FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 231410-11. September 11, 2019.]
ALEJANDRO I. ALCANTARA AND THE SARANGANI CATTLE COMPANY, INC., petitioners, vs.THE GUHAY CLAN, ET AL. AND THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 11, 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. Nos. 231410-11 (Alejandro I. Alcantara and The Sarangani Cattle Company, Inc. v. The Guhay Clan, et al. and The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources). — This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 dated September 15, 2016 and Resolution 2 dated April 24, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which upheld the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples' (NCIP) Decision 3 dated February 10, 2011 and Resolution 4 dated January 13, 2012 holding that private respondent Guhay Clan is entitled to the possession of the subject lots under Certificate of Ancestral Land Title No. R-12-GSC-1205-000051.
We grant the petition, and reaffirm Our ruling that the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 5 of Republic Act No. (RA) 8371, or "The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997" (IPRA), is limited to disputes involving the protection and promotion of the rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs)/Indigenous Peoples (IPs) where both parties are members of the same ICC/IP.
I.
Petitioner Alejandro I. Alcantara is a lessee of 1,228 hectares of property under Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement No. 103 (FLGLA) from November 1984 to December 2007. 6 Subsequently, under Forest Land Grazing Management Agreement No. 21-2007, (FLGMA) effective December 31, 2007 until December 31, 2032, petitioner Sarangani Cattle Company, Inc. (SCCI), became the leaseholder and possessor of the 1,228 hectares of property. 7
Despite the FLGLA and the FLGMA, private respondent applied with public respondent NCIP for a title over 104 hectares of the property. 8 On December 22, 2005, during the effectivity of the FLGLA, the NCIP granted private respondent a Certificate of Land Title (CALT) over the 104 hectares. 9 On December 20, 2007, before the effectivity of FLGMA entitling SCCI to be the leaseholder and possessor of the 1,228 hectares, the Register of Deeds of General Santos City issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-01 in the name of private respondent. 10
Thus, on December 2, 2009, petitioners filed with the NCIP a petition to review and reinvestigate the CALT on the ground that it was irregularly issued, and for non-compliance with RA 8371. 11 The case was docketed as NCIP OJ Case No. 009-2009. Private respondent was ordered to comment on the petition. 12
Meanwhile, on January 12, 2010, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession over the lots covered by OCT No. P-01. 13 In an Order dated February 2, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition outright, and found that "this is not a case for the issuance of a writ of possession, but an ejectment case against whomsoever is withholding the possession of said parcels of land, which are allegedly owned by the petitioner. Such being the case, this Court is devoid of any jurisdiction to hear the same." 14
Subsequent to this dismissal of the petition for the issuance of writ possession, private respondent filed in February 15, 2010 an ex-parte petition seeking a writ of possession this time, before the NCIP en banc. 15 NCIP docketed this ex-parte petition as Case No. RXI-0029010, and by Order dated November 12, 2010, required petitioners to comment on the petition. 16
Meanwhile, on January 12, 2011, NCIP dismissed NCIP OJ case No. 009-2009 17 having been filed beyond the prescriptive period provided in Rule III, Section 5, No. 3 (a) of Administrative Circular No. 1, Series of 2003 (AC 1-03). 18 Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied, 19 they filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 122549. 20
On February 10, 2011, the NCIP en banc granted the ex parte petition filed by private respondent for the issuance of a writ of possession. The NCIP en banc found that private respondent is entitled to the possession of the subject lots, 21 and therefore enjoined all acts that would impede or prevent private respondent's acts on possessing the subject lots, and directed petitioners to peacefully vacate these lots. 22 Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. 23 They therefore appealed before the CA, and the case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 123236. 24
In sum, the issues brought for the CA's consideration are the propriety of: (1) the dismissal of the petition for review and reinvestigation of CALT granted to private respondent (CA-G.R. SP No. 122549); and (2) the issuance by the NCIP of a writ of possession over the subject lots (CA-G.R. SP No. 123236). By Resolution dated May 18, 2012, the CA consolidated these cases, 25 and after deliberations, dismissed the consolidated petitions for review on September 15, 2017. 26
In CA-G.R. SP No. 122549, the CA held that the NCIP correctly dismissed the petition for review and reinvestigation on the ground that it was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided in AC 1-03. The rule prescribes that a petition for cancellation of CALT alleged to have been fraudulently acquired should be filed within one year from the date of registration. Here, the CA found that the subject CALT was registered on December 2, 2007, and that the petition was filed only on December 20, 2009, clearly beyond the one-year period. The CA emphasized that that procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. 27
In CA-G.R. SP No. 123236, the CA found that the issuance of the writ of possession by the NCIP was in order. It held that the principles in land registration cases are applicable here because the application for the issuance of a CALT (before the NCIP) is akin to a registration proceeding. Thus, when the CALT was registered, the NCIP had the ministerial duty to deliver the possession of the subject land to the registered owners. 28
Petitioner now comes before Us arguing that the CA erred in dismissing the consolidated petitions, to wit:
I. The NCIP has no jurisdiction to issue a Writ of Possession against petitioners, the State, and the City of General Santos, who are not Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples; and
II. Even if the NCIP had such jurisdiction, the NCIP gravely and want only abused its discretion such that it has lost such jurisdiction. 29
On December 13, 2017, We directed private respondents, the NCIP, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) (which We impleaded in this case as a party-respondent) to comment on the petition. 30
In its comment, 31 the NCIP submits that it had jurisdiction to issue the writ of possession, pursuant to the exercise of its powers ordained by law. It argues that the issuance of the writ is a consequence of its power to issue CALTs, which power is conferred by Section 44 of RA 8371. 32
The DENR, through the Office of the Solicitor General, concurs with petitioners in its comment. 33 It contends that the NCIP's jurisdiction under Section 66 of RA 8371 is limited, and applies only when the opposing parties of a controversy are members of the same ICC/IP. 34 The DENR states that here, petitioners are not members of any ICC/IP group, hence, they are not covered by the jurisdiction of the NCIP. The determination of who has a better right of possession over the subject lots is within the province of the regular courts, not the NCIP. 35
Despite repeated proper notices, private respondent failed to file its comment. In order not to delay the resolution of this case, We deemed private respondent to have waived the filing of its comment in a Resolution dated July 17, 2019. 36
II.
The petition has merit. We agree with petitioners and the DENR.
At the onset, We note that the issue of jurisdiction was squarely raised by petitioners in their comment and opposition to private respondent's ex parte petition for issuance of writ of possession. They argued that the recovery of the possession of the subject lots from their present and actual possessor should be made before the regular courts and not with the NCIP. 37
The NCIP, however, disagreed with petitioners. It cited Rule III, Section 5 of AC 1-03, thus:
RULE III — JURISDICTION
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following:
(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the RHO:
a. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;
b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of ICCs/IPs;
c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;
d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of RA 8371; and
e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
(2) Original Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office:
a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and settlement of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under customary laws; and
b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No. 8371.
xxx xxx xxx 38
The NCIP held that "[t]he pending petition stripped down in its bare form seeks a decision from this Commission that the petitioner Guhay Clan be installed to the possession of the subject parcels of land x x x. Without being confused by its title as one seeking for a writ of possession, this petition therefore is a case involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs." 39
We already settled the scope of the NCIP's jurisdiction under Section 66 of RA 8371. We held that that the jurisdiction of the NCIP in Section 66 is limited to claims and disputes involving rights of in Section 66 is limited to claims and disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where both parties belong to the same ICC/IP group, but if such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the proper regular courts shall have jurisdiction. 40 In fact, We declared the afore-cited NCIP rule as null and void for expanding the jurisdiction of the NCIP. 41
For context and understanding, We briefly discuss the cases of Unduran v. Aberasturi, (Unduran) 42 and Lim v. Gamosa (Lim) 43 which established this ruling.
In Unduran, respondents Aberasturi filed a petition for accion reivindicatoria before the RTC of Bukidnon against petitioner Talaandig Tribe on March 3, 2004. 44 Aberasturi filed the case as the attorney-in-fact of the lawful owners and possessors of an unregistered parcel of agricultural land (105.7361 hectares) which appears to be located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig Tribe. The Talaandig Tribe claims to have been living since birth on the land located at Barangay Miarayon, Bukidnon, Mindanao. 45
The Talaandig Tribe moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the case. It argued that the NCIP has exclusive original jurisdiction, as the subject matter concerns a dispute and controversy over an ancestral land/domain of ICCs/IPs. Aberasturi later on amended to petition to one for injunction, damages, and other relief. Subsequently, Talaandig Tribe moved to refer the case to the Regional Hearing Officer of the NCIP (RHO-NCIP), and to dismiss the amended complaint. Aberasturi opposed these motions. 46
On February 15, 2005, the RTC denied the motion to refer the case to the RHO-NCIP. It also granted the injunctive relief prayed for by Aberasturi against the Talaandig Tribe. The Talaandig Tribe therefore filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA which affirmed the RTC, and denied the referral of the case to the NCIP in its Decision dated August 17, 2006. The Talaandig Tribe's motion for reconsideration was denied. 47
Thus, petitioner Talaandig Tribe filed an appeal on certiorari before Us arguing in the main that the CA erred in affirming the jurisdiction of the RTC over an injunction case involving an ancestral domain of the Talaandigs. It contends that the NCIP has exclusive jurisdiction as the case concerns a claim and dispute involving rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain. For his part, respondent Aberasturi counters that the Talaandig Tribe cannot invoke the protection under RA 8371 because the conflict does not involve an ancestral domain; and that they (respondents) are not IPs so the condition precedent before bringing a dispute before the NCIP, i.e., exhaustion of remedies under customary laws by the parties, cannot be satisfied. 48
We denied the appeal and upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC. We ruled that contrary to petitioner Talaandig Tribe's contention, the mere fact that the case involves members of ICCs/IPs and their ancestral land is not enough for it to fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of RA 8371, to wit:
Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, however, that no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP. (Underscoring supplied.)
We explained that the qualifying provision requires two conditions before disputes may be brought before the NCIP, thus: (1) exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of the parties; and (2) compliance with condition precedent through the said certification by the Council of Elders/Leaders. As defined in the law, customary laws is a body of written and/or written rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed by the respective ICCs/IPs. Given these provisions, the only reasonable interpretation of the law should be that the parties to the dispute or claim belong to the same ICC/IP because only then can the two conditions be complied with. Otherwise, as We emphasized, "it would be violative of the principles of fair play and due process for those parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP to be subjected to its customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders." 49
In fact, as previously mentioned, We invalidated in Unduran Rule III, Section 5 of the NCIP Rules insofar as it expands the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of RA 8371. 50 The rule cannot validly include disputes where the parties do not belong to the same ICC/IP.
Subsequent to Unduran, We had the opportunity in Lim to further clarify the nature of the jurisdiction of the NCIP-whether it is primary and concurrent with courts of general jurisdiction, and/or original and exclusive, to the exclusion of other courts.
Lim involved a petition for violation of rights to free and prior and informed consent and unauthorized and unlawful intrusion filed by the Tagbanua ICC before the NCIP against Lim, et al. Lim moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the NCIP does not have jurisdiction over the case because they (Lim, et al.) are not members of the ICCs/IPs. The NCIP denied the motion through a Resolution dated November 30, 2006. Thus, Lim filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to reverse the NCIP Resolution. The CA however, affirmed the NCIP, and held that the NCIP was bestowed with an all-encompassing grant of jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs. 51
Lim therefore brought the issue to Us. We resolved to reverse the CA on the basis of the principle of Unduran, that is, based on the qualifying proviso in Section 66, the NCIP's jurisdiction over claims involving rights of ICCs/IPs occur only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. The jurisprudential significance of Our teaching in Lim is on the context where We are able to simplify the nature of the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of RA 8371 — the NCIP neither has the primary and/or exclusive and original jurisdiction over disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs. 52
Preliminarily, We noted in Lim that both the NCIP and the CA interpreted the statutory grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP as primary, original and exclusive, in all cases and instances where the claim or dispute involves rights of IPs/ICCs, without regard to whether one of the parties is non-IP/ICC. In fact, in NCIP AC 1-03 and Administrative Circular No. 1 Series of 2014, known as "The 2014 Revised Rules of Procedure before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples," the NCIP specified the cases where the NCIP, through its Regional Hearing Offices, shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction. 53
We did not sustain this classification of jurisdiction delineated by the NCIP, and declared Administrative Circular No. 1, Series of 2014 void for expanding the law. Foremost, We are mindful of Unduran which tells Us that the only reasonable interpretation of the proviso in Section 66 is that both parties in the dispute belong to the same ICC/IP. Second, while We recognized that the NCIP is the primary government agency to promote and protect the rights of the ICCs/IPs, We clarified that the creation of such agency does not per se grant it primary and/or exclusive and original jurisdiction to exclude the regular courts from taking cognizance of cases which may involve rights of ICCs/IPs. Besides, whenever other administrative bodies exercise primary, exclusive and original jurisdiction in specific cases, these bodies (in all instances) had been explicitly and specifically granted with such jurisdiction by law. Here, that explicit grant of jurisdiction by law is clearly wanting.
Lim therefore concluded that, taking into account Unduran, there is no clear intendment by the legislature to bestow primary and/or exclusive and original grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP over all claims and disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs under Section 66 of RA 8371. 54 At best, its limited jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the regular trial courts in the exercise of their general jurisdiction extending to all controversies brought before them within the legal bounds of rights and remedies. 55
We see no reason not to apply the foregoing principles in this case. Here, there is no dispute that petitioners are not members of a particular ICC or IP. Under Unduran, the jurisdiction of the NCIP cannot then be properly invoked. In other words, the NCIP could not have, at any point, taken congnizance of the petition for reinvestigation and review of the CALT, nor of the ex parte petition for a writ of possession, filed before it. A different interpretation will result not only in a clear deviation from the legislative intent of RA 8371, but more regrettably in a flagrant violation of due process and fair play to the parties.
Utmost consideration to the right to due process of the party/ies who will be compulsorily subjected to customary laws which they have not "traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed x x x" 56 should be paramount. A reading of Section 66 of RA 8371 as bestowing original and exclusive jurisdiction on the NCIP over all disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs irrespective of the parties to the action clearly runs afoul of this basic human right. The resulting disregard of this basic tenet of due process in the guise of promoting and protecting our ICCs/IPs via the grant of exclusive and original jurisdiction to the NCIP can never be countenanced.
As a matter of law, jurisdiction vests only when the requisites for its proper invocation are present. Otherwise, conferment of jurisdiction never occurs, as in this case. Consequently, all actions by the NCIP arising from its purported exercise of jurisdiction do not have any legal effect. At any rate, the NCIP Rules, on which the NCIP anchored its purported jurisdiction, have already been declared null and void.
Finally, private respondent's reliance on City Government of Baguio v. Masweng, (Masweng) 57 fails to convince. Masweng is the prevailing case law at the time private respondent filed the ex parte petition for writ of possession before the NCIP. 58 Suffice it to say that We have already stated that this Court in Masweng "did not identify and elaborate on the statutory basis of the NCIP's 'original and exclusive jurisdiction' on disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains. Hence, such description of the nature and scope of the NCIP's jurisdiction made without argument or full consideration of the point, can only be considered as an obiter dictum, which is a mere expression of an opinion with not binding force for purposes of resjudicata and does not embody the determination of the court." 59 So much so that We declared that such ruling "cannot tie our hands and declare a grant of primary and/or original jurisdiction on the NCIP, when there is no such explicit conferment by the IPRA." 60
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated September 15, 2016 and Resolution dated April 24, 2017 of the Court of Appeals, respectively, in the consolidated petitions of CA-G.R. SP No. 122549 and CA-G.R. SP No. 123236 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo pp. 57, 67b, penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes with the concurrence of Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Elihu A. Ybañez.
2.Id. at 69-71.
3.Id. at 115-124.
4.Id. at 125-128.
5. Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.
6.Id. at 12.
7.Id. at 12-13.
8.Id. at 13.
9.Id.
10.Id.
11.Id.
12.Rollo, pp. 13-15.
13.Id. at 15.
14.Id. at 17-18.
15.Id. at 18-21.
16.Id. at 23.
17.Id.
18. Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples.
19.Rollo, p. 25.
20.Id.
21.Rollo, p. 60.
22.Id. at 25.
23.Id.
24.Id.
25.Id.
26.Rollo, p. 26.
27.Id. at 63-64.
28.Id. at 66-67.
29.Id. at 26.
30.Id. at 104.
31.Id. at 169-180.
32. Sec. 44. Powers and Functions. — To accomplish its mandate, the NCIP shall have the following powers, jurisdiction and function:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) to issue certificate of ancestral land/domain title;
xxx xxx xxx
33. Rollo, pp. 147-158.
34. Id. at 153.
35.Id.
36. Id. at 207-208.
37. Id. at 116.
38. Id. at 117-118.
39. Id. at 118.
40. Unduran v. Aberasturi, G.R. No. 181284, April 18, 2017, 823 SCRA 80, 102.
41. Id. at 105.
42. Unduran v. Aberasturi, G.R. No. 181284, October 20, 2015, 773 SCRA 114.
43. G.R. No. 193964, December 2, 2015, 775 SCRA 646.
44. Unduran v. Aberasturi, supra note 42 at 132.
45. Id. at 131.
46. Id. at 132-133.
47. Id. at 134.
48. Id. at 138.
49. Id. at 117.
50. Id. at 150-152.
51. Lim v. Gamosa, supra note 43 at 655.
52. Id. at 647.
53. Rule III, Sections 5 and 1, respectively of the 2003 and 2014 Administrative Circular, provide: thus:
Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of RA 8371, including but not limited to the following:
(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer (RHO):
a. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;
b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of ICCs/IPs;
c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;
d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8 (b) of RA 8371; and
e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
54. Lim v. Gamosa, supra note 43 at 660.
55. Id. at 683.
56. RA 8371, Chapter II, Sec. 3 (f).
57. G.R. No. 180206, February 4, 2009, 578 SCRA 88.
58. Rollo, p. 172.
59. Unduran v. Aberasturi, supra note 40 at 125.
60. Lim v. Gamosa, supra note 42 at 683.