Aegis PeopleSupport Philippines, Inc. v. Urnos

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 205205. July 10, 2019.]

AEGIS PEOPLESUPPORT PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs.SHERYL A. URNOS, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 10, 2019which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 205205 (Aegis PeopleSupport Philippines, Inc. v. Sheryl A. Urnos). — This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision 2 dated July 31, 2012 and Resolution 3 dated November 6, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 113569. Here, We reiterate the rule that reinstatement under paragraph 3 of Article 229 (formerly Article 223) of the Labor Code refers to "restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or separated." 4

Respondent Sheryl A. Urnos (respondent) was a Team Manager of petitioner Aegis PeopleSupport Philippines, Inc. (petitioner) from April 12, 2004. Five days prior to the effectivity of her resignation on February 6, 2008, or on February 1, 2006, respondent filed a complaint with petitioner alleging that her immediate superior, Conrado Patricio Monzon (Monzon), sexually harassed her. Petitioner conducted an investigation and found the claim of sexual harassment against Monzon to be untrue because he and respondent were actually lovers. 5

On August 17, 2006, respondent filed a complaint 6 for sexual harassment and constructive dismissal with the Labor Arbiter (LA). She claimed that she was constrained to resign because of Monzon's sexual advances upon her at the work place.

In his Decision 7 dated February 28, 2008, the LA found that petitioner's lack of sexual harassment policy effectively condoned Monzon's harassment against respondent and led to the latter's involuntary resignation. 8 Consequently, the LA directed petitioner to immediately reinstate respondent. 9 The LA held:

WHEREFORE, premises all considered, the [respondent] is hereby found constructively dismissed and [petitioner is] ordered to:

1. Immediately reinstate [respondent] to her former position under a true shifting schedule per her contract without loss of benefits and seniority rights. [Respondent]'s reinstatement is immediately executory for which [petitioner is] hereby directed to report compliance herewith within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of this Decision;

2. Jointly and severally pay [respondent] her full backwages, back allowances, and all back benefits from January 2006 to the present which, based on the undisputed computation submitted by [respondent] as her Annex D of her Position Paper is P628,613.00 per annum computed from January 2006 to the date of this Decision, or P1,257,266 up to January 2008 plus 2/12 of P628,613 or P104,768.84 from January 2008 to the present or a total of P1,361,994.84;

3. Jointly and severally pay [respondent] moral damages in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00).

4. Jointly and severally pay [respondent] exemplary damages in the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00); and

5. Jointly and severally pay [respondent] attorney's fees in an amount equivalent to ten n percent (10%) of the total monetary award.

SO ORDERED. 10

Not satisfied with the LA's ruling, both parties appealed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), with petitioner questioning the ruling of illegal dismissal 11 and respondent demanding for a higher award of moral and exemplary damages. 12

On June 24, 2008, respondent filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution on the reinstatement 13 aspect of the LA's Decision dated February 28, 2008. Respondent alleged that there was no effort on petitioner's part to comply with the reinstatement order. 14

Subsequently, on June 30, 2008, respondent received petitioner's return to work notices dated June 5, 2008 15 and June 18, 2008. 16 Considering that these notices are bereft of specifications, respondent, through her counsel, sent petitioner a letter dated June 30, 2008 inquiring as to the terms of reinstatement (i.e., the exact position and schedule that petitioner is calling respondent to report to; and her annual package). 17

In a letter dated July 9, 2008, petitioner assured respondent that she would be reinstated as one of its team managers and the monetary package would be under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to her separation pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code. 18

Acting on the parties' appeal, the NLRC, in a Decision 19 dated June 9, 2009, reversed and set aside the LA's Decision dated February 28, 2008 and dismissed respondent's complaint for illegal dismissal. The NLRC's Decision became final and executory on November 15, 2009, per Entry of Judgment 20 dated December 4, 2009.

In the intervening time, the LA granted respondent's motion for issuance of a writ of execution 21 of her reinstatement aspect on June 30, 2009. Because petitioner's return-to-work notices did not sufficiently comply with the reinstatement order of the LA Decision dated February 28, 2008, the LA ordered the collection of respondent's accrued salaries from March 2008 to June 15, 2009 amounting to P759,574.04. In a subsequent Writ of Execution, 22 the LA extended respondent's entitlement to accrued salaries until November 15, 2009 or the date when the NLRC Decision became final and executory.

On August 18, 2009, petitioner questioned the Writ of Execution and sought for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent its implementation. 23 The NLRC dismissed petitioner's appeal in a Resolution 24 dated November 5, 2009. The NLRC affirmed the findings of the LA that respondent had not been actually reinstated to work, and found that respondent is entitled to her salaries and benefits from February 28, 2008 until the finality of the NLRC Decision dated June 9, 2009.

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the NLRC Resolution 25 dated November 5, 2009 but the NLRC denied it. 26

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari27 under Rule 65, assailing the NLRC Resolutions.

In its Decision 28 dated July 31, 2012, the CA denied the petition and affirmed the NLRC Resolutions. Thus, the CA dismissed petitioner's claim. The CA found that there was an actual delay of respondent's reinstatement as she was never reinstated prior to the reversal of the LA's Decision dated February 28, 2008. 29

The CA agreed with the NLRC that petitioner's return to work notices to respondent were vague, deficient, and non-compliant with the Labor Code and the dispositive portion of the LA's Decision dated February 28, 2008. Petitioner merely requested respondent to return to work without any assurance that she would be occupying a position under the same terms and conditions prior to her dismissal. If it were not for her lawyer's letter requesting for the confirmation of the terms of the reinstatement, petitioner would not have bothered to clarify the contents of its notices. The CA noted that, if it were really petitioner's intention to immediately reinstate respondent under the same terms and conditions of her employment prevailing prior to her dismissal, it could have clearly stated so in its return to work notices. Moreover, petitioner's failure to comply with the LA's Order and the new NLRC rules of procedure to submit a report of compliance within ten calendar days from receipt of the LA Decision clearly denotes refusal to reinstate. Thus, petitioner is liable to respondent for accrued wages pending appeal of the LA Decision even if the decision was later on reversed by the NLRC. 30

In its Resolution 31 dated November 6, 2012, the CA likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 32

Hence, this petition. Petitioner argues that: (1) respondent is not entitled to accrued salaries pending the NLRC's resolution of the appeal in the illegal dismissal case considering that her non-reinstatement is entirely without petitioner's fault; 33 and (2) assuming that respondent is entitled to accrued salaries, such should be computed from May 18, 2008 or petitioner's receipt of a copy of the LA Decision until June 9, 2009 or the date of the NLRC Decision overturning that of the LA. 34

We partially grant the petition.

Under paragraph 3, Article 229 (formerly Article 223) 35 of the Labor Code, the LA's Order for the reinstatement of an employee found illegally dismissed is immediately executory even during pendency of the employer's appeal from the decision. The employer must reinstate the employee, either by physically admitting him under the conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal, and paying his wages, or, at the employer's option, merely reinstating the employee in the payroll until the decision is reversed by the higher court. Failure of the employer to comply with the reinstatement order, by exercising the modes in the alternative, renders him liable to pay the employee's salaries pending appeal. Moreover, an order of reinstatement issued by the LA is self-executory, i.e., the dismissed employee need not even apply for and the LA need not even issue a writ of execution to trigger the employer's duty to reinstate the dismissed employee. 36

Reinstatement means "restoration to a state or condition from which one had been removed or separated." It presupposes that the prevailing position at the time of removal from service still exists, or that there is a vacant position that is substantially equivalent or of similar nature to the position previously held by the employee. 37 There must be a clear intent on the part of the employer to reinstate the employee to a "former position under the same terms and conditions" or to a "substantially equivalent position." 38

Indeed, petitioner required respondent to return to work after the LA executed its Decision dated February 28, 2008. The June 5, 2008 and June 18, 2008 return to work notices, however, are vague because of the lack of specificity as to the position being offered to respondent. 39 The notices were silent as to the position or salary that respondent would be assuming. They clearly did not comply with the jurisprudential requirement that respondent will be reinstated to a former position under the same terms and condition prevailing at the time of her dismissal.

Petitioner's letter dated July 9, 2008 likewise did not comply with the requirement of the law. It states that respondent "would be reinstated as one of the Team Managers of the Company." 40 Respondent, however, was a Team Manager of the biggest and most prestigious account of petitioner, where she managed more than 100 employees. 41 Thus, to require her to work for other accounts, without any justifiable explanation as to the impossibility of returning to her previous position, would not pass the test of being under the same terms and conditions or to a substantially equivalent position.

We now resolve the amount of accrued salaries due to respondent. The LA found that respondent is entitled to her accrued wages from February 28, 2008, the date of the LA Decision, until November 15, 2009, the date of finality of the NLRC Decision. On the other hand, petitioner claims that the accrued salaries should be computed only from the time it received a copy of the LA Decision, or on May 18, 2008, until the date of the NLRC Decision overturning that of the LA, or on June 9, 2009.

In Islriz Trading v. Capada, 42 We ruled that the employee is entitled to his accrued salaries only from the time the employer received a copy of the LA Decision declaring the employee's termination illegal and ordering his reinstatement up to the date of the NLRC ruling overturning that of the LA. This is because it is only during the said period that the employee is deemed to have been illegally dismissed and entitled to reinstatement pursuant to the LA's Decision, which was in effect at that time. 43

In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, We agree with petitioner that accrued salaries should be computed covering the period of May 18, 2008, when petitioner received the LA Decision, until June 9, 2009, the date of the NLRC Decision overturning that of the LA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated July 31, 2012 and Resolution dated November 6, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 113569 are AFFIRMED in so far as the declaration that respondent is entitled to accrued salaries. The records of this case are REMANDED to the Office of the Labor Arbiter for the correct computation of respondent's accrued salaries from May 18, 2008 to June 9, 2009. Respondent is ordered to make the proper restitution to petitioner for whatever excess amount she has received.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 2-35.

2.Id. at 36-43; penned by Associate Justice Edwin D. Sorongon, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Marlene Gonzales-Sison.

3.Id. at 56-58.

4.Pfizer, Inc. v. Velasco, G.R. No. 177467, March 9, 2011, 645 SCRA 135, 146.

5.Rollo, p. 37.

6.Id. at 110.

7.Id. at 313-355.

8.Id. at 335-337.

9.Id. at 354.

10.Id. at 354-355.

11.Id. at 356-357.

12.Id. at 38, 203-218.

13.Id. at 113-118.

14.Id. at 115.

15.Id. at 111.

16.Id. at 112.

17.Id. at 358-359.

18.Id. at 123-125.

19.Id. at 154-168.

20.Id. at 557.

21.Id. at 227-236.

22.Id. at 434-441.

23.Id. at 237-270.

24.Id. at 84-95.

25.Id. at 96-106.

26.Id. at 107-108.

27.Id. at 59-83.

28.Id. at 36-43.

29.Id. at 40-41.

30.Id. at 41-42.

31.Id. at 56-58.

32.Id. at 44-55.

33.Id. at 19.

34.Id. at 27-28.

35. Art. 229 [223]. Appeal. — x x x

xxx xxx xxx

   In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.

36.Bergonio, Jr. v. South East Asian Airlines, G.R. No. 195227, April 21, 2014, 722 SCRA 360.

37.Supra note 4.

38.Rollo, p. 147.

39.Id. at 41.

40.Id. at 123.

41.Id. at 92.

42. G.R. No. 168501, January 31, 2011, 641 SCRA 9.

43.Rollo, p. 28.

n Note from the Publisher: Written as "then" in the original document.