THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-19-1923. September 4, 2019.][Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 17-2903-MTJ]
RAYMUNDO M. ACHACOSO, complainant, vs.PRESIDING JUDGE DANIEL JOSE J. GARCES, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT [MCTC], UBAY-PRESIDENT CARLOS P. GARCIA, UBAY, BOHOL, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 4, 2019, which reads as follows:
"A.M. No. MTJ-19-1923 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 17-2903-MTJ] (Raymundo M. Achacoso vs. Presiding Judge Daniel Jose J. Garces, Municipal Circuit Trial Court [MCTC], Ubay-President Carlos P. Garcia, Ubay, Bohol). — The Court NOTES the Report dated October 16, 2018 of the Office of the Court Administrator on the verified letter-complaint dated March 29, 2017 (with enclosures) of complainant Raymundo M. Achacoso against respondent Presiding Judge Daniel Jose J. Garces, MCTC, Ubay-President Carlos P. Garcia, Ubay, Bohol, for Grave Misconduct, in relation to Criminal Case Nos. 6821-11 and 6822-11, entitled People of the Philippines v. Lorgina Boiser, for violation of Republic Act No. 6085.
This administrative case stemmed from the verified Letter-Complaint 1 filed by complainant Raymundo M. Achacoso (Achacoso) against Presiding Judge Daniel Jose J. Garces (Judge Garces) of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Ubay-President Carlos P. Garcia, Ubay, Bohol, charging him with grave misconduct, in relation to Criminal Case Nos. 6821-11 and 6822-11, entitled People of the Philippines v. Lorgina Boiser.
Antecedents
Achacoso is the brother of Nimfa Achacoso Namuag (Namuag), the assassinated principal witness in Criminal Case Nos. 6821-11 and 6822-11, then pending before the sala of Judge Garces. He averred that Namuag was then legally assisted by Atty. Lord M. Marapao (Atty. Marapao). 2
On June 20, 2012, Atty. Marapao filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition, 3 requesting Judge Garces to inhibit himself from the proceedings of the cases. Consequently, Judge Garces issued an Order 4 dated July 20, 2012, which directed Atty. Oriculo A. Granada (Atty. Granada) to file comment on the motion within ten (10) days from receipt of the order. Thereafter, no order was issued by Judge Garces despite the lapse of time. 5
Meanwhile, on October 10, 2013, Namuag was killed. Atty. Marapao, thus, filed a Manifestation Re: Notice of Death/Motion, 6 informing the court that he could no longer prosecute the subject criminal cases due to the untimely death of his client. He believed, however, that the cases, being more public than private in nature, could still be prosecuted by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bohol based on the available records. 7
In an Order dated March 11, 2014, Judge Garces, upon motion of the accused, dismissed the criminal cases on the ground of lack of interest to prosecute. Atty. Marapao, however, claimed that Judge Garces' action was improper. He argued that the public prosecutor and other interested parties should have been given the chance to present their side. 8
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in the 1st Indorsement 9 dated April 25, 2017, required Judge Garces to submit his comment on the complaint.
In his Comment, 10 Judge Garces asserted that the criminal cases were validly dismissed. He pointed out that the order of dismissal was issued upon motion of the defense and with the acquiescence of the public prosecutor, who believed that he could not prosecute the case in the absence of the private complainant and other interested parties. 11 With respect to the resolution of the motion for voluntary inhibition, Judge Garces contended that in view of Atty. Marapao's withdrawal of appearance from the cases, he considered the motion moot and academic, and therefore, there was no necessity to take further action on the matter. 12
Findings and Recommendation of the OCA
In its Report 13 dated October 16, 2018, the OCA held that the issue on the propriety of the issuance of the order dismissing the criminal cases pertain to Judge Garces' exercise of his adjudicative functions and, hence, beyond the realm of administrative inquiry. Nonetheless, the OCA held that Judge Garces could be held administratively liable for his undue delay in resolving the motion for voluntary inhibition. The pertinent portions of the findings of the OCA state:
However, this Office cannot turn a blind eye on respondent Judge Garces' failure to promptly resolve the private prosecutor's Motion for Voluntary Inhibition. Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that judges must resolve all matters within three (3) months from the date of submission. A matter is deemed submitted for resolution upon the filing of the last pleading.
In this particular instance, respondent Judge Garces issued an Order dated 20 July 2012 directing the counsel for the accused to comment on Atty. Marapao's Motion for Voluntary Inhibition within ten (10) days from receipt of notice. The accused, however, did not file the required comment despite notice. Indubitably, respondent Judge Garces did not act on the motion until he issued the Order dated 11 March 2014 dismissing the subject criminal cases. In fine, he continued to handle the cases and left the motion seeking his inhibition unresolved for almost two (2) years before he ordered the dismissal of the cases. 14
Hence, the OCA recommended the following:
1.wxwxthe instant administrative complaint against respondent Presiding Judge Daniel Jose J. Garces, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Ubay-President Carlos P. Garcia, Ubay, Bohol, be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter; and
2.wxwxrespondent Judge Garces be found GUILTY of undue delay in resolving the prosecution's Motion for Voluntary Inhibition in Criminal Case Nos. 6821-11 and 6822-11 and be meted the penalty of REPRIMAND, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with severely. 15
On March 13, 2019, the Court resolved to re-docket the instant administrative complaint as a regular administrative matter. 16
Ruling of the Court
The Court agrees with the OCA that Judge Garces cannot be held administratively liable for the alleged wrongful issuance of the dismissal order dated March 11, 2014 as this pertains to the exercise of his adjudicative functions.
The Court adheres to the policy that the errors, if any, committed by a judge in the exercise of his judicial functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings. 17 Also, administrative complaints against judges and justices cannot, and should not, substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling. 18In this case, there was no showing that the prosecution questioned the dismissal order, either through a motion for reconsideration or an appeal before the higher court.
Even granting that Judge Garces erred in his order, the Court emphasizes that the judge cannot be subjected to liability — civil, criminal or administrative, for such judicial error, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 19
In the same vein, administrative liability will only attach upon proof that the actions of the judge were motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred, or attended by fraud, corruption, 20 or a deliberate intent to do an injustice on his part. 21 In the absence of a showing to the contrary, defective or erroneous decision or order is presumed to have been issued in good faith. 22
The Court finds that the foregoing considerations to hold Judge Garces administratively liable with respect to the issuance of the order of dismissal were not sufficiently established in the complaint. Significantly, Achacoso did not impute malice or bad faith on the part of Judge Garces; the latter was, therefore, presumed to have acted in good faith. Moreover, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the judgment or order is adverse to a party. 23
However, Judge Garces' failure to resolve the motion for voluntary inhibition is another matter that merits the imposition of administrative sanction against him. The Court, in Hebron v. Judge Garcia II, 24 ruled that:
Under Article VIII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that "[a]ll cases or matters filed after the effectivity of [the] Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the [SC], and, unless reduced by the [SC], twelve months for all collegiate courts, and three months for all other courts." In relation thereto, SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87 provides that "[j]udges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so." 25 (Emphases ours)
Thus, without having duly applied for any extension before the Court, Judge Garces was bound to resolve the pending incident in the said cases within the three-month period prescribed by the Constitution, which he failed to do. He, instead, ascribed his failure to resolve the motion to Atty. Marapao's withdrawal of appearance as private prosecutor. For Judge Garces, this rendered the issue moot and academic. 26
Judge Garces' arguments fail to persuade. The Order dated July 20, 2012 provides:
The Motion shows that counsel for the accused [Atty. Granada] was furnished a copy through registered mail dated June 18, 2012. To date, no comment has been received from him.
Counsel for the accused, Atty. Oriculo Granada is hereby directed to file his comments to the said motion for voluntary inhibition within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. Thereafter, with or without such comment, the Court will take appropriate action on the matter.
SO ORDERED. 27 (Emphasis ours)
Notably, accused's counsel, Atty. Granada received the foregoing order on August 6, 2012 per the registry return receipt card attached to the back portion of the order. 28 The accused, however, did not file comment despite notice. On the other hand, Atty. Marapao's request to be relieved as private prosecutor in the subject criminal cases was filed on October 21, 2013. 29 Evidently, more than one year had elapsed since the time when the motion should have been deemed submitted for resolution. Thus, Judge Garces' justification for his failure to resolve the motion has no merit.
The Court deems that when Judge Garces issued the Order dated July 20, 2012, he was aware of the mandate to expeditiously and promptly resolve pending incidents in cases before his sala. It is, however, incumbent upon him to resolve the same within the prescribed deadline.
In this respect, Judge Garces' failure to perform his judicial duty with reasonable promptness also contravenes the provisions of Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, to wit:
Section 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
Relatedly, the Court, in OCA v. Judge Casalan, 30 declared that judges must adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct in order to preserve the integrity, competence and independence of the Judiciary and make the administration of justice more efficient. The Court, likewise, emphasized the need to strictly observe this duty so as not to negate its efforts to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problem of congestion and delay that have long plagued the courts. 31
Moreover, if We were to accept Judge Garces' excuse, this would be tantamount to giving an imprimatur to the act of deferring resolution of a pending incident until an event supervenes that would render the issue moot. The Court, thus, cannot take delays lightly as this would be, in effect, an abject abandonment of every magistrate's sworn duty.
In light of the foregoing, the Court holds Judge Garces accountable for his actuation. Under Item No. 1, Section 9, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is a less serious charge punishable by either: (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one month nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00, but not exceeding P20,000.00. 32
Taking into account the prevailing facts of the present case, the Court, therefore, deems it appropriate to impose a fine of P10,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future would be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Presiding Judge Daniel Jose J. Garces, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Ubay-President Carlos P. Garcia, Ubay, Bohol, is found GUILTY of undue delay in resolving the prosecution's Motion for Voluntary Inhibition in Criminal Case Nos. 6821-11 and 6822-11, and is ORDERED to PAY a FINE of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with severely.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 1-11.
2.Id. at 2.
3.Id. at 12-17.
4.Id. at 18.
5.Id. at 3.
6.Id. at 19-23.
7.Id. at 39.
8.Id.
9. Signed by Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez, Deputy Court Administrator Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino and OCA Assistant Chief of the Legal Office James D.V. Navarrete; id. at 26.
10.Id. at 27-33.
11.Id. at 27-28.
12.Id. at 32.
13. Signed by Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez and Deputy Court Administrator Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino; id. at 39-43.
14.Id. at 42.
15.Id. at 43.
16.Id. at 46.
17.Re: Verified Complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against Justices Bueser, et al., of the Court of Appeals, 701 Phil. 462, 468 (2013).
18.Maylas, Jr. v. Judge Sese, 529 Phil. 594, 598 (2006).
19.Atty. Fernandez v. CA Justices Verzola, Villarama, Jr. and Guariña III, 480 Phil. 1, 6 (2004).
20.Re: Verified Complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against Justices Bueser, et al., of the Court of Appeals, supra note 17, at 469.
21.Planas v. Judge Reyes, 492 Phil. 288, 300 (2005).
22.Id.
23. Chua v. Judge Madrona, 742 Phil. 98, 109 (2014).
24. 698 Phil. 615 (2012).
25. Id. at 623.
26. Rollo, p. 32.
27. Id. at 18.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 31.
30. 785 Phil. 350 (2016).
31. Id. at 358.
32. See Item Nos. 1 and 2, Section 11 (B), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.