Alberca v. Transocean Shipmanagement (Phils.), Inc.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 204102. August 4, 2021.]

SAMUEL M. ALBERCA, petitioner, vs.TRANSOCEAN SHIPMANAGEMENT (PHILS.), INC., JOHN T. ESSBERGER B.V., AND/OR MR. CARLOS S. SALINAS, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated04 August 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 204102 (Samuel M. Alberca v. Transocean Shipmanagement (Phils.), Inc., John T. Essberger B.V., and/or Mr. Carlos S. Salinas). — Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari dated December 17, 2012 filed by petitioner Samuel M. Alberca (Alberca) praying for the reversal of the Decision 1 dated June 28, 2012 and the Resolution 2 dated October 22, 2012 the Court of Appeals (CA) in the case entitled, "Transocean Shipmanagement (Phils.), Inc., John T. Essberger B.V., and/or Mr. Carlos S. Salinas vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Samuel M. Alberca," docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 123285.

The Factual Antecedents

Alberca was employed by the respondents Transocean Shipmanagement (Phils.), Inc., John T. Essberger B.V., and/or Mr. Carlos S. Salinas (respondents) as a pumpman on board the vessel M/T Bastian Broere under a Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA)-approved employment contract, which commenced on October 21, 2009. 3

On January 9, 2010, while working on deck, Alberca's left hand was caught between the roller and the rope, injuring his second, third and fourth fingers on his left hand. First aid measures were rendered by the other crew members. Thereafter, Alberca was brought to a doctor in the Netherlands, where he was diagnosed with "crush injury, digits II, III, and IV and minimal avulsion fracture distale phalange, left hand."4

On January 12, 2010, Alberca was medically repatriated, and was immediately referred to the company-designated physician at the Metropolitan Medical Center. He was diagnosed to have crush injury of the left hand with burst laceration of the third and fourth fingers, and hematoma of the index finger. He immediately underwent surgical operations, and was given medications for his condition. 5

For over five months, Alberca underwent several sessions of physical therapy and other treatments under the care and supervision of the company-designated physician. On April 27, 2010, the company-designated physician found that there was improving sensation and strength of the index, middle, and ring fingers on Alberca's left hand, but Alberca was advised to continue with his therapy and home exercise. Thereafter, on May 22, 2010, the company-designated physician issued a medical report where it was found that there was improved sensation on the left second finger with flexion contracture of the distal interphalangeal joint, left third finger. Likewise, the company-designated physician found that Alberca's grip strength remains to be good, but the company-designated physician advised Alberca to continue physical therapy and to come back for re-evaluation on June 11, 2010. However, despite due notice, Alberca failed to show up for his re-evaluation. 6 CAIHTE

Unsatisfied with the treatments rendered by the company-designated physician, and unknown to the respondents, Alberca sought the medical opinion of Dr. Manuel Fidel M. Magtira (Dr. Magtira) on May 29, 2010. 7 Based on the medical report 8 dated May 29, 2010, Dr. Magtira found that Alberca was suffering from a 20.15% of Grade 10 Disability — loss of grasping power for large objects between the fingers and palm of one hand. Further, Dr. Magtira noted that since Alberca is a left-handed person, the injury to his dominant hand is a burden, and as such, Alberca was declared permanently unfit for further sea duties. 9

On June 17, 2010, and after Alberca failed to show up for re-evaluation, the company-designated physician issued a medical report which stated that: "The specialist opines that patient is for possible fitness to work on June 11, 2010. However, patient failed to report as instructed."10 Finally, on July 29, 2010 or 168 days from Alberca's repatriation, the company-designated physician issued his final and definitive assessment, which found that Alberca was suffering from a 20% of Grade 12 Disability due to the loss of function of petitioner Alberca's third finger. 11

Proceedings before the Labor Tribunals

Alberca filed a Complaint against the respondents before the Labor Arbiter claiming full disability benefits. In the Complaint, which was principally grounded on the medical assessment of Dr. Magtira, Alberca argued that: (1) the medical assessment of the company-designated physician is not final and conclusive; and (2) he is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits pursuant to Permanent Medical Unfitness provisions in their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) since Dr. Magtira declared him to be permanently unfit for sea duties. 12 Pertinently, the Permanent Medical Unfitness provisions of the CBA provide:

20.1.3.1

A seafarer who suffers disabling permanent disability as a result of a work related illness or from an injury as a result of an accident regardless of fault but excluding injuries caused by a seafarer's willful act, whilst traveling to or from the ship, and whose ability to work is reduced as a result thereof, shall in addition to sick pay, be entitled to compensation according to the provisions of this Agreement. In determining work related illness, reference shall be made to the Philippine Employees Compensation Law and/or Social Security Law. 13

20.1.4. Permanent Medical Unfitness

A seafarer whose disability is assessed at 50% or more under the POEA Employment Contract shall, for the purpose of this paragraph be regarded as permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity and entitled to 100% compensation, i.e., US$148,500.00 for senior officers, US$118,800.00 for junior officers and US$89,100.00 for ratings (effective January 1, 2008). Furthermore, any seafarer assessed at less than 50% disability under the contract but certified as permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity by the Company doctor, shall also be entitled to 100% compensation. 14 (Emphasis supplied)

In response, the respondents argued that Alberca is guilty of medical abandonment, and his refusal to continue his treatment prevented improvement of his physical condition. Moreover, the respondents argued that the findings of the company-designated physician must be upheld. 15

On April 28, 2011, the Labor Arbiter rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Samuel's claim for payment of full disability benefits is dismissed for lack of merit. Respondents are hereby ordered to pay Samuel disability benefits equivalent to 20% of Grade 12 pursuant to the POEA Standard Employment Contract.

All other claims are dismissed for lack of basis.

SO ORDERED. 16

In denying Alberca's claim for full disability benefits, the Labor Arbiter highlighted that Alberca failed to continue his treatments, and thus, Alberca himself prevented his injury from being cured. Moreover, the Labor Arbiter noted that Alberca's claim for full disability benefits has no basis considering that his own doctor of choice, Dr. Magtira, made an assessment that he was merely suffering from a Grade 10 Disability. Finally, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the medical findings of the company-designated physician, though not automatically binding, must be given more probative weight in this case, considering the extensive medical evaluation conducted by the company-designated physician over the course of several months. 17

Aggrieved, Alberca appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). 18 Notably, the NLRC gave credence to the findings of Dr. Magtira that since Alberca is a left-handed person, the injury to his dominant hand made him unfit for further sea duties. Moreover, the NLRC explained that permanent disability is the inability to perform work for more than 120 days, and since Alberca has not been able to work for more than 120 days since he was medically repatriated on January 12, 2010, then there is no doubt that he is suffering from permanent and total disability. 19 Thus, the NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter's Decision, and ordered the respondents to pay Alberca full disability benefits:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated April 28, 2011 is hereby MODIFIED by ordering the Respondents to pay disability benefits to the Complainant in the amount of US$89,100.00 pursuant to the AMOSUP CBA.

The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 20

The respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied in the NLRC's Resolution 21 dated December 2, 2011.

Petition before the CA

Because of the adverse rulings of the NLRC, the respondents elevated the case before the CA via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In their Petition for Certiorari, the respondents alleged that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and excess of jurisdiction when it awarded Alberca permanent and total disability benefits in the amount of US$89,100.00 considering that:

First, both the company-designated physician and petitioner Alberca's doctor of choice assessed Alberca to be suffering only from Grade 12 Disability and Grade 10 Disability, respectively. 22

Second, the POEA Standard Employment Contract specifically provides that it is the company-designated physician who should assess the seafarer's degree of disability. 23

Third, while a seafarer may ask for the medical opinion of another doctor, such opinion does not automatically set aside the medical findings of the company-designated physician. 24 DETACa

Fourth, the medical findings of Dr. Magtira deserve scant consideration since he only examined Alberca once, and he did not conduct any extensive medical examinations nor tests upon Alberca. On the other hand, the medical assessment of the company-designated physician was based on extensive medical examinations over the course of several months. 25

Fifth, the NLRC's reliance on the presumption that a seafarer is suffering from permanent and total disability after the lapse of 120 days is misplaced since such rule has already been modified and extended to a maximum of 240 days. In the present case, the company-designated physician issued his medical assessment within 198 days from repatriation, clearly within the 240-day period. In any case, it must be emphasized that the POEA Standard Employment Contract actually measures disability benefits in terms of grading and not merely by the number of days. 26

On June 28, 2012, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the instant petition. The Decision rendered by the Sixth (6th) Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated September 30, 2011 in NLRC LAC No. OFW (M)-07-000607-11 and the subsequent Resolution dated December 2, 2011 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision rendered by Labor Arbiter Eduardo DJ. Carpio dated April 28, 2011 in NLRC NCR Case No. (M) NCR-06-08617-10 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED. 27

In reversing the Resolution of the NLRC, the CA ruled that under the POEA Standard Employment Contract, the company-designated physician is the one tasked to assess a seafarer's disability. Thus, the findings of the company-designated physician must be upheld, especially because company-designated physicians extend extensive medical attention and acquire familiarity and detailed knowledge of the patient's medical condition. 28

The CA likewise stated that it cannot give credence to the medical findings of Alberca's doctor of choice, Dr. Magtira, considering that Dr. Magtira's assessment that Alberca is unfit for sea duties was made only after he had seen Alberca once. 29 All told, the CA found no reasonable basis to grant full disability benefits in favor of Alberca. 30

The Instant Petition

In view of the CA's reversal of the NLRC Decision, Alberca came before this Court by way of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, 31 where Alberca raised the following issues:

I. THE [CA] COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND VIOLATION OF SECTION 20 (B) OF THE POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT IN HOLDING THAT IT IS THE COMPANY-DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN'S FINDINGS WHICH SHOULD FORM THE BASIS OF ANY DISABILITY CLAIM OF THE SEAFARER.

II. THE [CA] COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT FAILED AND/OR REFUSED TO APPLY THE CORRECT LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE ON DISABILITY BENEFITS.32

Thus, in the instant petition, Alberca principally argued the following:

First, citing several case law, Alberca contended that the medical findings of the company-designated physician are not conclusive upon the seafarer and the courts since the seafarer may seek the opinion of his or her doctor of choice. 33

Second, Alberca argued that the company-designated physician is only given a period of 120 days to declare a seafarer fit to work or assess the degree of the seafarer's disability. 34 However, in this case, Alberca was subjected to treatments for more than five months without any such declaration of fitness or unfitness for work from the company-designated physician. 35 Thus, such failure of the company-designated physician to declare Alberca's fitness to work within the 120-day period entitles him to permanent and total disability benefits. 36

Third, Alberca alleged that the CA gravely erred when it failed to apply the Permanent Medical Unfitness provisions of the CBA. Accordingly, Alberca argued that under the Permanent Medical Unfitness provisions of the CBA, he is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits since Dr. Magtira already declared him to be permanently unfit for further sea duties. 37

On May 9, 2013, respondents filed their Comment/Opposition (To Petitioner's Petition for Review), 38 where the respondents averred that the CA correctly ruled that Alberca is not entitled to full disability compensation.

In their Comment/Opposition, the respondents emphasized that Alberca's claim for full disability benefits has no factual and legal basis because neither the company-designated physician nor Alberca's doctor of choice made an assessment that Alberca is suffering from a permanent and total disability. 39

The respondents likewise argued that mere inability to work for a period of 120 days does not entitle a seafarer to permanent disability benefits since under the POEA Standard Employment Contract, disability benefits are measured not through the number of days, but by the disability gradings assessed by the company-designated physician. In any case, the respondents stressed that the presumption of permanent disability after the lapse of 120 days has already been modified. Citing several jurisprudence, the respondents stated that a seafarer's disability only becomes permanent when the company-designated physician, within the period of 240 days, declares it to be so, or when after the lapse of such period, fails to make such declaration. Thus, since the company-designated physician was able to make a medical assessment within the 240-day period, Alberca is not entitled to full disability benefits. 40 aDSIHc

Finally, the respondents alleged that Dr. Magtira's declaration that Alberca is unfit for further sea duties cannot be used as a basis for his entitlement to full disability benefits under the CBA, since Dr. Magtira is not an independent doctor contemplated under the POEA Standard Employment Contract. Under the POEA Standard Employment Contract, if the seafarer's doctor of choice disagrees with the assessment made by the company-designated physician, a third doctor may be jointly appointed by the employer and the seafarer. However, in this case, Dr. Magtira was chosen by Alberca alone, and thus, cannot be considered as the independent doctor contemplated under the POEA Standard Employment Contract. 41

On October 7, 2013, Alberca filed his Reply where he reiterated that he is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits. 42

Our Ruling

Upon review of the submissions filed before this Court, it appears that the main issue to be resolved is whether Alberca is entitled to the full compensation for permanent and total disability.

As a general rule, only questions of law raised via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are reviewable by this Court. 43 However, such rule may be relaxed when, as in the present case, the findings of the CA differ with that of the NLRC. 44 However, while there are no procedural obstacles for this Court to conduct this review, We still find that the instant Petition is devoid of merit.

In Disability Compensation, the Company-

As correctly stated by the CA, under the POEA Standard Employment Contract, the person tasked to determine whether the seafarer is suffering from any disability or is fit to work is the company-designated physician. 45 Such rule has likewise been consistently upheld in a long line of cases.

In Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. Velasquez, 46 this Court categorically ruled that the disability of a seafarer can only be assessed by a company-designated physician:

These provisions clearly illustrate that respondent's disability can only be assessed by the company-designated physician. If the company-designated physician declares him fit to work, then the seaman is bound by such declaration.

Further, it should be noted that the claim for sickness and permanent disability benefits arose from the stipulations in the standard format contract of employment pursuant to a circular of the POEA. Such circular was intended for all parties involved in the employment of Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel. The POEA Contract, of which the parties are both signatories, is the law between them and as such, its provisions bind both of them. Thus, the parties are both bound by the provisions of the POEA Contract which declares that the degree of disability or fitness to work of a seafarer should be assessed by the company-designated physician. 47 (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)

Further, in Ison v. Crewserve, Inc., 48 this Court again ruled that the company-designated physician is the one tasked to determine a seafarer's degree of disability:

[I]t is explicit and clear that for purposes of determining the seafarer's degree of disability, it is the company-designated physician who must proclaim that he sustained a permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of his employment. This was the ruling in Panganiban v. Tara Trading Shipmanagement, Inc., where it was held that there being no ambiguity in the wordings of the Standard Employment Contract that the only qualification prescribed for the physician entrusted with the task of assessing the disability is that he be "company-designated," the literal meaning of the same shall thus control. 49 (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted) ETHIDa

With the foregoing, it is evident that the task of determining a seafarer's disability principally falls upon the company-designated physician. Nevertheless, We confirm Alberca's understanding that the assessment made by the company-designated physician is not automatically binding nor conclusive, considering that the POEA Standard Employment Contract recognizes a seafarer's prerogative to consult with his or her doctor of choice. 50 In fact, in Andrada v. Agemar Manning Agency, Inc., 51 We clarified that the assessment made by the company-designated physician is not automatically final or binding, since a seafarer may consult with a doctor of his or her choice:

Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman's disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter's employment. It is his findings and evaluations which should form the basis of the seafarer's disability claim. His assessment, however, is not automatically final, binding or conclusive on the claimant, the labor tribunal or the courts, as its inherent merits would still have to be weighed and duly considered. The seafarer may dispute such assessment by seasonably exercising his prerogative to seek a second opinion and consult a doctor of his choice. x x x 52 (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)

Such ruling has been reiterated by this Court in Seacrest Maritime Management, Inc. v. Roderos, 53 where it was held:

It is settled jurisprudence that it is the company-designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman's disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter's employment. While this is so, the same finding is not automatically final, binding or conclusive.

In fact, should the seafarer disagree with the assessment by the company designated physician, the former may dispute the assessment by seasonably exercising his/her prerogative to seek a second opinion and consult a doctor of his/her choice. In case of disagreement between the findings of the company-designated physician and the seafarer's doctor of choice, the employer and the seafarer may agree jointly to refer the latter to a third doctor whose decision shall be final and binding on them. 54 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

In other words, and as succinctly stated by this Court in Tulabing v. MST Marine Services (Phils.), Inc., 55 "[t]he only instance when the assessment of the company-designated physician may be challenged is when the seafarer likewise consulted with his personal physician who issued a different assessment."

In the present case, Alberca submitted himself to be examined by the company-designated physician upon his repatriation on January 12, 2010. He was then examined and treated by respondents' company-designated physician over the course of five months. However, despite several treatments and months of physical therapy, Alberca felt that his condition has not improved, and thus, consulted with his doctor of choice, Dr. Magtira. On May 29, 2010, Dr. Magtira assessed Alberca to be suffering from 20.15% of Grade 10 Disability and declared Alberca to be permanently unfit for further sea duties. Notably, when Dr. Magtira issued his assessment, the company-designated physician was still in the process of evaluating Alberca's condition and was yet to issue his medical assessment. Finally, on July 29, 2010 or 168 days from Alberca's repatriation, the company-designated physician issued his final and definitive assessment, which found that Alberca was suffering from a 20% of Grade 12 Disability due to the loss of function of Alberca's third finger.

Here, Alberca urges this Court to disregard the medical assessment of the company-designated physician, simply because the same is not automatically conclusive, and asks this Court to sustain the declaration made by Dr. Magtira that he is unfit to resume further sea duties. This We cannot do.

As borne by the records of this case, neither the company-designated physician nor Alberca's doctor of choice assessed Alberca's disability as total and permanent. In fact, Dr. Magtira declared that Alberca is suffering merely from a 20.15% of Grade 10 Disability. In this regard, it must be emphasized that an award for the full amount of permanent and total disability presupposes a Grade 1 Disability. 56 Thus, We agree with the findings of the Labor Arbiter that Alberca's claim for full disability benefits has no basis whatsoever since Dr. Magtira himself did not assess Alberca to be suffering from a Grade 1 Disability.

Nonetheless, if Alberca indeed thought that Dr. Magtira declared his disability as a permanent and total one, Alberca should have complied with the procedure laid out in the POEA Standard Employment Contract. In instances when the medical findings of the company-designated physician differ from the assessment of the seafarer's doctor of choice, a third doctor may be agreed jointly by the employer and the seafarer, whose findings shall be final and binding on both parties. 57 Pertinently, this referral to a third doctor has been consistently held by this Court to be mandatory in nature. 58 In fact, in Abundo v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, 59 this Court has ruled that in case of disagreements between the company-designated physician and the seafarer's chosen physician as to the seafarer's medical condition, the referral of the dispute to a third doctor is mandatory, and the seafarer's failure to abide thereby makes the assessment of the company-designated physician final and binding. Considering that no third doctor was appointed in this case, it is clear that Alberca failed to abide by this mandatory procedure, and consequently, the findings of the company-designated physician must be sustained.

To reiterate, there is no basis to uphold Alberca's claim that he is suffering from permanent and total disability, and Alberca likewise failed to comply with the mandatory procedure to refer the dispute to a third doctor. Given the foregoing, this Court has no other recourse but to sustain the findings of the company-designated physician that Alberca is suffering from a 20% of Grade 12 Disability.

The Company-Designated Physician Must

Alberca asseverates that the company-designated physician only has a period of 120 days to declare a seafarer's fitness or unfitness for work, and after the lapse of such period without any declaration from the company-designated physician, the disability of the seafarer must automatically be considered as permanent and total. Alberca is mistaken.

In Teekay Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. Ramoga, Jr., 60 this Court has categorically ruled that the mere lapse of 120 days without any declaration from the company-designated physician regarding the seafarer's fitness or unfitness to work does not automatically entitle the seafarer to full disability benefits:

As it now stands, the mere lapse of 120 days from the seafarer's repatriation without the company-designated physician's declaration of the fitness to work of the seafarer does not entitle the latter to his permanent total disability benefits. As laid down by this Court in Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc., et al., and in Jebsens Maritime, Inc., Sea Chefs Ltd., and Enrique M. Aboitiz v. Florvin G. Rapiz, the following guidelines shall govern the seafarer's claims for permanent total disability benefits:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him;

2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total;

3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and

4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any justification. 61

Meanwhile, in Pastrana v. Bahia Shipping Services, 62 We emphasized the importance of complying with this 120-day/240-day period:

The duty of the company-designated physician to issue a final and definitive assessment of the seafarer's disability within the prescribed periods is imperative. His failure to do so will render his findings nugatory and transform the disability suffered by the seafarer to one that is permanent and total. As explained by the Court in Pelagio v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.:

Otherwise stated, the company-designated physician is required to issue a final and definite assessment of the seafarer's disability rating within the aforesaid 120/240-day period; otherwise, the opinions of the company-designated and the independent physicians are rendered irrelevant because the seafarer is already conclusively presumed to be suffering from a permanent and total disability, and thus, is entitled to the benefits corresponding thereto. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) AIDSTE

From the foregoing, it is clear that the company-designated physician has an initial period of 120 days within which to issue a final and definitive assessment of the seafarer's disability. Nevertheless, if the seafarer is still required to undergo treatment after the lapse of the 120-day period (such as in this case), such period may be extended to 240 days. However, if the company-designated physician fails to make an assessment within the initial 120-day period or the extended 240-day period, then the seafarer is conclusively presumed to be suffering from a permanent and total disability and is entitled to the full disability benefits. Undoubtedly, therefore, the mere lapse of 120 days does not automatically entitle a seafarer to full disability benefits since the company-designated physician may still issue an assessment within the 240-day period.

In other words, there are only two instances when a seafarer is considered to be suffering from permanent and total disability, and consequently entitled to full disability benefits are: first, when the company-designated physician fails to make his/her assessment within the periods prescribed by law; and second, when the seafarer is declared to be suffering from a Grade 1 Disability.

In this case, the company-designated physician issued his medical assessment that Alberca is suffering from 20% of Grade 12 Disability. Such assessment was issued on July 29, 2010 or 168 days from Alberca's repatriation. Clearly, the company-designated physician issued his medical assessment within the time prescribed by law.

Considering that the company-designated physician did not assess Alberca to be suffering from a Grade 1 Disability, and the company-designated physician was able to make a final and definitive medical assessment within the time prescribed, Alberca cannot be considered to be suffering from a permanent and total disability, and thus, he is not entitled to full disability benefits. SDAaTC

At this juncture, this Court finds it necessary to clarify that in disability compensation, the amount a seafarer is entitled to should be based on the disability gradings found in the POEA Standard Employment Contract, and is not simply determined by the number of days. The number of days, particularly the 120-day and 240-day periods, are significant, only as to when the company-designated physician must issue his or her assessment of the medical condition of the seafarer. Such periods are of little importance when it comes to how much the seafarer is entitled to since disability compensation is based solely on the disability gradings outlined in the POEA Standard Employment Contract. 63

Finally, We likewise note that the Permanent Medical Unfitness provisions of the CBA cannot justify Alberca's claim for full disability benefits. Such provision is clear that it is the company-designated physician who must declare the seafarer as permanently unfit for sea duties. Since no such declaration was made by the company-designated physician, then it stands to reason that Alberca cannot claim full disability benefits.

All said, this Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the CA when it ruled that Alberca is not entitled to the full amount of disability compensation for total and permanent disability. However, this Court finds it necessary to point out that under the POEA Standard Employment Contract, a Grade 12 Disability is equivalent to 10.45% of the maximum amount of disability benefits, 64 and not 20%, as ruled by the Labor Arbiter and affirmed by the CA.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari dated December 17, 2012 filed by petitioner Samuel M. Alberca is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated June 28, 2012 and the Resolution dated October 22, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled, "Transocean Shipmanagement (Phils.), Inc., John T. Essberger B.V., and/or Mr. Carlos S. Salinas vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Samuel M. Alberca," docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 123285 are hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The respondents are hereby ORDERED TO PAY petitioner Samuel M. Alberca disability benefits for a Grade 12 Disability, or 10.45% of the maximum amount of disability benefits pursuant to the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency Standard Employment Contract.

SO ORDERED." (Rosario, J., designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2835 dated July 15, 2021.)

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 225-238; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican with Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. concurring.

2.Id. at 240-241.

3.Id. at 10-11.

4.Id. at 99.

5.Id.

6.Id. at 99-101.

7.Id. at 13, 100.

8.Id. at 95-96.

9.Id. at 96.

10.Id. at 101.

11.Id.

12.Id. at 14, 100-102.

13.Id. at 29.

14.Id. at 57.

15.Id. at 102-103.

16.Id. at 106.

17.Id. at 104-106.

18.Id. at 107-121.

19.Id. at 129-131.

20.Id. at 132-133.

21.Id. at 134-135.

22.Id. at 150.

23.Id. at 151.

24.Id. at 161.

25.Id. at 165-166.

26.Id. at 180-181.

27.Id. at 237.

28.Id. at 233-235.

29.Id. at 233.

30.Id. at 237.

31.Id. at 8.

32.Id. at 16-17.

33.Id. at 17-23.

34.Id. at 20.

35.Id. at 21.

36.Id. at 24-28.

37.Id. at 29-30.

38.Id. at 248-281.

39.Id. at 249.

40.Id. at 267-274.

41.Id. at 274.

42.Id. at 283.

43.Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc. v. Silvestre, 823 Phil. 44, 56 (2018).

44.Aldaba v. Career Philippines Shipmanagement, Inc., 811 Phil. 486, 495 (2017).

45.Rollo, p. 234.

46. 591 Phil. 839 (2008).

47.Id. at 849.

48. 685 Phil. 704 (2012).

49.Id. at 715.

50. POEA Standard Employment Contract, Section 20 (A) 3.

51. 698 Phil. 170 (2012).

52.Id. at 182.

53. 830 Phil. 750 (2018).

54.Id. at 769.

55. 832 Phil. 363 (2018).

56.Id.

57. POEA Standard Employment Contract, Section 20 (A) 3.

58.Dionio v. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 217362, November 19, 2018; Ilustricimo v. NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc., 834 Phil. 693 (2018).

59. G.R. No. 222348, November 20, 2019.

60. 824 Phil. 35 (2018).

61.Id. at 44.

62. G.R. No. 227419, June 10, 2020.

63. POEA Standard Employment Contract, Section 20-A (6).

64. POEA Standard Employment Contract, Section 32.