SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 221338. March 20, 2019.]
REUBEN B. AGUILOS, petitioner, vs.VIMIN M. VARIAS, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 20 March 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 221338 — Reuben B. Aguilos v. Vimin M. Varias
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision 2 dated May 12, 2015 and Resolution 3 dated October 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 137739.
Reuben B. Aguilos (petitioner), Clerk III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Services, Bureau of Customs (BOC-CIIS), was the assigned inspector for the registration of Healix Foundation Incorporated's (Healix) accreditation. Such accreditation is necessary for its importations. Vimin M. Varias (respondent), on the other hand, is Healix's secretary, in-charge of the corporation's annual registration of said accreditation. 4
In a Sinumpaang Salaysay, respondent narrated that sometime in the last week of August, 2004, petitioner demanded money from her in exchange for a clearance to be issued by the BOC-CIIS for Healix's importation of reagents. It was agreed to be given at Healix's office. 5
Unknown to petitioner, respondent reported the incident to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), which then organized an entrapment operation to be implemented on the date of the meeting in Healix's office. Marked money was prepared for that purpose. 6
At the day of the meeting, the NBI operatives immediately apprehended petitioner upon the latter's receipt of the marked money, which he placed in his right pocket. The arrest was supported by a Joint Affidavit of Arrest of the NBI operatives, Disposition Form of the entrapment operation conducted by the agents of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI, Certification issued by the NBI Forensic Chemist finding petitioner positive of yellow fluorescent powder placed in the marked money, and the Booking and Arrest Report with Arrest Information Sheet. 7
Aside from the criminal cases filed as a result of such arrest, an administrative Complaint 8 for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service was filed against petitioner, which is now the subject of this review. HESIcT
In his Position Paper, petitioner merely denied the charges against him. He admitted that he went to Healix's office but alleged that it was for purposes of inspection. He further alleged that respondent indeed tried to hand him money but he denied having received the same. 9
In its February 18, 2014 Decision, 10 the Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the service with the corresponding accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office, cancellation of civil service eligibility, and bar from taking the civil service examination, or in case dismissal can no longer be enforced due to petitioner's separation from the service, a fine in the amount equivalent to petitioner's salary for one year, deductible from his retirement benefits or any receivables from his office, shall be imposed.
The Ombudsman found petitioner's unsupported allegation of frame-up to have no leg to stand on. There was also no imputation of ill-motive on the part of respondent that may have urged the latter to falsely impute such charges against petitioner. The Ombudsman thus upheld the presumption of regularity in the entrapment operation conducted by the NBI agents.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in the Ombudsman's August 14, 2014 Order. 11
On appeal, the CA affirmed the Ombudsman's February 18, 2014 Decision in its entirety. The CA found the entrapment operation wherein petitioner was caught red-handed receiving the marked money, as well as the result of the ultraviolet light examinations on the petitioner, and respondent's narration of the circumstances of petitioner's extortion in her Sinumpaang Salaysay, are more than substantial evidence, to conclude petitioner's guilt of grave misconduct. The CA also found petitioner's assertion of frame-up self-serving and unsupported, which thus, cannot prevail over the overwhelming evidence pointing to his misconduct.
Anent petitioner's argument that the Ombudsman is not empowered to impose the accessory penalty of dismissal from the service, the CA cited Section 10, Rule III of the Ombudsman Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 17-03, which provides that the penalty of dismissal from the service shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office, and bar from taking civil service examination. The CA also cited Section 46 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), which classified grave misconduct as a grave offense punishable by dismissal from the service, and Section 52 (a) thereof, which provides that the penalty of dismissal carries with it the aforecited accessory penalties. 12
As to petitioner's allegation that the Ombudsman's Decision failed to cite the basis of its findings in violation of Section 14 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the CA ruled that while it is imperative that every decision must state distinctly and clearly the factual and legal bases therefor, synthesizing and simplifying the facts and law to support the conclusions in the decision is acceptable. Besides, according to the CA, it has clearly discussed the bases of the Ombudsman finding petitioner's guilt as well as the penalty imposed therefor.
In its October 1, 2015 Resolution, the CA likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition, raising the following issues: (1) whether petitioner can be held administratively liable for grave misconduct; (2) whether the Ombudsman may impose the accessory penalties carried by the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from the service; and (3) whether the Ombudsman's Decision violated Section 14 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
We find no merit in the petition.
First. Without any support, petitioner sweepingly argues that respondent's allegations and the evidence against him cannot stand the test of substantiality. Also, petitioner raised questions regarding the factual circumstances of the entrapment operation and his arrest. caITAC
At the outset, it must be noted that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law can be raised. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. 13 Thus, absent the recognized exception to such rule, the Court will not review the findings of fact of the lower court or tribunal. 14 In this case, petitioner's bare allegations and unsupported arguments failed to justify this Court's review of the appreciation of facts by the Ombudsman and the CA.
Besides, it is also settled that "findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence" or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is guilty of the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming." Thus, the Ombudsman's factual findings are generally accorded great weight and respect, if not finality by the courts, by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. 15
At any rate, a careful review of this case would show that the Ombudsman, as affirmed by the CA, did not err in concluding that substantial evidence exists to prove that petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct. Indeed, respondent's testimony, found credible by the Ombudsman and the CA, coupled with the fact that petitioner was caught red-handed during the entrapment operation soliciting money in exchange for a clearance for importation, are more than substantial evidence, proving petitioner's misconduct. The Ombudsman and the CA correctly ruled that this is a clear-cut corrupt practice, tantamount to a grave misconduct, constituting flagrant disregard of well-known legal rules, 16 warranting the imposition of dismissal from the service. 17
Second. Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has no authority to impose accessory penalties carried by the penalty of dismissal from the service, pointing out that the same cannot be found in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
This argument deserves scant consideration.
Ombudsman A.O. No. 07 or the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by A.O. No. 17, clearly states that "(t)he penalty of dismissal from service shall carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision." 18 Also, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS, which applies to all disciplinary and non-disciplinary cases brought before agencies and instrumentalities of the government, 19 provides that the penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office and bar from taking civil service examinations. Hence, contrary to petitioner's argument, the imposition of the accessory penalties is not without basis.
Third. In his final attempt to invalidate the Ombudsman's Decision, petitioner argues that the same violated Section 14 (1), Article VIII 20 of the Constitution. A reading of the said Decision, however, clearly shows that the same contains a complete summary of the facts, the arguments of both parties and the evidence on record, the issues to be resolved, and the basis of the Ombudsman's ruling, i.e., the pieces of evidence presented against petitioner clearly and substantially show bad faith and corruption on his part, which constitute grave misconduct warranting the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from the service and its accessory penalties. 21 Hence, there is no merit in petitioner's argument that the Ombudsman's Decision failed to comply with the formal requirements of the Constitution.
In all, finding no reversible error on the part of the CA in affirming the Ombudsman's February 18, 2014 Decision, this Court resolves to sustain the same.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated May 12, 2015 and the Resolution dated October 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 137739 are hereby AFFIRMED. ICHDca
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MARIA LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-14.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier and Associate Justice Melchor Q.C. Sadang, concurring; id. at 33-46.
3.Id. at 22-23.
4.Id. at 34.
5.Id.
6.Id.
7.Id.
8.Id. at 77-80.
9.Id. at 123.
10.Id. at 119-127.
11.Id. at 140-145.
12.Id. at 42-43.
13.Office of the Ombudsman v. De Villa, 760 Phil. 937, 949 (2015).
14.Agustin-Se v. Office of the President, 780 Phil. 371, 387 (2016).
15.Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon v. Dionisio and Molina, G.R. No. 220700, July 10, 2017.
16.Hon. Miro v. Dosono, 634 Phil. 54, 64 (2010).
17. REVISED RULES ON ADMINISTRATIVE CASES IN THE CIVIL SERVICE (RRACCS), Rule 10, Sec. 46 (A) (3). See Office of the Ombudsman v. Delos Reyes, Jr., 745 Phil. 366, 384 (2014).
18. Section 10, Administrative Order No. 17 of the Ombudsman dated September 15, 2003.
19. RRACCS, Rule 1, Section 2.
20. Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
21. Rollo, p. 124.