THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 243924. June 17, 2019.]
RODOLFO ACERO y PELAYO, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 17, 2019, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 243924 (Rodolfo Acero y Pelayo vs. People of the Philippines). — This Petition for Review filed by petitioner Rodolfo Acero y Pelayo (petitioner) under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to annul and set aside the Decision 1 dated April 30, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 39757 affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City.
Petitioner was charged in an Information dated February 25, 2013 with violation of the Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Law.
According to the Information, petitioner, with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner, private complainant Richard Martin Sison (Sison), took, stole and carried away the latter's black Honda XRM motorcycle with plate number 4795-GM at around 9:00 in the evening of February 21, 2013. The Information reads:
That on or about the 21st day of February 2013, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner[,] take, steal and carry away one (1) unit Honda XRM, color black with Plate No. 4795-GM of an undetermined value, belonging to Richard Martin Sison y Yngete, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party. 2
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the violation charged. Hence, trial on the merits ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented Sison as its lone witness. He testified that at around 9:00 in the evening of February 21, 2013, while he was smoking outside of his house around 10 meters away from his motorcycle, he saw someone passed by whom he ignored. Thereafter, he heard the sound of the revving of his motorcycle engine and saw the petitioner on his motorcycle driving it away. Sison chased the petitioner, but probably the latter had difficulty driving his motorcycle, hence, he left the same on the ground and ran. Sison continued to chase the petitioner and while doing so, he saw a barangay official whom he informed about what was going on. The barangay officials then chased the petitioner using the barangay mobile and were able to catch the latter.
For his part, petitioner denied the accusation that he took Sison's motorcycle. According to him, he was at that time in the area to have a drinking spree with his friend Leo. On his way home, he saw four (4) men passed by. According to petitioner, the men looked at him and then followed him. Hence, allegedly sensing that he would be in trouble with those men, petitioner decided to walk towards the barangay hall instead. However, when he arrived thereat, he was suddenly boxed on the cheek by Sison without him knowing the reason for such aggression. He was then brought to Camp Karingal for reasons unknown to him and was later charged with carnapping. 3
On January 9, 2017, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, rendered a Decision 4 finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of R.A. No. 6539. The RTC found the testimony of Sison candid, consistent and straightforward, and that Sison had no motive to implicate the accused besides holding him liable for taking his motorcycle. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding RODOLFO ACERO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of RA 6539 and he is sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
SO ORDERED. 5
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the CA. However, as stated at the outset, the CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated January 9, 2017 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81[,] is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the imposable penalty upon [petitioner] is an indeterminate penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum.
SO ORDERED. 6
Undaunted, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, but his motion was "denied for lack of merit" by the CA in its Resolution 7 of December 18, 2018.
Hence, petitioner is now before the Court with this petition assailing the decision and resolution of the CA, and arguing that the latter gravely erred when it affirmed the finding of conviction of the RTC. According to petitioner, the CA "made inferences that are manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible, and were based in misappreciation of facts." 8
Simply put, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is guilty of carnapping under R.A. No. 6539.
Petitioner strongly insists that he is not guilty of violation of R.A. No. 6539. He stands firm on his alibi that while he was at the area at that time, he was having a drinking spree with a certain Leo. He also questions the credibility of Sison as a witness by pointing out that the latter was not able to positively identify him as the one who took away his motorcycle. Petitioner also stresses that the essential element of ownership by another was not proved.
The Court does not agree.
First, it should be emphasized that petitioner was clearly and positively identified by Sison as the person who took his black Honda XRM motorcycle with plate number 4795-GM. In fact, Sison was able to describe the person who took the vehicle as wearing a T-shirt and shorts, and was carrying a sling bag, and that when the petitioner was brought to Camp Karingal, Sison also positively pointed to him as the offender.
Indeed, the petitioner's denial cannot overturn his conviction in light of Sison's positive testimony. It is consistently held that the positive identification of the accused, "when categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the mere denial of the appellant whose testimony is not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence." 9 In this case, petitioner's denial is a mere negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimonies of credible witnesses.
Moreover, petitioner's defense of denial has no leg to stand on as he was not even able to present "Leo" to corroborate his story that he was having a drinking spree with the latter at the time the offense was committed.
People v. Donio10 holds that:
x x x the uncorroborated alibi and denial of Donio must be brushed aside in light of the fact that the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained his identity. It is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony.
Second, the intent to gain on the part of the accused was already presumed from his unlawful taking of the motorcycle. The fact that he was not actually able to gain from it is irrelevant in carnapping as the important consideration in this case is the intent to gain or animus lucrandi, which is presumed from the time of unlawful taking. 11
Carnapping is defined under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-Carnapping Law, as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things."
The elements of carnapping are:
(1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. Essentially, carnapping is the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle. 12
Clearly, in this case, all the elements of carnapping are complete.
Third, the accused's assertion that private complainant is not the registered owner of the motorcycle does not deserve merit or consideration. As it is clear from the elements of carnapping provided above, in criminal prosecution for carnapping, the fact that the complainant is the absolute owner of the motor vehicle need not be established. What is simply required is that the motor vehicle that was taken does not belong to the accused.
And lastly, anent the modification in the penalty imposed upon the petitioner, the Court finds the CA correct in modifying the penalty imposed by the RTC.
R.A. No. 6539, which is the governing law at the time of the commission of the offense in this case, provides the penalties for carnapping, as follows:
Section 14. Penalty for Carnapping. — Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things. (Emphasis and underscoring Ours)
In this case, what clearly transcribed was only simple carnapping as the offense was not alleged nor shown to have been committed by means of violence. Hence, an indeterminate sentence of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum, was the proper imposable penalty instead of the straight penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months which the RTC imposed.
The CA opined:
We find that the RTC's imposition of a straight penalty of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months is therefore improper. When an offense is punished by a special law, such as RA No. 6539, the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that "the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum prescribed by the same." As echoed in a string cite, the appropriate penalty to be imposed in simple carnapping is an indeterminate sentence of fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum. 13
WHEREFORE, from the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Decision dated April 30, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 39757, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED." (HERNANDO, J., on official leave)
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justices Ramon A. Cruz and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodil V. Zalameda and Pablito A. Perez; rollo, pp. 30-38.
2.Id. at 31.
3.Id. at 61.
4.Id. at 60-63.
5.Id. at 63.
6.Id. at 38.
7.Id. at 43.
8.Id. at 16.
9.People v. Manicat, 722 Phil. 522, 526 (2013).
10. 806 Phil. 578, 599 (2017).
11.People v. Bustinera, 475 Phil. 190, 208 (2004).
12.People of the Philippines v. Renato Cariño y Gocong and Alvin Aquino y Ragam, G.R. No. 232624, July 9, 2018.
13.Rollo, p. 38.