Agbayani v. Heirs of Agbayani-Santiago

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 193903. September 21, 2016.]

PRISCILLA G. AGBAYANI, petitioner, vs. THE HEIRS OF CYPRES AGBAYANI-SANTIAGO, REPRESENTED BY DOUGLAS SANTIAGO, THE HEIRS OF AMOR AGBAYANI, REPRESENTED BY JOVITA LUCAS-AGBAYANI, AND RUTH AGBAYANI-CANTORNA, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 21, 2016, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 193903 — PRISCILLA G. AGBAYANI, Petitioner, v. THE HEIRS OF CYPRES AGBAYANI-SANTIAGO, REPRESENTED BY DOUGLAS SANTIAGO, THE HEIRS OF AMOR AGBAYANI, REPRESENTED BY JOVITA LUCAS-AGBAYANI, AND RUTH AGBAYANI-CANTORNA, Respondents. — The letter dated August 17, 2016 of Julie Aylene D. Mendoza, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Manila, transmitting the record of Civil Case No. CV-08-120111 consisting of 359 pages is NOTED.

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Resolution dated May 4, 2010 1 and the Resolution dated September 6, 2010 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. UDK-6448, which resolutions dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Priscilla G. Agbayani (Priscilla).

Priscilla is the widow of the late Cipriano Agbayani, who died in Manila in 2004. They had three children, namely, Ruth Agbayani-Cantorna (Ruth), Amor Agbayani (Amor), and Cypres Agbayani-Santiago (Cypres). Amor and Cypres subsequently died and were survived by their respective spouses and children.

The heirs of Amor Agbayani were represented in the case by Jovita Lucas-Agbayani (Jovita), while the heirs of Cypres Agbayani-Santiago were represented by Atty. Douglas Santiago (Atty. Santiago).

On September 29, 2008, Priscilla filed a complaint for partition of the estate of Cipriano, which was docketed as Civil Case No. CV-08-120111 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 11.

The heirs of Cypres moved to dismiss the complaint. They claimed, among others, that the inventory of the properties of the late Cipriano was inaccurate; there was no earnest effort to reach a compromise; and there was failure to implead in the suit indispensable parties such as Atty. Santiago, who was the surviving spouse of Cypres, and Jovita who was the surviving spouse of Amor. Ruth and Jovita did not file any responsive pleading.

Priscilla filed her Comment to the above motion, then the heirs of Cypres filed their Reply. Priscilla, thereafter, filed a Rejoinder where she prayed for the denial of the motion to dismiss and the inclusion of Atty. Santiago and Jovita as indispensable parties.

In an Order3dated January 8, 2009, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that the motion was anchored on factual matters that could best be threshed out at the trial of the case. The trial court granted Priscilla's prayer for the inclusion of Atty. Santiago and Jovita as party defendants.

The heirs of Cypres filed a partial motion for reconsideration and a series of responsive pleadings, asserting that a substantial portion of Cipriano's estate had not been included for partition. The heirs of Cypres argued that the complaint must be dismissed for lack of cause of action; if not, an order should be issued for Priscilla to amend her inventory of Cipriano's estate.

Shortly thereafter, on March 23, 2009, the heirs of Cypres filed an Answer Ad Cautelam to the complaint for partition, alleging therein their affirmative and special defenses and compulsory counterclaim. CAIHTE

In an Order 4 dated March 26, 2009, the RTC granted the heirs of Cypres's partial motion for reconsideration as to the inclusion of the other properties in the estate of Cipriano and directed Priscilla to submit a complete inventory thereof. Priscilla received the aforementioned order on April 15, 2009.

Priscilla then received a notice of pre-trial conference and an order setting the conference on June 8, 2009. Priscilla filed her pre-trial brief.

The heirs of Cypres again moved for the dismissal of the complaint for partition for lack of interest to prosecute the case, citing Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, because of Priscilla's noncompliance with the Orders dated January 8, 2009 and March 26, 2009 of the RTC. The first order referred to the inclusion of Atty. Santiago and Jovita as indispensable parties, while the second order directed Priscilla to submit a complete inventory of the properties of the decedent. The heirs of Cypres insisted that unless there is a service of summons and a proper amendment of the complaint, said orders of the trial court would be rendered nugatory, thereby depriving the defendants of due process.

The pre-trial conference was cancelled in view of the above motion to dismiss. Priscilla then filed an Amended Complaint on June 8, 2009.

In an Order5 dated July 27, 2009, the RTC denied the second motion to dismiss of Atty. Santiago. Copies of the Summons and Amended Complaint were served upon Atty. Santiago on September 14, 2009.

Atty. Santiago filed an Omnibus Motion6 to reconsider the aforesaid order of the RTC and to expunge the Amended Complaint for having been filed without leave of court. Atty. Santiago pointed out that an answer to the complaint had long been filed when the amended complaint was filed without leave of court.

In the Order7 dated November 10, 2009, the RTC recalled its Order dated July 27, 2009 and dismissed the complaint for partition. The trial court noted that an amendment to a complaint is a matter of right before a responsive pleading is filed. However, an answer to the complaint for partition had already been filed and that the trial court only ordered the inclusion of Atty. Santiago and Jovita as party defendants but without giving Priscilla leave of court to amend the complaint. As the Amended Complaint was filed without leave of court, the same was treated as a mere scrap of paper. The RTC applied Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court given the failure of Priscilla to comply with its Orders dated January 8, 2009 and Order dated March 26, 2009 for an unreasonable length of time.

Priscilla filed a motion for reconsideration of the above order, but the same was denied in the RTC Order 8 dated January 29, 2010. Priscilla received this order on February 11, 2010.

On April 12, 2010, Priscilla filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, with the docket fee paid through registered mail. Priscilla alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Order dated November 10, 2009 as well as its Order dated January 29, 2010.

In its assailed Resolution dated May 4, 2010, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition of Priscilla, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. UDK-6448. The appellate court ruled that the correct legal recourse for Priscilla was to file an ordinary appeal, not a petition for certiorari. Assuming that the petition was properly filed, the Court of Appeals found that Priscilla failed to remit the necessary docket and other legal fees.

Priscilla filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution, explaining that she remitted by registered mail the required docket fees but the postal money orders were returned as she failed to indicate the correct docket number ("CA-G.R. No."). She argued that she availed herself of the correct remedy of a petition for certiorari as an appeal is only available after the trial court's rendition of an order decreeing partition and accounting. DETACa

In the assailed Resolution dated September 6, 2010, the Court of Appeals denied Priscilla's motion for reconsideration. The appellate court reiterated that the proper recourse was to file an ordinary appeal.

Hence, Priscilla filed this petition for review.

Priscilla alleged that the trial court's dismissal of her complaint for partition — on the ground that she failed to comply with the Orders dated January 8, 2009 and March 26, 2009 for an unreasonable length of time — was done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The heirs of Cypres filed their Comment to Priscilla's petition, arguing that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed Priscilla's petition for certiorari for being an improper remedy that was resorted to as a remedy for her lost appeal. They also pointed out that Priscilla did not timely pay the required docket fees and she failed to justify such failure.

In their Comment, the heirs of Amor adopted the arguments of the heirs of Cypres.

On the other hand, Ruth, in her Comment, supported Priscilla's petition. She alleged, among others, that the bases for the dismissal of the case in the RTC were clearly attributable to Priscilla's former counsel, who failed to legally assist Priscilla to comply with the orders of the trial court.

We deny the petition.

The assailed RTC Order dated November 10, 2009 dismissed the complaint of Priscilla pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court; while the assailed RTC Order dated January 29, 2010 denied Priscilla's motion for reconsideration.

Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that an order of dismissal under said provision has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits of the case, unless otherwise declared by the trial court. Thus —

SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Samson v. Fiel-Macaraig, 9 which likewise involved a dismissal pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, we held that:

The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits is appeal. This is true even if the error, or one of the errors, ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision. The availability of the right to appeal precludes recourse to the special civil action for certiorari. The RTC Order subject of the petition was a final judgment which disposed of the case on the merits; hence, it was a subject for an ordinary appeal, not apetition for certiorari. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

In this case, there was no indication in the assailed RTC Order dated November 10, 2009 that the dismissal therein was anything but an adjudication upon the merits of the case. As such, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that Priscilla should have instituted an appeal, not a special civil action of certiorari.

As found by the Court of Appeals, Priscilla admitted that she received on February 11, 2010 a copy of the RTC Order dated January 29, 2010, which denied her motion for reconsideration. Thus, the 15-day reglementary period for the filing of an appeal to the Court of Appeals fell on February 26, 2010. Priscilla, instead, resorted to the improper remedy of filing a petition for certiorari on April 12, 2010.

The Court stressed in Tirazona v. Court of Appeals10 that an appeal and a petition for certiorari are not substitute remedies. Specifically — aDSIHc

The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by one's own neglect or error in the choice of remedies. It also bears to stress the well-settled principle that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. Under Rule 56, Sec. 5(f) of the Revised Rules of Court, a wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal merits an outright dismissal. (Citations omitted.)

Furthermore, we cannot fault the Court of Appeals for refusing to take cognizance of Priscilla's petition given that there was indeed a failure to timely pay the necessary docket fees therefor.

Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. — Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal.

In Gonzales v. Pe, 11 the Court underlined the rule that the payment of the docket and other legal fees within the reglementary period for the filing of an appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional. We ruled that —

It bears stressing that an appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC to the CA must be made within 15 days from notice. And within this period, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from. The requirement of paying the full amount of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. The payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not perfected. The appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. Further, under Section 1(c), Rule 50, an appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the ground of the non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.

As Priscilla failed to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period, the trial court's order of dismissal became final and executory and the appellate court did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari. Our ruling herein, however, is without prejudice to the right of any of the other co-heirs of Priscilla to file an action for partition, which right accrues to each individual co-heir/co-owner and does not prescribe. 12

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated May 4, 2010 and the Resolution dated September 6, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. UDK-6448 are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. ETHIDa

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

 

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 81-82.

2. Id. at 83-87.

3. Id. at 219-220.

4. Id. at 244-A.

5. Id. at 290-291.

6. Id. at 294-297.

7. Id. at 324-325; penned by Presiding Judge Cicero D. Jurado, Jr.

8. Id. at 352.

9. 625 Phil. 184, 190 (2010).

10. 572 Phil. 334, 348 (2008).

11. 670 Phil. 597, 610-611 (2011).

12. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides:

  ARTICLE 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

  Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.

  A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.

  Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

  No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.