SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-16-2445. January 25, 2016.][Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 14-4323-RTJ]
ATTY. LORENZO S. ALMINAZA, petitioner, vs. JUDGE PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 25 January 2016 which reads as follows:
"A.M. No. RTJ-16-2445[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 14-4323-RTJ: ATTY. LORENZO S. ALMINAZA v. JUDGE PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR
It is the judge, not his or her subordinates, who is responsible for the administration of his or her docket.
Complainant Atty. Lorenzo S. Alminaza is the counsel for petitioners in Civil Case No. 13-1969, entitled Sofronio B. Marcial v. Lanie Garcia-Marcial, and in Civil Case No. 13-1975, entitled Reggie C. Tan v. Shellane Velmonte-Tan. Both cases were raffled to Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City where respondent Judge Philadelfa B. Pagapong-Agraviador was the Presiding Judge. 1
The respondents in both civil cases failed to file their answers within the period required under the law. In view of this failure, complainant filed for his clients on May 29, 2014 separate Motions to Set the Case for Pre-Trial. Until September 25, 2014, respondent judge failed to act on the Motions. She also failed to schedule the cases for pre-trial or pre-trial conference. 2
In his administrative Complaint 3 dated September 25, 2014, complainant claimed that respondent judge failed to act on his Motions. 4
Complainant argued that respondent judge's failure to act on his Motions and to set the cases for pre-trial were violations of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, 5 Section 16 of the Bill of Rights, and the Speedy Trial Act. 6 Her commission of these violations constituted Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure that must be "rectified in order to restore the confidence of the public, litigants, and Officers of the Court, to the Bench and to the Judiciary." 7
Complainant prayed for respondent judge to be held liable for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Procedure. 8
In her Comment, 9 respondent judge argued that "she did not maliciously violate [complainant's] clients' rights to speedy disposition of cases." 10 The Complaint against her was a malicious attempt to undermine her integrity and independence as a judge. 11
Respondent judge pointed out that complainant had previously sought her inhibition in other cases, Civil Cases No. 12-1746 and 13-2001, pending before her sala. 12 Since she did not inhibit herself from trying these cases, complainant filed motions to withdraw the cases, which she granted. 13 Complainant had "an axe to grind against [her.]" 14 Respondent judge also pointed out that complainant had already filed an administrative case against her. 15 He was, according to respondent judge, "maliciously attempting to undermine her independence and integrity at the expense of his clients." 16 Complainant was "Judge[-]Shopping[.]" 17
Respondent judge further argued that she ordered her Civil Docket Clerk to send notices for a pre-trial conference. 18 When she learned that the case was not set for pre-trial, she immediately issued a Memorandum 19 requiring her clerk to explain in writing why her handwritten order to send notices of pre-trial was not complied with. 20 Her clerk admitted in her response letter 21 that she had been reckless in her job of setting cases for pre-trial and sending notices of pre-trial. 22
According to respondent judge, when she learned about her clerk's error, she ordered the cases to be set for pre-trial conference on January 7, 2015. 23
On January 5, 2015, according to respondent judge, complainant filed a motion to defer the scheduled pre-trial pending the resolution of the motion for inhibition of the respondent. She denied the motion. 24
Complainant did not appear on the day of the pre-trial conference. He also failed to submit pre-trial briefs and judicial affidavits. 25 CAIHTE
Respondent judge averred that complainant's failure to appear during the scheduled pre-trial conference showed that he was not really ready and willing to have a pre-trial conference. 26 Hence, she should not be charged for gross ignorance of the law. At most, she could be faulted for simple negligence in her supervision of her clerk. 27
Respondent judge prayed for the dismissal of the case against her. 28
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the case "be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter[.]" 29 It also recommended that respondent judge be found guilty of gross inefficiency and fined P10,000.00, with a warning that "repetition of the same or any similar offense [would] warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty." 30 Thus:
It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court that:
1. the complaint dated 25 September 2014 filed against respondent Judge Philadelfa B. Pagapong-Agraviador, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter; and
2. respondent Judge Agraviador be found GUILTY of Gross Inefficiency and be FINED in the amount of P10,000.00, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or any similar offense will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty. 31
According to the Office of the Court Administrator, since it is the judge's responsibility to organize and coordinate with court personnel regarding the incidences of his or her docket, it is also the judge who assumes responsibility in case those court personnel make mistakes. 32
Respondent judge is administratively liable for her failure to immediately schedule the pre-trial of the cases involved. The duty to ensure the proper administration of justice, which includes ensuring the speedy disposition of cases through the efficient and effective organization of her docket, rests upon the assigned judge.
Canon 6, Section 5 of A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, otherwise known as the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, provides:
SEC. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
Section 7 of the same Canon provides:
SEC. 7. Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of judicial duties.
Prompt action on motions is essential to the speedy disposition of cases. Speedy disposition of cases is an essential aspect of justice. As dispensers of justice, judges should keep in mind that "undue delay in the administration of justice erodes the people's faith in the judicial system. Delay not only reinforces the belief of the people that the wheels of justice in this country grind slowly; it also invites suspicion, however unfair, of ulterior motives on the part of the judge." 33
Respondent judge's failure to promptly rule on complainant's motions may or may not have caused delay in the administration of justice, given complainant's failure to appear during the set pre-trial conference. However, such delay further opened not only her but also the judiciary to suspicion of unfairness in rendering decisions.
Respondent judge cannot blame her clerk for her failure to promptly schedule the pre-trial of complainant's cases. The duty to administer her sala rests upon her. In V.C. Ponce Co., Inc. v. Eduarte: 34
Neither can respondent judge seek refuge behind the acts or omissions of his staff members because —
A judge . . . is expected to keep his own record of cases so that he may act on them promptly without undue delay. It is incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing system in his court so that no disorderliness can affect the flow of cases and their speedy disposition. . . . Proper and efficient court management is as much his responsibility. He is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his functions.
The Court was even more terse in Pantaleon v. Judge Teofilo L. Guadiz, Jr. where it said:
Respondent cannot hide behind the incompetence of his subordinates. He should be the master of his own domain and take responsibility for the mistakes of his subjects. 35 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Respondent judge's immediate action to correct her error reveals her lack of malicious intent to violate the Code of Judicial Conduct. 36 Her inadvertence, however, cannot be left unpunished.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Philadelfa B. Pagapong-Agraviador guilty of inefficiency in the administration of her docket. Respondent Judge Agraviador is REPRIMANDED and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or any similar offense will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty. DETACa
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, p. 1, Complaint.
2. Id. at 2.
3. Id. at 1-4.
4. Id. at 2.
5. Re: Proposed Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures.
6. Rollo, p. 2, Complaint.
7. Id., citing Magpali v. Judge Pardo, 591 Phil. 628 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division] and CONST., art. III, sec. 16.
8. Id. at 3.
9. Id. at 9-20.
10. Id. at 10.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 11.
13. Id. at 12.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 14-15.
19. Id. at 38.
20. Id. at 15-16, Comment.
21. Id. at 39.
22. Id. at 16, Comment.
23. Id. at 15.
24. Id. at 16.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 18.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 45, OCA Report.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 44-45.
33. Chu, et al. v. Judge Capellan, 691 Phil. 1, 14 (2012) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
34. 397 Phil. 498 (2000) [Per Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
35. Id. at 517.
36. See also New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (Annotated), USAID 43 (February 2007). Footnote no. 314 provides: "1989 Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 1, Rule 1.02. Sierra Nevada Stagelines, Inc. v. Rossi, 892 P.2d 592 (Nev. 1995) points out the importance of disposing of judicial matters promptly and efficiently, but acknowledges that promptness should not be achieved at the expense of fairness. Usually, American courts will sanction judges for a lack of timeliness only if the conduct involves a pattern of delay. See e.g., In re Gerard, 631 N.W.2d 271 (Iowa 2001); In the Matter of Alvino, 494 A.2d 1014 (N.J. 1985) (holding that inadvertent delay does not warrant judicial discipline but rather administrative correction.)."