Abigail's General Merchandise v. Dela Cruz

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 237478. November 28, 2018.]

ABIGAIL'S GENERAL MERCHANDISE/AMELIA MOJICA, petitioners, vs.RAMON G. DELA CRUZ, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated November 28, 2018, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 237478 — (Abigail's General Merchandise/Amelia Mojica, petitionersv. Ramon G. Dela Cruz, respondent). — When employees are indefinitely suspended and allowed to look for another job, they are considered to have been dismissed from work.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 praying that the Court of Appeals July 26, 2017 Decision 2 and February 12, 2018 Resolution 3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 145907 be reversed and set aside. 4 The Court of Appeals affirmed the March 31, 2016 Decision 5 of the National Labor Relations Commission, 6 which in turn affirmed the October 28, 2015 Decision 7 of the Labor Arbiter. 8 All three (3) tribunals held that Ramon G. Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) was illegally dismissed.

Abigail's General Merchandise (Abigail's Merchandise), owned by Amelia Mojica (Mojica), is a local enterprise engaged in delivering and distributing raw materials in Luzon. 9

Abigail's Merchandise hired Dela Cruz as a truck driver on June 24, 2013. On January 3, 2015, Dela Cruz was dismissed from work, prompting him to file an Illegal Dismissal Complaint against Abigail's Merchandise and Mojica (Abigail's Merchandise, et al.) before the National Labor Relations Commission. 10

Dela Cruz alleged that he worked daily from 8:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., but when required, would extend work until 2:00 p.m. On a monthly average of 16 trips, he would be paid P1,000.00 each. 11

Dela Cruz narrated that he figured in two (2) vehicular accidents the month before his dismissal. 12 The first was on December 2, 2014, when the truck he was driving accidentally sideswiped the foot of a pedestrian named Rodolfo O. Llantada. 13 The second was on December 14, 2014, when his truck accidentally sideswiped the front left side of a Toyota Corolla. 14 He stated that he "acted with caution and [the incidents] happened accidentally without malice and deliberate negligence on his part." 15 ISHCcT

Dela Cruz claimed that since the second accident, Abigail's Merchandise, et al., no longer allowed him to drive for them. On January 3, 2015, Dela Cruz asked Mojica through a text message if he was already dismissed from work so he could look for another job. Mojica, in her reply, allowed him to apply for another work. 16

Dela Cruz claimed that he was illegally dismissed without just cause. He added that he only received P2,000.00 and P3,000.00 as 13th month pay in 2013 and 2014, respectively. Abigail's Merchandise, et al., also failed to give him his service incentive leave. 17

On the other hand, Abigail's Merchandise, et al., stated that Dela Cruz's monthly salary was P11,638.00, not P16,000.00. Denying his illegal dismissal, they contended that they merely exercised their management prerogative when they allowed him to rest after the accidents. They admitted, however, that Mojica permitted Dela Cruz to find another job. 18

Abigail's Merchandise, et al., likewise asserted that they gave Dela Cruz his 13th month pay or its equivalent when he attended their Christmas Party in December 2014. 19

In her October 28, 2015 Decision, 20 Labor Arbiter Danna M. Castillon (Labor Arbiter Castillon) found that Dela Cruz's dismissal was illegal. 21 She held that his dismissal was sufficiently established:

This Office finds the argument of the complainant credible for in the first place[,] if he is no longer interested to work with the respondent as driver[,] he would not have filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. There [is] no substantial evidence to support the claim of the respondents that there was no dismissal in this case and it is consistent with human experience that no employee would challenge his dismissal if he was not dismiss[ed] at all. 22

Labor Arbiter Castillon held that Dela Cruz was liable only for simple imprudence. His liability cannot be considered gross and habitual, which could have been a just cause for terminating his employment. In dismissing him, Abigail's Merchandise, et al., also failed to comply with procedural due process. 23

Labor Arbiter Castillon ordered Abigail's Merchandise to pay Dela Cruz full backwages and separation pay in lieu of his reinstatement. 24 The dispositive portion of her Decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Abigail's General Merchandise is guilty of illegally dismissing complainant. Consequently, it is ordered to pay complainant his separation pay with full backwages in the total amount of P202,386.67.

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.25 (Emphasis in the original)

Abigail's Merchandise, et al., appealed the case before the National Labor Relations Commission. 26

In its March 31, 2016 Decision, 27 the National Labor Relations Commission affirmed with modification the Decision rendered by Labor Arbiter Castillon. The National Labor Relations Commission affirmed her finding of illegal dismissal but deducted P3,000.00 from the judgment award as it was received by Dela Cruz as 13th month pay. 28 CAacTH

The dispositive portion of its Decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is DENIED and the Decision dated October 28, 2015 is AFFIRMED subject to modification in that the P3,000.00 received by complainant as 13th month pay must be deducted from the judgment award.

SO ORDERED. 29 (Emphasis in the original)

Abigail's Merchandise, et al., filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari against the Sixth Division of the National Labor Relations Commission and Dela Cruz, praying that the National Labor Relations Commission Decision be declared null. 30

In its July 26, 2017 Decision, 31 the Court of Appeals affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission Decision and dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. 32 It pointed out that the petition was premature since they failed to file a motion for reconsideration, "an indispensable procedural requirement." 33

The Court of Appeals further held that even if it ruled on the merits of the case, the Petition for Certiorari would still be dismissed because Abigail's Merchandise, et al., did not comply with procedural and substantive due process requirements in dismissing Dela Cruz: 34

It is not disputed that three [3] weeks after his suspension, [Dela Cruz has] not received any update on the status of his employment with [Abigail's Merchandise], prompting him to ask Mojica through text message if he was already dismissed, so that he could start looking for another job, to which Mojica replied in the affirmative. Her straightforward acquiescence to [Dela Cruz's] suggestion directly shows that [Abigail's Merchandise, et al.] have no more use of his services and that his termination was imminent[;] otherwise, they would have just lifted his suspension and ordered his immediate reinstatement.

Indeed, to say that [Dela Cruz] is still employed with the company but telling him to look for work elsewhere is an oxymoron that We simply cannot subscribe to in principle. Neither can we subscribe to the defense that [Dela Cruz] was not invited back into the fold because the trucks he was assigned to are still under repair. We note that the accidents in which he was involved did not cause severe damage to the vehicles. If repairs were actually made, the process of restoring superficial damage should not take more than a few hours. 35

The Court of Appeals held that its finding of non-compliance with due process was further bolstered when Abigail's Merchandise, et al., failed to conduct their own investigation to determine if it was really Dela Cruz who was negligent in the two (2) accidents. 36 The dispositive portion of its Decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated March 31, 2016 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 37 (Emphasis in the original)

Abigail's Merchandise, et al., moved for reconsideration, which was denied in the Court of Appeals February 12, 2018 Resolution. 38

Thus, Abigail's Merchandise, et al., filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari39 against Dela Cruz. They insist that respondent was not dismissed. 40 In allowing him to rest, they merely exercised their management prerogative "to avoid more accidents and while the truck assigned to him is still being repaired." 41 They argue that it was a necessary recourse made in good faith to prevent injury to petitioners and "to minimize damage pending settlement to accident victims." 42 IAETDc

Petitioners emphasize that it was respondent who asked them if he could look for a job. 43 They claim that petitioner Mojica's reply of "BAHALA KA"44 (up to you) only meant that she did not oppose his plan to look for work, and should not be equated to an outright dismissal. Moreover, she consented only to accommodate respondent's request so he could earn additional income. Petitioners allege that respondent only filed the Illegal Dismissal Complaint when he was unable to find another job. 45

Petitioners add that the accidents were serious, which caused them to lose a large amount of money for settlement. Since respondent committed gross negligence, they were justified in letting him go. 46

Finally, petitioners aver that they are exempted from filing a motion for reconsideration before the National Labor Relations Commission since "the questions raised in the [C]ertiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the [National Labor Relations Commission]." 47

In his Comment, 48 respondent maintains that he was illegally dismissed when he was "directed to look for another work[.]" 49 He reiterates that he was prevented from driving ever since the incidents. Three (3) weeks after, he inquired with petitioners about his employment status. 50 Petitioner Mojica's answer that he can look for another job "created the impression that employment has been severed." 51

Respondent points out that petitioners failed to substantiate their claim that the truck was under repair. Moreover, this argument was "raised for the first time only before the Court of Appeals," 52 and was never mentioned in any of petitioners' earlier pleadings. 53

Respondent adds that if he was not dismissed or there was no intention to dismiss him, then petitioners should have stated that respondent's Complaint was the result of a mere misunderstanding. However, petitioners never offered to reinstate him as a truck driver. They were even firm that they will not enter into any settlement with him. 54

Respondent contends that petitioners cannot claim that they merely exercised management prerogative. He avers that petitioners failed to comply with the required procedure before an employer can validly suspend or dismiss an employee. 55

Respondent also asserts that he was not guilty of gross negligence. 56 Petitioners' Initial Investigation Reports on the two (2) incidents did not mention that respondent "thoughtlessly disregarded the consequences of his actions." 57 He explains that the December 2, 2014 accident was caused by a pedestrian's negligence, while the December 14, 2014 accident was caused by the other vehicle's driver. He emphasizes that he exercised care and caution in both instances. 58 He also notes that the Initial Investigation Reports, which petitioners relied on, did not even mention "who was at fault." 59

Respondent likewise argues that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the Petition for Certiorari since petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration. He also alleges that petitioners did not attach material pleadings in their Petition before this Court, which raises only questions of fact. 60

Finally, respondent insists that the National Labor Relations Commission did not err in granting him separation pay and 13th month pay. 61

This Court resolves the sole issue of whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed.

Before going to the merits of the case, this Court notes that petitioners admitted to not filing a motion for reconsideration of the National Labor Relations Commission Decision, arguing that they were exempted because: DcHSEa

(a) The questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court, and (b) [u]nder the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless, as when it would raise the same points. Clearly, the filing of a motion for reconsideration would have served no purpose. 62 (Citations omitted)

Petitioners are mistaken.

This Court has repeatedly explained that a motion for reconsideration is "indispensable for it affords the [National Labor Relations Commission] an opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it might have committed before resort to the courts can be had." 63

In Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 64 this Court has elaborately discussed the importance of filing a motion for reconsideration:

The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is indispensable before resort to the special civil action for certiorari to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its error, if any. The rule is well-settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari, subject to certain exceptions. Thus, in Abraham v. NLRC, the Court ruled:

"Generally, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent tribunal to allow it an opportunity to correct its imputed errors. However, the following have been recognized as exceptions to the rule:

(a) where the order is a patent of nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;

(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;

(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;

(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;

(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;

(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;

(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;

(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and

(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved."

In Seagull Shipmanagement and Transport, Inc. v. NLRC, we ruled: SCaITA

". . . . The law intends to afford the tribunal, board or office, an opportunity to rectify the errors and mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice can be had. However, in the case at bar, petitioners had not only failed to explain its failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC, it has also failed to show sufficient justification for dispensing with the requirement. Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences of petitioners' own omission to file the required motion for reconsideration."

xxx xxx xxx

Certiorari is not a shield from the adverse consequences of an omission to file the required motion for reconsideration. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals in its decision, petitioners may not arrogate to themselves the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. In Zapata v. NLRC, this Court held:

"Petitioner cannot, on its bare and self-serving representation that reconsideration is unnecessary, unilaterally disregard what the law requires and deny respondent NLRC its right to review its pronouncements before being hailed to court to account therefor. On policy considerations, such prerequisite would provide an expeditious termination to labor disputes and assist in the decongestion of court dockets by obviating improvident and unnecessary recourse to judicial proceedings. The present case exemplifies the very contingency sought to be, and which could have been, avoided by the observance of said rules."

The plain and adequate remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the court or agency to rectify its mistakes without the intervention of a higher court. To dispense with this requirement, there must be a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for the failure to comply with the requirement. 65 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

In this case, petitioners failed to justify why they did not file a prior motion for reconsideration. They were not able to sufficiently show that their case falls under any of the exceptions in Abraham v. National Labor Relations Commission. 66

On the case's merits, petitioners argue that respondent was not dismissed. Under their management prerogative, he was merely allowed to rest.

This a question of fact improper in a petition for review on certiorari. 67 This Court will not disturb the findings of fact of the labor tribunals, more so if affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 68

Nonetheless, this Court finds that respondent was constructively dismissed. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners forced him to take a leave. If respondent was indeed "merely allowed to rest," 69 petitioners should have informed him of its duration. This way, it would be clear for him that he was still under the employ of petitioners despite being prohibited to work. Moreover, respondent should have still received his salary during his rest or forced leave, since it is uncertain if it is with or without pay. Petitioners should have also forbidden him to look for another job as he was technically still in their payroll. Finally, petitioners' adamant refusal to settle shows that they did not intend to continue respondent's employment. These circumstances lead to no other conclusion but to the illegality of respondent's dismissal.

Time and again, this Court has recognized the right of employers "to control and manage their enterprise effectively," 70 which includes the imposition of appropriate sanctions to erring employees. However, management prerogative should not be exercised arbitrarily. In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Dawal, et al.: 71

Management prerogative is not unbridled and limitless. Nor is it beyond this [C]ourt's scrutiny. Where abusive and oppressive, the alleged business decision must be tempered to safeguard the constitutional guarantee of providing "full protection to labor[.]" Management prerogative cannot justify violation of law or the pursuit of any arbitrary or malicious motive. 72 (Citations omitted) aTHCSE

All told, petitioners failed to show any cogent reason for this Court to reverse the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals July 26, 2017 Decision and February 12, 2018 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 145907 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED." (Peralta, J., on official business.)

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-22.

2.Id. at 28-34-B. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela of the Second Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.

3.Id. at 23-27. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela of the Former Second Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.

4.Id. at 17.

5.Id. at 77-86. The Decision, in the case docketed as NLRC LAC No. 01-000180-16, was penned by Commissioner Isabel G. Panganiban-Ortiguerra and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Joseph Gerard E. Mabilog and Commissioner Nieves E. Vivar-De Castro of the Sixth Division of the National Labor Relations Commission, Quezon City.

6.Id. at 34.

7.Id. at 57-61. The Decision, in the case docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB IV-02-00207-15-B, was penned by Labor Arbiter Danna M. Castillon of the National Labor Relations Commission Regional Arbitration Branch No. IV, Calamba City.

8.Id. at 85.

9.Id. at 28 and 58.

10.Id. at 28-29.

11.Id. at 29.

12.Id. at 58.

13.Id. at 143, Lipa Police Station Initial Investigation Report dated December 2, 2014.

14.Id. at 144, Lipa Police Station Initial Investigation Report dated December 14, 2014.

15.Id. at 58.

16.Id. at 29.

17.Id. at 58.

18.Id. at 29 and 58-59.

19.Id. at 29 and 59.

20.Id. at 57-61.

21.Id. at 61.

22.Id. at 59.

23.Id. at 59-60.

24.Id. at 60-61.

25.Id. at 61.

26.Id. at 77.

27.Id. at 77-86.

28.Id. at 82-85.

29.Id. at 85.

30.Id. at 28.

31.Id. at 28-35.

32.Id. at 34.

33. Id. at 30-31.

34. Id. at 31-34.

35. Id. at 33.

36. Id. at 33-34.

37. Id. at 34.

38. Id. at 23-27.

39. Id. at 3-22.

40. Id. at 8-12.

41. Id. at 9.

42. Id. at 10.

43. Id. at 11.

44. Id. at 12.

45. Id. at 11-12.

46. Id. at 13-15.

47. Id. at 15.

48. Id. at 161-186.

49. Id. at 174.

50. Id.

51. Id. at 175.

52. Id. at 176.

53. Id.

54. Id. at 176-177.

55. Id. at 177-180.

56. Id. at 180-183.

57. Id. at 182.

58. Id. at 182-183.

59. Id. at 183.

60. Id. at 166-172.

61. Id. at 166-172.

62. Id. at 17.

63. Lagera v. National Labor Relations Commission, 385 Phil. 1087, 1091 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]. See Building Care Corp. v. NLRC, 335 Phil. 1131, 1137-1138 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division] and S/G Luna v. NLRC, 336 Phil. 963, 969 (1997) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].

64. 440 Phil. 743 (2002) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].

65. Id. at 751-753.

66. 406 Phil. 310, 316 (2001) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].

67. DST Movers Corp. v. People's General Insurance Corp., 778 Phil. 235, 244-246 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

68. Monana v. MEC Global Shipmanagement and Manning Corporation, et al., 746 Phil. 736, 749 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

69. Rollo, p. 8.

70. Mendoza v. Rural Bank of Lucban, 477 Phil. 902, 915 (2004) [Per J. Panganiban, First Division]; Philamlife v. Gramaje, 484 Phil. 880, 894 (2004) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].

71. 781 Phil. 474 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].

72. Id. at 501.