SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 203387. March 4, 2013.]
MARK LALLY ABAPO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 04 March 2013 which reads as follows:
G.R. No. 203387 (Mark Lally Abapo v. People of the Philippines). — For resolution is the motion for reconsideration 1 of the Minute Resolution 2 dated November 21, 2012 filed by Mark Lally Abapo (petitioner). The petitioner questions the denial by the Court of the petition to review his conviction for robbery under Article 299 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The petitioner asserts that his conviction was erroneous as it was based on hearsay evidence. The petitioner also insists that the Court of Appeals (CA) overlooked the pieces of evidence clearly showing his invalid warrantless arrest and that violations of his constitutional rights were committed by the police during the custodial investigation.
We deny the motion for the following reasons:
First, the matter of the alleged violation of the petitioner's constitutional rights was raised for the first time on the motion for reconsideration before the CA. "[J]urisprudence precludes raising an issue only for the first time on appeal . . . . [W]ith more reason should such issue be disallowed or disregarded when initially raised only in a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court." 3
We note that a Rule 45 review is different from an appeal filed under Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. It is the latter appeal that opens the entire case for review and where the Court may resolve issues not raised before the lower courts. ETDaIC
Second, the appreciation of the evidence is a factual issue inappropriate in a Rule 45 review. We previously held that "[t]here is a question of law . . . when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts." 4 In the strictest sense, there is a question of law when the issue for review only assails the conclusion drawn from the established facts and the presented evidence.
The petitioner's arguments require the Court to make its own examination of the probative value of the pieces of evidence (i.e., the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the admissibility of the pawnshop tickets) adduced before the lower courts. Unless exceptional circumstances exist however, the factual findings of trial courts, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive to the Court. 5 In this case, we do not see and the petitioner has not shown any exceptional reason to warrant a deviation from the rule.
Notably, there was sufficient evidence to support the petitioner's conviction even without considering the pawnshop tickets, which the petitioner claims to be inadmissible evidence. The records show that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were based from their own personal knowledge. The records also show that no ill motive was established to discredit the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Third, the circumstantial evidence adduced sufficiently supports the petitioner's conviction for robbery. The elements of robbery with force upon things are: "1) there is a taking of personal property; 2) the personal property belongs to another; 3) the taking is with animus lucrandi; and 4) the taking is with violence against or intimidation of persons or with force upon things." 6 All these elements of the crime and the identity of the petitioner as its perpetrator were duly established by circumstantial evidence. The CA's findings show that —
1. On April 23, 2005, while complainant was at the port of Masbate City waiting to get a ride to Legaspi City, accused-appellant asked her whether she was really going to Legaspi City, and she answered yes;
2. In the morning of August 24, 2005, accused-appellant approached Jancel, and requested if he could pawn some pieces of jewelry belonging to his mother. Jancel agreed and they went to Cebuana Lhuiller . . . to pawn the pieces of jewelry[;]
3. [The security of the pawnshop] corroborated Jancel's testimony. He stated that he saw Jancel and accused-appellant heading towards Cebuana Lhuiller. Only Jancel entered the pawnshop to pawn pieces of [jewelry], while accused-appellant was waiting outside the pawnshop. When Jancel received the loan amount, he handed it to accused-appellant and the two left the pawnshop; DCSETa
4. Accused-appellant left Masbate City after pawning the pieces of jewelry.
5. When [the private complainant] returned on April 24, 2005, she found that her house was ransacked. Three (3) pieces of glass of the windowpanes were detached: [The private complainant's] luggage bag, where she kept her pieces of jewelry, was forcibly opened. Her earrings, fifteen (15) pieces of assorted jewelry and P4,000.00 cash, were all missing;
6. The four pawnshop tickets covering the pieces of . . . jewelry were found in one of accused-appellant's shoes;
7. Upon verification by [the private complainant] from Cebuana Lhuiller, she confirmed that the pieces of jewelry covered by the pawn tickets are the same pieces of jewelry that were lost as a result of the robbery; and
8. When accused-appellant returned to Masbate City, and confronted by [the private complainant], she handed the four (4) pawnshop tickets. Accused-appellant was asked how he came into possession of the said tickets, but he failed to provide satisfactory explanation. 7
Lastly, the ruling of the Court in People v. Bautista, etc., et al., 8 relied on by the petitioner, is inapplicable; its factual milieu differs from the facts of the present case.
ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 94-119.
2. Id. at 93.
3. Titan Construction Corporation v. David, Sr., G.R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010, 615 SCRA 362, 378.
4. Soriente v. Estate of the Late Arsenio E. Concepcion, G.R. No. 160239, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 315, 325, citing Ramos, et al. v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Phils., et al., 125 Phil. 701, 705 (1967). Emphasis ours.
5. Titan Construction Corporation v. David, Sr., supra note 3, at 373.
6. Consulta v. People, G.R. No. 179462, February 12, 2009, 578 SCRA 648, 654.
7. Rollo, pp. 61-63; citations omitted.
8. 192 Phil. 234 (1981).