof as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED. 21

The Labor Arbiter ruled that Manalansan did not conceal material facts because syncope was not found in the examination form. Even if it was, it found that Anglo-Eastern alleged a different cause for Manalansan's recent repatriation. 22 Furthermore, Anglo-Eastern cannot deny knowledge of Manalansan's previous medical condition because they have already previously hired him and had all the opportunity to pre-qualify, screen, and choose him. 23

Having found that Manalansan proved his ailment to be work-related and acquired during his employment with Anglo-Eastern, the Labor Arbiter declared the disability as total and permanent. Manalansan's claim for sickness allowance and attorney's fees were granted; however, his claim for moral and exemplary damages were denied. 24

In a Memorandum of Appeal 25 dated May 21, 2013, Anglo-Eastern appealed the Labor Arbiter's decision to the National Labor Relations Commission.

In its September 18, 2013 Resolution, 26 the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter and gave greater probative weight on the medical opinions and assessments of Dr. Sucre and Dr. San Luis since Manalansan was denied medical assistance upon his repatriation. The dispositive portion of the Resolution read:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Decision of Labor Arbiter Veneranda C. Guerrero dated 2[9] April 2013 is hereby AFFIRMEDin toto.

SO ORDERED.27 (Emphasis in the original)

Anglo-Eastern filed a Motion for Reconsideration on October 2, 2013 which was denied by the National Labor Relations Commission in its November 29, 2013 Resolution. 28

Thus, Anglo-Eastern filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals.

In its November 26, 2015 Decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the rulings of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission after finding no grave abuse of discretion warranting the nullification of their decisions. The dispositive portion of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed September 18, 2013 and November 29, 2013 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC LAC No. 06-000572-13 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.29 (Emphasis in the original)

In its April 21, 2016 Resolution, 30 the Court of Appeals denied Anglo-Eastern's Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, petitioners filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari on June 10, 2016. 31 On October 13, 2016, respondent filed his Comment. 32 On August 11, 2017, petitioners filed their Reply. 33

Petitioners claim that respondent failed to present substantial evidence to prove his entitlement to total and permanent disability compensation. Further, they aver that his disability did not fall under any of the occupational diseases found in Section 32 of the POEA-SEC. 34

Petitioners also allege that respondent is disqualified from receiving any compensation due to his concealment and misrepresentation of a preexisting medical condition pursuant to Section 20 (E) of the POEA-SEC. 35 Petitioners claim that they relied on the report of the medical practitioners on respondent's fitness; however, he concealed that he previously suffered from dizziness and fainting spells during his pre-employment medical examination in September 2012. 36

Petitioners allege that its refusal to pay respondent's disability compensation is justified under the POEA-SEC and does not amount to bad faith making them liable for the reimbursement of attorney's fees. 37

On the other hand, respondent argues that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming the Labor Arbiter and National Labor Relations Commission's findings since they are based on evidence. Moreover, respondent alleges that petitioners are seeking to address issues that are beyond the province of this Court to resolve in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. 38

Respondent claims that it was petitioners' physician who pronounced him fit to work after his treatment for syncope and examined him in his recent pre-employment medical examination. In claiming he is not guilty of concealment, respondent argues that syncope is extremely distant or without any connection from his recent illness which resulted to his repatriation. Further, he alleges that syncope is not an illness specified in the pre-employment medical examination form. 39

Respondent avers that because petitioners refused to give him medical assistance or refer him to a medical institution upon his repatriation, he is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits. 40 He further claims entitlement to moral and exemplary damages for petitioners' unjust refusal to provide medical assistance and pay disability compensation. 41

In rebuttal, petitioners reiterate that respondent was repatriated due to his pre-existing condition of body weakness with dizziness and fainting, which he failed to disclose in his pre-employment medical examination. 42 Petitioners further aver that respondent failed to prove entitlement to Grade 1 disability benefits under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC. Lastly, they deny liability by arguing that a referral to a third doctor must first be satisfied before any cause of action may arise. 43

For resolution is the issue of whether or not respondent Manalansan is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits. Subsumed under this is the issue of whether or not respondent is guilty of concealment which would disqualify him for the award of disability compensation.

This Court denies the petition.

I

The entitlement of an overseas seafarer to disability benefits is governed by law, the employment contract incorporating the POEA-SEC, and medical findings. 44 Since petitioners hired respondent on November 5, 2012, the 2010 POEA-SEC 45 applies in this case. In the 2010 POEA-SEC, the procedure for recovering compensation and benefits for injury or illness is as follows:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS. —

A. Compensation and Benefits for Injury or Illness

The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

3. . . .

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. In the course of the treatment, the seafarer shall also report regularly to the company-designated physician specifically on the dates as prescribed by the company-designated physician and agreed to by the seafarer. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties. 46

Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.47 explained the procedure as well as the obligations of both the seafarer and company for the medical assessment:

[T]he seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.

xxx xxx xxx

[A] temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability. 48 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar49 affirmed that a presumption of total and permanent disability arises if the company-designated physician did not give an assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work within the prescribed periods:

[T]he company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. That should he fail to do so and the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.

xxx xxx xxx

Consequently, if after the lapse of the stated periods, the seafarer is still incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties and the company-designated physician had not yet declared him fit to work or permanently disabled, whether total or permanent, the conclusive presumption that the latter is totally and permanently disabled arises. 50

A summary of the guidelines to be observed when a seafarer claims permanent and total disability benefits is found in Talaroc v. Arpaphil Shipping Corporation: 51

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;

2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;

3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and

4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification. 52 (Citation omitted)

Thus, it is the primary responsibility of the company-designated physician to give a complete and definite assessment of disability grading or fitness to work of seafarers. 53

In Orient Hope Agencies, Inc. v. Jara, 54 the failure of the company-designated physician to provide a final and definitive assessment of the seafarer's condition within the 240-day extended period changed the seafarer's temporary and total disability to a permanent and total disability.

The recent case of Esteva v. Wilhelmsen Smith Bell Manning, Inc., et al.55 reiterated that a presumption of a seafarer's total and permanent disability arises when a final and definite disability assessment was not issued by the company-designated physician within the prescribed periods. It added that in such cases, the mandatory rule on a third doctor referral will not apply.

We justified the policy on disability claims in this wise:

Law and economics can provide the policy justification of our existing jurisprudence. The contract between the manning agency and the seafarer is strictly regulated by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration due to the unaccounted consequences that these contracts produce, mostly in the form of work-related risks and injuries. In economics, these are referred to as "externalities," which are unintended effects or consequences of an activity that affects the parties but are not reflected and imposed as a cost.

In employing seafarers, the manning agency and the shipping company, which have control over the ship, bear the burden of complying with safety regulations. When externalities such as occupational hazards are not accounted for, they escape the burden of shouldering the cost of keeping the vessel safe for their seafarers.

Imposing a liability induces the employers and the injured seafarers to be burdened with the cost of the harm when they fail to take precautions. This process of "internalization" means the consequences and costs are accounted for and are attributed to the party who causes the harm. Thus, the occupational hazards are internalized through a claim of damages paid by the employer. Seafarers are compensated for the injuries they suffered.

Here, the law intervenes to achieve allocative efficiency between the parties. Allocative efficiency means that both parties reach a mutually beneficial agreement. In a strict economic sense, allocative efficiency concerns the satisfaction of individual preferences where an optimal market is producing goods that consumers are willing to pay. A choice or policy increases allocative efficiency only if it makes an individual better off and no one worse off. Hence, allocative efficiency compels the law to help the parties achieve their goals as fully as possible.

Allocative efficiency for both employers and seafarers is reached by internalizing the occupational hazards through a seafarer's employment contract and Philippine Overseas Employment Administration regulations. The disability claims internalize the costs of injury and hazards by making employers compensate the seafarers without the need to bargain for the amount and process of compensation. When employers internalize the costs of the harm caused, they are constrained to both comply with legal standards and invest in the seafarers' safety. On the other hand, seafarers are also constrained to internalize the cost of their injuries if they will not take precautions. This policy provides an incentive for the seafarers to work efficiently because the risks to occupational hazards are reduced. By internalizing the externalities through legal standards, both employers and seafarers are encouraged to work at an efficient level.

In cases of worker's compensation, no fault is needed to be ascribed to employers for the seafarers to qualify for disability compensation. This no-fault system guarantees injured employees a "relatively swift and certain compensation for their job-related harms. The system relieves employees and their employers of the costs of demonstrating and challenging fault, respectively." 56 (Citations omitted)

In the present case, it is undisputed that petitioners denied the required post-employment medical examination and assessment to respondent upon his repatriation, in clear violation of Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC. No final and definite disability assessment was issued by the company-designated physician within the prescribed periods because respondent was not even medically examined. Considering that the 240-day period lapsed without any assessment from the company-designated physician or declaration as to petitioner's fitness to work, there is a presumption that he was totally and permanently disabled. This presumption arises because in disability compensation, "it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity." 57

Furthermore, contrary to petitioners' argument, "the third-doctor rule does not apply when there is no valid final and definitive assessment from a company-designated physician." 58 As held in Kestrel Shipping Co., Inc. v. Munar, 59 without the required final and definite assessment from the company-designated physician, the seafarer need not comply with the third doctor referral provision under Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC:

In addition, that it was by operation of law that brought forth the conclusive presumption that Munar is totally and permanently disabled, there is no legal compulsion for him to observe the procedure prescribed under Section 20-B (3) of the POEA-SEC. A seafarer's compliance with such procedure presupposes that the company-designated physician came up with an assessment as to his fitness or unfitness to work before the expiration of the 120-day or 240-day periods. Alternatively put, absent a certification from the company-designated physician, the seafarer had nothing to contest and the law steps in to conclusively characterize his disability as total and permanent. 60 (Emphasis supplied)

II

Section 20 (E) of the 2010 POEA-SEC provides concealment as a ground which disqualifies a seafarer from disability compensation and benefits:

E. A seafarer who knowingly conceals a pre-existing illness or condition in the Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) shall be liable for misrepresentation and shall be disqualified from any compensation and benefits. This is likewise a just cause for termination of employment and imposition of appropriate administrative sanctions.

There are two categories of information obtained in Pre-Employment Medical Examinations to determine whether a prospective seafarer is fit, unfit, or temporarily unfit for sea duty. These are: (1) "information obtained from and colored by the prospective seafarer's opinion, i.e., information on medical history gained from probing questions asked to prospective seafarers and answered by them to the best of their knowledge"; 61 and (2) "information generated by procedures conducted by health professionals." 62 However, between the seafarer and the physician, the examining physician is in a better position to assess whether a prospective seafarer is fit for sea duty, even one with an existing medical condition:

Between the prospective seafarer and an examining physician, the latter is in a better position to assess fitness for the rigors of sea duty. Apart from one's literal body, a prospective seafarer's only other contribution to a medical examination is a set of responses to questions. A seafarer's personal health assessment is borne by his or her amateur opinion, or otherwise unrefined understanding of nuanced medical conditions. In contrast, the procedures attendant to a PEME are conducted and supervised by professionals with scientific and technical capabilities. Their examinations generate verifiable empirical data, which are then evaluated by a physician.

A PEME is not expected to be an in-depth examination of a seafarer's health. Still, it must fulfill its purpose of ascertaining a prospective seafarer's capacity for safely performing tasks at sea. Thus, if it concludes that a seafarer, even one with an existing medical condition, is "fit for sea duty," it must, on its face, be taken to mean that the seafarer is well in a position to engage in employment aboard a sea vessel "without danger to his health."

A recommendation stating that a seafarer is "fit for sea duty" when standardized procedures would readily reveal that he or she is not can only mean that medical examiners failed to diligently screen a seafarer. The persons responsible for the examination are then bound by their negligence. Ultimately, it is more appropriate that the examining physician, a trained professional, and not the seafarer, who is a layperson, be faulted for discounting the presence of diseases even after subjecting the seafarer to a series of procedures.

For its part, a recruiting employer is expected to know the physical demands of a seafarer's engagement. It is then equally expected to peruse the results of PEMEs to ensure that, health-wise, its recruits are up to par. An employer who admits a physician's "fit to work" determination binds itself to that conclusion and its necessary consequences. This includes compensating the seafarer for the aggravation of negligently or deliberately overlooked conditions. 63 (Citations omitted)

As found by the Court of Appeals, the company-designated physician, Dr. Robert D. Lim (Dr. Lim), diagnosed respondent with syncope when he was first repatriated in May 2012. Dr. Lim was also the one who declared Manalansan fit to work for having no "recurrence of near syncope" after medical treatment. 64 Petitioners, through its President and Operational Manager Gregorio Sialsa, were given a copy of the medical report by Dr. Lim. 65

Further, the Labor Arbiter found that: (1) syncope is not found in the Pre-Employment Medical Examination form; (2) respondent was not suffering from frequent dizziness or fainting spells before his second deployment, which is why he did not check it in the Pre-Employment Medical Examination form, contrary to what petitioners insist; and (3) during the preliminary conference on January 18, 2013, respondent disclosed that he was repatriated for work-related shoulder injury and not syncope as claimed by petitioners. 66 At this juncture, it must be noted that "a measure of good faith can be appreciated on the part of a seafarer who is unable to grasp the nuances of his or her medical condition." 67

Based on the attendant facts, the Labor Arbiter, the National Labor Relations Commission, and the Court of Appeals aptly concluded that respondent did not conceal or misrepresent a pre-existing illness or condition during his Pre-Employment Medical Examination. In the first place, respondent was deemed to have no pre-existing illness by the company-designated physician who declared him fit to work as he had no "recurrence of near syncope." Moreover, petitioners cannot deny knowledge of respondent's medical condition since they were the same employer who hired, repatriated, treated, and declared him fit to work before hiring him again in November 2012. Thus, there is no concealment of a known medical condition amounting to misrepresentation under Section 20 (E) of the 2010 POEA-SEC.

This Court is duty-bound to respect the prior consistent findings of the Labor Arbiter, the National Labor Relations Commission, and the Court of Appeals, particularly in a Rule 45 Petition where this Court is limited to resolving pure questions of law. This Court should not to substitute its own appreciation of facts to those of the tribunals which previously weighed the parties' claims and the evidence they submitted. 68

III

This Court likewise finds no reason to deviate from the uniform findings of the Labor Arbiter, National Labor Relations Commission, and the Court of Appeals awarding attorney's fees as respondent was compelled to litigate due to petitioners' denial of his valid claims. However, this Court disagrees with the lower courts in not awarding moral and exemplary damages to respondent.

In Sharpe Sea Personnel, Inc. v. Mabunay, Jr., 69 this Court considered as bad faith the company's belated release of disability assessment and its scheme to discredit the findings of the seafarer's doctor, and awarded moral and exemplary damages in favor of the seafarer. In Esteva70 this Court also held the company liable for moral and exemplary damages when it kept the seafarer in the dark about his medical assessment and disregarded the findings of the seafarer's chosen physicians because the seafarer supposedly failed to consult a third doctor.

In Magsaysay Mol Marine, Inc. v. Atraje, 71 we held that it is the height of unfairness, bordering on bad faith, for the employer to demand compliance with the third doctor rule from the seafarer when they themselves did not fulfill their obligations under the law and the POEA-SEC. Similarly, petitioners in this case are in bad faith for not fulfilling their obligations under the law and the POEA-SEC while still demanding that respondent comply with the third doctor rule. Considering the rulings in Sharpe Sea Personnel, Inc., Esteva, and Magsaysay Mol Marine, Inc., the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages would be commensurate to the anxiety and inconvenience suffered by respondent, and the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages is proper by way of example or correction for the public good.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' November 26, 2015 Decision and April 21, 2016 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 134072 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioners Anglo-Eastern Crew Management Philippines, Inc., Anglo-Eastern Crew Management (ASIA) Limited and Gregorio Sialsa are ordered to pay respondent Flixy N. Manalansan US$61,720.00 as permanent and total disability benefits, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total of these amounts. All damages awarded shall be subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Resolution until its full satisfaction. 72

SO ORDERED." (Hernando, J., additional member viceZalameda, J., per Raffle dated August 19, 2020.)

By Authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 69-103.

2.Id. at 105-119. The November 26, 2015 Decision was penned by Associate Justice Pedro B. Corales and concurred in by Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Rodil V. Zalameda (Now a member of this Court) of the Eleventh Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

3.Id. at 121-123. The April 21, 2016 Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Pedro B. Corales and concurred in by Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Rodil V. Zalameda of the Eleventh Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

4.Id. at 139-156; and 158-159. The September 18, 2013 and November 29, 2013 Resolutions were penned by Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and concurred in by Commissioners Teresita D. Castillon-Lora and Erlinda T. Agus.

5.Id. at 124-136. The April 29, 2013 Decision in LAC No. 06-000572-13 was penned by Labor Arbiter Veneranda C. Guerrero.

6.Id. at 106. See also, pp. 130-131 stating:

"Syncope, i.e., temporary loss of consciousness and posture, described as 'fainting' or 'passing out' and is usually related to temporary insufficient blood flow to the brain."

7.Id.

8.Id. at 124-125.

9.Id. at 125.

10.Id. at 125-126.

11.Id. at 106; and 125-106.

12.Id. at 126.

13.Id. at 107.

14.Id. at 107 and 152.

15.Id. at 107.

16.Id. at 127-128.

17.Id.

18.Id. at 199-213.

19.Id. at 176-192.

20.Id. at 475-486 and 487-493.

21.Id. at 135-136.

22.Id. at 133.

23.Id. at 134.

24.Id. at 135.

25.Id. at 254-276.

26.Id. at 139-156.

27.Id. at 156.

28.Id. at 158-159.

29.Id. at 119.

30.Id. at 121-123.

31.Id. at 69-103.

32.Id. at 592-600.

33.Id. at 606-622.

34.Id. at 91.

35.Id. at 92.

36.Id. at 93-94.

37.Id. at 96.

38.Id. at 593.

39.Id.

40.Id. at 595.

41.Id. at 596.

42.Id. at 606.

43.Id. at 615.

44.Esteva v. Wilhelmsen Smith Bell Manning, Inc., et.al., G.R. No. 225899, July 5, 2019, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65396> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

45. POEA Memorandum Circular No. 010-10 (2010), Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships, available at <http://www.poea.gov.ph/memorandumcirculars/2010/10.pdf> (last accessed on April 28, 2020).

46. POEA Standard Employment Contract (2010), sec. 20 (A) (3).

47. 588 Phil. 895 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

48.Id. at 912-913.

49. 702 Phil. 717 (2013) [Per J. Reyes, Second Division].

50.Id. at 731-735.

51. 817 Phil. 598 (2017) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division];

52.Id. at 612.

53.See Magsaysay Mol Marine, Inc. v. Atraje, G.R. No. 229192, July 23, 2018, 873 SCRA 368 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

54. G.R. No. 204307, June 6, 2018, 864 SCRA 428 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

55. G.R. No. 225899, July 5, 2019, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65396> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

56.Id.

57.Orient Hope Agencies, Inc. v. Jara, G.R. No. 204307, June 6, 2018, 864 SCRA 428, 456 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division] citing Remigio v. National Labor Relations Commission, 521 Phil. 330, 347 (2006) [Per J. Puno, Second Division] citingPhilippine Transmarine Carriers v. NLRC, 405 Phil. 487 (2001) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].

58.Id. at 457.

59. 702 Phil. 717 (2013) [Per J. Reyes, Second Division].

60.Id. at 737-738.

61.Manansala v. Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc., 817 Phil. 84, 102-103 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

62.Id.

63.Id. at 103-104.

64.Rollo, p. 113.

65.Id.

66.Id. at 133.

67.Manansala v. Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc., 817 Phil. 84, 112 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

68.See Ebuenga v. Southfield Agencies, Inc., 828 Phil. 122 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

69. 820 Phil. 306 (2017) (Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

70.G.R. No. 225899, July 5, 2019, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65396> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

71. G.R. No. 229192, July 23, 2018, 873 SCRA 268 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

72.Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].