Albano v. Suriaga

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 234580. October 13, 2021.]

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR VAL LUIS TAGADIAD, petitioner,

ACE VERGEL ALBANO, petitioner-relator, vs.INVESTIGATOR SURIAGA, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated13 October 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 234580 (In Re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Val Luis Tagadiad, petitioner; Ace Vergel Albano, petitioner-relator v. Investigator Suriaga, respondent). — This resolves the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus1 under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court filed by Ace Vergel Albano (petitioner-relator), for and on behalf of petitioner Val Luis Tagadiad (petitioner), seeking a two-fold relief: first, that respondent Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Marcel Suriaga 2 (respondent) of the Manila Police District, Sta. Ana Police Station produce the body of petitioner and show cause of his detention; and second, that after due proceedings, petitioner be restored of his liberty and forthwith be discharged from confinement. 3

Petitioner-relator alleges that at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of October 17, 2017, petitioner was taken into custody by respondent without a warrant and was detained at Sta. Ana Police Station (PS-6) located at Plaza Hugo, Sta. Ana, Manila. He further alleges that despite the lapse of six days from the time petitioner was detained, no criminal charge was filed against him. Thus, he claims that petitioner's arrest and detention were illegal. 4

In a Resolution 5 dated November 29, 2017, the Court required respondent to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice.

In his Comment, 6 respondent counters that the petition against him is baseless and, accordingly, prays for its dismissal. 7 He asserts that the allegations in the petition are belied by the evidence attached to his pleading which reveal that petitioner was arrested on October 17, 2017 by the tanods of Brgy. 784, Zone 86, Manila upon the complaint of a certain Angelito Nugoy Aguas (Aguas) for theft. 8 As averred in the Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Paghuli9 executed by Barangay Kagawad Eduardo S. Nicer, the said tanods brought petitioner to the Ospital ng Maynila for medical examination 10 and, thereafter, sought the assistance of Police Station 6 where respondent is assigned as investigator. Booking procedures were done in accordance with law, as evidenced by the Booking Sheet and Information Report 11 prepared by respondent. Likewise, respondent propounded questions to Aguas, whose answers thereto make up the latter's Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Reklamo. 12 DHITCc

The following day, petitioner was referred to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila for inquest proceedings. 13 Thus, respondent maintains that he has complied with what is incumbent upon him.

On October 23, 2017, petitioner was charged with the crime of theft, as defined and penalized under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The accusatory portion of the Information 14 reads:

That on or about October 17, 2017, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating together with others whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away the following, to wit:

CASH — Php7,000.00

Two (2) pairs of Nike shoes — 20,000.00

or all in the total amount of Php27,000.00, belonging to ANGELITO AGUAS y NUGOY, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount of Php27,000.00, Philippine Currency.

Contrary to law. 15

The case was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. R-MNL-17-05404-CR. On November 7, 2017, petitioner posted a cash bond in the amount of P20,000.00 16 and was ordered released on bail by Judge Reynaldo A. Alhambra, Executive Judge of the RTC of Manila. 17 At 6:46 in the evening of the same day, petitioner was released, as recorded in the blotter and acknowledged by both petitioner and petitioner-relator through their signatures therein. 18

Later on, the RTC Branch 41 of Manila, to which the case was raffled, dismissed the case against petitioner on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In its Order 19 dated November 29, 2017, the RTC ratiocinated:

In view of the enactment of Republic Act 10951, amending certain provisions of Act 3815 (otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code), including Article 309 (Penalties for the crime of theft) and Article 315 (Swindling [Estafa]), vesting jurisdiction in the Metropolitan Trial Courts theft and estafa cases involving amounts or value of property and damage not exceeding one million two hundred thousand pesos (P1,200,000.00) and two million four hundred thousand pesos (P2,400,000.00), respectively, let the instant case be dismissed, without prejudice.

The accused is thus released from detention. [handwritten]

SO ORDERED. 20 cEaSHC

In lieu of comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation 21 dated February 28, 2018 that the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed. 22

The OSG argues that the petition failed to state a cause of action against respondent, stressing that when the restraint is lawful and pursuant to a court process, it cannot be inquired into through habeas corpus. The OSG insists that petitioner was arrested by virtue of a citizen's arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and respondent had no other recourse but to perform his official function of conducting investigation upon petitioner's turnover by the barangay tanods who apprehended him. 23

Moreover, the OSG contends that the filing of the Information against petitioner, his subsequent discharge from custody on bail, and the eventual dismissal of the case against him constitute supervening events which render the present petition moot and academic. 24

The petition is devoid of merit.

Regarded as the "great writ of liberty," the writ of habeas corpus was devised as a "speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom." The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal." 25

Governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to "all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." 26

In this case, the Court does not subscribe to petitioner-relator's claim that petitioner was illegally arrested and unlawfully detained. While it is true that petitioner was arrested without a warrant, it is one of the instances authorized under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

Contrary to the allegations contained in the petition, petitioner was arrested by the barangay tanods, not by respondent. The said tanods immediately responded to Aguas' plea for help about the theft which transpired inside his house. Based on the CCTV footage of the barangay, the tanods acquired personal knowledge of facts that a crime had just been committed. It was shown how petitioner, who then stayed with Aguas overnight, and two other persons went inside Aguas' house and, after a few minutes, got out bringing with them pairs of shoes. Hence, the warrantless arrest of petitioner was clearly justified, pursuant to paragraph (b) of the above-quoted provision. 27 CTIEac

Even assuming petitioner's arrest was illegal, it was cured by the filing of the Information against him. 28 What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus. 29 It is noteworthy to point, however, that the Information against petitioner was filed on October 23, 2017, one day before the present petition for habeas corpus was filed. By then, the restraint of petitioner's liberty was already by virtue of the Information and, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available. 30

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court expressly provides:

Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment (Underscoring supplied.)

Prescinding therefrom, a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court. 31 Taking into consideration that petitioner had been duly charged in court, he cannot be allowed to question his detention through a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the Information. 32

Furthermore, the incidents following the filing of the petition eventually resulted in petitioner's release from detention. As correctly invoked by the OSG, citing Pulido v. Gen. Abu, 33 when the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 34 In Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, 35 a moot and academic case is defined as one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. 36

A petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioner is lifted either temporarily or permanently. 37 Here, petitioner was provisionally released upon posting a cash bail bond. Then, he was again ordered released from detention when the criminal case against him was dismissed, albeit without prejudice to its re-filing before the proper court.

In view thereof, the instant petition must be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic. As enunciated by the Court in Sps. Sarmiento, et al. v. Sps. Magsino: 38

It is a rule or universal application that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions where no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Thus the Court will refrain from expressing its opinion in a case where no practical relief may be granted in view of a supervening event. 39 SaCIDT

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and academic.

SO ORDERED." (Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., on official leave; Hernando, J., Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2846 dated October 6, 2021.)

By authority of the Court:

TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court

By:

(SGD.) MA. CONSOLACION GAMINDE-CRUZADADeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-9.

2. Impleaded herein as Investigator Suriaga.

3.Rollo, p. 5.

4.Id. at 4-5.

5.Id. at 10-11.

6.Id. at 13-17.

7.Id. at 14.

8.Id. at 18.

9.Id. at 22.

10.Id. at 24.

11.Id. at 23.

12.Id. at 19-21.

13.Id. at 18.

14.Id. at 26.

15.Id.

16.Id. at 28-29.

17.Id. at 27.

18.Id. at 30.

19.Id. at 48; penned by Presiding Judge Rosalyn D. Mislos-Loja.

20.Id.

21.Id. at 38-44.

22.Id. at 42.

23.Id. at 39-41.

24.Id. at 42.

25.Agcaoili, et al. v. Hon. Farinas, et al., 835 Phil. 405, 422 (2018).

26. Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.

27.Rollo, p. 22.

28.Kiani v. The Bureau of Immigration & Deportation, 518 Phil. 501, 507-508 (2006).

29.Ampatuan v. Judge Macaraig, et al., 636 Phil. 269, 278 (2010).

30.Velasco v. CA, 315 Phil. 757, 769 (1995).

31.In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Datukan Malang Salibo, Salibo v. Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex, et al., 757 Phil. 630, 648 (2015).

32.Go, Sr. v. Ramos, 614 Phil. 451, 483 (2009).

33. 553 Phil. 450 (2007).

34.Id. at 462.

35. 522 Phil. 705, (2006).

36.Id. at 753.

37.Toyota v. Ramos, 223 Phil. 528, 532 (1985).

38. 719 Phil. 573 (2013).

39.Id. at 583. Citation omitted.