SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 163801-17. September 16, 2015.]
ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR.,petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 163840-57. September 16, 2015.]
ANGEL CHUA,petitioner, vs. FOURTH DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR,respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 16 September 2015 which reads as follows:
"G.R. Nos. 163801-17 (Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines) & G.R. Nos. 163840-57 (Angel Chua v. Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, People of the Philippines and Office of the Special Prosecutor)
These are consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus seeking to reverse and set aside the December 12, 2003 1 and April 13, 2004 2 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 25922-39, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Antonio P. Belicena, et al."
In its Fact-Finding Report, dated September 22, 1999, the Fact-Finding and Investigation Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) found that there were questionable transfers of 91 Tax Credit Certificates (TCCs), amounting to P356,729,815.00, from 18 garment firms to Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) during the years 1995, 1996 and 1997. 3
In another Fact-Finding Report, dated October 6, 1999, the FFIB stated that from 1993 to 1997, the same 18 garment firms irregularly transferred 246 TCCs, with a total face value of P614,686,764.00, in favor of Petron Corporation (Petron) through several deeds of assignments. 4 CAIHTE
Both reports showed that the garment firms dubiously obtained numerous TCCs and transferred the same to Shell and Petron using forged deeds of assignment and incomplete documentary requirements. In spite of the doubtful prerequisites, the government officials of the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance, Manila (DOF-Center), approved the transfers of TCCs to Shell and Petron.
Consequently, the FFIB filed a total of forty-one (41) complaints 5 before the Ombudsman against officials of the DOF-Center, Shell, Petron and the 18 garment firms, which included petitioner Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr. (Andutan), Executive Director of the DOF-Center; and Angel Chua (Chua), General Manager of Jantex Philippines, Inc., one of garment firms involved. The complaints charged them with violations of Section 3 (e) and (j) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the illegal transfer of TCCs to Shell and Petron. 6
During the preliminary investigation, Andutan averred that the procedure in the transfer of TCCs was duly complied with; that a taxpayer could negotiate a TCC; that the DOF-Center officials could not be held liable for the approval of the transfer of TCCs as it was made without malice and corruption; 7 that his official duty had been regularly performed; and that there was no damage to the government as the value of the TCCs in the hands of the transferees could still be assessed. 8
Chua did not appear before the Ombudsman during the preliminary investigation to explain his side. 9
Ombudsman Resolution
In its Joint Resolution, 10 dated March 27, 2000, the Ombudsman recommended the filing of the Informations against several public and private respondents, including Andutan and Chua, for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. It found that the garment firms submitted forged deeds of assignment and incomplete documentary requirements, yet, the officials of the DOF-Center, Shell and Petron never bothered to verify the genuineness of these documents. The Ombudsman enumerated the chain of acts committed to unlawfully secure the TCCs. These acts indicated a conspiracy among the officials of the DOF-Center, the officers of the garment firms involved and the officers of Shell and Petron to defraud the government of its tax money in a large-scale fashion.
The Ombudsman, however, dismissed the complaints against Margaret de Luna, Sonia Carmona, Carmencita Camara, Roy Alindayu, Renato Andaya, Virgilio Piñon, and Rodel Rodriguez for lack of probable cause. They submitted specimens of their signatures and, upon investigation, the Ombudsman was convinced that their signatures in the deeds of assignment were forged and that they were never a part of the anomalous transactions.
Consequently, twenty-three (23) Informations were filed against DOF-Center officials and officers of the garment firms and Shell (Shell Cases), while eighteen (18) Informations were filed against DOF-Center officials, and officers of the garment firms, and Petron (Petron Cases) before the Sandiganbayan, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP).
The present consolidated petitions involve the Petron Cases,11 where Andutan was charged in Criminal Case Nos. 25922-24, 12 25927-29, 13 25931-25937 14 and 25939; 15 and Chua, in Criminal Case No. 25932. 16 The Informations in the above specified criminal cases all uniformly alleged:
That during the period from [indicated dates], or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforementioned first two (2) accused Antonio P. Belicena and Uldarico P. Andutan, Jr., both public officers, being then the Assistant Secretary/Administrator, and Deputy Executive Director, respectively, of the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance, Manila, while in the performance of their official functions and acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, conspiring and confederating with each other, together with accused [names of accused Petron officials], and [names of accused transferor corporation officers], did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally recommend and approve the transfer of the following Tax Credit Certificates purportedly issued to [name of transferor corporation], to wit:
[list of TCCs with nos. and respective amounts, with total amount]
from [name of transferor corporation], represented by accused [names of accused transferor corporation officers], unto and in favor of Petron Corp., represented by accused [names of accused Petron officials], without legal basis and proper/required documentation, thereby causing undue injury and damage to the government in the aforestated amount and at the same time giving unwarranted benefit, preference or advantage to the said private firms. 17
The Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 25925-26, 18 25930 19 and 25938, 20 also charging Andutan with the same offense, bore the same format but included the additional allegation on the use of a forged deed of assignment.
On July 26, 2000, Chua filed his motion for reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation 21 before the Sandiganbayan. He asserted that he was not notified of any preliminary investigation against him; that he did not participate in the issuance or transfer of TCCs; and that his signatures in the implicated deeds of assignment were forgeries. He attached to his motion several documents with his specimen signature.
On June 11, 2002, Andutan filed his Motion to Quash 22 before the Sandiganbayan. He alleged that the facts charged did not constitute an offense and the criminal action or liability, if any, had been extinguished. He averred that the transfer of the TCCs to Petron had legal basis under R.A. No. 7844, the Board of Investment-Department of Finance (BOI-DOF) Agreement, dated October 13, 2000 (BOI-DOF Agreement), and their respective implementing rules and regulations (IRR). He also invoked the July 23, 1999 Decision 23 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in Case No. 5657 (CTA Decision), which upheld the transferability of the subject TCCs to Petron. Thus, the elements of evident bad faith and manifest partiality did not exist. DETACa
On August 9, 2002, Chua filed a motion to adopt Andutan's motion to quash with reservation. 24
The Sandiganbayan Resolution
On December 12, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed resolution which denied the motions filed in Criminal Case Nos. 25922-39, including those by Andutan and Chua. The anti-graft court stated that the transferability of the TCCs was not the focal issue in those cases. Rather, the dispute centered on the illegality of the transfers through the connivance of the public officers and private individuals. The bulk of the transfers was made within a very short span of time, which indicated a pre-arranged agreement to lend a semblance of legality in the process, albeit the inexistent or forged supporting documents.
The Sandiganbayan also ruled that the CTA Decision could not be applied as it dealt with collection of taxes, which was evidently alien to the criminal liability of the perpetrators under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Thus, the Sandiganbayan concluded that such prior judgment could not bar the continuation of the criminal case.
On January 21, 2004, Andutan and Chua filed their respective motions for reconsideration 25 of the assailed Sandiganbayan resolution. Andutan argued that the transfer of the TCCs had legal basis. On the other hand, Chua averred that the Fact-Finding Report of the FFIB, dated September 5, 2001 (September 5, 2001 Report), as approved by the Ombudsman, confirmed that his signatures in the involved deeds of assignment were forgeries. Thus, the Ombudsman had already cleared him of any criminal liability.
On April 13, 2004, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed resolution denying the motions for reconsideration filed by Andutan and Chua, among others, as the arguments discussed therein were mere reiterations of issues raised in their motions to quash. The anti-graft court also wrote that the parties must go to trial to substantiate their respective claims.
Hence, these petitions.
ISSUES
(G.R. Nos. 163801-17)
I.
THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED PATENT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND/OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE INFORMATIONS AND CHARGES IN CRIM. CASES NOS. 25922-39 WITH RESPECT TO PETITIONER.
II.
THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED PATENT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND/OR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT RULING THAT WITH RESPECT TO PETITIONER, (1) THE FACTS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATIONS DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE, AND (2) THE CRIMINAL ACTION OR LIABILITY, IF ANY, HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED.26
(G.R. Nos. 163840-57)
THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE, FLAGRANTLY AGAINST THE EVIDENCE, TO PETITIONER'S ALLEGATION OF FORGERY AND IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO QUASH.27
G.R. Nos. 163801-17
In his petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, 28 Andutan argued that: First, the transfer of the TCCs to Petron was valid pursuant to Section 17 of R.A. No. 7844, or the Export Development Act. Under the said law, the transfer of TCCs was liberalized to the point that TCCs had become negotiable instruments like a check or promissory note.
Second, the BOI-DOF Agreement stated that the transferee of a TCC may be a supplier of raw materials, whether or not forming part of the transferor's export products. Thus, even though the oil products supplied by Petron to the garment firms did not form part of the latter's export products, Petron could still be a valid transferee of the TCCs.
Third, R.A. No. 7844, the BOI-DOF Agreement, and their IRR had rendered unnecessary the documentary requirements cited by the Ombudsman. Thus, as a DOF-Center official, he did not err in approving the transfers of the TCCs. Andutan also pointed out that the CTA Decision upheld the transferability of the TCCs to Petron.
Fourth, The elements of evident bad faith and manifest partiality were inexistent as his act of approving the transfer of the TCCs to Petron was within the confines of the law. In the same manner, the element of undue injury was absent because no damage would be sustained by the government as it could assess the TCCs during a post-audit process.
In its Comment, 29 the OSP averred that Andutan failed to prove the grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan. It asserted that R.A. No. 7844, the BOI-DOF Agreement, their IRR, and even the CTA Decision, only pertained to the transferability of the TCCs to Petron, but not the legality of their transfers. The current criminal cases were indubitably related to the irregularity of the TCC transfers and the criminal liability of the petitioners. Andutan's defense that the transfer of the TCCs to Petron complied with the conditions and documentary requirements set forth by law was a matter best left to the processes of trial.
Moreover, the OSP "submitted that the aforequoted Informations bear the ultimate facts which, if hypothetically assumed to be true would be sufficient to convict petitioners of the crime charged." 30 It enumerated the elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 and these were all present as shown by the allegations in the Informations.
In his Reply, 31 Andutan added that the CTA Decision demonstrated that the transfers of the TCCs were legal and valid. The CTA was the judicial body which had the primary jurisdiction, competence and expertise in deciding issues on taxation, and its decision was entitled to great weight.
G.R. Nos. 163840-57
In his petition for review, Chua pointed out that the September 5, 2001 Report, which was approved by the Ombudsman, had found that his signatures on the deeds of assignment were a complete forgery. In fact, he was even included in the list of witnesses. Considering then that his signatures were confirmed as forgeries, there could be no basis for the allegation in the information that he conspired with the other accused in the commission of the purported crimes.
In its Comment, 32 the OSP countered that the September 5, 2001 Report referred to a different criminal case, which was the plunder charge against the spouses Chingkoe and their cohorts for amassing ill-gotten wealth amounting to P2,468,795,577.00 in the fraudulent TCC transfers. Moreover, this September 5, 2001 Report was never presented by the Ombudsman in the present criminal case and could not be used by the prosecution as an admission.
The OSP argued that, even if the deeds of assignment were set aside due to the alleged forged signature, the Information charged Chua with the acts of conspiracy with his co-accused in irregularly transferring the TCCs to Petron. Ergo, he was still properly charged for his participations in the offenses charged. The OSP concluded that if Chua would like to maintain his defense of forgery, such matter must be tackled in a full-blown trial.
In his Reply, 33 Chua insisted that he could not be included in the charge of conspiracy as the only act ascribed to him was his signing of the deeds of assignments. He declared that conspiracy must be established by clear and convincing evidence. ATICcS
The Court's Ruling
The petitions are bereft of merit.
Grave abuse of discretion was not
When a court denies a motion to quash, the aggrieved party is not mindlessly endowed with the unbridled right to question the same before a higher tribunal. The party must take into consideration the stringent rules embodied in the extraordinary actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
In petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, the petitioner therein must prove grave abuse of discretion or that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 34 The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 35
In this case, the Court is not convinced that the petitioners had sufficiently established the grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan. As will be discussed later, the anti-graft court properly denied the motion to quash.
On the other hand, the remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. 36 Here, the assailed act of the Sandiganbayan, which was the denial of the motion to quash, is clearly a discretionary act. It involves the exercise of judgment on whether to dismiss the criminal case or to continue with the trial. Evidently, such act is not the proper subject of a mandamus.
The laws and decision cited by
Pursuant to its March 27, 2000 Joint Resolution, the Ombudsman charged the petitioners with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. It found that the general transfer of TCCs from the garment firms to Petron were irregular and violative of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), between the BOI and the DOF, dated August 29, 1989 (August 29, 1989 MOA), which implemented Article 21 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 226, otherwise known as the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.
Andutan contends that Section 17 of R.A. No. 7844, 37 and the BOI-DOF Agreement, 38 and their IRR 39 had modified or superseded the August 29, 1989 MOA. The contention is erroneous. The cited laws and rules only support the claim that TCCs are transferable from one taxpayer to another. The transfer, however, must comply with certain prerequisites in order to be valid. The non-compliance with these requirements and specifications, and not the transferability nature of the TCCs, is one of the main issues in the present criminal actions.
The petitioners cannot find solace either in the cited CTA Decision. The said decision only dealt with the issue relating to the use and transferability of the TCCs to Petron. As properly noted by the Sandiganbayan and the OSP, the subject matter before the CTA was the government's collection of taxes against Petron, not the criminal liability of the perpetrators in the dubious transfers of TCCs. Hence, the CTA Decision cannot be applied to the pending criminal cases.
In its March 27, 2000 Joint Resolution, the Ombudsman stated that the transferor garment companies and transferee Petron failed to comply with the documentary requirements in the transfer of the TCCs, yet the DOF-Center officials approved the same, to wit:
And as the complainant FFIB posits, not only were the important documents to effect the questionable transfers lacking [i.e., supply agreement, purchase orders, delivery receipts and invoices, board resolutions/secretary's certificates, etc.] at the time of the transactions, but that the following strict requirements before the transfers could be allowed were not adhered to:
One year track record of supply equivalent to 85% of the value of the tax credit to be transferred;
Purchase Order of at least 85% of the value of tax credit to be transferred (85% [to] be based on delivery receipts for materials/supplies rather than on P.O.'s track record of transactions); and
Supply contract stipulating that the consideration for supply consist[s] wholly or in part of the tax credit being transferred to the supplier. 40
Andutan argues that the BOI-DOF Agreement and its IRR rendered nugatory the documentary requirements in the transfer of the TCCs. The Court is not persuaded. A simple examination of the IRR, which was drafted pursuant to the BOI-DOF Agreement, demonstrates that the documentary requirements for the transfer of TCCs were preserved as follows:
Sec. 8. The documents to be submitted in requesting for transfer of tax credits are:
a) Letter request signed by the highest executive officer of the transferor;
b) Original tax credit certificate and one photocopy;
c) Notarized deed of assignment signed by responsible officers of the transferor and the transferee. This document must state the consideration for the transfer;
d) Secretary's certification on the board resolution of both parties on the authorized signatories to the deed of assignment;
e) Specific documents to support the consideration for the transfer as stated in the deed of assignment, such as:
• Commercial documents like sales contract, invoices, pro-forma invoices, covering the trade transaction declared as basis for the transfer;
• Audited financial statements of the transferor for the last two (2) years, with breakdown of manufacturing cost indicating the cost of the particular materials subject of the transfer, if the transfer is based on supply of materials;
• Secretary's certification on the present ownership profiles of the companies, for transfers to related companies;
• Other documents/information as prescribed in the foregoing guidelines.
f) Copy of the BOI registration certificate of both parties;
g) Clearances from BIR and BOC;
h) Liquidation Report on previously approved transfer(s). 41
As can be observed above, the documentary requirements for the transfer of TCCs even became more stringent under the IRR. It is only upon compliance with these pre-requisites could a transfer of TCC be upheld. The petitioners must, therefore, prove that these requirements were fulfilled to controvert the criminal charges against them during a full-blown trial.
The defense of forgery must
The Ombudsman filed the Informations for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 against the petitioners pursuant to its March 27, 2000 Joint Resolution. In turn, the said resolution was based on the Fact-finding Reports of the FFIB, dated September 22, 1999 and October 6, 1999. Chua insists that the September 5, 2001 Report of the FFIB, which was approved by the Ombudsman, should clear him from any criminal liability as the said report found his signatures to be forgeries, to quote:
37. In a certification, dated 3 September 1998 issued by Mr. Jose O. Espiritu, Chief MIS, BID, the names of the following (all involved in the processing of tax credit under their respective signatures appearing in the Deed of Assignments (these signatures were confirmed by the NBI as forgeries). cSEDTC
a. Roy L. Alindayu — General Manager, Allstar Spinnig
b. Rodel P. Rodriguez — Gen. Manager, Filstar Textile
c. Virgilio S. Piñon — Gen. Manager, Alliance Thread
d. Reynato C. Andaya — Gen. Manager, Diamong Knitting
e. Margaret A. De Luna — Gen. Manager, Master Colour
f. Sonia G. Carmona — Gen. Manager, Express Colour
g. Carmencito C. Camara — Gen. Manager, Fiber Tech
h. Joel Ignacio — Gen. Manager, Spintex
i. Angel Chua — Gen. Manager, Jantex
j. Fernando Orendez — Gen. Manager, Jibtex
k. Rodrigo R. Garcia — Gen. Manager, Filstar 42
The Court is of the view that the September 5, 2001 Report cannot be used by Chua in the motion to quash to exculpate him from criminal liability. First, as stressed by the OSP, the said September 5, 2001 Report was never presented by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan. Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court 43 provides that only those admissions, whether oral or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings shall be considered as a judicial admission, which would not require proof. Thus, absent any offer of such report during the presentation of evidence before the courts, its contents could not be utilized against the prosecution.
Second, the September 5, 2001 Report pertains to a completely different charge. It alleged that the spouses Chingkoe and their cohorts amassed ill-gotten wealth amounting to P2,468,795,577.00 in the fraudulent TCC transfers. On the other hand, the present criminal cases refer to the charges of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 against the DOF-Center officials and the officers of the garment firms and Petron.
Third, the March 27, 2000 Joint Resolution, which was the basis of the Informations filed before the Sandiganbayan, and the September 5, 2001 Report pertained to different TCCs. Chua, as General Manager of Jantex, was accused of participating in the improper transfer of the TCCs to Shell and Petron in the March 27, 2000 Joint Resolution. Particularly, the said resolution involved three (3) specific TCC transfers to Shell 44 (TCC Nos. 6179, 6183 and 6311) and nine (9) specific TCC transfers to Petron 45 (TCC Nos. 5677, 6002, 6027, 6621, 6778, 7211, 7244, 7022 and 7305). The September 5, 2001 Report, on the other hand, did not state specific TCC numbers but only reported that Jantex had nine (9) accounted and twenty (20) unaccounted TCCs. 46 Manifestly, insofar as Jantex is concerned, the TCCs challenged by these two documents differ from each other.
Fourth, the garment firms identified in the March 27, 2000 Joint Resolution and the garment firms investigated in the September 5, 2001 Report were not the same. In the March 27, 2000 Joint Resolution, the Ombudsman associated eighteen (18) garment firms with the irregular transfer of TCCs to Petron. 47 Conversely, the September 5, 2001 Report only focused on eleven (11) garment firms, owned and controlled by the Chingkoe spouses. 48
Based on the foregoing, the Sandiganbayan appropriately dispensed with the September 5, 2001 Report before the trial on the merits commenced.
Contrary to Chua's claim, the Information in Criminal Case No. 25932 charged him with "[c]onspiring and confederating with each other . . . [in] the transfer . . . of the following Tax Credit Certificates . . . without legal basis and proper/required documentation." 49 His signing of the deeds of assignment was not the only act that implicated him. His act of transferring the TCCs from Jantex to Petron without legal basis and proper documentation also incriminated him. In its March 27, 2000 Joint Resolution, the Ombudsman painstakingly detailed the elaborate scheme and conspiracy to defraud the government through transfers of TCCs as follows:
. . . Rather, we observed that all what was being done was for the transferor firms to hand over their TCCs to the oil company [SHELL or PETRON], sign the Deeds of Assignment, together with the concerned official of the transferee, whereupon the latter just sends the same to the DOF-Center for immediate approval by Undersecretary [Asst. Secretary/Administrator] Belicena who then issues a tax debit memo addressed to the BIR Collection Program Division "authorizing the debit of tax credit on raw materials and supplies" against the TCCs, and thereafter the oil company writes to the same BIR office transmitting the TCCs so approved at the DOF-Center, along with the Deeds of Assignment and the said transferee's excise tax liabilities for the given period, which application was then reflected at the back of the TCCs by the BIR, with its corresponding Tax Debit Memo [BIR Form No. 2821], bearing a control number, which marks the final utilization of the said TCCs.
[Underscoring Supplied]
Clearly, the Ombudsman considered several acts of Chua in the grand conspiracy to defraud the government, aside from his signing of deed of sale, in its March 27, 2000 Joint Resolution, and in the filing of the corresponding Information for Criminal Case No. 25932.
The Ombudsman, as part of the prosecutorial arm of the government, had the discretion whether to include or exclude persons in the Information filed before the courts upon the existence of probable cause. 50 In this case, considering that Chua never attended the preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman exercised its discretion to indict him before the Sandiganbayan. Despite being given an opportunity to face the complaint at the preliminary investigation, Chua chose the path of indifference, to be above it all. His claim that he was not notified of the preliminary investigation deserves scant consideration. SDAaTC
Forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. 51 Those who make the allegation of forgery have the burden of proving it because a mere allegation is not evidence. 52 Even so, Chua is not precluded from invoking his defense of forgery during the trial before the Sandiganbayan. In Marquez v. Sandiganbayan,53 the Court held that an accused should be given an opportunity to substantiate his defense of forgery during his turn to adduce evidence. "[T]he appreciation of whether the signatures of [accused] are genuine or not is subject to the discretion of the graft court, this discretion, by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing." 54
The facts charged in the
Ultimately, the root issue in the present petitions relate to the sufficiency of the Information. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. . . .
In People v. Balao, 55 the Court held that the fundamental test in determining the adequacy of the averments in an information is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime. Matters extrinsic or evidence aliunde should not be considered. 56
Here, the Court is of the view that the Informations filed in these cases contained facts sufficient to constitute an offense. The elements of the crime of violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019 are as follow:
(1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former;
(2) that said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions;
(3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; and
(4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. 57
Indeed, all the elements of the crime are present in the Informations filed. The first and second elements are present as Andutan has been charged as a public officer who committed the unlawful acts during the performance of his official duty as then Deputy Executive Director of the DOF-Center, while Chua was charged as a private individual in conspiracy with a public officer. The third element is shown by the allegation that Andutan's unlawful acts in the illegal transfer of TCCs caused the government to lose the alleged amounts of money, which, in turn, translate into unwarranted benefits to the private individuals and entities who profited at the expense of the government. The fourth element is covered by the assertion that the unlawful acts were alleged to have been knowingly and voluntarily done in violation of law.
On a final note, the Court must remind the petitioners that the remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant accused to enter a plea and go to trial. Indeed, matters of defense raised therein should be fully ventilated in a full blown trial on the merits. Should the decision be adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment and assign as error the denial of the motion to quash. 58
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The December 12, 2003 and April 13, 2004 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 25922-39 are AFFIRMEDin toto. (Brion, J., on leave; Perez, J. designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 2191 dated September 16, 2015)
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Rodolfo G. Palattao with Associate Justices Gregory S. Ong and Norberto Y. Geraldez, concurring; G.R. Nos. 163801-17, rollo pp. 47-53.
2. Id. at 55-61.
3. Id. at 241.
4. Id. at 248.
5. Twenty-three (23) complaints for the irregular transfers of TCCs to Shell; while eighteen (18) complaints for the irregular transfers of TCCs to Petron.
6. Id. at 238.
7. Id. at 254.
8. Id. at 263.
9. Id. at 275.
10. Id. at 238-277.
11. Andutan was charged in the Informations for Criminal Case Nos. 25922-39; while Chua was charged in the Information for Criminal Case No. 25932.
12. G.R. Nos. 163801-17, rollo, pp. 63-75.
13. Id. at 84-94.
14. Id. at 99-126.
15. Id. at 127-130.
16. Id. at 103-106.
17. Id. at 5-6.
18. Id. at 76-83.
19. Id. at 96-98.
20. Id. at 127-130.
21. G.R. No. 163840-57, rollo, pp. 39-42.
22. G.R. Nos. 163801-17, rollo, pp. 135-160.
23. Id. at 278-310.
24. G.R. No. 163840-57, rollo, pp. 56-57.
25. G.R. Nos. 163801-17, rollo, pp. 217-223.
26. Id. at 12.
27. G.R. Nos. 163840-57, rollo, p. 11.
28. G.R. Nos. 163801-17, rollo, pp. 3-43.
29. Id. at 324-353.
30. G.R. Nos. 163801-17, rollo, p. 337.
31. Id. at 366-377.
32. Id. at 131-148.
33. Id. at 149-154.
34. See Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 155306, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA 24.
35. BCDA v. COA, G.R. No. 209219, December 2, 2014.
36. Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015.
37. SECTION 17. Negotiability. — All tax credits herein provided shall be negotiable.
38. SECTION 1. Tax credit certificates shall be allowed for transfer under conditions stated herein: . . .
c. For tax credit certificates on raw materials and supplies, the transferee should be a supplier of the transferor of raw materials, supplied and consumables, whether or not forming part of the latter's export products, for as long as these are used by the latter in the production of export products, as used by the latter in the production of export products, as registered with the BOI; provided that the amount of tax to be transferred shall be limited to the latter's actual consumption of the specific material being declared as basis of the transfer and to acceptable inventory level;
xxx xxx xxx
39. SECTION 3. For tax credits on raw materials . . .
"(c) For transfer to supplier of materials, supplies or consumables, the materials being used as basis for the transfer need not form part of the transferor's finished product and may include such materials for own productions of inputs and utilities.
"(d) The amount of tax credit should be limited to an inventory level of three (3) months for major materials or six (6) months for minor materials based on the transferor's average monthly consumption of the materials being supplied by the transferee as obtained from the transferor's audited financial statements for the last two (2) years. For this purpose, a material is considered major if its cost reaches at least 10% of the transferor's total raw material cost; otherwise it is considered minor. . . .
40. G.R. Nos. 163801-17, rollo, p. 274.
41. Id. at 189.
42. G.R. No. 163840-57, rollo, p. 109.
43. Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
44. G.R. Nos. 163801-17, rollo, p. 243.
45. Id. at 252.
46. G.R. No. 163840-57, rollo, p. 103.
47. G.R. Nos. 163801-17, rollo, p. 248.
48. G.R. No. 163840-57, rollo, p. 95.
49. G.R. Nos. 163801-17, rollo, pp. 104-105.
50. See Insular Life v. Serrano, 552 Phil. 469 (2007).
51. Heirs of Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 753, 763 (1998).
52. Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107967, March 1, 1994, 230 SCRA 550, 558.
53. Marquez v. Sandiganbayan, 656 Phil. 177 (2011).
54. Id. at 187.
55. 655 Phil. 563 (2011), citing Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan, 484 Phil. 350 (2004).
56. Id. at 571-572.
57. Guy v. People, 601 Phil. 105, 226 (2009).
58. Enrile v. Manalastas, G.R. No. 166414, October 22, 2014.