THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 8908. February 13, 2017.]
NORA M. ALDANA, complainant,vs. ATTY. PABLO S. MAGAT, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated February 13, 2017, which reads as follows:
"A.C. No. 8908 (Nora M. Aldana v. Atty. Pablo S. Magat). — An Affidavit-Complaint 1 was filed before us by Nora M. Aldana (complainant) against Atty. Pablo S. Magat (respondent) on March 7, 2011 for filing frivolous pleadings with malicious intent of delaying judicial proceedings; violations of Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; gross ignorance of the law and rules of procedure; harassment; conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar; and violation of the lawyer's oath.
Investigating Commissioner Hannibal Augustus B. Bobis, finding for the complainant, recommended that respondent be reprimanded for trifling with the legal process and for violating Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 2
Acting on the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, 3 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors (IBP Board) issued the following Extended Resolution: 4
EXTENDED RESOLUTION
This is an extension of Resolution No. XXI-2015-110 of the Board of Governors issued on January 31, 2015 pertaining to the January 30, 2014 Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Hannibal Augustus B. Bobis in the subject case. This case initiated by Complainant Nora M. Aldana against respondent Atty. Pablo Magat was initially filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court and docketed as A.C. No. 8908. The facts and statements of the respective parties are found in the said Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Bobis, pertinent portions of which are reproduced thus:
"II. Statement of the Complaint
The complainant filed a complaint for grave coercion against the respondent's client [with] the Manila Prosecutor's Office. After the termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating city prosecutor — finding probable cause — filed an information [before] the [M]etropolitan [T]rial [C]ourt. CAIHTE
During the course of the proceedings, the herein respondent filed a motion to quash the information alleging that the latter had prescribed. This motion was denied by the trial court.
Unsatisfied, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the [R]ules of [C]ourt in the Regional Trial Court reiterating the arguments he raised in the motion to quash and the motion for reconsideration regarding the alleged prescription of the complainant's cause of action. This caused the complainant to file an action for disbarment; specifically for 'filing frivolous pleadings with malicious intent of delaying judicial proceedings, violations of Rules 1[0].01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, gross ignorance of the law and the [r]ules of procedure, harassment, conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar and violation of lawyer[']s oath in Criminal Case No. 454463-CR entitled, 'People vs. Crispin Yabut and Delia Yabut' before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 30, Manila where he (respondent) entered his appearance as counsel for the defense.'
III. Respondent's Position/Defense
The respondent readily admits that he filed a motion to quash and the subsequent petition for [certiorari] based on Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The respondent further claims that he filed the said pleadings because he genuinely believes that the complainant's cause of action already prescribed. The respondent's principal defense can be gleaned from the petition for [certiorari] based on Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which he filed on behalf of his clients [with] the RTC of Manila x x x
In other words, the herein respondent posits the following legal theories: (1) the filing of a complaint by a private person in the [O]ffice of the [C]ity [P]rosecutor for purposes of preliminary investigation does NOT interrupt the period of prescription while the complaint is pending resolution; (2) the period of prescription is interrupted only after the city prosecutor or the latter's representative files a criminal complaint in a proper trial court; and (3) the definitions of 'complain[t]' and 'information' as found in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court are wrong — in fact, the correct definitions of the latter concepts are found in the petition for [certiorari] filed by the respondent and quoted above."
Commissioner Bobis recommended that —
"Considering respondent's considerable experience in the practice of law, his completion of the relevant MCLE seminars, and the fact that the rule on prescription has been set since 1967, it is respectfully recommended that respondent be REPRIMANDED for trifling with legal process and for violating Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."
His bas[i]s for the foregoing recommendation is embodied in the following discussion:
"IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
The key provision regarding the prescription of felonies is Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code which provides as follows:
'Article 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.'
It is clear from the said provision that the mere filing of a complaint in the city prosecutor's office interrupts the running of the period of prescription. The complaint mentioned in the said article refers to the complaint defined under Section 3 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, i.e., a sworn written statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended party, any peace officer, or other public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated. DETACa
The respondent's insistence on his legal theories regarding prescription of felonies in the pleadings he filed in the first and second level courts constitute[s] knowingly citing as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, The respondent's actuations violate Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides as follows:
[']Rule 10.02. — A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert a fact that which has not been proved.'
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent's arguments regarding prescription — and the proceedings he initiated as a result thereof — constitute a considerable waste of time and effort on the part of trial courts concerned to speedily resolve the issues he raised this time n that cannot be taken back and it should have been better spent on other, more meritorious cases. In other words, the respondent abused legal process by maintaining a cause of action which had already been repealed by relevant law and jurisprudence.
Considering the respondent's considerable experience in the practice of law, his completion of the relevant MCLE seminars, and the fact that the rule on prescription has been set since 1967, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be REPRIMANDED for trifling with legal process and for violating Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."
THE RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF
On January 31, 2015, the Board issued said Resolution No. XXI-2015-058 which reads:
"RESOLVED to REVERSE, as it is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex 'A', and finding that no evidence that Respondent committed a mistake and his defense of good faith valid, the case is hereby DISMISSED."
The Board was constrained to reverse and set aside the findings of the Commissioner because respondent's act was not against the Code of Professional Responsibility nor the Lawyer['s] Oath, or rules mandating high standards of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing required from lawyers. Respondent argued that the criminal case for grave oral defamation against his clients should be dismissed on the ground of prescription. Pertinent portions of his Motion for Reconsideration are quoted thus:
"The Honorable Supreme Court laid down the fundamental guidelines in the prescription of offenses, to wit:
'It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Hence, in the case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails xxx'
So far, it appears that in all cases cited by the Honorable Regional Trial Court do not refer to grave oral defamation. Even those cited by the ACP did not refer to grave oral defamation cases. (Note: However, the complainant in this administrative case cited the grave oral defamation case in Francisco as discussed above.)
The cases cited which require the filing with the court to toll the running of the prescriptive period refer to cases covered specifically by law.
Those other cases wherein the mere filing with the CPO will toll the period of prescription did not refer to grave oral defamation. They refer to other cases.
However, under Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a law in itself, grave oral defamation prescribes in six months. It is respectfully submitted that this provision of the Revised Penal Code is a substantive right of the accused provided by law itself, Article 90, RPC x x x"
While complainant posits that the Motion to Quash is frivolous, the Board does not find it so. Indeed, respondent's arguments are neither capricious, whimsically nor wholly indefensible. A lawyer is obliged to present every legal defense in support of his client's position. Insofar as respondent's supposed falsehood in the narration of facts is concerned, suffice it to state that the same has yet to be proven. Complainant's allegation is not enough. In Siao v. Atty. De Guzman, Jr., the Supreme Court reiterated its oft repeated ruling that in suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove her allegations by preponderant evidence. Elaborating on the required quantum of proof, the Supreme Court declared thus: aDSIHc
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses' interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number. (Citations omitted.)
In the absence of preponderant evidence, the presumption of innocence of the lawyer continues and the complaint against him must be dismissed.
In fine, it is emphasized that the power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons. The purpose of disbarment is to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges [proffered] against him until the contrary is proved; and as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duty in accordance with his oath.
WHEREFORE, the Board of Governors hereby REVERSES and SETS [ASIDE] the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Hannibal Augustus B. Bobis and recommends the dismissal of the complaint against respondent Pablo S. Magat.
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board. The complainant failed to prove, by substantial evidence, that respondent committed a misconduct warranting the imposition of a disciplinary action.
WHEREFORE, the complaint against Atty. Pablo S. Magat is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 2-14.
2.Id. at 423.
3.Id. at 416-423.
4.Id. at 424-429.
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "raised This is time" in the original document.