Alcober v. RPMC Plastic Phil.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 198358. March 10, 2014.]

LOURDES B. ALCOBER, petitioner, vs. RPMC PLASTIC PHIL./ROLEX PLASTIC MANUFACTURING CORP., DANNY UY AND JORDAN UY, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated March 10, 2014 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 198358 — LOURDES B. ALCOBER, Petitioner, v. RPMC PLASTIC PHIL./ROLEX PLASTIC MANUFACTURING CORP., DANNY UY AND JORDAN UY, Respondents.

Petitioner appeals the decision promulgated on March 30, 2011, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) found no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in finding her to have voluntarily resigned from her employment instead of being illegally dismissed.

The antecedents follow.

To avert imminent serious financial reverses, RPMC Plastic Phil./Rolex Plastic Manufacturing Corporation (RPMC) adopted a retrenchment program to downsize its workforce. Accordingly, on January 28, 2008, it filed an Establishment Termination Report with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). 2 One of the ten employees served with the Notice of Retrenchment was petitioner, who was then RPMC's Production Supervisor since October 1987.

The Notice of Retrenchment sent to petitioner reads:

Dear Ms. Alcober,

This is to formally inform you, that due to the continued low orders received by the company, . . . the company has no other recourse but to reduce its workforce.

To prevent losses due to the above conditions, we regret to inform you, that the company has filed for retrenchment notice to the Department of Labor and Employment, on January 28, 2008.

Pursuant to the rules and regulations on retrenchment, you will be given 30 days prior to the effectivity and deemed separated from the service effective February 27, 2008. Separation pay shall be given, equivalent to 1/2 month salary (13) days for every year of service.

If you would want to avail the separation pay at an earlier time, kindly surrender your ID and ATM card for speedy processing and release of benefits.

Likewise, please be advised that you are no longer required to report for duty effective January 29, 2008, but shall enjoy your salary. Therefore, you are still required to come every Tuesday for the signing of payroll until the retrenchment period takes effect on February 27, 2008. ICcDaA

(sgd.) Raquel S. Reyes3

Prior to the effectivity of her retrenchment, petitioner submitted her resignation letter dated February 12, 2008, 4 which reads:

Re: Resignation

To: Management of RPMC

This is in accordance to (sic) the memo dated January 28, 2008 which advice (sic) me that on January 29, 2008 I'm no longer oblige (sic) to report for work. Also included on your memo [is] that I should formally resign. This is to formally inform the management that I resign from RPMC effective Tuesday[,] February 12, 2008.

In behalf of my family we extend our gratitude to RPMC for the trust and confidence you [have] shown for about 20 years and 2 months of my tenure in the company.

Respectfully [y]ours,

RPMC accepted petitioner's resignation. On February 15, 2008, she received her separation pay, 13th month pay, and salary for the period ending January 28, 2008, totaling P148,995.03. 5 She then executed the following waiver and quitclaim in favor of RPMC, to wit:

SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY UKOL SA

NA AKO SI, LOURDES ALCOBER, nasa wastong gulang na at kasalukuyan naninirahan sa 98 Maligaya St., Bagong Barrio, Cal. City at pagkatapos manumpa sangayon sa batas ay aking isasalaysay ang mga sumusunod:

1. Na ako ay nagtrabaho sa RPMC PLASTICS PHILS., INC. na nakatalaga sa No. 258 G. Araneta Avenue, S.F.D.M., Quezon City;

2. Na ako ay kusang loob na umalis sa RPMC PLASTICS PHILS., INC., noong Feb. 12, 2008;

3. Na aking naiintindihan na wala na akong mahahabol, hinahabol at hahabulin na anuman laban sa RPMC PLASTICS PHILS., INC. at sa mga nangangasiwa nito bunga ng kanyang pagtratrabaho sa naturang tanggapan at sa kanyang pagkamatay o magdedemanda ng sibil o criminal;

4. Na ang nilalaman ng salaysay na ito ay nagpapaliwanag sa akin at ang mga salita nito ay naiintindihan ko at malaya kong nilagdaan ang salaysay na ito;

Bilang Patotoo sa naturang salaysay na ito, ako ay lumagda ngayong 20 February 2008 sa Quezon City, Philippines.

Nagsasalaysay Lourdes Alcober (sgd.)6

On March 3, 2008, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of separation pay against respondents. She claimed that she had been compelled to resign because respondents had threatened that she would not be given separation pay unless she resigned. 7

Respondents countered that petitioner had opted to voluntarily resign instead of being retrenched in order to avail herself of the higher separation pay equivalent to 17 days' pay for every year of service in case of resignation as stipulated in the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA), as opposed to the 1/2 month (13 days) pay for every year of service in case of retrenchment. 8

On May 26, 2008, the Labor Arbiter dismissed petitioner's complaint for lack of merit, declaring that she had voluntarily resigned from her employment, and had not been dismissed. 9

On appeal, the NLRC initially reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision, and held that petitioner had been illegally dismissed. It ordered respondents reinstate her with backwages, and to pay her moral damages of P500,000.00 and attorney's fees. 10 It pointed out that the essence of resignation was voluntariness, which implied an option to stay employed; that the option to stay was absent in her case in view of her impending retrenchment; and that it could not be said, therefore, that she had voluntarily resigned.

On April 23, 2009, however, the NLRC granted respondents' motion for reconsideration, and affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. 11

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, claiming that the NLRC had thereby gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. aCSDIc

On March 30, 2011, 12 the CA denied the petition for certiorari upon finding that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. It observed that petitioner had failed to prove her having been constructively dismissed; that the Notice of Retrenchment did not hint or suggest any threat that she would not be paid separation pay if she did not resign; that she had voluntarily resigned as evidenced by her letter of resignation that contained words of gratitude, her receipt of the benefits to which she was entitled by reason of her resignation, and her execution of a waiver and quitclaim. 13

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied her motion for its lack of merit on August 24, 2011. 14

Petitioner is now insisting to the Court that she was constructively dismissed when she was given the Notice of Retrenchment; that she was forced to tender her resignation because she was "confronted by the fact that she will not be paid separation pay" unless she submitted a resignation letter; that her immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal showed that she had been forced to resign; that she had no reason to resign because she was already 57 years old and was only 3 years away from her retirement for which she could have received retirement benefits; that she did not resign to receive a higher separation pay because she was a supervisory employee who was not covered by the existing CBA of the rank-and-file employees; that the burden was on respondents to show that she had voluntarily resigned; that her handing a resignation letter did not shift the burden of proof in illegal dismissal; and that her acceptance of the separation pay did not signify her consent to her illegal dismissal.

The petition for review has no merit.

The CA correctly found that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding that petitioner had voluntarily resigned from her employment.

It is basic that before the employer should bear the burden of proving that the dismissal of the employee was legal, the latter must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of her dismissal from service. If there is no dismissal, there will be no need to delve on its validity or legality. 15 In other words, it is not the dismissal, but the validity of the dismissal, that the employer carries the burden of proving.

Petitioner was thus burdened to prove at the outset that she had been dismissed from her employment. She did not discharge the burden, however, considering that she did not substantiate her claim of having been forced to resign by threats of her not receiving her separation pay if she did not do so. For sure, her bare allegations of threat or force did not constitute substantial evidence to support a finding of a forced resignation.

Nor may the Notice of Retrenchment be regarded as a threat upon petitioner to do anything against her will and consent. In St. Michael Academy v. NLRC, 16 the Court laid down the requisites for intimidation to vitiate consent as follows:

For intimidation to vitiate consent, the following requisites must be present: (1) that the intimidation caused the consent to be given; (2) that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real or serious, there being evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of doing the act which is forced on the person to do as the lesser evil; and (4) that it produces a well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury to his person or property. 17

The circumstances of the case did not establish the foregoing requisites. While it is true that respondents gave the Notice of Retrenchment to petitioner 30 days in advance and stated therein that she would no longer be required to work within the period, they did so not to threaten her but to comply with the requirements of the law to authorize the retrenchment. Contrary to her claim (as stated in her resignation letter) that the notice had advised her to formally resign, the notice had merely given her the option to receive her separation pay earlier, instead of waiting for the effectivity of the retrenchment, by surrendering her ID and ATM cards in advance.

Petitioner's resignation letter belied her allegation of being forced to resign. The letter contained words of gratitude for her more than 20 years of employment in RPMC. In a number of rulings, 18 the Court has considered words of gratitude contained in a resignation letter as antithetical to a claim of threat or coercion.

Moreover, petitioner also received all the benefits due her as the consequence of her resignation, for which reason she executed an affidavit of waiver and quitclaim. The efficacy of the waiver and quitclaim must be upheld. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the settlement were unconscionable, that the law will step in to bail out the employee. But the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what she was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim being credible and reasonable. HAEDCT

Petitioner received a higher separation pay by opting to resign instead of waiting for her retrenchment to take effect. Clearly, she had a good reason to preempt the retrenchment by resigning. Had she not resigned, she would have nonetheless been separated from her employment by January 29, 2008, the date of the effectivity of the retrenchment, and she would then still not have reached her retirement. Hence, her claim that she had no reason to resign because she was due to retire after three years is not well-taken.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition for review for its lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on March 30, 2011; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 31-43; penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo with Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante concurring.

2. Id. at 159.

3. Id. at 74.

4. Id. at 78.

5. Id. at 143-144.

6. Id. at 33-34.

7. Id. at 34.

8. Id.

9. Id. at 34-35.

10. Id. at 54.

11. Id. at 31.

12. Supra note 1.

13. Id. at 37-42.

14. Id. at 45-46.

15. Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM) v. Pulgar, G.R. No. 169227, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 244, 256.

16. G.R. No. 119512, July 13, 1998, 292 SCRA 478.

17. Id. at 496.

18. Auza, Jr. v. MOL Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 175481, November 21, 2012, 686 SCRA 66; Bilbao v. Saudi Arabian Airlines, G.R. No. 183915, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 540; Globe Telecom v. Crisologo, G.R. No. 174644, August 10, 2007, 529 SCRA 811; St. Michael Academy v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra.