ADVERTISEMENT
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 232782. March 21, 2018.]
FRANKLIN ALEJANDRO Y CHUA, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated21 March 2018which reads as follows: DETACa
"G.R. No. 232782 (Franklin Alejandro y Chua vs. People of the Philippines). — This treats of the Motion for Reconsideration 1 filed by herein petitioner-movant Franklin Alejandro (Alejandro) against this Court's Resolution 2 dated November 8, 2017, denying his Petition for Review on Certiorari3 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, due to his failure to show any reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals (CA) in its Decision 4 dated October 24, 2016 and Resolution dated July 5, 2017, in CA-G.R. CR No. 34592.
The Antecedents
On May 2, 2000, Engineer Victor Albalyade (Engr. Albalyade) and Engr. Renato Santos, employees of Maynilad Water Services, Inc. (MWSI) were conducting a routine inspection along San Juan Luna Street, corner Meisec Street, Binondo, Manila, when they chanced upon someone manipulating to open a fire hydrant and collecting water therefrom. This led to the discovery that the water from the fire hydrant was used to wash cars at Mico's Car Wash (Mico's).
The MWSI employees approached the car wash boys at Mico's and asked to talk to the owner. They were referred to Alejandro who was the father of the owner of Mico's. Upon confrontation, the MWSI employees warned Alejandro that it is illegal to withdraw water from the fire hydrant. This angered Alejandro, who retorted "if it is illegal, then you try closing it." The MWSI employees left to avoid further confrontation.
From May 3 to 9, 2000, Engr. Albalyade along with other employees of MWSI conducted a daily surveillance of Mico's, wherein they discovered that despite warnings, the car wash boys still continued fetching water from the fire hydrant.
On May 10, 2000, a team composed of Engr. Albalyade, accompanied by other MWSI officers, along with members of the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) conducted an investigation against water pilferage committed by the staff of Mico's.
Two employees of MWSI posed as customers of Mico's who wished to avail of car wash services. They noticed that in cleaning the cars, the car wash boys first used water inside a drum, but once the water supply dwindled, a car wash boy went to the fire hydrant and started withdrawing water therefrom.
Immediately, the PNP-CIDG operatives came over, introduced themselves and informed the car wash boys that it is illegal to get water from the fire hydrant. The PNP-CIDG members arrested four car wash boys, including Raffy Alejandro (Raffy), son of Alejandro. The police officers likewise confiscated the car wash equipment and started loading them inside a van.
Meanwhile, Alejandro arrived at the scene and started unloading the car wash equipment. Alejandro introduced himself as the Barangay Chairman, and stated that he was the owner of the equipment. He asked why the operatives confiscated the same equipment, and threatened to charge the operatives with theft. The PNP-CIDG officers, who were then in civilian outfits, introduced themselves. A commotion ensued between Alejandro and an MWSI officer, when Alejandro insisted on retrieving the equipment while the MWSI officer prevented the former from doing so. Because of the commotion, the four car wash boys were able to escape.
Thereafter, two Informations were filed against Alejandro. In Criminal Case No. 00-184894, Alejandro was charged, along with his son Raffy, and four unidentified car wash boys for water pilferage. While in Criminal Case No. 04-232000, Alejandro was charged for violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019. 5 The Information 6 for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, states that:
That on May 10, 2000, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court accused FRANKLIN ALEJANDRO, a public officer being the chairman of Barangay 293, Zone 28, Binondo, Manila while in the performance of his official function and taking advantage of his position, with manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally interfere with a legitimate operation then being conducted by the elements of the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group against water pilferages, when he ordered the unloading of the car wash equipment seized from four (4) unidentified car wash boys who were arrested pilfering water from the MWSI fire hydrant in said barangay, and who managed to escape due to the accused interference, thereby giving unwarranted benefit to them and the owner of the car wash business who is the son of the accused. aDSIHc
CONTRARY TO LAW." 7
Alejandro pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued thereafter.
On February 28, 2011, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision, 8 acquitting Alejandro of the charge of Violation of Section 8 (h) in relation to R.A. No. 8041, 9 but convicting him of violating Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019. In convicting Alejandro, the RTC held that he exhibited manifest partiality to favor his son and the car wash boys by interfering with a legitimate police operation. Such interference resulted in the escape of the culprits, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to his son and the car wash boys. The RTC sentenced Alejandro to one (1) year in prison. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2) In Criminal Case No. 04-2320000 entitled "PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANKLIN ALEJANDRO," the court finds [ALEJANDRO] guilty of violating Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and sentences him to straight penalty of one (1) year of imprisonment.
With cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED. 10
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modification. The CA held that Alejandro was correctly found to have exhibited manifest partiality when he introduced himself as the Barangay Chairman and interfered with the anti-water pilferage operation. As Barangay Chairman, Alejandro was expected to maintain public order and assist the police operatives. Instead, he deliberately meddled with the operation to save his son and the car wash boys. The unwarranted benefit in the instant case was evident from the fact that because of his interference, the car wash boys escaped arrest and detention.
However, the CA modified the penalty imposed by the RTC by increasing the sentence to six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office. The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is DENIED. The appealed Joint Decision dated 28 February 2011 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, City of Manila, Branch 52 in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 00-184894 and 04-232000 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The petitioner-movant is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum to ten (10) years as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from holding public office. 11
Dissatisfied with the CA ruling, Alejandro filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari12 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On November 8, 2017, this Court issued a Resolution 13 denying the petition.
Aggrieved, Alejandro filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 14
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Alejandro points out that he was acquitted of the charge of obstruction of justice, and as such, must likewise be acquitted from the crime of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Likewise, Alejandro reiterates that he was not acting as a public official when the crime was committed, thereby removing the crime within the ambit of R.A. No. 3019. He again points out that he did not exhibit any "manifest partiality," and did not interfere with the operations conducted by the PNP-CIDG. Moreover, he reiterates that he did not cause any undue injury to the government, or give any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. Finally, Alejandro seeks the Court's liberality on humanitarian considerations, as he is already 73 years old.
Ruling of the Court
The Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
At the outset, the Court notes that the arguments advanced in the motion for reconsideration are a mere rehash of the contentions provided in the petition, which have been squarely and judiciously passed upon by the CA and affirmed by this Court.
Be that as it may, it cannot be gainsaid that "[i]t is the policy of the Philippine Government, in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto." 15 Pursuant thereto, Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes the following corrupt practice committed by a public officer, to wit:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers x x x:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
To convict an accused under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, the prosecution must prove the following elements beyond reasonable doubt, viz.:
1. That the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them;
2. That said public officers committed the prohibited acts during the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions;
3. That they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party;
4. That such injury was caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and
5. That the public officers acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. 16
In the case at bar, as correctly held by the CA, the prosecution established all the elements for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. Alejandro is a public officer, who abused his position by introducing himself to the MWSI employees and the police operatives as the Barangay Chairman. There was no reason for Alejandro to boast of his position as the Barangay Chairman, if not to exert influence over the operatives and interfere with the arrest of his son and the car wash boys, as well as the confiscation of the car wash equipment.
The Court agrees with the CA's ratiocination that Alejandro, being the Barangay Chairman, was tasked with maintaining public order within the barangay. As a public officer, he was expected to respect the law and assist the operatives in their operations. Instead, in grave abuse of his authority and in breach of his sworn duty, Alejandro meddled and interfered with the operation, to give undue advantage to his son and his son's employees. Given that his son and the car wash boys were caught in flagrante delicto pilfering water, Alejandro should not have prevented the operatives from performing their job. ETHIDa
Alejandro would like the Court to believe that in proceeding to the scene of the crime, he merely acted as a father who was concerned about the arrest of his son. If the same were true, then there was no reason for Alejandro to impress upon the police operatives that he was the Barangay Chairman. Evidently, Alejandro did this to exert influence and instill fear and pressure on the police operatives.
Moreover, it must be noted that as for the third and fourth elements of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019, jurisprudence instructs that there are "two ways by which Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be violated — first by causing undue injury to any party, including the government and second, by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. Although neither mode constitutes a distinct offense, an accused may be charged under either mode or both." 17
There is no quibbling that Alejandro gave the car wash boys an unwarranted advantage, as they were able to escape the apprehension of the PNP-CIDG operatives. As correctly opined by the CA, the car wash boys were caught in flagrante delicto illegally drawing water from the fire hydrant. They could have been properly arrested and taken into custody, were it not for the interference of Alejandro. Likewise, as aptly observed by the CA, the car wash boys were given a more advantageous position as the police officers were not able to get their identities and other essential information, such as their addresses or whereabouts.
Furthermore, Alejandro acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in granting the aforementioned unwarranted benefits. Notably, in Ampil v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., 18 the Court explained the meaning of the terms "partiality" and "bad faith," as follows:
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. x x x." 19
As earlier explained, Alejandro acted in bad faith by breaching his sworn duty as a public officer by interfering with a legitimate arrest to favor his son and the car wash boys. He obstinately insisted on the retrieval of the car wash equipment, notwithstanding the fact that such equipment were seized pursuant to a legitimate operation.
Based on the foregoing, it becomes all too apparent that the CA did not commit any reversible error in finding Alejandro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Neither does the Court agree with Alejandro's specious argument that his acquittal by the municipal trial court of obstruction of justice, should likewise warrant his exoneration from the charge of R.A. No. 3019. The elements necessary to prove a conviction for obstruction of justice are completely different from those of R.A. No. 3019. Perforce, an acquittal from the charge of obstruction of justice bears no effect on Alejandro's guilt under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Finally, the Court finds that the CA correctly modified the penalty imposed by the RTC.
Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 195 20 amended Section 9 of R.A. No. 3019, by increasing the penalty for violation of acts committed under Section 3 of the same law, to wit:
Sec. 9. Penalties for violations. — (a) any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful income. (Emphasis Ours)
Accordingly, Alejandro was correctly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from holding public office.
In fine, the Court has often impressed upon public officers the importance of upholding the constitutional mandate that public office is a public trust. Public officers are mandated to observe the strictest standards of honesty, integrity and probity. By his acts, Alejandro transgressed this strict constitutional mandate, for which, he should be held accountable for. Alejandro's old age is not a ground to exonerate him from the crime he committed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY for lack of merit.
No further pleadings or motions shall be entertained in this case. Let entry of final judgment be issued immediately.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of CourtBy:(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 84-88.
2.Id. at 83.
3.Id. at 20-36.
4. Penned by Associate Justice Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles, with Associate Justices Florito S. Macalino and Leoncia R. Dimagiba, concurring; id. at 37-49.
5. The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Approved on August 17, 1960.
6.Rollo, pp. 38-39.
7.Id.
8.Id. at 55-80.
9. AN ACT TO ADDRESS THE NATIONAL WATER CRISIS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Approved on June 7, 1995.
10.Id. at 79-80.
11.Id. at 48.
12. Id. at 20-36.
13. Id. at 83.
14. Id. at 84-87.
15. Republic Act No. 3019, Section 1.
16. People v. Balao, et al., 655 Phil. 563, 572-573 (2011), citing Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, 462 Phil. 712, 720 (2003).
17. Valencerina v. People, 749 Phil. 886, 915 (2014).
18. 715 Phil. 733 (2013).
19. Id. at 757-758.
20. AN ACT AMENDING SECTIONS EIGHT, NINE, TEN, ELEVEN, AND THIRTEEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED AND NINETEEN, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT. Approved on March 16, 1982.