SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 226499. January 24, 2018.]
JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES [RET.], petitioner,vs. BRGY. CHAIRMAN JOSE ROBLES, AND CITY ENGINEER RICASOL MILAN, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated24 January 2018which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 226499 (Judge Adoracion G. Angeles [Ret.] vs. Brgy. Chairman Jose Robles, and City Engineer Ricasol Milan). — This Petition for Review 1 filed by Retired Judge Adoracion G. Angeles (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner) under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to annul and set aside the Decision 2 dated February 26, 2016 and Resolution 3 dated August 23, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 97662.
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-36518 (T-253990), located in Barangay Santor, City of Malolos, Bulacan.
On February 20, 2010, petitioner visited the subject property. There she discovered that the mango trees therein planted have dwindled and the produce thereof has greatly declined. She was informed that respondent Barangay Captain Jose Robles (Robles) has allowed the public to pass through her property. On that same day, attributing the decline in the produce to the actions of Robles, petitioner caused the construction of a dividing wall to enclose her property.
Two days thereafter, petitioner was informed through text message by the wife of her caretaker that the perimeter wall she has built upon the premises was destroyed by Robles, respondent City Engineer Ricasol Milan (Milan), two police officers, and two other unidentified men, as it is considered as a nuisance. Before the day ended, petitioner went to the premises and after seeing the destruction immediately reported the matter to the police. 4
On February 26, 2010, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan a petition for Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunctions and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) with damages against Robles and Milan (hereinafter collectively referred to as the respondents). 5
After summary hearing, the RTC issued its Order dated June 18, 2010 granting the application and directing the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, after posting of the necessary bond. By virtue of which, respondents, their agents, or any other person acting on their behalf were ordered to refrain and to cease and desist from allowing the public from entering the petitioner's property. 6
During the scheduled pre-trial conference, despite notice, only Milan appeared. The respondents were then declared in default and the petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex parte. 7
On February 11, 2011, the RTC of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 78, rendered its Decision 8 granting the petition, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant petition. Accordingly,
1. Let a Writ of PERMANENT INJUNCTION be issued against respondents Brgy. Captain Jose Robles, City Engr. Ricasol Milan and PO2 Carlito Bernardo, their agents or any other person acting in their behalf, ordering them to perpetually REFRAIN AND TO CEASE AND DESIST from allowing the public from entering or traversing petitioner's property located at Brgy. Santor, City of Malolos, Bulacan, covered by TCT No. RT-36518 (T-253990);
2. Further, respondents Brgy. Captain Jose Robles, City Engr. Ricasol Milan and PO2 Carlito Bernardo are hereby ordered to pay the petitioner:
a. The amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php50,000.00), by way of moral damages;
b. The amount of SIX HUNDRED FOUR PESOS (P604.00) by way of compensatory damages;
c. The amount of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (Php25,000.00), by way of attorney's fees; and
d. The amount of SIXTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE PESOS (Php16,155.00), as costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED. 9
Aggrieved, the respondents appealed the RTC decision to the CA.
On February 26, 2016, the CA rendered its Decision, 10 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Decision dated February 11, 2011 and Order dated June 10, 2011 of the [RTC] of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78, in Civil Case No. 140-M-2010, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby issued DISMISSING the petition for prohibitory and mandatory injunction for lack of merit. aScITE
SO ORDERED. 11
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the decision, but the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution 12 dated August 23, 2016.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner raises the following errors committed by the CA:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE APPEAL DUE TO VIOLATIONS OF RULE 50 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE;
II. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE THE LEGAL PERSONALITY TO FILE AN APPEAL; and
III. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION BASED ON THE BARE ALLEGATION OF RESPONDENTS. 13
On the procedural aspect, petitioner submits that the CA erred in not dismissing the respondents appeal and instead treating it as one filed under Rule 44, contrary to the statement in the latter's brief that it is filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 14 Likewise, petitioner submits that the appeal should have been dismissed for having been filed 20 days beyond the period required by law. 15
Still on procedure, petitioner argues that having been declared in default by the RTC, respondents are divested of legal personality to participate in the proceedings.
Moreover, not having had the opportunity to present evidence, petitioner argues that "respondents can never claim that the appealed judgment is contrary to the evidence or to the law." 16 Finally, petitioner posits that she has sufficiently established by preponderance of evidence that the partition wall was built inside her property, which position was supported by the findings of RTC after the conduct of ocular inspection. 17
The Court is not persuaded.
Anent the erroneous denomination of respondents' petition, the Court agrees with the CA's ruling. 18 Considering that the clear intent of the respondents as manifested by their Notice of Appeal dated July 31, 2011, and their statement of assigned errors contained in their Appellant's Brief 19 that they submit for review before the CA both factual and legal determinations of the RTC there is no reason for the Court to dismiss the appeal solely on this ground.
It need not be emphasized that the Court has time and again ruled that where strong considerations of substantive justice are evident in the petition, the application of rules of procedure may be relaxed in the exercise of the Court's equity jurisdiction. 20 Thus, in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, the Court has allowed meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. 21
Likewise, even assuming for the sake of argument that the respondents' brief before the CA has been filed out of time, the admission of the same lies within the discretion of the CA.
As enunciated in the guidelines set forth in the case of Government of the Kingdom of Belgium v. CA, 22 the power conferred upon the CA by the Rules to dismiss an appeal is "discretionary and directory and not ministerial and mandatory." Furthermore, the failure of an appellant to file his brief within the reglementary period does not have the effect of causing the automatic dismissal of the appeal, in which case the appellate court has the prerogative to still allow the appeal. 23
Also, contrary to what petitioner suggests, the mere fact that the respondents have been declared in default and as such did not have the opportunity to present evidence does not automatically mean that judgment should automatically favor the petitioner. As clearly enunciated in the case of Gajudo, et al. v. Traders Royal Bank: 24
The mere fact that a defendant is declared in default does not automatically result in the grant of the prayers of the plaintiff. To win, the latter must still present the same quantum of evidence that would be required if the defendant were still present. A party that defaults is not deprived of its rights, except the right to be heard and to present evidence to the trial court. If the evidence presented does not support a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint should be dismissed, even if the defendant may not have been heard or allowed to present any countervailing evidence. 25 HEITAD
While respondents have lost their standing in court for having been declared in default, it does not mean that they are left without any recourse, among which includes the right to appeal, albeit on limited grounds, to wit:
first, the failure of the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of the complaint; second, the decision is contrary to law; and third, the amount of judgment is excessive or different in kind from that prayed for. In these cases, the appellate tribunal should only consider the pieces of evidence that were presented by the plaintiff during the ex parte presentation of his evidence. 26
In the case before the RTC, on the basis of the Certification issued by Assistant City Assessor Dominga S. Ladia and the Cadastral Map of Barangay Santor, City of Malolos, Bulacan, the lower court concluded that the partition wall was built within petitioner's property line. 27 Simply stated, the RTC found that petitioner was well within her rights as the registered owner of the property to construct the said wall as a matter of preserving the same. Corollarily, the demolition caused by the respondents is unjustified and subjects them to liability for damages. 28
In their appeal before the CA, respondents argued that the petitioner failed to prove the material allegations of her complaint, i.e., that she exercises dominion over the area on which the perimeter wall was constructed.
The CA found that the petitioner "built the partition wall on a barangay road leading to the property of Malolos Heights (Lot 4506 of the Cadastral Map) to prevent the entry of people to and the passing through her property, which adjoins that of Malolos Heights." 29
Considering the variance in the factual findings, this Court decides to entertain and resolve questions of fact, even as a petition for review on certiorari should only be limited to questions of law. 30
Evaluating the evidence presented by the petitioner, this Court finds basis in the CA resolution.
In support of her position, petitioner insists that the absence of a road in her property proves that the wall was erected within the confines thereof. 31
Verily, irrespective of petitioner's allegation, what remains is that she failed to substantiate her allegation that the passageway that she blocked was on her property. On the contrary, the evidence she presented lends credence to the fact that the said wall was built outside her property lines.
To begin with, the evidence relied upon by the RTC, provides no positive declaration that the wall was built on the petitioner's property (Lot No. 4525) and not on a barangay road. Neither do the said pieces of evidence conclusively establish the absence of a barangay road bordering the petitioner's property. The March 5, 2010 Certification issued by the Office of the City Assessor and relied upon by the RTC states:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that as per attached blue print of the Cadastral Map of Barangay Santor, there is an existing road in between Lots 4518 and 4513 and Lots 4519 to 4524, please see attached plan.
This certification is based on the cadastral map of Barangay Santor available in the Office for identification purposes.
(Sgd.) DOMINGA S. LADIA32
As evident from the wording of the said certification, it merely attests to the existence of a barangay road between Lots 4518 and 4513, and Lots 4519 and 4524. Such statement does not discount the fact that a similar road may exist on petitioner's property (Lot No. 4525), which as correctly pointed out by the CA, was not even a subject thereof.
A certificate of title is conclusive as to all matters contained, such as the precise measurement, boundaries and location of the property it covers. 33 In fine, what defines a piece of land are "the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits." 34
In the instant case, the identity of petitioner's land, its boundaries, and limits are accurately and sufficiently described in TCT No. RT-36518 (T-253990). The Court adopts and quotes in this regard the determination of the CA: ATICcS
And in this case, Judge Angeles' TCT No. RT-36518 (T-253990) explicitly state that it is bound on the northwest by a road and Lot 4506 where the Malolos Heights Subdivision stands.
As Judge Angeles admits that she had caused the closure of the small space or opening leading to the private subdivision of the Malolos Heights, it is clear that she was referring to the end of the public road ascertained during the hearing for the TRO to be along points 42 and 43 of the Cadastral Map. And as it is readily apparent that Judge Angeles' property, Lot 4525, does not share boundaries with points 42 and 43 of the Cadastral Map, We are convinced that Judge Angeles constructed the partition wall beyond her property lines.
Indeed, there could be no other conclusion for how else could a 1 meter wide partition wall effectively block people and vehicles from entering her property, unless it was built along the road? It strains credulity to think otherwise when Judge Angeles admits that her entire property consisting of 1,057 square meters is unfenced. This being the case, in no way can a 1 meter partition wall along her property lines be a useful barrier. 35 (Citations omitted)
Otherwise stated, considering the technical description of the property as well as the testimony of the petitioner as to the location of the partition wall and her objective in constructing the same, there can be no other logical conclusion than that the wall was built on the road that bounds her property on the northwest, outside her property lines. This renders her act unjustified and subject to abatement by the respondents.
Considering the foregoing, petitioner having failed to establish that her rights have been violated, there is thus no basis for the award of damages.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 26, 2016 and Resolution dated August 23, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97662 are hereby AFFIRMED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-21.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba, with Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Jhosep Y. Lopez concurring; id. at 22-36.
3.Id. at 37-46.
4.Id. at 54-56.
5.Id. at 52.
6.Id. at 54.
7.Id.
8.Id. at 52-60.
9.Id.
10.Id. at 22-36.
11.Id. at 36.
12.Id. at 37-46.
13.Id. at 9-10.
14.Id. at 10.
15.Id. at 12.
16.Id. at 14.
17.Id. at 15-17.
18.Id. at 26.
19.Id.
20.CMTC International Marketing Corp. v. BHAGIS International Trading Corp., 700 Phil. 575, 582 (2012).
21.Philippine Bank of Communications v. CA, G.R. No. 218901, February 15, 2017, citing Tanenglian v. Lorenzo, et al., 573 Phil. 472, 489 (2008).
22. 574 Phil. 380 (2008).
23.Id. at 391; See also Diaz v. People, 704 Phil. 146, 157 (2013).
24. 519 Phil. 791, 794 (2006).
25.Id.
26.Otero v. Tan, 692 Phil. 714, 725 (2012).
27.Rollo, p. 56.
28.Id. at 58-59.
29.Id. at 30.
30.Pascual v. Burgos, et al., G.R. No. 171722, January 11, 2016, 778 SCRA 189, 191, citing Medina v. Mayor Assistio, Jr., 269 Phil. 225, 232 (1990).
31.Rollo, pp. 15-16.
32.Id. at 31-32.
33.Spouses De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corp., 492 Phil. 643, 655 (2005); Carvajal v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 582 (1997).
34.Vda. de Tan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 213 SCRA 95, 102 (1992).
35. Rollo, p. 35.