FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 244831. July 14, 2021.]
PEDRO ACQUIAT, petitioner, vs. EUTIQUIO M. BERNALES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 14, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 244831 (Pedro Acquiat,Petitioner, v. Eutiquio M. Bernales,Respondent.) — This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (Petition) seeks to annul and set aside the Decision 2 dated 28 May 2018 and the Resolution 3 dated 15 January 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 09649. The CA Decision reversed the Decision 4 dated 21 April 2014 and Resolution 5 dated 21 September 2015 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 16741, which modified the Decision 6 dated 24 March 2010 of the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. VII-BOH-716-2005 for Recognition and Preservation of Tenancy Rights, Injunction and Damages.
Antecedents
On 10 April 1969, Pedro Bernales (Pedro), the deceased father of respondent Eutiquio Bernales (Eutiquio), designated petitioner Pedro Acquiat (Acquiat) as tenant in his landholding located at Tubog, Ubay, Bohol and in Camali-an and Hambabauran, Ubay, Bohol. During Pedro's lifetime, Acquiat planted and cultivated rice and camote on the said landholding and shared part of the produce with Pedro. Upon Pedro's death in 1978, he was succeeded by his son, Eutiquio, who respected Acquiat's status as a tenant. 7
Sometime in 1984, Eutiquio instructed Acquiat to plant mango and coconut seedlings in parts of the Camali-an landholding and in the larger part of the Tubog, Ubay, Bohol property. Since then, Acquiat took care of the said mango and coconut plantations. 8 He also constructed his own residential structure within the said area. 9
On 05 May 2005, with the help of his family and laborer Pablito Capin, Acquiat sprayed chemicals on 28 mango trees to induce them to bear fruits. On the day of the supposed harvest on 07 September 2005, instead of Acquiat, it was Eutiquio, with the aid of policemen of the Municipality of Ubay, who harvested all the fruits which were loaded on the municipality's dump truck. Eutiquio was then the Municipal Mayor. 10
Eutiquio also sued Acquiat for qualified theft and evicted him from the subject landholdings. The criminal case was, however, dismissed on a finding that Acquiat had a color of title over the subject properties. 11
Acquiat, for his part, filed the subject Complaint for Recognition and Preservation of Tenancy Rights, Injunction and Damages with the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Tagbilaran, n Bohol on 08 August 2006. This was subsequently amended on 31 August 2006. 12
In opposition, Eutiquio filed his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, insisting that the subject properties which he acquired by succession from his late father, Pedro, has an aggregate area of 16 hectares, and Acquiat was allowed to plant and cultivate root crops only in a one (1)-hectare portion, and rice in only two (2) hectares, thereof. 13
Eutiquio purchased about 200 grafted mango seedlings and hired workers to plant them on his property in 1984. Acquiat did not contribute anything in his mango plantation and was not allowed to till or cultivate the portion of the properties devoted to coconuts and mangoes. According to Eutiquio, he spent for the fertilizers, transplanting, fencing and other agricultural activities in the mango plantation, and that he has been harvesting the mangoes therein since 1992 to 2005 during which Acquiat claimed to have been spraying the mango trees, without his consent. 14 Per Eutiquio, he merely allowed Acquiat to live within the area. 15
The PARAD of Bohol rendered a Decision on 24 March 2010, 16 declaring Acquiat to be an agricultural lessee but only of the area planted with rice, corn and other perennial crops amounting to 3 hectares, as likewise admitted by Eutiquio, 17 and not over the portions devoted to mango and coconut trees. The PARAD ruled that no tenurial relationship existed between the parties on the excluded portions as there was no sharing agreement between them on the harvest of the mangoes. 18 The PARAD disposed the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Complaint filed on 13 December 2005 by petitioner Pedro Acquiat is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. Petitioner is hereby DECLARED as a bona fide agricultural lessee over a parcel of land devoted to rice and the upland portion planted with other perennial crops with an area of three (3) hectares, more or less, located in Barangay Tubog, Ubay, Bohol.
The MARO of Ubay, Bohol, is hereby DIRECTED to assist the parties in executing an agricultural leasehold contract for the parcel of land devoted to rice and the upland portion cited above incorporating thereto the mutual agreement by the parties pursuant to pertinent laws and rules.
The MARO of Ubay, Bohol is DIRECTED to determine the monetary value of the harvest for the mango trees in 2005 taking into consideration all pertinent records of the same including those indicated in the records of the Philippine National Police in Ubay, Bohol.
Respondent Eutiquio Bernales is DIRECTED to pay petitioner Pedro Acquiat seventy percent (70%) of the total amount as determined by the MARO of Ubay, Bohol, stated in the preceding paragraph representing the petitioner's share in the harvest of the mango trees in 2005.
The MARO of Ubay, Bohol is DIRECTED to call the parties to a conference regarding this matter within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Decision.
Petitioner Pedro Acquiat is DIRECTED to withdraw the amount of P25,134.00 deposited with DARPO Cashier and deliver the same to respondent Bernales which amount represents the landowner's share of the harvest of the Riceland portion of the subject property.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 19
On appeal, the DARAB modified the PARAD's Decision and declared in its Decision dated 21 April 2014 that Acquiat is a de jure tenant of the entire 11-hectare landholding planted to rice, root crops, mangoes and coconuts. The DARAB gave credence to the Certification of the OIC Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Alice D. Basilad (Basilad) that Acquiat is a bona fide tenant-tiller of the landholding formerly declared in the name of Pedro. The DARAB likewise relied on the Joint Affidavit of adjoining tillers Paciano Sequera and Escolastico Hoylar who attested that Acquiar is a tenant of the landholding. 20
Eutiquio's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the DARAB in its Resolution dated 21 September 2015. Dissatisfied, Eutiquio n filed an appeal with the CA. 21
Ruling of the CA
On 28 May 2018, the CA granted the petition, viz.22 :
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 21 April 2014 and Resolution dated 21 September 2015 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 16741, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the PARAD dated 24 March 2010 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED. 23
According to the CA, Acquiat failed to prove the existence of all elements of tenancy over the entire property, specifically the elements of consent and sharing of harvest. 24 The CA underlined that there is no evidence that Eutiquio consented to a tenancy relationship with Acquiat over the portion with mango and coconut trees (disputed portion). Independent and concrete evidence is needed to prove consent of the land owner. There is a clear lack of intent on the part of Eutiquio to install Acquiat as his agricultural tenant over the disputed portion of the landholding. Moreover, proof of a sharing agreement between the parties is wanting. 25 The CA further ruled that the MARO's Certification does not prove Acquiat's claimed tenancy since the same does not serve as conclusive evidence. 26
The CA thus adjudged that substantial evidence is wanting to establish that Acquiat is Eutiquio's agricultural tenant on the disputed portion. As such, the tenancy relationship is non-existent except over the area devoted to rice, corn and root crops. 27
Acquiat's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated 15 January 2019. 28 Hence, this Petition.
Issue
Aggrieved by the CA's Decision, Acquiat is now before the Court raising the sole issue of whether or not the CA erred in overturning the DARAB Decision which ruled that Acquiat is a tenant to the entire 11-hectare landholding. 29 Stripped to its core, the critical issue is whether there exists an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between the parties over the disputed portion of the property.
Ruling of the Court
The Petition must be denied.
Acquiat claims that the MARO Certification and the Joint Affidavit of the adjoining tenants prove his tenancy over the entire landholding. 30 We, however, are not persuaded. The findings of this Court shall be discussed in seriatim.
Propriety of Factual Review
At the outset, the Court notes that the determination of whether a person is an agricultural tenant is a question of fact. As a general rule, questions of fact are not proper subjects of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as this mode of appeal is confined to questions of law. 31 Nevertheless, this rule admits of several exceptions such as when the findings of fact of the lower tribunals are conflicting, as in this case. 32
The Court finds that the aforesaid exception to the general rule applies in the instant case. Therefore, We shall proceed to rule on the main issue.
Petitioner failed to prove
According to Republic Act No. 1199, 33 as amended, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines, an agricultural leasehold tenancy exists "when a person who, either personally or with the aid of labor available [from] members of his immediate farm household, undertakes to cultivate a piece of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his immediate farm household, belonging to or legally possessed by, another in consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both." 34
The existence of a tenancy relation is not presumed. The following indispensable elements must be proven in order for a tenancy agreement to arise:
1. the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
2. the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
3. there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
4. the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production;
5. there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
6. the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. 35
The absence of any of the requisites does not make an occupant, cultivator, or a planter a de jure tenant which entitles him to security of tenure under existing tenancy laws. 36
An assertion that one is a tenant does not automatically give rise to security of tenure. Nor does the sheer fact of working on another's landholding raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. One who claims to be a tenant has the onus to prove the affirmative allegation of tenancy. Hence, substantial evidence is needed to establish that the landowner and tenant came to an agreement in entering into a tenancy relationship. 37
Indeed, the burden of proof rests on the one claiming to be a tenant to prove his affirmative allegation by substantial evidence. His failure to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim would put the opposite party under no obligation to prove his exception or defense. 38 Verily, the onus rests on Acquiat to prove his affirmative allegation of tenancy.
In this regard, it bears stressing that the right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of a landowner, except as may be provided by law. Hence, the consent of the landowner should be secured prior to the installation of tenants. 39 Jurisprudence has further held that self-serving statements regarding supposed tenancy relations are not enough to establish the existence of a tenancy agreement. There should be independent evidence establishing the consent of the landowner to the relationship. 40
Corollary to this, the principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent in what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is a legal relationship. Thus, the intent of the parties and their understanding of such agreement should be primordial. 41
Guided by the foregoing, We find that Acquiat failed to provide sufficient evidence that there was, in the first place, an agricultural leasehold tenancy agreement entered into by himself and Eutiquio over the disputed portion of the landholding, i.e., the portion planted with mango and coconut trees.
Eutiquio, on the other hand, has sufficiently proven that Acquiat was merely hired and renumerated as a laborer when he planted the mango seedlings in 1984. 42 His declarations that "Pedro Acquiat was his caretaker of the land in Tubog, Ubay, Bohol where his mango plantation grows," and that "Pedro Acquiat is his tenant who is living in his farm house within his mango plantation," do not prove consent to the purported tenancy. As the CA correctly pointed out, the first merely indicated that Acquiat was a caretaker of the mango plantation, and the second, only that he resided therein. Neither, however, confirmed that he was a tenant as well. 43
To be sure, there was clear lack of intent on Eutiquio's part to install Acquiat as his agricultural tenant over the disputed portion of the property.
More importantly, the essential element of sharing of harvest was also not sufficiently established. In Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 44 We ruled that the respondents' self-serving statements regarding tenancy relations could not establish the claimed relationship. The fact alone of working on another's landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. There must be substantial evidence on record adequate enough to prove the element of sharing. 45 The Court emphasized that to prove such sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented. Self-serving statements are deemed inadequate; competent proof must be adduced. In Landicho v. Sia, 46 the Court declared that independent evidence, such as receipts, must be presented to show that there was a sharing of the harvest between the landowner and the tenant. 47 In Bejasa v. Court of Appeals, 48 We similarly held that to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented, as self-serving statements are deemed inadequate. Proof must always be adduced. 49
Here, Acquiat failed to show any evidence that there is sharing of harvest between him and Eutiquio as to the disputed portion. Per his allegations, Acquiat has occupied and cultivated the disputed portion of the property for a period of 10 years. On this note, common sense dictates that Acquiat, if he is indeed a de jure tenant, should fully know his arrangement with Eutiquio as to the sharing of harvest. Acquiat, however, failed to persuasively show their arrangement. Evidence such as receipts which prove the sharing of the harvest between Acquiat and Eutiquio were not presented. In fact, after a meticulous scrutiny of the records, We find that no evidence regarding the same was ever submitted by Acquiat. 50
Further, it is uncontroverted that it was Eutiquio who was involved in the agricultural activity pertaining to the mango trees in the disputed portion of the landholding. It was only in May 2005 when Acquiat contracted a sprayer for the mango trees to bear fruits. Even Acquiat himself tacitly admitted that he did not obtain any consent from Eutiquio on the spraying of said mango trees. 51
Verily, not all elements of tenancy relationship over the disputed portion of the property are present in the instant case.
Anent the Certification of the MARO, it is well-entrenched in our jurisprudence that certifications of administrative agencies and officers declaring the existence of a tenancy relation are merely provisional. They are persuasive but not binding on the courts, which must make their own findings. While tenancy presupposes physical presence of a tiller on the land, the MARO's Certification fall short in proving that Acquiat's presence served the purpose of agricultural production and harvest sharing. Again, it cannot be overemphasized that in order for a tenancy to arise, it is essential that all its indispensable elements must be present. 52
Moreover, the Certification merely stated that the subject tenanted landholding is planted with mangoes, coconuts, palay and other fruit trees. It does not categorically state the specific area over which Acquiat is a tenant. Notably, during Basilad's testimony, she was categorical in stating that based on the OLT documentation folder and office file identification of the Agrarian Office, Acquiat is a tenant of the rice fields only. 53
As to the Joint Affidavit of the adjacent tenants, such evidence severely fails to establish the existence of a tenancy agreement. At most, the aforementioned Joint Affidavit merely establishes that Acquiat occupied the property and that he helped plant the mango seedlings. However, it did not categorically declare that Acquiat had a tenancy arrangement over the portion designated for mango and coconut trees. 54
In Heirs ofFlorentino Quilo v. Development Bank of the Philippines-Dagupan Branch, 55 the Court held that an affidavit of the same nature as the said Joint Affidavit fails to prove consent of the landowner. In the said case, We explained that such document in no way confirms that the alleged tenant's presence on the land was based on a tenancy relationship that the landowners had agreed to as "[m]ere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land does not automatically convert the tiller into an agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws." 56 The same applies in this case.
All told, the evidence on record is inadequate to arrive at a conclusion that Acquiat was a de jure tenant of the entire landholding. The requisites for the existence of a tenancy relationship are explicit in the law, and these elements cannot be done away with by conjectures.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 28 May 2018 and the Resolution dated 15 January 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 09649 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 9-29.
2.Id. at 261-274; Penned by Associate Justice Gabriel T. Robeniol and concurred in by Associate Justices Gabriel T. Ingles and Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap of the Eighteenth (18th) Division, Court of Appeals, Cebu City.
3.Id. at 287-289.
4.Id. at 113-125.
5.Id. at 136-137.
6.Id. at 70-82; Penned by Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Josephus A. Baterna of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.
7.Id. at 263.
8.Id.
9.Id. at 70.
10.Id.
11.Id.
12.Id.
13.Id. at 264.
14.Id.
15.Id. at 77.
16.Id. at 70-82.
17.Id. at 75.
18.Id. at 79-81.
19.Id. at 81-82.
20.Id. at 119-124.
21.Id. at 261-262.
22.Id. at 261-274.
23.Id. at 274.
24.Id. at 269.
25.Id. at 269-270.
26.Id. at 271.
27.Id. at 273.
28.Id. at 287-289.
29.Id. at 19.
30.Id. at 20-24.
31.Romero v. Sombrino, G.R. No. 241353, 22 January 2020 [Per J. Caguioa], citing Goyena v. Ledesma-Gustilo, 443 Phil. 150 (2003), G.R. No. 147148, 13 January 2003 [Per J. Carpio-Morales].
32.See Pascual v. Burgos, G.R. No. 171722, 11 January 2016 [Per J. Leonen].
33. Entitled "AN ACT TO GOVERN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN LANDHOLDERS AND TENANTS OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS (LEASEHOLDS AND SHARE TENANCY)," approved on 30 August 1954.
34.Romero v. Sombrino, supra at note 31.
35.Id.
36.Id.
37.Romero v. Sombrino, supra at note 31.
38.Quintos v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, 726 Phil. 366 (2014), G.R. No. 185838, 10 February 2014 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe], citing Soliman v. Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc., 607 Phil. 209 (2009), G.R. No. 169589, 16 June 2009 [Per J. Nachura]; See also J.V. Lagon Realty Corp. v. Heirs of Vda. De Terre, 834 Phil. 553 (2018), G.R. No. 219670, 27 June 2018 [Per J. Martires].
39.Quintos v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, id.
40.Id.
41.See Pagarigan v. Yague, 758 Phil. 375 (2015), G.R. No. 195203, 20 April 2015 [Per J. Brion]; See also Chico v. Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 800 (2000), G.R. No. 134735, 05 December 2000 [Per J. Vitug].
42.Rollo, p. 79.
43.Id. at 21-22, 269.
44.See Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 247 Phil. 398 (1988), G.R. No. 60287, 17 August 1988 [Per J. Gutierrez].
45.VHJ Construction and Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 480 Phil. 28 (2004), G.R. No. 128534, 13 August 2004 [Per J. Callejo, Sr.], citing Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, id.
46.See Landicho v. Sia, 596 Phil. 658 (2009), G.R. No. 169472, 20 January 2009 [Per J. Puno].
47.J.V. Lagon Realty Corp. v. Heirs of Vda. De Terre, 834 Phil. 553 (2018), G.R. No. 219670, 27 June 2018 [Per J. Martires], citing Landicho v. Sia, id.
48.See Bejasa v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 499 (2000), G.R. No. 108941, 06 July 2000 [Per J. Pardo].
49.See Macalanda, Jr. v. Acosta, 817 Phil. 869 (2017), G.R. No. 197718, 06 September 2017 [Per J. Tijam], citing Bejasa v. Court of Appeals, id.
50.Macalanda, Jr. v. Acosta, id.
51.Rollo, p. 80.
52.Macalanda, Jr. v. Acosta, supra at note 46.
53.Rollo, pp. 127, 271.
54.Id. at 267.
55. 720 Phil. 414 (2013), G.R. No. 184369, 23 October 2013 (Per J. Sereno].
56.Romero v. Sombrino, supra at note 31, citing Heirs of Quilo v. Development Bank of the Philippines-Dagupan Branch, id.
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "Tagbiliran" in the official document.
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "Euitiquio" in the official document.