SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 220432. January 18, 2017.]
JAYSON ALMODIEL Y EDUARTE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated18 January 2017 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 220432: JAYSON ALMODIEL Y EDUARTE v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
This reviews a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision 2 dated April 29, 2015, and the Resolution 3 dated August 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34668. The Decision affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision dated November 28, 2011, and the Resolution denied petitioner Jayson Almodiel y Eduarte's (Almodiel) Motion for Reconsideration. The Regional Trial Court found Almodiel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping under Rep. Act No. 6539. 4
At around 5 a.m. on August 29, 2010, Mark Benneth Sy (Sy) was looking for his motorcycle, a Honda XRM with Plate No. 1551-PM. 5 Sy allegedly parked his motorcycle in front of his house at Northville 1, Bignay, Valenzuela City. 6 As he was looking around for the motorcycle, Ryan Asadon (Asadon), his neighbor, mentioned that at around 2 a.m., he saw Almodiel pushing the motorcycle near Sy's street. 7 Asadon then accompanied Sy to the police station where they reported the incident and issued an alarm on the missing motorcycle. 8
Almodiel was apprehended and subsequently charged with violating Rep. Act No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act. 9 The accusatory portion of the Information 10 filed before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City reads:
That on or about August 29, 2010 in Valenzuela City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away with them one (1) Honda XRM Motorcycle with Plate No. 1551-PM without the consent of its owner MARK BENNETH SY y EBBAH, to the damage and prejudice of the said complainant.
Contrary to Law. 11
During trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses: Sy, Asadon, and PO3 Ronaldo Ruiz. 12
Sy testified that he discovered his motorcycle was missing at around 5 a.m. on August 29, 2010. 13 He was then told by Asadon that the latter saw Almodiel pushing the motorcycle at around 2 a.m. of the same day. 14 To prove that he was the owner of the motorcycle, Sy presented his Certificate of Encumbrance, Certificate of Registration, LTO Official Receipt, Sales Invoice, Certificate of Stock Reported, and a Motor Vehicle Inspection Report. 15
Asadon testified that at around 2 a.m., he saw Almodiel pushing the motorcycle near Sy's house. 16 When asked, Almodiel informed Asadon that he was borrowing the motorcycle from Sy. 17 Asadon did not find this unusual because on previous occasions, Sy had lent his motorcycle to Almodiel. 18 Asadon was able to identify Almodiel as he had known him for three (3) years, 19 and Asadon positively identified the motorcycle as belonging to Sy because he sometimes rode to work with him. 20 When he found Sy looking for his motorcycle, he told Sy about what transpired between him and Almodiel; afterwards, he accompanied Sy to the police station to report the incident. 21
Another witness, PO3 Ronaldo Ruiz, corroborated the testimonies of Sy and Asadon. 22 He identified Sy's Malaya at Kusang Loob na Salaysay and the Flash Alarm on the missing motorcycle, both of which he prepared. 23
On the other hand, counsel for Almodiel presented him as the sole witness. 24 For his testimony, Almodiel denied stealing the motorcycle. 25 He explained that he merely borrowed it and even returned it to Sy's wife at around 4 a.m. to 5 a.m. of the same day. 26 He explained that he and Sy knew each other as they had worked in the same company. 27 He also expressed his shock that Sy had filed a carnapping case against him, when he merely borrowed the motorcycle and even returned it on the same day. 28 ATICcS
In its Decision 29 dated November 28, 2011, the Regional Trial Court found Almodiel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping under Rep. Act No. 6539. The trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate prison sentence of 14 years and eight (8) months, as minimum, to 16 years, as maximum, less the period he spent under preventive imprisonment under Article 29 30 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. 31
The Regional Trial Court held that the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses showed that (1) there was taking of the motorcycle owned by Sy; and (2) the taking was done by Almodiel without the owner's consent. 32 Furthermore, the intent to gain is presumed from the illegal taking of the motorcycle. 33 Almodiel's defense of denial, without corroborating evidence, failed to convince the trial court that he was innocent. 34
On December 1, 2011, Almodiel moved for new trial based on the Affidavit of Desistance 35 that Sy executed on November 28, 2011. 36 The Affidavit reads:
I, MARK BENNETT SY, of legal age, Filipino, and presently residing at Blk. 28, Lot 32, Northville I, Bignay Valenzuela City under oath state:
1. That I am the same MARK BENNETT SY who is the private complainant in the case no. 1096-V-10 for violation of R.A. 6539 now pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 269, wherein the accused is one JAYSON ALMODIEL y EDUARTE;
2. That after a careful and thorough evaluation of the facts and circumstances that led to the filing of the aforementioned case against the said accused, I came to realize that said case merely arose from a misunderstanding between us and misapprehension of facts;
3. That I am no longer interested in the further prosecution of my case against the accused JAYSON ALMODIEL y EDUARTE, and hereby declare my desire to have the same dismissed;
4. That I was never forced, coerced, intimidated nor promised any monetary consideration in executing this Affidavit of Desistance, and I am fully aware that once this case is dismissed, I can no longer revive the same;
5. That I have executed this Affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing facts and to support my request for the dismissal of the instant case.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this 28th day of November 2011 at Valenzuela City. 37 (Emphasis supplied)
The Motion was denied by the Regional Trial Court on December 6, 2011. 38
Almodiel appealed before the Court of Appeals, but his appeal was denied on April 29, 2015. 39 The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision and held that the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses were detailed and "made in an unequivocal and forthright manner." 40 It held that Almodiel's defense of denial could not be given merit because he was unable to support his defense with clear and convincing evidence. 41
Almodiel's Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals on August 27, 2015. 42
Hence, this Petition was filed.
The sole issue for resolution is whether the prosecution was able to prove that petitioner Jayson Almodiel y Eduarte is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping as defined under Rep. Act No. 6539.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
Rep. Act No. 6539 defines carnapping as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." 43
To prove that carnapping was committed, the prosecution must show that the accused has taken a motor vehicle that he does not own without the consent of the owner, or "by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things," 44 and he took the motor vehicle with intent to gain. 45
The prosecution was able to show, through the evidence presented and the witnesses' testimonies, that all the elements of carnapping were present. Sy was able to show that he owned the motorcycle. 46 The same motorcycle was positively identified by Asadon, one of the witnesses, as owned by Sy. 47
Sy owned the lost motorcycle, and petitioner, who was not the motorcycle's owner, was positively identified by Asadon to have been pushing Sy's motorcycle. 48 Petitioner himself admitted that he took Sy's motorcycle, but averred that he merely borrowed it and even returned it to Sy's wife at around 4 a.m. to 5 a.m. 49 Aside from his testimony, he did not give any other evidence to show that Sy consented to lending him the lost motorcycle at 2 a.m. 50 Sy himself repudiated petitioner's claim that he allowed petitioner to borrow the motorcycle. 51
In People v. Tamolon, et al.: 52
As to the appellants' defense which is based mainly on denial and alibi, nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of the witness. In People of the Phils. v. Carlito Mateo y Patawid, we had occasion to state: TIADCc
Accused-appellants' bare-faced defense of denial cannot surmount the positive and affirmative testimony offered by the prosecution. . . . A defense of denial which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence becomes negative and self-serving, deserving no weight in law, and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over convincing, straightforward and probable testimony on affirmative matters. . . .
Indeed, denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. Alibi is an inherently weak defense, which is viewed with suspicion and received with caution, because it can easily be fabricated. For alibi to prosper, appellant must prove not only that he was at some other place when the crime was committed but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of its commission.
In the case at bench, no convincing evidence was presented by the defense to reinforce the appellants' denial and alibi. 53 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Here, petitioner admitted to taking the motorcycle, but alleged that he merely borrowed it and even returned it to Sy's wife on the same day. 54 He also explained that he was accompanied by someone when he returned the motorcycle. 55 Aside from his testimony, he failed to present other evidence to corroborate his statements, including the person who allegedly accompanied him in returning the motorcycle as a witness. 56
Petitioner's mere taking of the motorcycle without its owner's consent is a presumption of his intent to gain. 57 It does not matter if there was actual gain or not; what is important is the intent. 58 The gain is not limited to pecuniary benefits, but includes simply using the motorcycle without the consent of the owner. The mere use of the thing taken without the permission of the owner constitutes gain. 59 Even the subsequent return of the motorcycle does not remove the taker from criminal liability, as the use and enjoyment of the vehicle taken without the permission of the owner is enough to show that carnapping took place. 60 cSEDTC
Although it is true that petitioner's conviction relied only on the testimonies of the witnesses and there was no direct evidence presented by the prosecution, petitioner may still be convicted based on circumstantial evidence. Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstances;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (Emphasis in the original)
In People v. Dela Cruz, et al.: 61
Conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained, provided the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which lead to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. 62
In this case, the prosecution was able to show that at around 2 a.m., petitioner was seen by Asadon to have been pushing Sy's motorcycle. 63 When asked if he borrowed the motorcycle, petitioner replied in the affirmative. 64 However, at around 5 a.m., Sy discovered that his motorcycle was missing in front of his house. 65 While Sy was looking around for his motorcycle, Asadon told him that he saw petitioner pushing the motorcycle near Sy's house. 66 After being told of this information, Sy, accompanied by Asadon, went to the police station to report the loss. 67
Sy's act of immediately reporting the loss to the police belies petitioner's allegation that he merely borrowed the motorcycle. 68 The circumstances that make up the prosecution's case show that petitioner took Sy's motorcycle without consent. These circumstances, taken together, show the presence of the elements of carnapping, as defined under Rep. Act No. 6539.
The Affidavit of Desistance executed by Sy after petitioner's conviction is not enough to acquit petitioner, especially since the circumstances of the case show his guilt. In Santos v. People: 69
It is settled that an affidavit of desistance made by a witness after conviction of the accused is not reliable, and deserves only scant attention. The affidavits of desistance filed by the private complainant and her witness were executed twelve (12) days after the promulgation of judgment of conviction, and are clearly mere afterthoughts. Hence, then cannot have the effect of negating a previous credible declaration. 70 (Emphasis supplied)
In Santos, Virgilio Santos (Virgilio) was accused of attempted rape of an 18-year-old girl. 71 The Regional Trial Court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape. 72 Twelve (12) days after the promulgation of the Regional Trial Court Decision, Virgilio moved for new trial or reconsideration. 73 Four (4) days after filing his Motion, Virgilio filed a Supplemental Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration with attached affidavits of desistance of the 18-year-old girl and her witness. 74 This Court held that the affidavits of desistance were filed 12 days after the promulgation of the Decision, and were "clearly mere afterthoughts." 75 As the affidavits of desistance were "mere afterthoughts," they could not negate "a previous credible declaration." 76
In this case, the Affidavit of Desistance was executed by Sy after all the evidence was presented, specifically, on the day of promulgation of the Regional Trial Court Decision. 77 In the Affidavit, Sy explained that he was desisting from the case as it only arose from a misunderstanding between him and petitioner, as well as from a misapprehension of facts. 78
However, Sy did not elaborate on what the misunderstanding was, or how there was a misapprehension of facts. His mere statement, without any other explanation, does not show that his previous testimony was a nullity. Furthermore, from the filing of the Information before the Regional Trial Court on December 15, 2010 79 to the decision of conviction on November 28, 2011 80 — a time frame of almost one (1) year — Sy did not show any doubt as to the veracity of his accusations. He was consistent in his testimony that petitioner took his motorcycle without his consent. His testimony, taken together with the other evidence presented, showed petitioner's guilt. SDAaTC
Affidavits of desistance are frowned upon by courts for being a "mockery of our judicial system." 81 To allow a testimony to be set aside based only on an affidavit of desistance is to allow endless criminal litigation. 82 As explained in People v. Manigbas: 83
It is indeed a dangerous rule to set aside a testimony which has been solemnly taken before a court of justice in an open and free trial and under conditions calculated to discourage and forestall falsehood simply because the witnesses who had given them later on changed their minds. Such a rule constitutes a mockery of solemn trials and places the investigation of truth at the mercy of the unscrupulous. Unless there be special circumstances, which, coupled with the retraction of the witness, really raise a doubt as to the truth of the testimony given by him at the trial and accepted by the trial judge, and only if such testimony is essential to the judgment of conviction, so much so that its elimination would lead the trial judge to a different conclusion, a new trial based on such retraction would not be justified. Otherwise, there would never be an end to a criminal litigation. 84
Petitioner moved for new trial solely based on Sy's Affidavit of Desistance. 85 Other than this, no other evidence was attached to petitioner's Motion to show special circumstances that would warrant the reversal of the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. Sy's Affidavit of Desistance is likewise not believable given that it took Sy almost one (1) year to discover the supposed misapprehension of facts. There was no explanation as to what facts were misinterpreted by Sy. Simply stating that there was a misunderstanding between the accused and the complainant and that there was a misapprehension of facts does not negate the evidence presented in court and carefully evaluated by the judge as sufficient to convict petitioner of carnapping. AaCTcI
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated April 29, 2015 and the Resolution dated August 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34668 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.(Velasco, Jr., J., designated as Fifth Member per S.O. No. 2416-A dated January 4, 2017.)"
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 11-27. The Petition was filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2.Id. at 63-70. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Edwin D. Sorongon of the First Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3.Id. at 81. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Edwin D. Sorongon of the Former First Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4.Id. at 40-46. Rep. Act No. 6539 is otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, and was amended by Rep. Act No. 7659.
5.Id. at 13.
6.Id.
7.Id.
8.Id.
9.Id. at 14.
10.Id. at 28.
11.Id.
12.Id. at 40-42.
13.Id.
14.Id. at 41.
15.Id.
16.Id. at 65.
17.Id. at 41.
18.Id.
19.Id. at 44.
20.Id. at 67.
21.Id. at 13.
22.Id.
23.Id. at 65.
24.Id. at 42.
25.Id. at 13.
26.Id.
27.Id.
28.Id.
29.Id. at 40-46. The Decision was penned by Presiding Judge Emma C. Matammu of Branch 269, Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City.
30. REV. PEN. CODE, art 29, as amended Rep. Act No. 10592, states that:
Article 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. — Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
xxx xxx xxx
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the actual period of detention with good conduct time allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is absent without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio order the rearrest of the accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.
31.Rollo, p. 46.
32.Id. at 43-44.
33.Id.
34.Id. at 45.
35.Id. at 84.
36.Id. at 82-83.
37.Id. at 84.
38.Id. at 86. The Regional Trial Court Order was penned by Presiding Judge Emma C. Matammu of Branch 269, Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City.
39.Id. at 63-70.
40.Id. at 67.
41.Id. at 69.
42.Id. at 81.
43. Rep. Act No. 6539 (1972), sec. 2.
44. Rep. Act No. 6539 (1972), sec. 2.
45.People v. Calabroso, 394 Phil. 658, 676 (2000) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
46.Rollo, p. 41.
47.Id.
48.Id. at 98, Comment.
49.Id.
50.Id.
51.Id.
52. 599 Phil. 542 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
53.Id. at 552.
54.Rollo, p. 42.
55.Id.
56.Id.
57.People v. Gulinao, 259 Phil. 400, 407 (1989) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].
58.People v. Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA 284, 296 [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Third Division], citing Venturina v. Sandiganbayan, 271 Phil. 33 (1991) [Per C.J. Fernan, En Banc] and People v. Seranilla, 244 Phil. 195 (1988) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division].
59.Id.
60.Id.
61. 599 Phil. 369 (2009) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Second Division].
62.Id. at 378.
63.Rollo, p. 41.
64.Id.
65.Id.
66.Id.
67.Id.
68.Id. at 42.
69. 443 Phil. 618 (2003) [Per J. Puno, Third Division].
70.Id. at 625-626.
71.Id. at 621.
72.Id. at 620.
73.Id. at 623.
74.Id.
75.Id. at 626.
76.Id.
77.Rollo, pp. 46 and 84.
78.Id. at 82.
79.Id. at 40.
80.Id. at 46.
81.People v. Pimentel, 204 Phil. 327, 338 (1982) [Per J. Escolin, Second Division].
82.People v. Manigbas, 109 Phil. 469, 478 (1960) [Per J. Gutierrez David, Jr., En Banc].
83. 109 Phil. 469 (1960) [Per J. Gutierrez David, En Banc].
84.Id. at 477-478.
85.Id. at 86.