Angeles-Zapata v. Regional Trial Court of San Fernando City, Pampanga, Branch 46

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 207139. June 23, 2021.]

FRANCISCA ANGELES-ZAPATA, ET AL., petitioners,vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF SAN FERNANDO CITY, PAMPANGA, BRANCH 46; REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 23, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 207139 (FRANCISCA ANGELES-ZAPATA, ET AL., petitioners, v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF SAN FERNANDO CITY, PAMPANGA, BRANCH 46; REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), respondents). — Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed by Francisca Angeles-Zapata, et al. (petitioners) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the Order 2 dated December 14, 2012, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City, Pampanga, Branch 46 in Civil Case No. 097, and its Order 3 dated April 3, 2013, denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

The facts which gave rise to the instant controversy follow:

Milagros Zapata and petitioner Francisca Angeles are the registered owners of a parcel of land located in San Felipe, San Fernando, Pampanga, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 680721-R, and consisting of 31,222 square meters. 4 Later, Milagros Zapata fell ill, died, and is now represented by his wife, petitioner Francisca and their children (collectively, the petitioners). 5

On November 22, 2012, respondent Republic of the Philippines (respondent), through the DPWH and the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a complaint 6 for expropriation of 10,356 square meters of the said property. 7 Simultaneously, respondent also filed a Manifestation and Ex-parte motion (for the issuance of writ of possession)8 in which it expressed that it is ready to deposit two Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) checks in the total amount of P6,683,138.12, representing the zonal value of the property sought to be expropriated and the improvements thereon. 9

In response, petitioners filed their Answer with counterclaim and comment on Manifestation and ex parte motion, 10 in which they expressed no opposition to the taking of their property and the issuance of the writ of possession, but took exception as to respondents' basis and the amount of valuation. 11

During the hearing on December 14, 2012, upon presentation by respondent of the DBP checks and there being no objection from petitioners, the Court allowed that they be deposited with the Clerk of Court. On even date, the RTC issued the herein assailed Order, 12 which issued a writ of possession.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Release Sufficient Amount from Deposit in Order to Facilitate Humane & Orderly Transfer of Family Homes and Pay Hospitalization Debts13 on January 24, 2013. In the motion, petitioners argued that the writ of possession should not have been issued as the amount deposited by respondent is insufficient to cover the zonal value of the property and the improvements thereon, and that no part thereof has been released to them.

Respondent filed its Comment14 to petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, arguing in the main that the amount it deposited are supported by documentary evidence and calculated based on standard methods used by the DPWH. Also, they posit that the issuance of a writ of possession is ministerial on the part of the RTC after compliance with the requirements under Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8974 has been established, and that the release of the provisional amount of deposit to the property owner is not a condition sine qua non for such issuance. 15

After petitioners filed its Reply to Comment (on Motion for Reconsideration dated January 23, 2013), 16 the RTC issued the herein second assailed Order 17 dated April 3, 2013, adjudging as follows:

ALL TOLD, and in view of the foregoing, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

Accordingly, the Pre-Trial Conference set on April 5, 2013 at 8:30 in the morning is hereby maintained with the parties submission of their list of commissioners to be appointed by the Court to ascertain and report the just compensation of the subject property.

SO ORDERED. 18

Thus, petitioners filed this petition for certiorari. In support thereof, petitioners argue that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of possession despite the inadequacy of the amount deposited and that no part thereof has been released to owners. 19 Petitioners concede that "the hierarchy of courts should have been observed," 20 but argues that the case is a "special one" and involves a question of interpretation of R.A. No. 9184 which only the Court has the authority to perform. 21 CAIHTE

The petition is not meritorious.

After a review of the records of this case, the Court finds that the RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, the petition must be struck down for failure to observe the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

While the Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the CA in issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort to the Court is justified only when there are special, extraordinary, or compelling reasons that attend the case 22 which the petitioner must specifically allege and prove. In this case, other than their bare assertion that "this is the first time that this question of law has been brought up" before the Court, the petitioners failed to specify the particular issue involved and demonstrate its novel aspect. To be sure, it is not for the Court to provide the justification or reason to sustain the instant petition. Thus, on this score alone, the petition must fail as it is in direct violation of the hierarchy of courts.

In the case of GIOS-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC, 23 the Court reiterated and emphasized the importance of observing the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The Court clarified that the presence of "special and important reasons" is not the decisive factor in determining whether to permit the direct invocation of its jurisdiction, but rather the nature of the question raised by the parties. The strict observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not a mere policy but a constitutional imperative given the structure of our judicial system and the requirements of due process. 24 Thus, the Court reiterated that when a question before it "involves [the] determination of a factual issue indispensable to the resolution of the legal issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the question regardless of the allegation or invocation of compelling reasons, such as transcendental or paramount importance of the case. Such question must first be brought before the proper trial courts or the CA, both of which are specially equipped to try and resolve factual questions." 25

The importance of strictly ensuring the observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts cannot be overemphasized. To entertain a case, though in deviation of the said rule, would be to open the avenue for one too many cases similarly situated. The Court cannot allow the same in view of its already clogged dockets.

Among the allegations put forth by petitioners, in support of its submission that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, is that the amount deposited by the respondent and approved by the RTC is insufficient to cover the zonal value of the property and the improvements thereon. This involves a factual issue, the resolution of which entails a review and evaluation of the evidence presented. The Court is not a trier of facts and for this purpose, the CA is in the best position to resolve this issue.

An original action/special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as in the case at bar, is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of the judgment of the lower court, on the basis of either law or fact. Even if the findings of the lower court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, the correction is beyond the province of certiorari. 26

Grave abuse of discretion has a well-established meaning in jurisprudence. It connotes a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that effectively brings the acting entity outside the exercise of its proper jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility; and the abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction. 27

Even if the Court would entertain this petition, the Court finds no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC.

To reiterate, the issue in this case is limited to resolving the propriety of the issuance of a writ of possession, in particular, the adequacy of the amount deposited and whether such amount should be paid directly with the property owner.

With respect to the adequacy, no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed upon the RTC as the amount deposited is based upon ample documentary evidence within the purview of the standards set forth under R.A. No. 8974.

Under Sections 4 28 and 7 29 of R.A. No. 8974 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, 30 a writ of possession may only be issued after payment to the landowner of 100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the replacement costs of the improvements/structures thereon based on the current market prices for materials, equipment, labor, and other attendants costs for its acquisition and installation.

Contrary to petitioners' submission, the RTC did not err in affirming the initial valuation submitted by respondents. According to Department of Finance Department Order No. 25-05, dated December 2, 2005, the zonal value of agricultural land within the Barangay of San Felipe is determined by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to be at P300.00 per square meter. The costs of the improvements on the property were likewise supported by documentary evidence consisting of various Bill of Quantities 31 which specifies in as much detail as possible the materials and costs involved. The total amount of zonal valuation of the affected portion of the subject property and the improvements situated thereon are equal to the amount of check deposited by the respondents.

The Court is cognizant that R.A. No. 8974 mandates that the payment of the provisional valuation directly to the petitioners. However, with the petitioners' consistent opposition as to the amount thereof, the RTC did not commit an error in accepting the deposit in lieu of direct payment and in issuing the writ of possession. 32 "The deposit of the provisional amount with the court is equivalent to payment." 33

Upon compliance with the relevant requirements, the respondent is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right, and the issuance of such writ becomes ministerial duty on the part of the RTC. 34 It cannot be said, therefore, that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Orders dated December 14, 2012 and April 3, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando City, Pampanga, Branch 46, in Civil Case No. 097, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED." DETACa

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-12.

2.Id. at 28-29; rendered by Presiding Judge Mary Anne P. Padron-Rivera.

3.Id. at 160-166.

4.Id. at 32, 46.

5.Id. at 31.

6.Id. at 30-45.

7.Id. at 32, 87.

8.Id. at 86-91.

9.Id. at 87, 92-93.

10.Id. at 94-100.

11.Id. at 95-99.

12.Id. at 28-29.

13.Id. at 19-25.

14.Id. at 103-108.

15.Id. at 105-106.

16.Id. at 110-122.

17.Id. at 160-166.

18.Id. at 127-G.

19.Id. at 8.

20.Id. at 160.

21.Id. at 160-161.

22.Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc. v. Judge Riel, 750 Phil. 57, 67-68 (2015).

23. G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019.

24.Id.

25.Id.

26.Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corp., Inc., 479 Phil. 768, 780 (2004).

27.Pacaña-Contreras, et al. v. Rovila Water Supply, Inc., et al., 722 Phil. 460, 468 (2013), citing Barrazona v. RTC, Branch 61, Baguio City, 521 Phil. 53, 59-60 (2006).

28.Section 4.Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. — Whenever it is necessary to acquire real property for the right-of-way or location for any national government infrastructure project through expropriation, the appropriate implementing agency shall initiate the expropriation proceedings before the proper court under the following guidelines:

(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7 hereof;

(b) In provinces, cities, municipalities and other areas where there is no zonal valuation, the BIR is hereby mandated within the period of sixty (60) days from the date of the expropriation case, to come up with a zonal valuation for said area; and

(c) In case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property its proffered value taking into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 hereof.

Upon compliance with the guidelines abovementioned, the court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and start the implementation of the project.

Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the implementing agency shall present to the court a certificate of availability of funds from the proper official concerned.

In the event that the owner of the property contests the implementing agency's proffered value, the court shall determine the just compensation to be paid the owner within sixty (60) days from the date of filing of the expropriation case. When the decision of the court becomes final and executory, the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation as determined by the court.

29.Section 7.Valuation of Improvements and/or Structures. — The Department of Public Works and Highways and other implementing agencies concerned, in coordination with the local government units concerned in the acquisition of right-of-way, site or location for any national government infrastructure project, are hereby mandated to adopt within sixty (60) days upon approval of this Act, the necessary implementing rules and regulations for the equitable valuation of the improvements and/or structures on the land to be expropriated.

30. Section 10, Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 8974.

Section 10. Valuation of Improvements and/or Structures. — Pursuant to Section 7 of the Act, the Implementing Agency shall determine the valuation of the improvements and/or structures on the land to be acquired using the replacement cost method. The replacement cost of the improvements/structures is defined as the amount necessary to replace the improvements/structures, based on the current market prices for materials, equipment, labor, contractor's profit and overhead, and all other attendant costs associated with the acquisition and installation in place of the affected improvements/structures. In the valuation of the affected improvements/structures, the Implementing Agency shall consider, among other things, the kinds and quantities of materials/equipment used, the location, configuration and other physical features of the properties, and prevailing construction prices.

31.Rollo, pp. 49-63.

32. Cf. Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD) v. J. King and Sons Company, Inc., 603 Phil. 471, 487 (2009).

33.Id.

34.Id.; Municipality of Cordova, Province of Cebu, et al. v. Pathfinder Development Corp., et al., 788 Phil. 622, 632 (2016).