Alcancia y Tenorio v. People

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 238938. July 3, 2019.]

VERONICA ALCANCIA y TENORIO, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 3, 2019, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 238938 (Veronica Alcancia y Tenorio vs. People of the Philippines). — This is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions dated January 24, 2018 2 and April 19, 2018 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 38757. These resolutions declared petitioner Veronica Alcancia y Tenorio's (Veronica) appeal as abandoned, on the ground of failure to file an appellant's brief within the period allowed by the rules.

This case arose from three (3) criminal cases, which charged Veronica and a certain Hector Alcancia (Hector) with: (a) one (1) count of Illegal Recruitment, punishable under Section 6 (m), in relation to Section 7 (b), of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042; 4 (b) one (1) count of Illegal Recruitment punishable under Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042; and (c) one (1) count of Estafa, punishable under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 11-334, 11-335, and 11-336, respectively. These were also raffled to Branch 68 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal. 5

On November 9, 2011, Veronica pleaded not guilty to the criminal charges against her. The trial court was unable to obtain jurisdiction over the person of her co-accused, Hector. 6

The prosecution alleged that the private complainant, Ma. Belen De Guzman (Belen), was introduced to Veronica and Hector, when she learned from her friend that they can provide assistance in getting a visa to Germany. Veronica supposedly assured Belen that she can get a multiple-entry Szhengen Visa for a fee of P30,000,00. Veronica further represented that she can get Belen a job in Germany. 7

After paying the amount of P30,000.00 to Veronica, Belen was given the assurance that she can leave for Germany by May 2005. Belen, subsequently, made another payment of P65,000.00 to Veronica. However, when May 2005 arrived, Belen was advised that she would have to wait for her scheduled departure. 8

When Belen asked for the return of her money, Veronica stated that her money was spent for the supporting documents to her visa application. Veronica then gave Belen photocopies of certain documents, including an income tax return, a certification from an insurance company, and a Verbal Note. She also directed Belen to pretend that she works in Veronica's school. 9

That same month, it was Veronica — not Belen, who went to Germany. She promised to return with a sponsorship letter for Belen. The following month, however, or on July 2005, Hector called Belen and asked for another P150,000.00 to expedite the processing of her documents. Belen refused. She then demanded that Veronica and Hector either return her money or send her to Germany. Belen made several follow-ups, but Veronica and Hector no longer replied. 10

Veronica, for her part, failed to appear during her scheduled dates to present evidence. Upon the motion of the prosecution, the trial court resolved to consider this as a waiver of her right to present evidence. Veronica did not move for the reconsideration of this order. 11

In a Consolidated Decision 12 dated May 2, 2016, the RTC of Binangonan, Rizal found Veronica guilty of the first charge of Illegal Recruitment, as well as the charge of Estafa, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

a) In Criminal Case No. 11-334, accused Veronica Alcancia is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment under Section 6(m) of R.A. 8042 and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and a fine of P250,000.00;

b) In Criminal Case No. 11-335, accused Veronica Alcancia is found NOT GUILTY of Illegal Recruitment as charged on the ground of reasonable doubt; and

c) In Criminal Case No. 11-336, accused Veronica Alcancia is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8) months and (one)1 [sic] day of prision mayor, as maximum; and

d) Accused Veronica Alcancia is further ordered to indemnify complainant Ma. Belen De Guzman in the sum of P65,000.00, plus legal interest thereon from 10 October 2005, the date of receipt of the demand letter by the accused, until fully paid.

The penalties in this case consist in deprivation of liberty which cannot be served simultaneously by reason of the nature of such penalties. Hence, since the accused is sentenced to two terms of imprisonment, the terms should be served successively.

The criminal cases against at-large accused Hector Alcancia are in the meantime sent to the archives. The warrants of arrest for accused Hector Alcancia subsist and remain outstanding until his eventual arrest to face his own trial.

Let copies of this Consolidated Decision be furnished the Public Prosecutor, the counsel de parte, the private complainant, and the accused.

SO ORDERED. 13

The RTC of Binangonan, Rizal found that Veronica committed Illegal Recruitment when she promised to help Belen obtain a visa and a job in Germany, through her brother, Hector. This was further compounded by the fact that Veronica and Hector received money from Belen for the processing of her visa application. As regards the charge of Estafa, the trial court ruled that Veronica defrauded Belen through deceit, when she made these representations without actually being able to recruit and send Belen to Germany. As a consequence of this deceit, Belen paid substantial amounts of money to Veronica and Hector, under the mistaken belief that they would obtain a visa on her behalf. 14

On June 2, 2016, Veronica's counsel de oficio filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's judgment of conviction. 15 That same day, the trial court gave due course to the appeal and directed the clerk of court to forward the records to the CA. 16

In a notice dated September 20, 2016, the CA notified Veronica's counsel of record, Atty. Cipriano G. Robielos III (Atty. Robielos III), to file the appellant's brief within 30 days from notice. 17 Instead of filing the required brief, however, Veronica filed a Motion for New Trial 18 on October 14, 2016. She argued that the incompetence of her former counsel resulted in her failure to present evidence before the trial court. 19

In a Resolution 20 dated September 22, 2017, the CA ruled that a motion for new trial may only be filed on the ground of newly-discovered evidence. Furthermore, the CA found that the trial court notified Veronica and her counsel in open court regarding the date of her presentation of evidence, but she and her counsel failed to appear on said date. Veronica also did not move for the reconsideration of the trial court's order that considered her to have waived her right to present evidence. The CA, likewise, found that on June 14, 2011, Veronica signed an undertaking to appear during trial, and that her absence would constitute as an express waiver of her right to be present. 21

In view of Veronica's repeated failure to participate during the proceedings in the trial court, the CA resolved to deny her motion for new trial. This notwithstanding, Veronica was given another period of 30 days within which to file her appeal brief, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for New Trial is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

Accused-appellant, however, in the interest of justice, is given an inextendible period of thirty (30) days from notice to file her Appellant's Brief.

SO ORDERED. 22

The CA, in its first assailed Resolution 23 dated January 24, 2018, found that Veronica received a copy of its earlier resolution on October 3, 2017. But as per verification from the Case Management Information System on January 16, 2018, Veronica did not file the required brief. For this reason, the CA ruled to deem Veronica's appeal as abandoned:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is declared ABANDONED and is DISMISSED pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED. 24

On March 13, 2018, Veronica moved for the reconsideration of this resolution, stating that Atty. Robielos III did not contact her for unknown reasons. She also argued that her former counsel, Atty. Robielos III, has been negligent in handling her case. Veronica, thus, prayed for the reconsideration of the CA's Resolution dated January 24, 2018, as well as the admission of her attached appellant's brief. 25

In the second assailed Resolution 26 dated April 19, 2018, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-appellant's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for being filed out of time. Let an Entry of Judgment be issued in this case.

SO ORDERED. 27

Since the Resolution dated January 24, 2018 was received by Veronica's counsel on February 7, 2018, the CA ruled that she only had until February 22, 2018 within which to move for the reconsideration of the resolution. Veronica filed her motion only on March 13, 2018, or twenty (20) days after the lapse of the reglementary period. Thus, the CA ruled that its earlier resolution declaring the appeal abandoned has lapsed into finality. 28

Unsatisfied with the ruling of the CA, Veronica filed the present petition before this Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the resolutions declaring her appeal abandoned. According to her, Atty. Robielos III suffered from a heart failure at the time the brief became due. As a result, Veronica was unable to timely file her appellant's brief. She later obtained the services of another counsel in order to comply with the directive of the CA. 29

Essentially, Veronica claims that her counsel has been grossly negligent in the handling of her case. This supposedly resulted in her non-compliance with the prescribed rules of procedure. 30

Ruling of the Court

The Court finds the petition without merit.

It is a well-settled rule that the negligence of the counsel binds the client, including mistakes in the application of procedural rules. This proceeds from the agency created between the client and the counsel, pursuant to which the acts of the counsel are considered within the scope of the express or implied authority of the client. 31 In this manner, jurisprudence charges the parties with the duty to maintain regular contact with their lawyer, and to keep themselves informed of the progress of their case. 32

This is the prevailing rule because there would be no end to litigation if parties are allowed to simply allege that "the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned," 33 thus, necessitating the hiring of a new counsel and the reopening of the case. 34 While this rule indeed admits of an exception, the Court requires that the counsel's negligence should not be accompanied by the client's own negligence or malice. 35 There must also be proof that the negligence of the counsel was so gross and palpable, resulting in the violation of the client's due process rights. 36

In this case, Veronica initially argued that her former counsel, Atty. Robielos III, was negligent in handling her case. In the present petition, however, she claims that Atty. Robielos III suffered a heart failure, which resulted in the non-filing of the required appellant's brief. Whatever the case, Veronica was unable to sufficiently establish that Atty. Robielos III was grossly negligent in such manner that she was deprived of her right to due process.

The records clearly show that Veronica was given several opportunities to file the required appellant's brief with the CA. After the first notice to file the appeal brief was sent to Veronica's counsel, she moved for a new trial instead of complying with the directive. Despite the denial of her motion, the CA, in the interest of justice, granted another thirty (30)-day period within which Veronica may file the required brief. Again, she failed to observe the directive of the CA, which resulted in the abandonment of her appeal. The supposed negligence of her counsel, therefore, did not result in the violation of her right to due process.

Furthermore, the attached medical records of Atty. Robielos III show that he was admitted to the hospital on February 8, 2017. 37 Meanwhile, Atty. Robielos III received a copy of the CA's Resolution dated September 22, 2017 granting Veronica another period of thirty (30) days within which to file the appeal brief on October 3, 2017. 38 This was more than seven (7) months since his alleged heart failure. Had Veronica been more circumspect with her duty to monitor the status of her case, she should have obtained the services of another counsel. She cannot belatedly assign blame to the failing health of her counsel after the adverse resolution of the CA declaring her appeal abandoned. Besides, her own negligence contributed to the carelessness of her counsel. As the client, she also had the responsibility to keep abreast of the status of her case from her counsel. 39

There being no violation of Veronica's due process rights, the present petition must be denied for lack of merit. The Court cannot sanction Veronica's habitual failure to follow the procedural rules, and her repeated excuses about the unsubstantiated negligence of her counsel. It should be emphasized that the right to an appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, which must be exercised in the manner prescribed by law. 40 In these lights, the appeal of Veronica was correctly declared as abandoned for failing to strictly comply with procedural rules.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated January 24, 2018 and April 19, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 38757 are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED." (Inting, J., no part, due to his sister's prior participation in the Court of Appeals; Caguioa, J., designated additional Member per Raffle dated July 1, 2019.)

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 13-51.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Rafael Antonio M. Santos, with Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Socorro B. Inting concurring; id. at 56-57.

3.Id. at 60-62.

4. AN ACT TO INSTITUTE THE POLICIES OF OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT AND ESTABLISH A HIGHER STANDARD OF PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE WELFARE OF MIGRANT WORKERS, THEIR FAMILIES AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS IN DISTRESS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (Approved: June 7, 1995), as amended by R.A. No. 10022, AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8042, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS ACT OF 1995, AS AMENDED, FURTHER IMPROVING THE STANDARD OF PROTECTION AND PROMOTION OF THE WELFARE OF MIGRANT WORKERS, THEIR FAMILIES AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS IN DISTRESS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (Approved: July 8, 2010).

5.Rollo, pp. 90-92.

6.Id. at 92.

7.Id.

8.Id. at 93.

9.Id.

10.Id.

11.Id. at 94.

12. Rendered by Presiding Judge Lily Ann M. Padaen; id. at 90-99.

13.Id. at 98-99.

14.Id. at 95-97.

15.Id. at 100.

16.Id. at 102.

17.Id. at 103.

18.Id. at 104-108.

19.Id. at 105-106.

20.Id. at 110-114.

21.Id. at 112-113.

22.Id. at 114.

23.Id. at 56-58.

24.Id. at 57.

25.Id. at 115.

26.Id. at 60-62.

27.Id. at 61-62.

28.Id. at 61.

29.Id. at 25-26.

30.Id. at 29.

31.Ong Lay Hin v. Court of Appeals, et al., 752 Phil. 15, 23-24 (2015).

32.Bejarasco, Jr. v. People, 656 Phil. 337, 340 (2011).

33.Basuel v. Fact-finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), 526 Phil. 608, 615-616 (2006).

34.Mendoza, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 764 Phil. 53, 64 (2015).

35. See PO1 Tabobo v. People, 811 Phil. 235, 247-248 (2017).

36.Mendoza, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra, at 63-64.

37.Rollo, p. 138.

38.Id. at 56.

39.Lagua v. Court of Appeals, et al., 689 Phil. 452, 457 (2012).

40.Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. v. Elvira A. Villareal (deceased), et al., 708 Phil. 443, 445-446 (2013).