SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 255380. May 10, 2021.]
CESAR L. ABUEG, petitioner, vs.JULIANA SILVA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated10 May 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 255380 (Cesar L. Abueg vs. Juliana Silva). — Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Decision 1 dated December 20, 2019 and Resolution 2 dated December 11, 2020 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 158187. The CA dismissed petitioner Cesar L. Abueg's (Abueg) appeal from the Order 3 dated September 18, 2018 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 75 in Special Civil Action Case No. 2018-0-53, which dismissed Abueg's petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Said petition for certiorari ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Olongapo City, Branch 4 in rendering its Decision 4 dated March 27, 2018 in Civil Case No. 20-18-SCC (MTCC Decision), the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering [Abueg] to pay the plaintiff Juliana Silva the amount of [P]87,000.00 with 6% legal interest from finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO DECIDED. 5
In his petition before the Court, Abueg argues that the CA erred in holding that a petition for certiorari before the RTC is not a proper remedy to assail the MTCC Decision. He also reiterates that the MTCC committed grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded his defense of payment. He claims that the evidence he presented sufficiently proved that he fully paid the loan to Juliana Silva (Silva), which the latter failed to rebut. In particular, he asserts that P6,000.00 out of the P15,000.00 rental payments was applied to his loan with Silva, and the receipts presented by Silva for the payment of P6,500.00 on two separate occasions raises the presumption under Article 1176 6 of the Civil Code that prior installments have already been paid. 7
The petition has no merit.
Although a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 has been held to be a proper remedy to assail a judgment of the MTCC in a small claims case, 8 such petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment, and it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the MTCC Decision was tainted with jurisdictional errors. 9 On this score, the Court agrees with the CA that Abueg did not convincingly show that the MTCC committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving at its assailed Decision. A perusal of the petition for certiorari10 before the RTC shows that the grounds in support thereof are in fact imputations of errors of judgment for the factual findings arrived at in the MTCC Decision are allegedly contrary to the evidence adduced.
Moreover, Abueg's argument in his petition before this Court that he has sufficiently proved his claim of full payment raises questions of fact as it requires Us to review or evaluate the evidence presented. 11 As a rule, this Court's scope of review in Rule 45 petitions is limited to questions of law, 12 and the Court finds that none of the recognized exceptions 13 to this rule exist in this case.
As a general rule, the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. 14 The Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the uniform finding of the lower and appellate courts that Abueg did not sufficiently prove full payment of the loan to Silva, including his claim that part of his rental payments were intended to be applied to the payment of the loan. The receipts 15 of payment executed by Abueg dated April 27, 2017, May 28, 2017, October 28, 2017, and December 1, 2017, of P15,000.00, P15,000.00, P15,000.00, and P10,000.00, respectively, all state that said amounts were for the payment of house rentals for the periods April 17-May 27, 2017, May 28-June 28, 2017, September 28, 2017, and November 28-December 28, 2017, respectively. Neither does this Court find merit in Abueg's argument that the receipts presented by Silva for the payment of P6,500.00 on two (2) separate occasions raise the presumption that prior installments have already been paid. Other than the fact that such payments were made, there is no indication that such payments were indeed for later installments, and that Silva made no reservation as to prior installments — the basic facts that must be established in order for the presumption to arise.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED." (J. Lopez, J., designated additional member per Special Order No. 2822 dated April 7, 2021.)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, with Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Louis P. Acosta, concurring; rollo, pp. 47-54.
2.Id. at 56-57.
3. Penned by Judge Raymond C. Viray; id. at 86-89.
4. Penned by Presiding Judge Esmeralda B. David; id. at 82-85.
5.Id. at 85.
6.Article 1176. The receipt of the principal by the creditor without reservation with respect to the interest, shall give rise to the presumption that said interest has been paid.
The receipt of a later installment of a debt without reservation as to prior installments, shall likewise raise the presumption that such installments have been paid. (1110a)
7.Rollo, p. 36.
8. See A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Mondejar, 725 Phil. 288 (2014).
9.A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Mondejar, id. at 296.
10.Rollo, pp. 58-63.
11. "[T]he test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact." (Leoncio v. De Vera, 569 Phil. 512, 516 [2008], citing Binay v. Odeña, 551 Phil. 681, 689 [2007].)
12. See Section 1 of Rule 45, RULES OF COURT.
13. (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion. (See footnote 9 in Leoncio v. De Vera, supra at 517.)
14. See Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Spouses Royeca, 581 Phil. 188, 195 (2008) citing Jimenez v. NLRC, 326 Phil. 89, 95 (1996).
15.Rollo, p. 77.