Alimagno y Flauta v. People

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 250531. November 10, 2021.]

DALE ALIMAGNO y FLAUTA, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated10 November 2021 which reads as follows: HTcADC

"G.R. No. 250531 (Dale Alimagno y Flauta v. People of the Philippines). — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision 2 dated July 9, 2019 and Resolution 3 dated November 18, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 37526. The CA affirmed the Decision 4 dated March 31, 2015 of Branch 153, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Taguig City Finding Dale Alimagno y Flauta (petitioner) and his co-accused Glen Del Castillo y Flores (Del Castillo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Carnapping, as defined under Section 2 5 and penalized under Section 14 6 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6539, 7 as amended by RA 10883. 8

The Antecedents

The instant case stemmed from an Information 9 dated April 25, 2011 Filed before the RTC. The accusatory portion of the Information states:

That on or about the 26 July 2010 in Taguig City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, with intent to gain and by means of violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully and unlawfully point a gun at Danilo A. Quilong-Quilong, and forcibly steal and carry away the Toyota Camry he was driving, with plate number ZNL 415, registered under the name of Roberto R. Romulo, to the latter's damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 10

When arraigned on September 30, 2011. petitioner and Del Castillo entered pleas of not guilty. 11

Trial ensued.

The prosecution established that on July 26, 2010, at around 1:30 p.m., Danilo Quilong-Quilong (Danilo) was driving a Toyota Camry with plate number ZKL 12 415 owned by his employer. Ambassador Roberto Romulo (Ambassador Romulo). Danilo parked the car at the back of British School Manila in Bonifacio Global City, Taguig City. 13

While Danilo was having his lunch, two men approached and pointed their guns at him. One of the men wore a white mask over his face, had his hair in pony tail, wore a pair of shorts exposing a tattoo on his right knee, and held a .22 caliber gun; the other man, on the other hand, wore a stocking mask over his face, sported a silver hooded jacket, and carried a long firearm. 14 The men asked for the car key. When Danilo refused, the man wearing a white mask aimed the gun at Danilo's feet and fired it. Danilo was forced to hand over the car key. Thereafter, the two men boarded the Toyota Camry with plate number ZKL 415 and sped away. 15

The Regional Police Intelligence Unit (RPIU) Anti-Carnapping Office of the Philippine National Police (PNP) wrote down Danilo's statements in connection with the incident.

On July 29, 2010, Police Chief Inspector Wilson Delos Santos (PCI Delos Santos) of the RPIU Anti-Carnapping Office received information that two units of Toyota Camry without plate numbers were at the area of Filinvest 2, Brgy. Batasan Hills, Quezon City. Consequently, the RPIU Anti-Carnapping Office formed a surveillance team that proceeded to the target area at around 11:45 p.m. 16

After an hour of surveillance, the police officers spotted the two Toyota Camry vehicles parked in front of Filinvest 2. Using their mobile patrol, PCI Delos Santos and two of his teammates approached the vehicles. Soon after, an exchange of gunshots ensued. One of the vehicles sped away. After the team identified themselves as police officers, the persons from the remaining vehicle surrendered. 17

The police officers then searched the Toyota Camry and found a shotgun, a 9mm pistol, and the personal belongings of Ambassador Romulo. Later, at the police station, Danilo identified petitioner and Del Castillo as the carnappers. He pointed to Del Castillo as the man with a white mask and to petitioner as the man who wore a stocking mask. Danilo was able to recognize the face of petitioner, who was within a close distance when the carnapping took place. Upon further investigation, the investigators established that the Toyota Camry recovered from petitioner and Del Castillo was the same car they stole from Danilo on July 26, 2010. 18

In defense, both petitioner and Del Castillo denied the accusations against them.

Del Castillo testified that on July 26, 2010, he was with his parents, his wife, and two children at his house in BF Homes, Parañaque. He admitted that he knew petitioner as he met him through a certain Ivan Padilla (Padilla). He and petitioner lived in the same village. 19

Del Castillo further testified as follows:

He did not know that Padilla was involved in a carnapping as Padilla owns an auto shop in Parañaque. On July 29, 2010, he was at his house when petitioner, who was then driving a Toyota Camry, picked him up and told him that he needed a companion in going to Filinvest, Quezon City. 20 Petitioner brought with him Padilla and a certain "Coco" who were on board a separate Toyota Camry. He was not anymore surprised seeing petitioner drive a Toyota Camry; he was used to seeing petitioner drive different cars. 21 At around 5:00 p.m. he agreed to accompany petitioner to Filinvest 2, Quezon City. 22

While in Filinvest 2, Quezon City, he and petitioner stayed in the car and waited for someone. Suddenly, several police officers arrived and fired shots at them. They did not fire back at the police officers. He hid inside the car and pleaded to the police officers to stop shooting. He then surrendered by raising his hands. 23 Later, the police officers approached them, pulled them out of the vehicle, and boarded them inside a mobile patrol. At that point, he learned that they were using a carnapped vehicle. 24

On the other hand, petitioner testified as follows:

On July 29, 2010, Padilla called him up and asked him whether he could drive a Toyota. 25 Padilla told him that they were going to Filinvest to sell the Toyota vehicle he was driving. He had no knowledge of Padilla's business, or that Padilla was engaged in the buying and selling of cars. 26

When they arrived at Filinvest 2 at around 11:30 p.m., Padilla instructed him to park the Toyota vehicle along the road; another car parked behind them. Suddenly, a third car suddenly blocked them. Armed men came out from the third car and fired upon their Toyota vehicle. He and Padilla did not immediately get out of the Toyota vehicle because the armed men kept firing at them. When the firing stopped, they stepped out of the Toyota vehicle and lied face down on the ground. The armed men, who were police officers, then handcuffed and brought them to a hospital. Petitioner did not anymore see Padilla's vehicle. Afterwards, the police officers brought them to Camp Bagong Diwa and informed them that they were using a carnapped vehicle. 27

The RTC Ruling

In the Decision dated March 31, 2015, the RTC convicted petitioner and Del Castillo of the offense of Carnapping. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered. this court hereby finds accused DALE ALIMAGNO y FLAUTA and GLEN DEL CASTILLO y FLORES GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Carnapping (under Section 14, 2nd clause, of Republic Act No 6539) and hereby sentences them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months, is minimum, to Thirty (30) years, as maximum.

The accused are hereby ordered committed to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.

The bail bond under Trisco Bond No. 005981 under Travellers Insurance Surety Corporation of accused Glen del Castillo y Flores is hereby cancelled.

Police Supt. Maristelo Reyes Manalo is hereby directed to return the subject vehicle, under custody of NCRPO-ANCAR. Toyota Camry with plate number ZNL 415 to registered owner in the person of Ambassador Roberto Romulo.

SO ORDERED. 28

The RTC found that all the elements of Carnapping were proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt; that petitioner and Del Castillo were positively identified by Danilo as the armed men who forcibly took the subject vehicle; and that the positive identification of petitioner and Del Castillo as the perpetrators of the offense did not engender any doubt whatsoever. 29

The RTC found applicable to the case of Carnapping the presumption that when a stolen property is found in the possession of a person who is unable to give a satisfactory explanation of its possession, such person is presumed to have committed the crime of theft. It also noted inconsistencies between Del Castillo's and his wife's testimonies as to the former's whereabouts — the testimony of Del Castillo's wife that Del Castillo never left the house on July 29, 2010 is directly the opposite of the testimony of Del Castillo himself that he went with Padilla and petitioner to Filinvest 2, Quezon City to sell the Toyota Camry. Finally, it held that Del Castillo's act of jumping bail and fleeing before appearing in court to testify is an indication of guilt. 30

Undaunted, petitioner and Del Castillo filed an appeal with the CA. Del Castillo filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Post Bail Pending Appeal, which the RTC granted. However, on April 20, 2015, the RTC ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Del Castillo for his failure to post the corresponding bail bond. 31

On June 6, 2015, Del Castillo filed with the CA a Motion to Post Bail Pending Appeal and submitted his Personal Bail Bond issued by Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation in the amount of P300,000.00. 32 Prior to resolving the motion, the CA inquired with the RTC as to the status of the warrant of arrest issued against Del Castillo. The RTC manifested that the Return of Warrant of Arrest dated April 27, 2015 shows that the warrant was not served against Del Castillo because the "subject cannot be contacted/located/whereabouts is unknown." 33

In the Resolution dated January 18, 2016, the CA denied Del Castillo's Motion to Post Bail Pending Appeal as his whereabouts remained unknown. 34 On June 2, 2016, a Partial Entry of Judgment was entered against Del Castillo. 35

The CA Ruling

In the assailed Decision, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision. It disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE. premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 31, 2015 of Branch 153 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Taguig City, in Criminal Case No. 145299 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 36

The CA affirmed petitioner's conviction. According to the CA, all the elements of the offense of Carnapping were established. It gave weight to Danilo's testimony and his positive identification of petitioner and Del Castillo as the carnappers. It also found no ill motive on the part of Danilo in testifying against petitioner and Del Castillo. It declared that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is presumed to be the taker and the doer of the whole act. It sustained the penalty imposed by the RTC against petitioner and Del Castillo. 37

In a Resolution 38 dated November 18, 2019, the CA likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 39

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition.

Petitioner avers that the CA erred in affirming his conviction because of the prosecution's failure to establish his identity as one of the perpetrators of the offense. He insists that there was no sufficient evidence presented to prove that he was the person described by Danilo as the carnapper who wore a stocking mask, sported a silver hooded jacket, and carried a long firearm. He likewise argues that he sufficiently explained his possession of the allegedly stolen vehicle. 40

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that the prosecution was able to prove petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt; that all the elements of the offense of carnapping are present; and that the identities of petitioner and Del Castillo, through Danilo, a prosecution witness, as the ones who carnapped the Toyota Camry were established. The OSG emphasizes that petitioner's unexplained possession of the stolen Toyota Camry during the shootout in Filinvest 2, Quezon City raised the presumption that he is guilty of Carnapping. 41

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues: (1) whether the CA erred in affirming his conviction with his assertion that the prosecution failed to establish his identity as one of the perpetrators; and (2) whether the CA erred in affirming his conviction despite his sufficient explanation of possessing the subject vehicle. 42

Our Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

The issues raised are essentially evidentiary and factual in nature as they entail a re-appreciation and re-examination of the factual findings of the trial court. In this regard, the petition filed under Rule 45 must be denied because "one, x x x [it] violates the limitation of the issues to only legal questions, and, two, the Court, not being a trier of facts, will not disturb the factual findings of the CA, unless they were mistaken, absurd, speculative, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings reached by the court of origin," 43 which was not shown to be the case here.

Moreover, factual findings of the trial court in criminal cases are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record and affirmed on appeal by the CA. 44 It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that the Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the trial court's factual findings. 45 In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not overlook such factual matters. Consequently, the Court finds no reason to review, much less, overturn its factual findings.

In any case, the Court finds that the CA correctly held petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Carnapping.

Petitioner's Identity as One of

Petitioner argues that there is doubt as to his identification as one of the perpetrators of the carnapping; that Danilo gave inconsistent testimonies in the identification of the perpetrators; and that Danilo's testimony that the two men who forcibly took the Toyota vehicle from him were respectively armed with a .22 caliber revolver and a long firearm is utterly inconsistent with PCI Delos Santos' testimony that the weapons seized from petitioner and Del Castillo were a .9 mm handgun and a shotgun. 46

Petitioner's argument does not persuade.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the Court gives high respect to the trial court's evaluation of the testimony of a witness because it has the best opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness so as to determine if there is indeed truth to it. 47

Danilo's testimony is sufficient to establish petitioner's identity as one of the carnappers who forcibly took the Toyota vehicle. Notably, Danilo was the lone witness of the incident. In his testimony, he alleged that the first time he encountered petitioner and Del Castillo was during the carnapping incident, and he did not personally know them. Where there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the witness to testify falsely against the accused or pervert the truth, the logical conclusion is that no such motive exists and the former's testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. 48

Moreover, the inconsistencies that petitioner cited regarding Danilo's testimony, i.e., firearms identification and Del Castillo's tattoo, do not outweigh the fact that Danilo positively identified petitioner as the armed man who forcibly took the Toyota vehicle. Danilo was able to recognize petitioner's face because of his proximity to him despite the stocking mask; he did not merely rely on the identity of the piece of clothing and hooded jacket worn by petitioner but also on the latter's height and built. 49

Petitioner Failed to Fully

The Court sustains the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that petitioner's unexplained possession of the vehicle raises the presumption that he is the taker of the thing and the doer of the whole illegal act.

Petitioner's justification that Padilla merely asked him to drive the Toyota vehicle that turned out to be a carnapped vehicle is clearly self-serving. The prosecution established that petitioner and Del Castillo were Padilla's friends. When asked by Padilla, petitioner agreed without hesitation to drive, late at night, the Toyota vehicle that had no plate number. 50

Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides the presumption that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act. 51

In People v. Sia, 52 the Court explained:

It is a well-settled rule that when a person is found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act, he is presumed to be the taker and doer of the whole act. Thus, when property stolen is found in the possession of a person who is unable to give a satisfactory explanation of his possession thereof, he may be deemed to have committed the crime of theft of said property. x x x

The application of this presumption validly applies to a case of carnapping for, indeed, the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping is the same and, had it not been for the enactment of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle would certainly fall within the purview of either theft or robbery. 53

In the case, petitioner failed to overcome the disputable presumption that he was one of the carnappers who forcibly took the subject vehicle. What petitioner offered was a mere self-serving explanation.

As to the penalty imposed, the RTC, as sustained by the CA, correctly imposed the indeterminate penalty of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as minimum, to thirty (30) years, as maximum, because the carnapping was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of a person. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as applied to an offense punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence expressed at a range whose maximum term shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the special law, and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed. 54 Thus, the penalty imposed by the RTC which is seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as minimum, to thirty (30) years, as maximum, as provided by Section 14 of RA 6539, is in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 9, 2019 and Resolution dated November 18, 2019 in CA-G.R. CR No. 37526, finding petitioner Dale Alimagno y Flauta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Carnapping as defined under Section 2 and penalized under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539 and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as minimum, to thirty (30) years, as maximum, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED." (ROSARIO, J., designated as Additional Member vice GAERLAN, J., per Raffle dated October 27, 2021.)

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 12-31.

2.Id. at 33-49, penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a Member of the Court) with Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Pablito A. Perez, concurring.

3.Id. at 51-52; penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a Member of the Count with Associate Justices Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and Pablito A. Perez, concurring.

4.Id. at 71-84; penned by Presiding Judge Mariam G. Bien.

5. Section 2. x x ''Carnapping" is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. x x x.

6. Section 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence sir intimidation of persons, or force upon things and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty or life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed in the commission of the carnapping.

7. Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, approved on August 26, 1972.

8. New Anti-Carnapping Act of 2016; approved on July 17, 2016.

9. As culled from the CA Decision, rollo, p. 34.

10. As culled from the CA Decision, id.

11.Id.

12. Appears as "ZNL" and "ZKL" in some parts of the rollo.

13.Rollo, p. 35.

14.Id. at 35 and 92.

15.Id.

16.Id. at 36 and 93.

17.Id. at 36 and 75.

18.Id. at 37, 75, and 93.

19.Id. at 76.

20.Id.

21.Id. at 77.

22.Id. at 38.

23.Id. at 38 and 77.

24.Id. at 38.

25.Id. at 39.

26.Id.

27.Id. at 39-40.

28.Id. at 83-84.

29.Id. at 81-82.

30.Id. at 82-83.

31.Id. at 41.

32.Id.

33.Id.

34.Id. at 42.

35.Id.

36.Id. at 48.

37.Id. at 44-48.

38.Id. at 51-52.

39.Id.

40.Id. at 21-24.

41.Id. at 94-98.

42.Id. at 17.

43.Grana v. People, G.R. No 202111, November 25, 2019.

44. See People v. Dillatan, Sr., G.R. No. 212191, September 5, 2018, as cited in Cerezo v. People, G.R. No. 241593, January 14, 2019.

45. See People v. Dillatan, Sr., supra.

46.Rollo, pp. 23-24.

47. See People v. Catig, G.R. No. 225729, March 11, 2020.

48.People v. Advincula, 829 Phil. 516, 525 (2018).

49.Rollo, p. 44.

50.Rollo, pp. 46-47.

51. See also People v. Donio, 806 Phil. 578, 592 (2017).

52. G.R. No. 137457, 421 Phil. 784 (2001).

53.Id. at 798.

54.People v. Fieldad, 744 Phil. 790, 814 (2014).