Allied Banking Corp. v. Office of the Ombudsman

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 174755. March 29, 2022.]

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, NOW PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN THROUGH ASSISTANT OMBUDSMAN EDWARD HARUN V. PAGUNSAN OF THE FACT-FINDING INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH OFFICE, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedMarch 29, 2022which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 174755(Allied Banking Corporation, now Philippine National Bank v. Office of the Ombudsman through Assistant Ombudsman Edward Harun V. Pagunsan of the Fact-Finding Intelligence and Research Office). — Challenged in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure are the: (i) June 16, 2006 Decision 2 and (ii) September 20, 2006 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 63731 which dismissed petitioner Allied Banking Corporation's (petitioner), now Philippine National Bank (PNB) petition for certiorari for lack of jurisdiction.

The Antecedents

On February 9, 2001, petitioner received from the Office of the Ombudsman Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (OMB-FFIB) a Subpoena Duces Tecum, 4 requiring it to submit clear and certified true copies of the "bank records and all documents relative thereto, pertaining to all bank accounts (Savings, Current, Time Deposit, Trust, Foreign Currency Deposits, etc.) under the account names of Jose Velarde, Joseph E. Estrada, Laarni Enriquez, Guia Gomez, Joy Melendrez, Peachy Osorio, Rowena Lopez, Kevin or Kelvin Garcia, 727, 737, 747, 757, 777 and 858." 5 The investigation was prompted by several complaints filed against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) after he stepped down from his post. 6

On February 15, 2001, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion for Clarification 7 (First Motion) asking respondent Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to cite with sufficient particularity the specific bank record and/or document directed to be produced. Petitioner likewise assailed the OMB's failure to show the relevancy of the bank records and documents of the named individuals therein to the subject matter of the inquiry considering that these are names shared by several Filipinos. 8

On that same date, February 15, 2001, petitioner filed another Manifestation and Motion for Clarification 9 (Second Motion) wherein it questioned the authority of the OMB to compel it to produce information on foreign currency deposits considering that based on pertinent laws, foreign currency deposits are absolutely confidential in nature. CAIHTE

The OMB Ruling

In an Order 10 dated February 26, 2001 (First Order), the OMB resolved petitioner's First Motion and asserted its right to compel anyone for it to obtain documents that may show the assets, liabilities, net worth, business interest, and financial connection of persons under investigation per Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees." The OMB likewise enumerated and described the documents and records included in the subpoena duces tecum. The OMB then emphasized that the personalities whose bank accounts were the subject of inquiry were those who were with personal close association with Estrada, hence, relevant with the object of the investigation. 11 Respondent, thus disposed of the First Motion in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Allied Banking Corporation is hereby directed to immediately submit to this Office the documents and records subject of this Office's Subpoena duces tecum dated 8 February 2001 as they are now particularly described and specified in the instant ORDER.

SO ORDERED. 12

In another Order 13 dated February 19, 2001 (Second Order), the OMB resolved petitioner's Second Motion and ruled that the absolute confidentiality of foreign currency deposit accounts was intended only for "depositors who are nonresidents and are not engaged in trade or business in the Philippines." 14 The OMB also emphasized that under R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), the OMB is granted the power to examine bank accounts and records, in whatever currency it may be in. 15 The fallo of the Second Order reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Allied Banking Corporation is hereby directed to immediately submit to this Office the documents and records cited in the latter's subpoena duces tecum dated 8 February 2001, including but not limited to, the certified true copies of the following: applications to open account; specimen signature cards; debit and credit memos; daily transaction reports; ledgers; deposit slips; withdrawal slips; checks drawn against the accounts of former President Estrada, et al.; checks deposited to the said accounts; list of transactions involving payments made to stock brokers acting for and in behalf of the account holders; remittances made by stock brokers to the accounts stated in the subpoena; checks, investment denominated accounts, marketable securities, bonds, etc., relative to transactions involving the said stock brokers; and all other documents showing the transfer of funds to and from the said accounts.

It is so ordered. 16

Aggrieved, petitioner filed its Joint Motion for Reconsideration 17 assailing the First and Second Orders. 18 In an Order 19 dated March 9, 2001, however, the OMB dismissed the Joint Motion for Reconsideration and ordered petitioner to comply within 48 hours with the subpoena duces tecum, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered. The Allied Banking Corporation is hereby directed to submit to this Office, within forty eight (48) hours after receipt of this Order, the documents and records cited in the subpoena duces tecum dated 8 February 2001 and two Orders dated 21 February 2001, including but not limited to, the certified true copies of the following: applications to open account; specimen signature cards; debit and credit memos; daily transaction reports; ledgers; deposit slips, withdrawal slips; check drawn against the accounts of former President Estrada, et al.; checks deposited to the said accounts; list of transactions involving payments made to stock brokers acting for and in behalf of the account holders; remittances made by stock brokers to the accounts stated in the subpoena; checks, investment denominated accounts, marketable securities, bonds, etc., relative to transactions involving stock brokers; and all other documents showing the transfer of funds to and from the said accounts. The bank's failure to comply with this Order shall cause the immediate filing of criminal charges for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 and the initiation of other appropriate actions against its concerned officials.

It is so ordered. 20

Undaunted, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 21 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court with the CA. Petitioner insisted that the OMB cannot be compelled to produce the bank documents without running afoul with existing laws on the matter.

The CA Ruling

On June 16, 2006, the CA issued the assailed Decision 22 denying due course to the petition for lack of jurisdiction. It ratiocinated that the CA's jurisdiction over the orders or decisions of the OMB extends only to those rendered in administrative cases. Otherwise stated, it is limited to appeals from the decisions of the OMB in administrative disciplinary cases, filed pursuant to Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. 23

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. However, in a Resolution 24 promulgated on September 20, 2006, the CA denied the motion and affirmed the denial of the petition.

Hence, the instant petition for review interposing the following errors:

Issues

I.

THE HONORABLE [CA] ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI SEEKING TO QUESTION ORDERS OF THE [OMB] ISSUED IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF ITS INVESTIGATORY POWERS; [AND]

II.

THE HONORABLE [CA] ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 SEEKING TO QUESTION RESOLUTIONS OR ORDERS OF THE [OMB] CLARIFYING A SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM SHOULD BE TAKEN TO THE SUPREME COURT. 25

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit. DETACa

At the outset, We take judicial notice that Estrada had been found guilty of Plunder and was incarcerated due to such conviction. He, however, received executive clemency and his rights, civil and political, had been restored. Notwithstanding, per records of this case, it was certified by the OMB that "it appears that relative to G.R. No. 174755 entitled 'Allied Banking Corporation vs. Office of the Ombudsman,' CPL No. 01-0247 docketed as OMB-C-C-02-0614-I is still active in the CCMS database." 26 It would seem that the investigation against Estrada, et al., is still active. Hence, the need to resolve the instant case.

In the petition, petitioner insists that the [CA] has jurisdiction over its petition for certiorari assailing acts or omissions made as an incident of the investigatory powers of the OMB. It averred that the phrase "No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the [OMB], except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law," as provided for in Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, refers only to the decisions and findings of the OMB as a result of its action to complaints against officers and employees of the Government, as well as to enforce their civil, criminal and administrative liability, and not to the Ombudsman's actions relative to its fact-finding function and investigation. Thus, the CA committed a reversible error when it dismissed its Petition for Certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 27

Petitioner likewise contends that OMB no longer has the power and authority to compel the inspection of bank accounts in any investigation it is conducting considering that there is no pending litigation in any competent court, 28 as enunciated in the case of Marquez v. Desierto29(Marquez case).

The OMB, on the other hand, contends that only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing orders and decisions of the OMB in any case, except in administrative cases, where an aggrieved party may file a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court to the CA. 30

The OMB likewise avers that the ruling in the Marquez case is inapplicable to the case considering that the subpoena duces tecum addressed to petitioner was issued four (4) months before the promulgation of the Marquez case. As such, the ruling thereof cannot apply retroactively to the instant case: 31

The Court rules in favor of the OMB.

The CA has no jurisdiction over

Established is the rule that the CA has jurisdiction over orders, directives, and decisions of the OMB in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the orders, directives or decisions of the OMB in criminal or non-administrative cases. 32

In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Esmeña, 33 We, citing several authorities, emphasized that:

Pursuant to Fabian v. Desierto, appeals from the decisions of the OMB in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA via petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

However, in Duyon v. Court of Appeals and Golangco vs. Fung, the Court stressed that the CA's jurisdiction over appeals from orders, directives and decisions of the OMB extends to administrative disciplinary cases only. The CA cannot review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the OMB in criminal or non-administrative cases. 34 (Citations omitted)

Furthermore, while there were instances where the CA acquires jurisdiction even over petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, this is only possible when the subject matter of the petition is an order/resolution, considered as an interlocutory order arising from an administrative case. 35

In the most recent case of Gaudan v. Degamo, 36 We further clarified that the CA may entertain an appeal of the OMB's ruling in criminal cases if it is consolidated with an administrative case. The CA however, should set aside the challenge to the criminal aspect thereof for lack of jurisdiction and focused its review of the assailed the OMB issuances solely on administrative liabilities instead.

From the foregoing, it is beyond cavil that the CA has jurisdiction only over orders, directives, and decisions of the OMB in administrative disciplinary cases only. Otherwise stated, the CA cannot review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the OMB in criminal or non-administrative cases. aDSIHc

In the instant case, what petitioner assails are orders of the OMB clarifying its subpoena duces tecum and directing compliance by petitioner of the subpoena duces tecum in relation to a pending criminal case against Estrada, et al. These orders are in no way connected to any administrative complaint and/or liability thrown at Estrada, et al.

The observation of the CA on this matter is on point, thus: "Note that the assailed subpoena duces tecum and Orders are offshoots of the fact-finding investigation on the possible criminal liabilities of former President Estrada [et al.] Clear as the light of day, it is not a ruling rendered in an administrative case." 37

With administrative liability being out of the picture, the CA properly dismissed the petitioner's Petition for Certiorari for lack of jurisdiction.

Notwithstanding, petitioner insists that the CA, in a petition for certiorari, has jurisdiction over interlocutory order assailing acts or omissions made as an incident of the investigatory powers of the Ombudsman. Petitioner relies on Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, alleging that the second paragraph thereof refers only to the decisions and findings of the Ombudsman as a result of its action to complaints against officers and employees of the Government, as well as to enforce their civil, criminal and administrative liability, and not to the Ombudsman's actions relative to its fact-finding function and investigation. 38 We find such contention untenable.

First, petitioner's interpretation of the second paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770 is misplaced. More importantly, it bears stressing that the second paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770 had been found unconstitutional in the case of Ombudsman Carpio-Morales v. CA, 39 thus:

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against "decision or findings" of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45 appeal and thus — similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 — attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. x x x 40 (Citations omitted)

Petitioner's proper recourse was to file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the first and second Orders of the OMB before Us. In the case of Gatchalian v. Office of the Ombudsman, 41 We upheld the Court's jurisdiction when the assailed decision, resolution, or order was an incident of a criminal action. In that case, We exhaustively explained:

The first case on the matter was the 1998 case of Fabian vs. Desierto, where the Court held that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (R.A. 6770), which provides that all "orders, directives, or decisions [in administrative cases] of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court," was unconstitutional for it increased the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and concurrence. The Court thus held that "appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43."

Subsequently, in Kuizon v. Desierto, the Court stressed that the ruling in Fabian was limited only to administrative cases, and added that it is the Supreme Court which has jurisdiction when the assailed decision, resolution, or order was an incident of a criminal action. Thus:

In dismissing petitioners' petition for lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals cited the case of Fabian vs. Desierto. The appellate court correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It bears stressing that when we declared Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 as unconstitutional, we categorically stated that said provision is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action. In fine, we hold that the present petition should have been filed with this Court. x x x

In Golangco vs. Fung, the Court voided a decision of the CA which directed the Ombudsman to withdraw an Information already filed by it with a Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Court in Golangco reasoned that "[t]he Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases."

With regard to orders, directives, or decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative cases, the Court, in Tirol, Jr. v. Del Rosario, held that the remedy for the same is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Court explained:

True, the law is silent on the remedy of an aggrieved party in case the Ombudsman found sufficient cause to indict him in criminal or non-administrative cases. We cannot supply such deficiency if none has been provided in the law. We have held that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law. Hence, there must be a law expressly granting such privilege. The Ombudsman Act specifically deals with the remedy of an aggrieved party from orders, directives and decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. As we ruled in Fabian, the aggrieved party is given the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Such right of appeal is not granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like finding probable cause to indict accused persons. ETHIDa

However, an aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of the Ombudsman as to the existence of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court in Tirol, Jr., however, was unable to specify the court —whether it be the RTC, the CA, or the Supreme Court — to which the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should be filed given the concurrent jurisdictions of the aforementioned courts over petitions for certiorari.

Five years after, the Court clarified in Estrada v. Desierto that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioning the finding of the existence of probable cause — or the lack thereof — by the Ombudsman should be filed with the Supreme Court. The Court elucidated:

But in which court should this special civil action be filed?

Petitioner contends that certiorari under Rule 65 should first be filed with the Court of Appeals as the doctrine of hierarchy of courts precludes the immediate invocation of this Court's jurisdiction. Unfortunately, for petitioner, he is flogging a dead horse as this argument has already been shot down in Kuizon v. Ombudsman where we decreed —

In dismissing petitioners' petition for lack of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals cited the case of Fabian vs. Desierto. The appellate court correctly ruled that its jurisdiction extends only to decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In the Fabian case, we ruled that appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It bears stressing that when we declared Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 as unconstitutional, we categorically stated that said provision is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an administrative disciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from an incident in a criminal action. In fine, we hold that the present petition should have been filed with this Court.

Kuizon and the subsequent case of Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) drove home the point that the remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, when tainted with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an original action for certiorari with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals. In cases when the aggrieved party is questioning the Office of the Ombudsman's finding of lack of probable cause, as in this case, there is likewise the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 to be filed with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals following our ruling in Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman. (Emphasis supplied)

In the 2009 case of Ombudsman v. Heirs of Margarita Vda. De Ventura, the Court reiterated Kuizon, Golangco, and Estrada, and ruled that the CA did not have jurisdiction over orders and decisions of the Ombudsman in non-administrative cases, and that the remedy of aggrieved parties was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with this Court. The foregoing principles were repeatedly upheld in other cases, such as in Soriano v. Cabais and Duyon v. Court of Appeals. 42 (Citations omitted)

Now that it has been settled that it is only the Supreme Court, which may review orders, directives, and decisions of the OMB in criminal or non-administrative matters, petitioner clearly committed a procedural blunder when it assailed the two Orders of the OMB before the CA. To reiterate, only the Supreme Court may review the OMB's Orders, being offshoots of the fact-finding investigation on the possible criminal liabilities of Estrada, et al.

The OMB has the authority to

Section 15 of R.A. No. 6770 enumerates the powers and functions of the OMB. Paragraphs 1, 8, and 11 thereof, state:

Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;

xxx xxx xxx

(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records;

xxx xxx xxx

(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein.

The Ombudsman shall give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government officials and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints involving grave offenses as well as complaints involving large sums of money and/or properties. cSEDTC

Pursuant to paragraph 8, the OMB is vested with the power to issue compulsory processes, such as subpoena and subpoena duces tecum. It also has the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records.

Notwithstanding, petitioner insists that such provision of the OMB Act has been modified by the Marquez case. 43 We disagree.

In the Marquez case, We ruled that although the Ombudsman has the power to inquire, examine and have access to bank accounts, such power is conditioned on a pending litigation. We explained:

x x x [B]efore an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is existing is an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection. 44

While it may seem that petitioner is correct, considering that at the time the subpoenaduces tecum was issued in the instant case there was no pending litigation against Estrada, et al., records show that the subpoenaduces tecum addressed to petitioner was issued as early as February 8, 2001, 45 that is, four (4) months before the Marquez Case was promulgated on June 27, 2001. Since, judicial interpretations of statutes, such as that in Marquez Case, cannot be applied retroactively, it will not apply to the instant case. We further elucidate.

This has already been settled in the case of Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan, 46 wherein the Court explained that the Marquez Case only has a prospective effect since it abandons a judicial interpretation of RA 6770, viz.:

The Marquez ruling notwithstanding, the above-described examination by the Ombudsman of petitioner's bank accounts, conducted before a case was filed with a court of competent jurisdiction, was lawful.

For the Ombudsman issued the subpoenas bearing on the bank accounts of petitioner about four months before Marquez was promulgated on June 27, 2001.

While judicial interpretations of statutes, such as that made in Marquez with respect to R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, are deemed part of the statute as of the date it was originally passed, the rule is not absolute.

Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals teaches:

It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

When this Court construed the Ombudsman Act of 1989, in light of the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law in Marquez, that "before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction," it was, in fact, reversing an earlier doctrine found in Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Purisima.

Banco Filipino involved subpoenas duces tecum issued by the Office of the Ombudsman, then known as the Tanodbayan, in the course of its preliminary investigation of a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. SDAaTC

While the main issue in Banco Filipino was whether R.A. 1405 precluded the Tanodbayan's issuance of subpoena duces tecum of bank records in the name of persons other than the one who was charged, this Court, citing P.D. 1630, Section 10, the relevant part of which states:

(d) He may issue a subpoena to compel any person to appear, give sworn testimony, or produce documentary or other evidence the Tanodbayan deems relevant to a matter under his inquiry,

held that "The power of the Tanodbayan to issue subpoenae ad testificandum and subpoenae duces tecum at the time in question is not disputed, and at any rate does not admit of doubt."

As the subpoenas subject of Banco Filipino were issued during a preliminary investigation, in effect this Court upheld the power of the Tanodbayan under P.D. 1630 to issue subpoenas duces tecum for bank documentsprior to the filing of a case before a court of competent jurisdiction.

Marquez, on the other hand, practically reversed this ruling in Banco Filipino despite the fact that the subpoena power of the Ombudsman under R.A. 6770 was essentially the same as that under P.D. 1630. Thus Section 15 of R.A. 6770 empowers the Office of the Ombudsman to (8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records;

A comparison of this provision with its counterpart in Sec. 10(d) of P.D. 1630 clearly shows that it is only more explicit in stating that the power of the Ombudsman includes the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records which power was recognized with respect to the Tanodbayan through Banco Filipino.

The Marquez ruling that there must be a pending case in order for the Ombudsman to validly inspect bank records in camera thus reversed a prevailing doctrine. Hence, it may not be retroactively applied.

The Ombudsman's inquiry into the subject bank accounts prior to the filing of any case before a court of competent jurisdiction was therefore valid at the time it was conducted.

Likewise, the Marquez ruling that "the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection" may not be applied retroactively to the inquiry of the Ombudsman subject of this case. This ruling is not a judicial interpretation either of R.A. 6770 or R.A. 1405, but a "judge-made" law which, as People v. Luvendino instructs, can only be given prospective application:

[x x x] The doctrine that an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal effect was initially a judge-made one and was first announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales v. Enrile and reiterated on 20 March 1985 in People v. Galit. [x x x]

While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the requirements and restrictions outlined in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of promulgation of Morales. (Emphasis supplied)

In fine, the subpoenas issued by the Ombudsman in this case were legal, hence, invocation of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is misplaced. 47 (Citations omitted)

Otherwise stated, where a judicial interpretation abandons a doctrinal interpretation of such law, the Court, recognizing that acts may have been performed under the impression of the validity of its interpretation, has consistently held that such operative fact cannot be undone by the mere subsequent declaration of the nullity of its interpretation; thus, the declaration can only have a prospective application. But where no doctrine is abandoned, a judicial interpretation of the law should be deemed incorporated at the moment of its legislation. 48

Applied to the instant case, at the time of the issuance of subpoena duces tecum addressed to petitioner, the prevailing doctrine is that the OMB may examine and access bank accounts and records in aid of their investigation, even without a pending litigation. The promulgation of the Marquez Case four (4) months thereafter did not, in any way, invalidate the existing doctrine then, for as settled in Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan, 49 it applied prospectively, that is, to cases filed after its promulgation. Without a doubt, the OMB had the authority to issue the assailed subpoena duces tecum addressed to petitioner requiring it to produce the subject bank accounts of Estrada, et al.

In sum, We hold and so rule that petitioner committed a procedural blunder when it filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA assailing the two Orders of the OMB. As discussed thoroughly above, the CA's jurisdiction is limited to review of orders, directives and decisions of the OMB in administrative disciplinary cases only. Petitioner should have filed the petition with the Supreme Court following the established doctrine that it is the Supreme Court that has jurisdiction over orders, directives, and decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative matters.

Furthermore, We uphold the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to issue subpoena duces tecum notwithstanding the absence of any pending litigation, at that time, against Estrada, et al. This was the prevailing doctrine at the time the subpoena duces tecum was issued. While this doctrine had already been abandoned in the Marquez case in that that there must be a pending case in order for the Ombudsman to validly inspect and compel the presentation of bank records, it must be stressed that Marquez Case was promulgated four months after the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum. To reiterate, when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively. Accordingly, Marquez Case did not, in any way invalidate the prevailing doctrine at the time of the issuance of the subpoena. acEHCD

All told, We find no reason to overturn the rulings of the CA and the OMB Office of the Ombudsman.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The June 16, 2006 Decision and September 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63731, are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-21.

2.Id. at 24-30; penned by Associate Justice Roberto A. Barrios, with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña and Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, concurring.

3.Id. at 32-33.

4.Id. at 34.

5.Id.

6.Id. at 24.

7.Id. at 35-38.

8.Id. at 36.

9.Id. at 39-44.

10.Id. at 57-62.

11.Id. at 57-61.

12.Id. at 62.

13.Id. at 146-154.

14.Id. at 148.

15.Id. at 151.

16.Id. at 154.

17.Id. at 63-81.

18.Id. at 63.

19.Id. at 82-93.

20.Id. at 93.

21.Id. at 94-127.

22.Id. at 24-30.

23.Id. at 28-29.

24.Id. at 32-33.

25.Id. at 8-9.

26.Id. at 406.

27.Id. at 9-12.

28.Id. at 14.

29. 412 Phil. 387 (2001).

30.Id. at 311-315.

31.Id. at 316-317.

32.Duyon v. CA, 748 Phil. 375, 385 (2014).

33. G.R. No. 219936, September 2, 2020.

34.Id.

35.Gatchalian v. Office of the Ombudsman, 838 Phil. 140, 147-148 (2018).

36. G.R. Nos. 226935, 228238 & 228325, February 9, 2021.

37.Rollo, p. 28.

38.Id. at 9-11.

39. 772 Phil. 672 (2015).

40.Id. at 716.

41.Supra note 35.

42.Id. at 147-151.

43.Supra note 49.

44.Id. at 397-398.

45.Rollo, p. 34.

46. 538 Phil. 684 (2006).

47.Id. at 721-723.

48.Castro v. Hon. Deloria, 597 Phil. 18, 26 (2009).

49.Supra note 46.