FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 224980. September 22, 2020.]
EGVERR JONATHAN A. ABUTIN, petitioner,vs. D.M. CONSUNJI, INC., respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 22, 2020which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 224980 (Egverr Jonathan A. Abutin v. D.M. Consunji, Inc. Egverr Jonathan A. Abutin v. D.M. Consunji, Inc.). — For the Court's Resolution is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which petitioner Egverr Jonathan A. Abutin (Abutin) filed, assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated March 8, 2016, and its Resolution 2 dated June 7, 2016 in CA-G.R. SP No. 138822. The CA reversed the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 148 in Civil Case No. 14-437, which affirmed the February 20, 2014 Metropolitan Trial Court (METC) Judgment. 4
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
On April 18, 2007, petitioner, Egverr Jonathan A. Abutin (Abutin), an officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a Contract to Sell 5 (Contract) with D.M. Consunji, Inc. (DMCI). The said contract binds DMCI, as the developer of the condominium project, "Bonifacio Heights," to sell to the petitioner a condominium unit, Unit 417 Romblon (Q) Building (subject unit), with a total contract price of One Million One Hundred Thirteen Thousand Pesos (P1,113,000.00), which shall be paid in One Hundred Twenty (120) equal monthly amortizations of Sixteen Thousand Nine Hundred Thirteen Pesos and Thirty-Four Centavos (P16,913.34), excluding the reservation and down payment billing, from May 30, 2007 to April 30, 2017. The subject unit is a housing project for the officers of the AFP. Abutin is an officer of the AFP and therefore, he became eligible to partake in the housing project. On the other hand, DMCI is the developer-in-contract with the government, through Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF), to implement and extend the housing project to the officers of the AFP.
DMCI alleges that Abutin failed to comply with the stipulations of the Contract, having only paid nine (9) out of one hundred twenty (120) monthly amortizations, the last payment being on January 30, 2007. On February 6, 2013, DMCI, through counsel, executed a Notice of Cancellation/Rescission, 6 cancelling the sale of the subject unit after the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice without Abutin updating his accounts and paying the overdue amortizations within the given period. As the period lapsed without Abutin abiding by the notice, DMCI sent Abutin a letter dated March 22, 2013, demanding that the latter vacate and surrender the possession of the premises within five (5) days from receipt. According to DMCI, due to the continuous illegal and unlawful possession of the subject unit by Abutin, it sought legal recourse by filing a Complaint for Ejectment 7 on April 16, 2013 with the MeTC, praying that Abutin vacate the subject unit, restore its rightful possession to DMCI, and pay the latter reasonable monthly rent of Seventeen Thousand Pesos (P17,000.00) from the filing of the Complaint until such time that the possession is restored. On July 9, 2013, an Officer's Return, 8 narrating the several attempts and diligent efforts made to serve summons and a copy of the Complaint to Abutin, compelling a substituted service to be made.
On August 22, 2013, DMCI filed a Motion to Render Judgment 9 praying that the MeTC render judgment pursuant to the Rules on Summary Procedure and in view of the fact that Abutin has failed to file an Answer to the Complaint within the given ten (10) day period under the Rules. Thereafter, Abutin filed an Entry of Appearance as Counsel with Motion to Accept Answer 10 and attached Answer 11 both dated August 28, 2013.
Meanwhile, Abutin, on September 6, 2013, filed a Comment/Opposition on the Motion to Render Judgment, 12 arguing that the Motion to Render Judgment be denied, the same being moot and academic as an Answer was already filed and duly received by the MeTC. Abutin further claims that the MeTC accepted his justification that being an Army Officer and being assigned to different parts of the country, he was not in his residence at the time the summons was served.
Abutin on his Answer claimed that he was well within his right to remain in possession of the subject unit as he was religiously paying the monthly amortizations, as evidence by the deductions on his pay slips made to HDMF or Pag-IBIG. He argues that a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between HDMF and DMCI, wherein the former would provide a housing loan facility in order to assist qualified AFP officers to avail of the housing developed by DMCI. Abutin further insist that on June 5, 2010, he along with other loan facility recipients, wrote a letter to Pag-IBIG expressing concern that their agreement, to provide an in-house financing scheme while their loan application to HDMF was being processed, was not honored. It was soon discovered that DMCI allegedly failed to submit several documentary requirements to HDMF, which necessarily led to the former's disallowance in taking out the loan proceeds from the latter.
In consideration of the facts that case falls under the Rules on Summary Procedure, the MeTC granted DMCI's Motion to Render Judgment and denying Abutin's Motion to Accept Answer in an Order dated November 6, 2013. It further directed DMCI to submit other documentary evidence.
METC Ruling
On February 2014, the MeTC rendered a Decision 13 in favor of DMCI, ordering Abutin to vacate the subject unit and to pay the corresponding attorney's fees and cost of the suit. The dispositive portion of the Judgment states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant EGVERR JONATHAN A. ABUTIN and all other persons claiming rights under him to:
1. Vacate the Unit and surrender the possession thereof to plaintiff DMCI;
2. Pay TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php20,000.00) as attorney's fees; and
3. Pay the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED. 14
Aggrieved, Abutin appealed the Judgment, elevating the case to the RTC via Notice of Appeal with filing of a Supersedeas Bond. 15
RTC Ruling
After the submission of the parties' respective memoranda, the RTC, in a Decision 16 dated September 30, 2014, the RTC reversed and set aside the February 20, 2014 Judgment of the MeTC. The RTC was in the position that the circumstances surrounding the case justify the relaxation of the rules. In addition, the RTC ruled that the instant case does not involve an ordinary unlawful detainer case where there are only two parties involved. Here, there are three (3) persons and/or entities involved, HDMF, DMCI and Abutin who is a member of the AFP. Furthermore, the RTC is of the view that it is still premature for DMCI to resort to the unlawful detainer case considering that there are still issues that need to be resolved between DMCI, HDMF, and Abutin. For the RTC, it would be at the height of injustice if it allows the ejectment of the defendant-appellant when it is clear that deductions are consistently made in his salary for what he believes was in payment for his loan only to be later confronted with possible eviction for apparent non-payment of his amortization. Lastly, the RTC held that it must exercise its equity jurisdiction to bring light and ensure that no injustice is committed.
Unsatisfied with the Decision of the RTC, DMCI appealed the Decision, elevating the case to the CA via Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
CA Ruling
On appeal, the CA granted the Petition for Review of DMCI reversing and setting aside the Decision of the RTC and reinstating the Judgment of the MeTC. The appellate court rationated that it is clear from the records that DMCI is the owner and developer of Bonifacio Height Condominium and that last April 18, 2007, DMCI, as owner entered into a contract with Abutin, as buyer, for the sale of the subject unit for a total contract price of One Million One Hundred Thirteen Thousand Pesos (P1,113,000.00) payable in One Hundred Twenty (120) monthly installments. For the CA having failed to timely perform Abutin's obligation to pay the monthly installments, the last payment being made on January 29, 2007, there is a patent non-compliance with the provisions of the contract, thus making Abutin's possession of the subject unit patently unlawful. In addition, the CA held that all allegation in DMCI's complaint leaves no question that all the required jurisdictional averments of unlawful detainer have been complied with. There is no doubt that DMCI has adequately established its superior right to possess the subject unit, being the owner and developer thereof. Moreover, the CA was in the position that the RTC's reliance on its finding that action for unlawful detainer was prematurely instituted is highly misplaced. Limited to the issue of possession, contest and breaches to Contracts between other parties not privy to the Contract to Sell between DMCI and Abutin may be ventilated in another tribunal.
Unconvinced by the Decision of the CA, Abutin filed this instant petition.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority. 17
As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may be resorted to. 18 Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
In substituted service, it must be accompanied by a report indicating that the person who received the summons on behalf of the defendant was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence to ensure that the latter would actually receive the summons. Impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and that such efforts have failed. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character, hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. The statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective. 19
In the present case, the Officer's Return states that:
After several attempts made and diligent effort exerted by the undersigned to serve the copy of summons and complaint and all annexes attached thereto upon the defendant, issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Branch 67 in the above-entitled case as follows:
|
DATE AND TIME |
REASON FOR FAILURE |
|
June 17, 2013 at 11:15 a.m. |
out of their residence |
|
June 26, 2013 at 03:25 p.m. |
out of their residence |
The same cannot be served personally because the defendant is always out of their residence located at Unit 417 Romblon (Q) Bldg. of Bonifacio Height Condominium Fort Bonifacio Western Bicutan, Taguig City.
On July 8, 2013, substituted service was made by the undersigned the copy of summons and complaint was serve and tendered to a certain Dolores Clariño (mother-in-law-) a person residing thereat of sufficient age and discretion to receive the same, but she refused to sign, assuring the undersigned that it will be immediately forwarded to the defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
The above Return of Summons does not show or indicate the actual exertion or any positive steps taken by the officer or process server in serving the summons personally to the defendant. As in Jose v. Boyon, 20 this Court ruled that:
The Return of Summons shows no effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken by either the process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on respondents. At best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons.
Likewise, the process server should have established the impossibility of prompt personal service before he resorted to substituted service. Impossibility of prompt personal service is established by the process server's failure to personally serve the summons within a period of one (1) month. Within this period, he must have had at least three (3) attempts, on two (2) different dates, to personally serve the summons. Moreover, he or she must cite in the officer's return why these attempts are unsuccessful. Evident from the above officer's return, the process server only attempted to serve the summons twice contrary to what the rules provide. "Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted. 21
In addition, it is apparent from the officer's return that there is no statement as the relation of confidence between Abutin and his mother-in-law. It is also contained in the officer's return that Abutin's mother-in-law refused to sign the receipt of the summons which is a strong indication that she did not have the necessary "relation of confidence" with Abutin. Clearly, it was not shown that the mother-in-law who received the summons in behalf of the petitioner was authorized and possessed a relation of confidence that petitioner would definitely receive the summons. This is not the kind of service contemplated by law. Thus, service on the mother-in-law of the petitioner could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted service.
Although the petitioner did not question the jurisdiction of the MeTC at the earliest opportunity it is contained in his Affidavit of Merit 22 that there are irregularities in his receipt of the summons. It should also be considered that as an army officer, the petitioner frequently travels and is being assigned in different places for months most of the time. Guided by the following circumstances, MeTC should have admitted the Answer filed by Abutin. The Court has time and again upheld the theory that the rules of procedure are designed to secure and not to override substantial justice. These are mere tools to expedite the decision or resolution of cases, hence, their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must be avoided. 23 Thus, the MeTC, as correctly pointed out by the RTC, should have considered the Answer filed by Abutin in the interest of substantial justice.
For it is the policy of the Court to afford party-litigants the amplest opportunity to enable them to have their cases justly determined, free from the constraints of technicalities. It should be remembered that the rules of procedure are but tools to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when their rigid application tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. 24
The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice. 25
Given the peculiar circumstances extant in the case at bar, the CA's affirmation of the Decision of MeTC Branch 67 of Makati City, would result in the miscarriage of justice. Abutin was unjustly declared in default by the METC and deprived of the opportunity to present arguments and evidence to counter the Complaint of DMCI. Hence, this Court is accepting and giving due course to the Petition of Abutin in the interests of substantial justice and equity.
The averments contained in the arguments of Abutin obviously involve factual matters which he must back up with evidence. We cannot rule on the same since this Court nor the Court of Appeals is not a trier of facts. Consequently, it is only prudent that the case be remanded to the METC for further proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Consequently, the March 8, 2016 Decision and June 7, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 138822, reinstating the February 20, 2014 Decision of MeTC, Branch 67, Makati City in Civil Case No. 106463, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court which is DIRECTED to admit the Answer with Counterclaim of Egverr Jonathan A. Abutin and, accordingly, conduct further proceedings.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
by:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino, with Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles, concurring; rollo, pp. 249-260.
2.Rollo, pp. 241-248.
3.Id. at 383-389.
4.Id. at 337-343.
5.Id. at 45-59.
6.Id. at 390.
7.Id. at 38-62.
8.Id. at 393.
9.Id. at 395-402.
10.Id. at 71-74.
11.Id. at 75-121.
12.Id. at 395-398.
13.Id. at 490-493.
14.Id. at 493.
15.Id. at 485-493.
16.Id. at 241-248.
17.Chu v. Mach Asia Trading Corp., 707 Phil. 284, 293 (2013).
18.Id.
19.Id.
20. G.R. No. 147369, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA 216, 223-224.
21.Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, 530 Phil. 454, 477 (2006).
22.Rollo, pp. 482-483.
23.Malixi v. Baltazar, G.R. No. 208224, November 22, 2017.
24.Vette Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. Cheng, 539 Phil. 37, 52 (2006).
25.Spouses Leynes v. Court of Appeals, 655 Phil. 25, 51 (2011).